The modulation of attention bias modification using transcranial electrical stimulation by Pretorius, Sara
 
DOCTORAL THESIS







Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 04. Feb. 2021





Sara Heidi Pretorius, BA, MSc 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of PhD 
 
Department of Psychology 
 







Attention bias towards threat is implicated in the development, aetiology and 
maintenance of anxiety.  Attention bias modification (ABM) is a cognitive training 
task which has been seen to manipulate the direction and magnitude of attention 
biases.  ABM training to reduce threat bias has been effective in reducing anxiety.  
Transcranial electrical stimulation (tES) is a form of non-invasive brain stimulation 
which is known to modulate the effects of cognitive training.  In the present 
research, two studies investigated the modulation of ABM with tES.  In study 1, 
172 participants (137 female) received transcranial random noise stimulation 
(tRNS) of the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), anodal transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) or 
sham tES delivered concurrently with active, control or no-training ABM across 
three consecutive days to assess the effect on attention bias and state anxiety.  
State anxiety was reduced across participants irrespective of ABM or tES group.  
Threat bias was reduced for participants with a pre-existing threat bias and 
neutral bias was reduced for participants with a pre-existing neutral bias. In study 
2, 39 participants (27 female) received ABM with anodal or sham tDCS of the left 
DLPFC during one session. As well as recording reaction times from the attention 
bias task, the N2pc component was measured as an electrophysiological indicator 
of attentional selection.  The digit span task measured attentional control.  State 
anxiety increased following ABM with sham (but not anodal) tDCS.  N2pc suggested 
no modulation of ABM with anodal tDCS but reaction time data revealed reduced 
threat bias for participants with a pre-existing threat bias who received anodal 
(but not sham) tDCS.  Digit span score was increased only for low trait anxious 
participants who received anodal tDCS.  Overall, there was no evidence of superior 
ii 
 
reductions in threat bias and anxiety for active ABM relative to non-active ABM or 
the enhancement of ABM effects with tES.  Instead, findings suggested that, for 
each experiment, outcomes were determined by the interaction of pre-existing 
cognitive and neural state with task and tES-induced frontal cortex facilitation.  
Where ABM sufficiently enhanced frontal mechanisms associated with top-down 
control this resulted in down-regulation of emotional response to anxiety evoking 
stimuli and its aversive influence on attentional processes.  Where training 
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Speilberger et al. (1983) termed the 20th century the “age of anxiety”.  It was an 
era in which an increasing amount of work to conceptualise and research anxiety 
was motivated by a growing awareness of its pervasive and debilitating nature 
(Speilberger et al., 1983).  Anxiety is an emotional and physiological state 
evolving from primal and automatic responses to perceived danger with the aim 
of promoting safety and survival (Beck, Steer & Brown 1996).  Historically, such 
a response signalled the need to interrupt the task at hand and to prepare an 
‘escape’ or ‘confront’ reaction (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Bishop, 2007).  The 
cognitive and physiological experiences associated with this signal are 
encapsulated in the modern characterisation of anxiety as “fear, worry and 
unease” in response to internal or external threats (Tian et al., 2016) or 
threatening circumstances (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).  Crucially, anxiety is a risk 
factor for both psychological disorder and physical illness (Tian et al., 2016; Yin 
et al. 2016).   
 
1.1.1  Trait and State Anxiety 
 
In 1983, an inventory was published to measure anxiety which comprised two 
scales (Speilberger et al., 1983).  Each was designed to assess one of the two 
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related but distinct constructs of anxiety.  These were trait anxiety and state 
anxiety.  The trait anxiety inventory measures the tendency to experience 
negative affect such as fear, apprehension and tension across situations (Barnes, 
Harp & Jung, 2002).  Trait anxiety is stable over time and situations (Leal et al., 
2017).  The highly trait anxious individual may consistently experience and 
report negative feelings along with associated physiological symptoms (Gidron, 
2013) and be prone to perceiving mildly aversive events as dangerous or 
threatening (Spielberger et al., 1983).  State anxiety refers to the level of 
tension, apprehension, nervousness and worry presently experienced (Eysenck, 
Santos, Derakshan & Calvo, 2007) and fluctuates as a factor of situational 
stressors (Barnes et al, 2002).  Trait and state anxiety interact, with highly trait 
anxious individuals often experiencing state anxiety in circumstances which 
would not evoke state anxiety in low-trait-anxious individuals (Spielberger, 
1972).   
 
Anxiety is an adaptive phenomenon often necessary to protect an individual 
from harm and higher levels of state and trait anxiety are not necessarily of 
clinical concern (Steimer, 2002).  Excessive anxiety may however be maladaptive 
and, in some circumstances represent an early warning or predisposition for 
anxiety disorder (Reidy & Richards, 1997). 
 
1.1.2  Anxiety Disorders 
 
Anxiety disorders are some of the most prevalent mental disorders (Craske & 
Zucker, 2002; MacDonald & Feifel, 2014) with an estimated 25% of adults 
experiencing an anxiety disorder across their lifetime (Angulo et al., 2017; 
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Bishop, 2007; Hill, Waite & Cresswell, 2016).  Anxiety disorders may result in 
poor psychosocial functioning, mental and physical health, relationships and 
quality of life.  There is a high rate of comorbidity with disorders such as major 
depressive disorder (MDD) and substance abuse (Angulo et al. 2017).  Anxiety 
disorders are associated with excessive fear, worry and avoidance of perceived 
threat, largely due to a tendency to over-estimate its value (MacDonald & Feifel, 
2014).  The clinically anxious individual may also underestimate their own ability 
to cope with the threat (Beck et al. 1997).  Associated physiological symptoms 
include increased heart rate, fast, shallow breathing, stomach or chest pain and 
sweating (Hill et al., 2016) and, in the long term, adverse impact upon 
cardiovascular health and mortality (Kizilcik et al., 2016).  The economic burden 
of anxiety disorders is considerable with the cost to the UK in 2013 estimated at 
€11,687 million (Fineberg et al., 2013).   There are also costs related to 
impaired workplace performance (Kizilcik et al., 2016).  Of the ten anxiety 
disorders listed in the DSM-5 (Hill et al., 2016) generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) are amongst the most prevalent 
(Counsell et al., 2017).   
 
1.1.2.1  Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
 
GAD is common, disabling and hard to treat (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). The 
disorder is characterised by extreme worry in daily life (Craske & Stein, 2016) 
which is difficult to control (Counsell et al., 2017).  Often the worry and anxiety 
are not attached to a trigger or stimulus but are persistent (Tyrer & Balwin, 
2006).  Symptoms may include restlessness, psychological and muscular tension, 
nervousness, poor concentration, irritability, sleep problems (Craske & Stein, 
4 
 
2016), palpitations, sweating and dry mouth (Tyrer & Baldwin, 2016).  First line 
treatment for GAD is psychological therapy such as cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) or drug treatment (Tyrer & Baldwin, 2016).  The most recent clinical 
guideline for the pharmacological treatment of GAD recommends treatment with 
a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) such as Sertraline in the first 
instance (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence [NICE], 2011).  
However, symptoms persist in 50% or more of the patients who undertake CBT 
and up to 50% of GAD patients who use pharmaceuticals report no improvement 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2017) 
 
1.1.2.2  Social Anxiety Disorder 
 
Social anxiety disorder is characterised by fear related to social events and 
scenarios.  Specific fears are over social embarrassment, (Kizilik et al., 2016; 
Schmid, Kleiman & Amodio, 2015), scrutiny and negative evaluation (Bruhl et 
al., 2014; Spence & Rapee, 2016), rejection, offending others (Kizilcik et al., 
2016) and inability to interact and cope in social situations (Beidel, Turner & 
Dancu, 1985).  Typically, these fears are disproportionate to the potential social 
threat presented (Spence & Rapee, 2016).  Consequently, individuals with SAD 
may avoid social situations (Bruhl et al., 2014; Rodebaugh et al., 2017) or 
experience them with intense anxiety (Spence & Rapee, 2016) and excessive 
physiological arousal (Beidel et al., 1985).  Social avoidance exacerbates social 
anxiety and so the relationship between emotion and behaviour is cyclical 
(Rodebaugh et al., 2017).   The socially anxious individual may also encounter 
impaired task performance (Schmid et al., 2015), poor advancement at work or 
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academically, loneliness and fewer romantic or sexual encounters (Beidel et al., 
1985).   
 
Anxiety disorders may run a chronic course if left untreated (Hill et al., 2016; 
MacDonald & Feifel, 2014) and it is essential to explore measures to intervene in 
their development.   
 
1.1.3  Cognitive Models of Anxiety 
 
Approximately 50 years ago influential models of anxiety began to emerge.  
Constructing such models enables identification of the point in anxiety formation 
at which intervention can occur.  An aspect of cognition which models have 
consistently espoused as central to anxiety is the tendency to selectively attend 
to and process information which signals or is related to threat (Beard et al., 
2012).  This bias interferes with cognitive processes including memory (Reidy & 
Richard, 1997), interpretation of circumstances and attention allocation (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2016) and is held to maintain anxiety (Cody & Teachman 2010).  As well 
as predicting the presence of cognitive bias in anxiety, information-processing 
models purported cognitive mechanisms via which they might arise.   
 
1.1.3.1 Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Matthews (1988, 1997) - 
Theory of Attention Bias and Anxiety 
 
Williams et al. (1997, 1998) explained attentional bias in anxiety using a two-
stage information processing model.  Stage one involves the evaluation of the 
threat value presented by a stimulus or event.  If a stimulus is deemed 
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sufficiently threatening, stage two, the attentional resource allocation system is 
triggered.  Individuals with high level trait anxiety are thought to favour 
orientation towards stimuli deemed as threatening and low-level trait anxiety is 
associated with orientation away from mildly threatening stimuli.  When state 
anxiety is elevated the relationship between trait anxiety and attention 
orientation is intensified with highly anxious individuals attributing higher levels 
of attention allocation to the perceived threat and low trait anxious individuals 
becoming more avoidant of the perceived threat (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
  
1.1.3.2  Mogg and Bradley (1998) - Cognitive Motivational Theory 
 
Mogg & Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational theory proposed the existence of 
two motivational systems which drive cognitive and behavioural outcomes to 
emotions.  The first is a valance evaluation system (VES) which is responsible for 
surveying the environment and identifying potential threats.  This is done rapidly 
and automatically via rudimentary assessment of the physical characteristics of 
the environment.  However, the VES might also be influenced by contextual 
information, interoceptive signals and past experience.  Importantly, this 
process occurs pre-attentively without effort or conscious awareness.  The 
second is a goal engagement system which determines reaction to the perceived 
threat level in terms of the amount of attention allocated to it.  In anxiety, a 
mildly threatening stimulus may be determined to be of moderate or high threat 
value by the valance evaluation system. This would trigger the allocation of 
increased attentional resources to the stimulus.  In low anxiety, the stimulus 
might be valued as of low threat and disregarded in favour of more positive or 
goal relevant stimuli.  However, even in low anxious individuals, increasing 
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threat value warrants increasing attention allocation to a stimulus.  Thus, 
cognitive motivational theory suggests that everyone (not just high anxious 
individuals) orients towards stimuli which are considered threatening but that 
high anxious individuals have a lower threshold for threat appraisal (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). 
 
1.1.3.3 Eysenck, Santos, Derakshan and Calvo (2007) - Attentional 
Control Theory 
 
Attentional control theory (ACT) proposes two attentional systems: a ‘top-down’ 
goal-directed system which is influenced by experience, knowledge and goals 
and a ‘bottom-up’ stimulus-driven system which responds to particularly salient 
information or stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  Typically, the top-down 
system exerts control over the bottom-up system attenuating the influence of 
salient and, importantly, aversive stimuli.  However, in anxiety, the balance 
between these two systems is disrupted and the stimulus-driven system has more 
influence over attentional allocation than the goal-directed system (Coombes et 
al., 2009).  It is suggested furthermore that anxiety interrupts two specific 
functions of attentional control: inhibition and shifting.  Effective ‘inhibition’ 
involves the ability to stop a pre-potent response or to resist interference from a 
task-irrelevant stimulus.  ‘Shifting’ means directing attention between relevant 
stimuli or tasks (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009).   
 
The present thesis will not evaluate evidence which refutes or supports these 
models or seek to dissociate between them.  However, these provide an 




1.1.4  Anxiety and Attention bias 
 
Underpinning each of the above models is the idea that anxiety is associated 
with attentional bias towards threat relevant stimuli.  Research has consistently 
shown that when threatening information or stimuli compete with neutral 
information or stimuli for attentional resources, anxious individuals will 
selectively attend to threat (Amir, Taylor & Donohue, 2011; for a review see 
Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007).   
 
Anxiety and vigilance of threatening stimuli possess an innate and privileged 
roles in human cognition (Bar Haim et al., 2007; Gilbert, 2000; LoBue & 
Rakinson, 2013).  A functional fear system has been proposed, which has evolved 
to aid the survival [and gene transmission, Ohman & Mineka, (2001)] of 
individuals and species by protecting against aversive, dangerous and 
threatening situations (Misslin, 2003).  This system is responsible for such 
defensive cognitive tendencies as visual attentional bias towards threat.  In their 
4-factor fear module model, Ohman and Mineka, 2001 suggested that this system 
is selective for stimuli which have posed a threat across time, is triggered 
automatically (outside of conscious awareness), is resistant to cognitive control 
and is associated with a specific neural circuitry centred around the amygdala.  
The proposed location of this neural circuit (subcortical regions of the medial 
anterior temporal lobe) indicates that behaviours elicited by the fear system 
have an adaptive basis as they are shared by mammals, including those with, in 
the words of Ohman & Mineka (2001), “more primitive brains”.  In further 
support of an ‘innate’ model of fear response, studies have shown that children, 
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as early as their first year, respond quickly to threat even before learning 
threat-relevant fears (LoBue & Rakinson, 2013).  The purpose of this fear system 
and the defensive mechanisms which it facilitates is to promote a state of 
mental preparedness and high arousal allowing for rapid response to potential 
threats (Gilbert, 1998).  For early humans, such threats may have been in the 
form of potential predators or hostile conspecifics (Shulkin & Rosen, 1998).  
Rapid or selective engagement to threatening facial expressions would therefore 
have been advantageous in terms of motivating the individual to quickly fight or 
flee.  This preferential attentional selection remains adaptive (Koster et al., 
2006) although, in modern humans it may not promote the same responses.  
However, in anxiety disorders there is an overactive threat appraisal system and 
individuals are abnormally sensitive to threat-related stimuli.  Anxious 
individuals are more likely to perceive stimuli, irrespective of their valence, as 
threatening (Barry, 2015).   
 
The relationship between biased attention toward threat and anxiety has been 
explored and largely substantiated using a number of cognitive paradigms (see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a review).  Early work utilised the emotional Stroop 
task and demonstrated that anxious participants take longer to name the colour 
of threat related words than of neutral words (e.g. Mathews & Macleod, 1985; 
Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989).  The prolonged latency of colour naming in 
this context is proposed to be due to attentional capture by emotionally salient 
words which delays response (Egloff & Hock, 2001).  Similar evidence of 
attentional bias towards threat-related words in anxiety has been produced in 
studies using the visual search paradigm (e.g. De Voogd, Wiers, Prins & 
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Salemink, 2014) and the emotional spatial cuing task (e.g. Fox, Russo & Dutton, 
2002). 
 
1.1.4.1 Attention Bias Assessment using the Emotional Dot-Probe 
Task 
 
Much of the evidence for a relationship between attentional bias and anxiety has 
come from studies using the emotional dot probe paradigm (Macleod et al., 
1986).   In the emotional dot probe task two stimuli (typically words or faces), 
one neutral and one emotionally valenced, (e.g. a face with a neutral expression 
and a face with a threatening expression) appear simultaneously on a computer 
screen (e.g., Bar-Haim, 2010).  Angry faces are often chosen as the negatively 
valenced stimuli as they represent potent social threat signals (Fox et al., 2002; 
Van Honk et al., 2002).  Both cues disappear and one is replaced by a target 
letter or symbol that must be identified by the participant (e.g. Amir et al., 
2008).  The target replaces the neutral stimulus in 50% of trials and the 
threatening stimulus 50% of the time.  More rapid responses to targets preceded 
by a threatening cue relative to targets preceded by a neutral cue reveals a 
threat bias (Bar-Haim, 2007). A critical factor of the emotional dot-probe task 
for assessing attention bias is that it is an implicit measure.  Participants are 
asked to respond to targets following emotional or neutral stimuli and not to the 





1.1.4.2 Evidence for Attention Bias using the Emotional Dot-Probe 
Task 
 
Using the emotional dot-probe task, Macleod, Matthews and Tata (1986) were 
the first to show that when targets appeared in the location of negatively-
valenced words, the targets would be detected more rapidly by clinically anxious 
participants.  The authors suggested that when presented with a pair of threat-
neutral words on a screen, attention would shift automatically and unconsciously 
to threat-related words and thus targets replacing these stimuli would be 
detected more rapidly invoking a faster response (Macleod et al., 1986).  The 
emotional dot-probe task has revealed enhanced vigilance for threat compared 
to neutral stimuli in enhanced state anxiety (Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 2000).  
However, Broadbent and Broadbent (1988) reported that trait anxiety predicted 
attention bias towards threat to a greater extent than state anxiety and that at 
high levels, trait anxiety was particularly predictive of greater threat bias 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988).  In studies involving participants with clinical 
anxiety, patients with generalised social phobia responded more rapidly to 
targets replacing socially or physically threatening words than neutral words 
(Asmundson & Stein, 1994).  Individuals with GAD have also shown greater 
attention bias towards threatening faces relative to neutral faces compared to 
individuals who did not have GAD.  This was irrespective of whether stimuli were 
presented for 500ms or 1250ms (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom & de Bono, 1999).  
Since the publication of these early findings, a wealth of evidence in support of 
the prioritised processing of threat-related stimuli in anxiety has been produced 




Although the emotional dot-probe task has highlighted faster responses to 
targets following threatening stimuli in anxiety, there is some debate regarding 
the mechanism of this facilitation (Koster et al., 2004).  Some have argued that 
it arises as a result of speeded detection of threat (Williams et al., 1997).  
Others have suggested that faster responses to threat-replacing targets could be 
explained by difficulty in disengaging from threat which causes attention to 
remain at the location of the threatening stimulus when the target appears (Fox 
et al., 2002). Koster et al. (2004) provided evidence for difficulty disengaging 
from threatening stimuli by showing that participants were slower to respond to 
targets replacing neutral images paired with threatening images compared to 
targets replacing neutral images paired with neutral images.  However, 
Vassilopoulus (2005) revealed that attention in social anxiety was marked by a 
pattern of rapid engagement (at 200ms) followed by avoidance (at 500ms). 
 
1.1.4.3  Attention bias findings from EEG studies 
 
Evidence of attention biases to threat in anxious and non-anxious individuals also 
comes from studies measuring neural activity in response to threatening and 
non-threatening visual stimuli.  Event related potentials (ERPs) are recordings of 
electrical brain processes (waves of electro-cortical activity), time and phase-
locked to specific events.  They offer a detailed electrophysiological 
representation of the time-course of neural processes associated with an event 
(Helfinstein et al., 2008).  ERPs are measured by placing electrodes on the 
surface of the scalp during electroencephalography (EEG), a non-invasive 
imaging technique.  ERPs associated with attentional processes are often 
observed within the first 500ms after the appearance of a stimulus in attention 
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experiments (Bar Haim et al., 2005).  It is suggested that early ERPs such as the 
C1 (a negative component between 50 and 100ms post-stimulus; Miller et al., 
2015), P1 (a positive deflection between 120ms and 140ms; Fu et al., 2010) and 
N170 (a negative ERP between 130ms and 210ms post-stimulus; Blau et al., 
2007), which are recorded within the first 200ms after stimulus presentation 
reflect bottom-up, automatic engagement.  Later ERPs such as the P2 (a positive 
voltage in the latency range of 100ms to 250ms after stimulus; Sur & Sinha, 
2009), P3 (a positive deflection between 300 and 650ms post stimulus; Salti, Bar-
Haim & Lamy, 2012) and late positive component (LPP; a sustained positivity 
also beginning around 300ms; Kujawa et al., 2013) observed after 200ms post- 
stimulus, represent top-down, post-perceptual actions such as categorisation, 
response selection (Harrewijn et al., 2017) and the post-perceptual processing of 
emotional stimuli (Richards, Holmes, Pell & Bethel, 2013).  Interestingly, ERPs 
have supported the presence of attentional bias to threat even where 
behavioural measures were taken but failed to evince threat related bias (e.g. 
Thomas, Johnstone & Gonsalvez, 2007).  Given that ERPs are believed to provide 
specific temporal indices of visual spatial attention allocation and stimulus 
processing (Bar Haim et al., 2005) they may provide a more sensitive measure of 
attentional bias and attentional processes than reaction time data. 
 
Many ERP studies have used the dot-probe paradigm to pinpoint the time course 
of attentional processes.  In a study using a dot-probe task with angry-neutral or 
angry-positive faces pairs, behavioural data revealed a bias towards angry faces 
(Eldar et al., 2010).  ERP data also supported the presence of a threat bias with 
an enhanced C1 to threat cues in anxious relative to non-anxious participants 
(Eldar et al., 2010).  High anxious participants but not low anxious participants 
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have also exhibited an enhanced N2PC (a negative component between 170ms 
and 270ms post-stimulus) for angry faces compared to neutral faces during a dot 
probe task (Fox, Derakshan & Shoker, 2008) and an augmented, and shorter 
latency of P2 for angry faces relative to neutral faces (Bar-Haim, Lamy & 
Glickman, 2005).  Evidence that ERPs reveal threat biases so soon after stimulus 
presentation support the view that attention is automatically deployed towards 
threatening stimuli, prior to conscious perception.  There are also findings of 
enhanced ERP amplitudes for threatening stimuli later than 300ms from stimulus 
presentation.  Socially anxious participants had elevated P3/LPPs for angry faces 
relative to reassuring faces in an adapted Erikson Flanker task (Moser et al., 
2008).  Furthermore, in an adapted dot-probe task, aversive images elicited an 
amplified LPP compared to neutral images across participants but the difference 
in ERP amplitude was more pronounced in participants with GAD (MacNamara & 
Hajcak, 2010). 
 
Despite evidence from ERP studies which corroborates the presence of threat 
bias in anxious participants, studies comparing ERPs in anxious and non-anxious 
participants have suggested that attention bias is not modulated by anxiety.  For 
example, Santesso et al. (2008) reported elevated P1 for angry faces relative to 
neutral faces for all participants which was unrelated to anxiety level.  An 
enhanced N170, EPN (Morel et al., 2014) and N2PC (Kappenman et al., 2014) for 
aversive relative to neutral stimuli across participants, irrespective of anxiety 
level has also been reported.   Furthermore, in non-anxious participants, 
elevated C1 (Eldar et al., 2010; Pourtois et al., 2004), P1 (Pourtois et al., 2004; 
Santesso et al., 2008), N2pc (Holmes et al., 2009) and P3 (Thomas, Johnstone & 
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Gonsalvez, 2007) amplitudes for aversive relative to neutral stimuli have been 
reported suggesting that elevated anxiety is not a prerequisite for threat bias.  
 
1.1.5  Targeting Anxiety 
 
The theory and evidence presented so far suggests that anxiety is pervasive and 
is associated with an attentional bias towards threat related stimuli.  Currently, 
first line treatments for anxiety disorders are cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) and pharmacological treatments, mainly selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs; Craske & Stein, 2016; Mogg et al., 2004; Hill, Waite & Creswell, 
2016).  However, neither treatment targets the threat bias which is 
characteristic of anxiety.  CBT is a psychotherapeutic treatment which is the 
most supported for treating anxiety disorders (Craske & Stein, 2016).  The 
method assumes that maladaptive cognitions maintain emotional distress and 
behavioural difficulties (Hoffman et al., 2012).  CBT includes therapeutic 
strategies which challenge and attempt to adapt dysfunctional cognitions as a 
way of reducing emotional distress in ways which encourage the patient to be a 
participant in their own treatment (Hoffman et al., 2012; Jonhson, Hoffart, 
Nordahl & Wampold. 2017).  Meta-analyses reveal CBT to be efficacious with 
medium to large effect sizes when compared to control condition in children 
(Crowe & McKay, 2016) and compared to control, waitlist or no-treatment 
conditions in adults (Hofmann et al. 2012).  However, one systematic review of 
87 studies gave a response rate of only 49.5% across anxiety disorders 
immediately following treatment and 53.6% at follow-up (Loerinc et al., 2015).  
SSRIs including Venlafaxine, Paroxetine, Fluoxetine and Citalopram, block the 
reuptake of serotonin in the brain (Farach et al., 2012).  This means that more 
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serotonin is available in the synaptic cleft which can bind to post-synaptic 
receptors (Farach et al., 2012).  This activation is thought to play an important 
role in the modulation of emotional processes (Olivier, 2015).  SSRIs are safe and 
tolerable compared to alternative psychopharmacological treatments for anxiety 
(Popovic et al., 2015). However, one third to a half of patients with anxiety 
disorder treated with SSRIs fail to achieve long-term remission (Farach et al., 
2012).  Moreover, there is a growing list of side-effects associated with SSRIs 
including drowsiness, attentional deficit, lack of concentration, memory 
impairment and apathy (Popovic et al., 2015), nausea, diarrhoea, insomnia, 
headache, restlessness, reduced libido, suicidal ideation (Farach et al., 2012) 
and sexual dysfunction (Isaac, 1999).  This information indicates that there are 
shortfalls in existing anxiety interventions and highlights the need for novel 
treatments.   
 
1.2 Attention bias Modification 
 
Recently, a cognitive paradigm called attention bias modification (ABM) has 
been developed to specifically target the implicit attention bias associated with 
anxiety.  ABM is non-invasive, simple to administer and easily accessible.  It 
avoids the effortful participation required for CBT and the potential side effects 
linked to SSRIs.  Previously, a cognitive task based on a dot-probe design was 
described which assessed the direction and level of attentional bias towards 
neutral and emotionally valanced stimuli.  In this task, participants are required 
to respond to a target which replaces either the neutral or the emotionally 
valenced stimulus by indicating its identity, gender etc.  Faster responses to 
targets replacing the emotional stimulus suggest an attentional bias towards that 
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emotion (Beard et al., 2012).  ABM paradigms are modifications of the emotional 
dot probe paradigm and have been recently developed with the aim of reducing 
attentional biases (Hayes, Matthews & Hirsch, 2010).   In those ABM training 
paradigms designed to modify bias away from threat a contingency is introduced 
and the target typically replaces the neutral stimulus in all (or nearly all) trials.  
This encourages participants to implicitly attend away from threatening stimuli 
(usually towards neutral stimuli; Boettcher, Berger & Renneberg, 2012).   
 
1.2.1  Attention Bias Modification and Anxiety 
 
ABM towards neutral stimuli has been repeatedly demonstrated to reduce threat 
bias and often this reduction is accompanied by a reduction in anxiety (see 
Beard et al., 2012, for a review), particularly when training is carried out over a 
number of days (e.g. Amir et al., 2009b; Bar-Haim, 2010; Li, Tan, Qian & Liu, 
2008).  In contrast, ABM training which augments biased attention towards 
threat stimuli has been shown to increase anxiety (Bar-Haim, 2010).  These 
findings support the suggestion that attentional threat bias may not simply arise 
from anxiety but may be causally related to its development and maintenance 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2012).     
 
Early ABM studies produced robust findings in healthy samples.  Using neutral-
threat word pairs, Macleod et al. (2002) sought to augment attention bias 
towards threat or away from threat in non-anxious participants. Attention was 
successfully manipulated in the intended direction.  Additionally, anxiety ratings 
in response to an anagram stress task were lower for participants who had been 
trained towards neutral targets compared to those who had been trained 
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towards threat-related targets (Macleod et al., 2002). Van Bockstaele et al. 
(2012) reported a reduction in threat bias in neuro-typical participants following 
ABM towards neutral faces. This reduction in threat bias did not generalise to an 
interference task in which participants responded to a target following a single 
neutral or angry face.  In a separate study, participants who were due to leave 
their home to study overseas were allocated to either ‘attend neutral’ ABM 
training spanning 15 days just prior to leaving, or no training (See, MacLeod & 
Bridle, 2009).  The active training group demonstrated a reduction in attentional 
bias towards threat following ABM training 17 days after initial assessment of 
attentional bias which was not present in the no-training group.  Participants 
who demonstrated the greatest reductions in attention bias towards threat also 
had the largest reductions in trait and state anxiety in response to the study’s 
naturalistic stressor (moving to Australia).  More recently neuro-typical 
participants received active (towards neutral) or control ABM training with 
neutral/social-threat word pairs (Chen et al., 2015).  Following training, 
participants in the active ABM group had a greater attentional bias away from 
threat relative to the control ABM group.   
 
In clinical samples, ABM training toward neutral faces seems to have been 
effective, not only in attenuating attention bias, but also in reducing the number 
of participants meeting the diagnostic criteria for clinical anxiety (Amir et al., 
2009b; Amir, Taylor & Donohue., 2011; Hazen, Vasey & Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt, 





1.2.1.1  ABM and Generalised Anxiety 
 
ABM studies have been carried out in populations with generalised anxiety.  In 
one study, eight sessions of word-based ABM training towards non-threat or 
control ABM training were delivered to individuals with generalised anxiety 
disorder (GAD; Amir et al., 2009a).  Participants in the active ABM group but not 
in the control group had a reduction in threat bias and in both self-report and 
clinician-rated anxiety following ABM training compared to before ABM training.  
Similar results were reported in Hazen et al. (2009) with participants who 
received five sessions of ABM training towards neutral words (away from threat 
words) demonstrating significantly greater reductions in threat bias and in 
anxious and depressive symptoms relative to participants who received control 
training.  
 
1.2.1.2  ABM and Social Anxiety 
 
ABM protocols have also been used with socially anxious participants and have 
demonstrated reductions in both attentional bias and social anxiety symptoms 
following ABM away from threat (e.g. Amir et al., 2009b; Amir, Taylor & 
Donohue, 2011; Li et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009).  In one study with socially 
phobic participants, Amir et al. (2009b) demonstrated reduced attentional bias 
post training in those who received ABM away from threat and subsequent 
reduction in self-report and clinician-assessed social anxiety relative to 
participants who received control ABM.  Additionally, only 50% of the active ABM 
group met the diagnostic criteria for generalised social phobia after ABM 
compared to 86% in the control ABM group and symptom reduction was 
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maintained for the active training group at a 4-month follow-up assessment 
(Amir et al., 2009b).  In a separate study, participants with social phobia were 
allocated to receive active ‘attend neutral’ ABM training or control ABM (Amir et 
al., 2011).  Those in the active training group who had the greatest level of 
attentional bias towards threat before ABM training had the greatest reductions 
in clinician rated social anxiety after ABM relative to participants in the control 
training group (Amir et al., 2011). In a recent study, participants with sub-
clinical social anxiety received ABM training towards neutral stimuli or control 
ABM in which stimuli were presented for either 100ms or 500ms.  Both the 100ms 
training group and the 500ms training group had greater reduction in threat bias 
and social anxiety following training compared to their respective control group 
(Liang, Tsai & Hsu, 2016). 
 
However, several studies focusing on ABM in social anxiety have produced 
weaker effects in terms of attention bias modulation and anxiety reduction.  
Internet-based active ABM away from threat or control ABM was delivered to 
socially anxious participants over 4 weeks (Boettcher et al., 2012).  Post-
treatment there were significant reductions in social anxiety symptoms in both 
ABM and control groups (Boettcher et al., 2012).  This finding was replicated in 
another study of internet-delivered ABM in social anxiety (Carlbring et al., 
2012). 
 
1.2.2  Inconsistency in ABM Research 
 
Despite encouraging results, findings related to the efficacy of ABM have been 
variable (Emmelkamp, 2012).  Some studies have failed to replicate the 
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successes of ABM from early research in terms of reducing attention bias and 
anxiety (e.g. Bunnell, Beidel & Mesa, 2013; Boettcher et al., 2012; Everaert et 
al., 2015; Fitzgerald, Rawdon & Dooley, 2016; Julian et al., 2012). Recently the 
evidence for ABM has been labelled ‘disappointing’ (Koster & Bernstein, 2015).   
 
Moreover, meta-analyses have reported inconsistent effect sizes for ABM 
outcomes.  Beard et al. (2012) and Hakamata et al. (2010) reported large effect 
sizes for change of attention bias in the trained direction.  However, Mogoase et 
al. (2014) reported medium effect sizes and Hallion and Ruscio (2011) reported 
small effect sizes although the latter meta-analysis included studies which 
sought to manipulate interpretation bias as well as ABM studies.  Hakamata et 
al. (2010) reported medium effects sizes for anxiety reductions but Beard et al. 
(2012) and Mogoase et al. (2014) reported small effect sizes for symptom related 
outcomes including anxiety, depression and alcohol craving reductions.  Hallion 
and Rusco (2011) and Cristea et al. (2015) also reported small effect sizes for 
anxiety and depression reduction and in the latter meta-analysis, effect sizes 
became non-significant once the authors removed outliers and adjusted for 
publication bias.  Such variation between meta-analyses findings might be 
explained by differences in inclusion criteria (Mogoase et al., 2015).  For 
example, Hakamata et al. (2010) included studies which looked at the impact of 
ABM on anxiety in healthy and clinically anxious participants.  Beard et al. (2012) 
on the other hand, incorporated ABM studies with varying outcome measures 
including anxiety, depression, alcohol dependency and smoking.  Notably, none 
of the earlier meta-analyses including Beard et al. (2012); Hakamata et al. 
(2010) and Hallion et al. (2011) included recent studies which have produced 
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negative findings (e.g. Boettcher et al., 2012; Bunnell, Beidel & Mesa, 2013; 
Everaert et al., 2015; Fitzgerald, Rawdon & Dooley, 2016; Julian et al., 2012). 
 
Inclusion criteria might explain different findings between meta-analyses.  
However, researchers have begun to explore other factors which might explain 
inconsistency in findings from individual ABM studies.   
 
1.2.2.1  Pre-existing Attention Bias Towards Threat 
 
A potential factor underlying inconsistent results is baseline level of attention 
bias in participants.  As attentional bias towards threat is implicated in a number 
of anxiety related pathologies, the mechanism via which ABM aims to reduce the 
associated symptoms is the reduction of threat bias.   In this context, ABM may 
be more effective where there is pre-existing threat bias (Mogoase, David & 
Koster, 2014).  However, a number of ABM studies did not find attentional bias 
towards threat in anxious participants prior to ABM training (e.g. Carleton et al., 
2015, Enock et al., 2014, McNally et al., 2013, see Mogg et al., 2017).  Given 
that the capacity of ABM for manipulating attention bias in a particular direction 
has been shown to be restricted to individuals with an existing attention bias in 
the opposite direction (e.g. O’Toole & Dennis, 2012) then pre-existing attention 
bias of participants should be considered during participant selection and when 
interpreting results from ABM studies. O’Toole and Dennis (2012) did not observe 
a change in attention bias from before to after ABM training when data from all 
participants was analysed.  However, when analysis was constrained to 
participants with a pre-training attentional bias either towards or away from 
threat, a significant change in bias in the opposing direction was revealed after 
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ABM training. In other studies, participants with greater levels of threat bias 
have been seen to display larger reductions in social anxiety following ABM 
(Amir, Taylor & Donohue, 2011).   Some researchers have chosen to include pre-
existing attentional bias as a selection criterion (e.g. Eldar et al., 2012).  Eldar 
et al. (2012) justified this pre-selection criterion by arguing that there might be 
a risk in inducing avoidance of threat in anxiety where there is no baseline 
threat bias to levels below what might be considered a healthy level of 
vigilance.  However, from a research perspective inconsistent results, stemming 
from varying levels of attention bias across ABM studies, may lead to lack of 
consensus regarding the outcomes and mechanisms of ABM training. 
 
1.2.2.2  Pre-existing anxiety 
 
In the same way that the reduction of attentional bias towards threat may be 
dependent upon a pre-existing threat bias, the alleviation of anxiety or anxiety 
symptoms may only occur (and in fact be necessary) in cases of unhealthy levels 
of anxiety.   A large proportion of ABM studies have therefore selected for 
participants with clinical or high-level anxiety (e.g.  Amir et al., 2011; Amir et 
al., 2009; Amir et al., 2010; Baert et al., 2010; Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring 
et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2010; Heeren et al., 2012; Li et al., 2008; Neubauer et 
al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2010; Wells et al., 2010). Review articles have 
identified larger effect sizes for successful ABM outcomes in individuals with 
high-level or clinical anxiety than for neuro-typical participants (Bar Haim et al., 
2007; Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, some ABM 
studies have used non-anxious samples, particularly when experimental designs 
have involved inducing threat bias by training participants to attend towards 
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threat stimuli (e.g. Cret et al., 2013; Eldar et al., 2008; Krebs et al., 2010; 
MacLeod et al., 2007; Suway et al., 2013).  The use of a neuro-typical sample 
still allows the investigation of the relationship between anxiety and attentional 
bias and how the manipulation of attention bias impacts anxiety.    
 
1.2.2.3  Variability in Methodology 
 
Another proposed explanation for inconsistent results in ABM research is the 
large variability in stimulus parameters across studies (Hakamata et al., 2010).  
These include stimulus type, stimulus alignment and positioning, size of stimuli 
and length of training in terms of number of trials and sessions (see chapter 2 for 
a full discussion).  A number of meta-analyses have examined methodological 
elements of ABM studies which may be influential in determining the success of 
ABM at modulating attention bias and symptoms.  When looking at the impact of 
ABM on both attention bias reduction and anxiety, Hakamata et al. (2010) found 
higher effect sizes for studies using word stimuli than those which used face 
stimuli in the ABM paradigm.  Beard et al. (2012) also found that stimulus type 
moderated ABM effect on symptoms with greater effect sizes for words 
compared to pictures.  However, for ABM effect on attention bias change, effect 
sizes were larger for pictures than for words (Beard et al., 2012).  Both studies 
reported larger effect sizes for vertically aligned stimulus pairs than for 
horizontally aligned stimulus pairs when considering ABM’s effect on both 
attention bias and symptoms.  The number of ABM training sessions has also 
been found to moderate the effect of ABM on attention bias change (Hallion & 
Rusco., 2011) with more sessions resulting in higher effect sizes for reduction in 
threat bias (Hakamata et al., 2010).  However, there are reports that number of 
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training sessions does not modulate the impact of ABM on symptoms (Hakamata 
et al., 2010; Hallion & Rusco, 2011) and meta-analyses have in fact, reported 
lower effects of ABM training on symptom reduction with a greater number of 
training sessions (Cristea et al., 2015). Another methodological factor which has 
been shown to have an impact on how ABM modifies attention bias is 
experimental setting with laboratory based studies generating larger effect sizes 
than studies conducted outside of the laboratory (Mogoase et al., 2014).   
 
Research is yet to define the optimal paradigmatic format for ABM. Until there is 
a better understanding of the contribution of aspects of the ABM design to 
efficacy, they are a potential source of variability within ABM research.  Despite 
mixed findings, ABM has produced beneficial results in terms of promoting more 
healthy allocation of attention and reducing anxiety and remains a candidate 
future treatment for anxiety symptoms (Clarke et al., 2014).   Further ABM 
research is needed to cast light on the mechanisms of ABM training.   
 
1.3 Transcranial Electrical Stimulation (TES) 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation (tES) is a non-invasive form of brain 
stimulation involving the application of a small current of electricity to selected 
areas of the cortex via scalp electrodes (Coffman, Clark & Parasuraman, 2014; 
Kuo & Nitsche, 2012).    Forms of stimulation which fall under the tES umbrella 
term include transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), transcranial 
alternating current stimulation (tACS), transcranial random noise stimulation 
(tRNS; Bikson, Edwards & Kappenman, 2014) and non-invasive deep brain 
stimulation via temporally interfering electric fields (TI; Grossman et al., 2017).  
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Each form of tES is proposed to have a distinct mechanism for achieving a 
neuromodulatory effect.   
 
1.3.1  TDCS 
 
In tDCS a weak electrical current is applied on the scalp via a pair of electrodes, 
one anodal and one cathodal (Kuo & Nitsche, 2012).  The current passes into the 
cortex and modulates cortical excitability in a polarity dependent manner.  
Anodal stimulation is generally used to increase cortical excitability in a 
targeted cortical region and cathodal stimulation to inhibit neuronal excitability 
within a given area (Javadi & Cheng, 2013).  TDCS during training has been 
demonstrated to improve performance in tasks of visual perception (Bolognini et 
al., 2010), motor control (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000) and memory and language 
(Cattaneo, Pisoni & Papagno, 2011) and this improvement has been seen to be 
present at up to 12 months after training (Dockery, 2009).  For example, Ditye, 
Jacobson, Walsh and Lavidor (2012) reported that anodal tDCS over the right 
inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), alongside cognitive training on four consecutive 
days generated better behavioural inhibition during a Stop Signal task versus 
training alone.   Anodal tDCS over the left posterior temporoparietal junction 
has been shown to produce better learning when applied during training for 
novel item naming over multiple days than sham tDCS (Meinzer et al., 2014).    
Parietal anodal tDCS (atDCS) or cathodal tDCS (ctDCS) was delivered whilst 
participants learned the magnitude of artificial numerical symbols (Cohen 
Kadosh et al., 2010).  A double dissociation was demonstrated related to polarity 
with anodal tDCS resulting in enhanced learning which was maintained at 6 
months after training and ctDCS leading to deficient learning (Cohen Kadosh et 
27 
 
al., 2010).  Despite the wealth of findings in support of the modulation of 
cognitive training with tDCS, the methodology (or at least its implementation) 
has its detractors.   Medina and Cason (2017), for example, reported that studies 
which have researched tDCS-modulated cognitive training have been 
underpowered. Meta-analyses have also reported that tDCS induced little or no 
enhancement of cortical excitability (as measured by motor evoked potentials; 
Horvath et al., 2015a) and had no significant effect on the outcomes of working 
memory or language training (Horvath et al., 2015b).  However, the latter of 
these meta-analyses has been criticised for inconsistent data selection and 
statistical approach (Price & Hamilton, 2015).  
 
The mechanisms of tDCS are not fully understood but it is thought that by 
inducing a shift in resting membrane potential, anodal stimulation brings 
neurons closer to their point of excitation thus rendering them more receptive 
to incoming excitatory input (Brunoni et al., 2012).   The longer term (learning) 
effects induced by tDCS are proposed to be NMDA receptor dependent (Stagg & 
Nitsche, 2011).  When pre- and post- synaptic neurons are activated 
simultaneously, excitation of the already depolarised post-synaptic cell relieves 
NMDA receptors of magnesium allowing for the influx of calcium (Luscher & 
Malenka, 2012).  This triggers a cascade which ultimately leads to an increase in 
synaptic efficiency via protein synthesis in a process which shares features of 
long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD; Cohen Kadosh, 
2010).  The effects of tDCS are also proposed to be dependent on GABA 
receptors with anodal tDCS linked to reductions in GABA concentration 
(Antonenko et al., 2017; Bachtiar et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2014) and cathodal 
28 
 
tDCS associated with reductions in both GABA and glutamate concentration 
(Cohen Kadosh et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2014).   
 
Nitsche and Paulus (2000) first demonstrated that tDCS increased cortical 
excitability more than 15 years ago.  Since then tDCS has been used frequently 
in studies and has been shown to be easy and safe to use with no reported 
seizures (Harvey et al., 2015).  Arguably, the main advantage of using tDCS over 
other forms of neuro-stimulation is that it is the most well-known form of TES 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2013) with a success and safety profile over a greater amount of 
time than other forms of tES.  A key disadvantage of tDCS is that active 
stimulation can be uncomfortable, likely due to shunting of current at the scalp 
(Zaghi et al., 2009).  The sensations most regularly reported are itching and 
tingling of the skin (Ambrus et al., 2010).  In addition to potentially rendering 
the receipt of tDCS unpleasant this might also make it difficult to maintain 
experimental blinds (Zaghi et al., 2009).  It is possible that in the future this 
problem might be mitigated by altering the size or montage of electrodes 
(Fertonani et al., 2015).   
 
1.3.1.1 The impact of tDCS on functional connectivity 
 
In addition to modulating neural activity in the brain structures below 
stimulating electrodes, tES is known to induce changes across functionally 
connected regions (e.g. Keeser et al., 2011, Krause et al., 2017, Meinzer et al., 
2012, Pena-Gomez  et al., 2012, Polania et al., 2012, Weber et al., 2014, 
Wörsching et al., 2017).   Studies which have examined the effect of tES on 
functional connectivity have used fMRI to measure changes in cerebral blood 
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flow across distributed brain networks following tDCS relative to before tDCS.  In 
a study by Keeser et al., 2011 participants received active or sham tDCS (anode 
over left DLPFC, cathode right supra-orbital) for 20 minutes at 2mA.  FMRI data 
were taken prior to and following tDCS and independent component analysis was 
used to assess the effects of active versus sham stimulation on resting state 
network connectivity.  The study examined connectivity within the default mode 
network (DMN) and the fronto-parietal network (FPN).  The DMN incorporates 
brain areas spanning the medial prefrontal cortices, medial and lateral parietal 
cortices and lateral temporal cortices (Garrison, 2015).  It is engaged during rest 
and is associated with self-referential thinking, autobiographical memory and 
theory of mind (Pena-Gomez et al., 2012).  The fronto-parietal network includes 
structures in the frontal and parietal cortices of the brain and is engaged during 
cognitive tasks requiring attentional control (Hossain, Myers and Kozma, 2018).  
Active, as compared to sham tDCS resulted in increased coactivation in regions 
of the default mode network and fronto-parietal network close to the site of 
stimulation and at more distal sites during rest.   There was also coactivation of 
the site of stimulation (left DLPFC) and the left middle frontal gyrus and of the 
left DLPFC and left superior frontal gyrus (Keeser et al., 2011).  Pena-Gomez et 
al. (2012) also investigated the effects of tDCS on resting-state DMN activation 
and on the anticorrelated network (AN) which has a strong negative correlation 
with DMN.  There was stronger spatial and temporal activation correlation 
between areas of AN (including superior parietal cortex and lateral prefrontal 
cortex) and reduced activation synchrony for areas of the DMN following active 
tDCS relative to sham tDCS.  The authors suggested that these effects might be 
implicated in improvements in cognitive function following tES (Pena-Gomez et 
al., 2012).  Attempts to understand how tDCS affects functional connectivity and 
30 
 
how might modulate cognitive functioning have been made (e.g. Meinzer et al., 
2012, Weber et al., 2013, Krause et al., 2017).  In one such study fMRI data were 
recorded during anodal or sham tDCS of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 
applied at rest or during performance of a semantic word retrieval task (Meinzer 
et al., 2012).  Superior word-recall in the task during anodal tDCS relative to 
sham tDCS corresponded with reduced activity in the left ventral IFG.  During 
task performance with concurrent anodal tDCS there was increased functional 
connectivity between the left IFG and the anterior insula, the bilateral inferior 
parietal cortices and also between the FPC and the left middle temporal gyrus.  
Seed-based analysis of fMRI data showed activation correlations within the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), SMA, basal ganglia and cerebellum.  
Krause et al. (2017) recorded local field potential, multi-unit activity and single 
neuron activity at multiple sites in the macaque neocortex during active and 
sham tDCS of the right PFC at rest and during active and sham tDCS delivered 
concurrently with a foraging paradigm.  There was a reduction in low-frequency 
local field potential coherence and an increase in high frequency coherence 
between distant sites (across prefrontal cortex and inferotemporal electrodes). 
Increased gamma frequency coherence was associated with faster task 
acquisition (Krause et al., 2017).   
 
These results indicate a relationship between tES induced changes in functional 
connectivity and task performance modulations and suggest that tDCS produces 
neuromodulatory effects which are not restricted to the site of stimulation but 
which are distributed across functional brain networks.  This neural mechanism 




1.3.2  TACS 
 
TACS delivers an alternating current into the cortex at a specific frequency. 
These bands represent the frequencies at which oscillations naturally occur 
within neural circuits (Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  TACS is thought to influence this 
intrinsic oscillatory activity (Wach et al., 2013) by synchronising or ‘entraining’ 
cortical oscillations (Antal & Paulus, 2013) or by adapting the amplitude of given 
frequencies (Hermann et al., 2013). A frequency-task interaction is proposed 
with neural oscillations of a specific frequency linked with specific cognitive 
functions.  Enhancing oscillations at a given frequency therefore, should have a 
predictable effect on behaviour (Brem et al., 2014).  TACS delivered at 10Hz for 
7 minutes over the motor cortex has been seen to improve implicit motor 
learning (Antal et al., 2008).  Additionally, theta tACS delivered parietally for 15 
minutes can improve working memory storage capacity (Jausovec & Jausovec, 
2014; Jausovec, Jausovec & Pahor, 2014).  To date, the application of TACS in 
the theta and gamma ranges has been shown promising effects in terms of 
improving working memory capacity (Jausovec et al., 2014; Meiron & Lavidor, 
2014) and enhancing fluid intelligence (Pahor & Jausovec; Santarnecchi et al., 
2013).  However, recently, Braun, Sokoliuk and Hanslmayr (2017) reported that 
tACS delivered in the beta range failed to ameliorate performance in a verbal 
and non-verbal material encoding task and did not modulate cortical 
excitability.  The authors questioned the effectiveness of tACS to entrain beta 
oscillations and modulate cognition (Braun et al., 2017).  Using tACS researchers 
have recently begun to explore the cortical rhythms which characterise 
attentional processes and attentional training.  By applying tACS at 10hz, 40hz or 
sham to the right parietal lobe during a spatial cueing task Hopfinger et al. 
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(2016) discovered that gamma oscillations in the right parietal cortex may 
support disengagement from task irrelevant stimuli and re-orienting to task 
relevant stimuli.  tACS in the alpha range (10hz) appeared to slow down 
responses to invalid targets (Hopfinger et al., 2016).  The findings suggested a 
role for parietal gamma and alpha oscillations in visual attention processes.  Van 
Schouwenburg et al. (2017) applied alpha tACS with the electrodes placed at F4 
and P4 (10-20 system of electrode placement) simultaneously and in-phase 
during a spatial attention task.  Alpha tACS but not sham tACS had an impact 
upon visual attentional processes by abolishing a laterality bias (faster responses 
for targets in the right hemifield; Van Schouwenburg et al.,2017).  This 
supported previous assertions that fronto-parietal alpha cohesion is integral to 
attentional processing (Sauseng et al., 2005). 
 
An advantage of tACS over tDCS is that it targets neurons which oscillate at a 
specific frequency within a neural region rather than exciting or inhibiting all 
neurons within a precise space.  It may therefore be less likely to stimulate 
neurons with competing functions, for example, excitatory and inhibitory 
neurons (Bestmann et al., 2015).  However, because TACS synchronises neurons 
to a given frequency (Cohen Kadosh, 2012) it may not lend itself to the 
enhancement of a dynamic neural system.    
 
1.3.3  TRNS 
 
TRNS involves the application of an alternating electrical current at random 
frequencies into the cortex (Fertonani et al., 2011) which can increase cortical 
excitability for up to an hour after stimulation (Moliadze et al., 2012). The 
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efficacy of low frequency (0.1-100Hz) tRNS for modulating cortical excitability 
has been explored (e.g. Terney et al., 2008) but it is high frequency tRNS, 
delivered at frequencies between 101 and 640Hz (Kuo & Nitsche, 2012), which 
has proven most proficient in this regard (e.g. Snowball et al., 2013).  In tRNS, 
bursts of current, at random amplitudes are delivered as samples, usually at a 
rate of 1280 samples per second (Moliadze et al., 2012).  Each sample is 
normally distributed around a mean of 0mA thus creating the ‘noise’ associated 
with transcranial random noise stimulation (Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  The 
mechanisms of tRNS have yet to be elucidated.  However, one theory is that 
tRNS generates small, consistent bursts of neural excitation which trigger the 
repeated polarisation of sodium channels (Paulus, 2011), bringing neurons closer 
to their threshold of activation (Fertonani et al., 2011).  Another way of 
explaining the facilitatory effects of tRNS is via the concept of stochastic 
resonance (Miniussi et al., 2013).  Stochastic resonance occurs in a noisy system 
when random noise is at an optimal level to render certain neurons more 
sensitive to weak incoming signals (Miniussi et al., 2013).  The weak signals are 
generated during performance of a cognitive task or cognitive training (Miniussi 
et a., 2013).  Thus, the principal of stochastic resonance does not propose that 
random noise causes neuronal firing per se but that it provides a platform for 
task-relevant brain activity, pushing naturally sub-threshold signals above their 
threshold of polarisation (Bestmann et al., 2015).  
 
As well as being responsible for short term modulation of cortical activity, the 
concurrent application of tRNS and cognitive training is known to elicit long 
lasting learning enhancements which suggests that the combined methodologies 
may be capable of inducing neuro-plastic changes (Medeiros et al., 2012).  The 
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consensus regarding the neural mechanisms of these long-term alterations is 
that, when high-frequency tRNS is applied during performance or learning of a 
cognitive task the resultant repeated neuronal firing activates NMDA channels, 
increasing intra-cellular calcium levels (Cohen Kadosh, 2012; Nitsche et al., 
2003).  This leads to synaptic plasticity of the type observed in long-term 
potentiation (LTP; Brunoni et al., 2012).  However, a study using 
pharmacological agents to investigate the neuronal effect of tRNS reported that 
neither the partial NMDA agonist D-cycloserine nor the NMDA antagonist 
dextromethorphan had any significant effect on tRNS induced neural excitability 
(Chaieb et al., 2015).  This suggests that the lasting effects of tRNS may be 
independent of NMDA warranting further investigation of these mechanisms. 
 
TRNS is more recent and less commonly used in research than tDCS (Cohen 
Kadosh, 2013) but has produced some robust findings in terms of its ability to 
enhance task performance when applied during cognitive training.  The 
application of high frequency tRNS to the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
during arithmetic training over 5 consecutive days, increased calculation speed 
and led to superior ‘rote’ learning of arithmetic rules compared to sham tRNS 
(Snowball et al., 2013).  This enhanced learning effect was still present after 6 
months (Snowball et al., 2013).  Elsewhere, high-frequency tRNS over the visual 
cortex led to better performance in an orientation discrimination task than sham 
stimulation, anodal tDCS and cathodal tDCS when delivered during training 
(Fertonani, Pirulli & Miniussi, 2011).   In contrast to these findings, Mulquiney et 
al. (2011) reported that performance in a 2-back task was enhanced following 
training in working memory tasks with concurrent anodal tDCS above the DLPFC 
but not following training with high frequency tRNS.  Nevertheless, favourable 
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findings (e.g. Ambrus, Paulus & Antal, 2010; Cappalletti et al., 2013; Fertonani 
et al., 2011; Snowball et al., 2013) present tRNS as a promising, emerging neuro-
modulation technique.   
 
There are advantages to using tRNS over tDCS or TACS as a means of enhancing 
the effects of training.  Firstly, relative to tDCS, tRNS is reported to have a 
higher cutaneous perception threshold (Ambrus et al., 2010).  The use of tRNS 
therefore results in less discomfort for participants and reduces the detection of 
experimental condition (Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  Secondly, random noise 
stimulation does not engage the neuronal homeostatic mechanisms associated 
with direct current stimulation (Miniussi, Harris & Ruzzoli, 2013).  During the 
application of anodal tDCS, neurons may adapt to compensate for continuous 
excitatory input.  In tRNS, the alternating nature of the applied current means 
that neurons are not subject to a constant electrical field but are subject to 
repeated sub-threshold stimulations and therefore ionic adjustments are less 
likely to be made (Fertonani et al., 2011).  Another consequence of the direct 
nature of the electrical current applied in tDCS is that it provides no subtlety if 
the process of learning involves the differential activation of a network of 
facilitatory and inhibitory neurons.  TRNS involves the generation of samples of 
positive and negative going current at random frequencies and amplitudes 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2012).  This is a more accurate representation of intrinsic 
oscillatory activity and therefore perhaps a more appropriate ‘overlay’ for 
intrinsic activity.   Another purported advantage of tRNS over tDCS is that tRNS 
current is not direction sensitive (Paulus, 2011).  Typically, in tDCS, a positive 
electrode (anode) is placed over a specific target site of the left or right cortical 
hemisphere and electrical current flows from this to a negative electrode 
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(cathode) often mistermed the ‘reference’ electrode (Biksom, Datta, Rahman & 
Scaturro, 2010; Horvath, Forte & Carter, 2015).  The possibility of ionic changes 
in the brain area beneath the return electrode therefore cannot be repudiated 
and it is possible that modulations of a specific cognitive function are not solely 
attributable to changes in cortical activity in the targeted brain region 
(Moliadze, Antal & Paulus, 2010).  TRNS avoids this complication by means of its 
operation.  Whilst advantageous in the sense that this circumvents the 
uncertainty associated with unknown effects at the cathode (during anodal 
stimulation) this also poses a disadvantage where the aim is to stimulate a brain 
structure in one specific hemisphere.  However, this has been attempted 
resulting in the successful modulation of training.  Fertonani et al. (2011) placed 
the tRNS active electrode above V1 and the return electrode on the right arm 
(Fertonani et al. 2011).  It is postulated that increasing the distance between 
the active and return electrode reduces the magnitude and duration of tDCS and 
tRNS induced after-effects (Moliadze et al., 2010).  Focality might be achieved 
by reducing the size of the active electrode and increasing the size of the return 
electrode thus increasing the density of the current delivered by the active 
electrode relative to the return (e.g. Fertonani et al. 2011).  Another way to 
potentially target a specific brain region would be to apply high definition tES 
(HD tES; Villamar et al., 2013).  In HD tES smaller (high definition) gel-based 
electrodes, approximately 25mm2 in size (Kuo et al., 2013) are applied to the 
scalp inside plastic electrode holders (e.g. Kuo et al., 2013) or are inserted into 
an EEG cap (e.g. Villamar et al., 2013).  The smaller electrode increases the 
current density at the target stimulation site (Roy et al., 2014).  Focality is 
achieved by surrounding a single ‘active’ electrode with multiple return 
electrodes between which the return current is split (Edwards et al., 2015).  In 
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the 4 x 1 high definition montage, a single stimulating electrode is positioned 
above the target brain region with 4 return electrodes positioned concentrically 
around it (e.g. Edwards et al., 2013; Kuo et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2014; Villamar 
et al., 2013).  In addition to increasing focality of stimulation, this montage 
should reduce the extent to which neural activity is altered below the return 
electrode as the current density which, with the traditional montage would have 
been allocated to one electrode, is divided between four electrodes (Roy et al., 
2014).  To date, the high definition approach to tES has been examined 
predominantly with tDCS (e.g. Edwards et al., 2013; Kuo et al., 2013; Roy et al., 
2014).  Research which has modelled current flow following HD tDCS revealed 
that, using this method current is relatively confined to the stimulated area 
(Edwards et al., 2013).  Few studies have examined the potential use of a HD 
montage with tRNS.  Heise et al. (2016) compared cortico-spinal activity change 
following 10 minutes of low-frequency tRNS with the stimulating electrode above 
M1 and the return electrode above the right supra-orbital area with high 
definition low-frequency tRNS of M1 using a ring montage.  There was an 
increase in corticospinal activity during and following HD tRNS but not following 
tRNS with the conventional montage.  Additionally, participants reported less 
discomfort with the high definition montage than with the 2-electrode montage 
(Heise et al., 2016).  These findings suggest that it may be possible to apply 






1.4 Neural Structures and Processes Associated with ABM  
(Selecting Site of Stimulation) 
 
Studies which have employed tES as a means of influencing cognitive processes, 
have applied stimulation above a well-defined neural region, often the area of 
the brain most associated with performance or modulation of that function 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2012).  In selecting a site of stimulation for enhancing the 
effects of ABM therefore it is necessary to identify which neural regions are most 
associated with the cognitive processes implicated in ABM training.  This is a 
complex assay however, given that attentional processes recruit a frontoparietal 
network including areas such as the anterior insula, ventral pre-frontal cortex 
(vPFC), dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (DLFPC), the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) and the pulvinar (the largest thalamic 
nucleus (Pessoa and Adophs, 2010).  Connectivity between these areas as well as 
activation of these structures in isolation is known to impact the efficacy of ABM 
training.  For example, Hakamata et al., 2018 reported a greater increase in 
connectivity between the pulvinar and transverse gyrus, along the 
temporoparietal junction following active ABM towards positive stimuli than 
following control ABM.  This increase in connectivity was correlated with 
decrease in self-report ‘fatigability’, a subscale of the temperament and anxiety 
inventory.  Furthermore, there was a reduction in connectivity between post-
central gyrus and ventral frontoparietal network for the active ABM group which 
was not associated with anxiety modulation (Hakamata et al., 2018). 
 
Although the attention network recruits an array of neural structures, cognitive 
models of attentional processes emphasise the role of two specific brain 
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regions.  They propose that selective attention is dependent on the influence of 
bottom-up salience driven mechanisms involving the amygdala and top-down 
attentional control mechanisms associated with the frontal cortices (Bishop, 
2007).  As such fMRI studies of ABM have focused on these areas.  One study by 
Britton et al. (2015) reported differences in amygdala activation between 
participants who had received ABM training across 4 weeks and participants who 
had received control ABM for the same period of time.  Bilateral amygdala 
activation for the threat bias contrast (reaction time for threat incongruent 
targets > reaction time for threat congruent targets) was increased for 
participants who had received active ABM group and reduced for control ABM 
group.  This result was complicated however by between group differences in 
amygdala activation prior to ABM training.  Greater reduction in social anxiety 
symptoms following ABM training was associated with greater baseline left 
amygdala activation, irrespective of ABM group and with allocation to the active 
ABM group (Britton et al., 2015).  Another study reported that ABM effects were 
mediated by neuroplastic changes in the extended amygdala-PFC network (Aday 
and Carlson, 2017).  For participants who received mobile phone-based ABM 
training towards neutral stimuli across 6 weeks, ABM was associated with 
reduced grey matter volume in the basal forebrain/extended amygdala and the 
medial PFC.  These grey matter volume reductions were positivity correlated 
with reductions in threat-related bias.  There were also increases in grey matter 
volume in the ventral PFC and dorso-lateral PFC however these changes were 
not associated with behavioural outcomes (Aday and Carlson, 2017).  These 
studies support a role for the amygdala in ABM processes and also emphasise the 
importance of functional connectivity between nodes of the attention network 
including the amygdala and the PFC.  Despite being strongly implicated in ABM 
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processes, as a subcortical structure the amygdala is not a viable target for 
transcranial electrical stimulation.  Therefore, studies with the aim of 
modulating the amygdala-prefrontal pathway have done so via tES to the PFC 
(e.g. Ironside et al., 2018, Mungee et al., 2014). 
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is considered central to cognitive control (Miller, 
2000).  As such, tES research with the aim of modulating cognitive outcomes has 
typically attempted to manipulate cortical excitability in this location.  One of 
the most commonly selected sites of stimulation of the PFC is the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).  Located in the upper region of the PFC, the DLPFC 
has functional projections to the thalamus (Wagner et al., 2013), basal ganglia 
(Scharmuller et al., 2014), hippocampus (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005) and 
areas of the parietal (Hughes et al., 2014) and occipital lobes (Kundu et al., 
2015). Anodal tDCS above the left DLPFC during training has enhanced learning 
in memory (e.g. Javadi & Cheng, 2013), attentional control (Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013; Wolkenstein et al., 2013) and executive planning (Dockery et al., 
2009) relative to sham tDCS or cathodal tDCS.   
 
Another sub-region of the PFC with notable links to executive function 
(Hampshire et al., 2010) is the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).  The IFG is in the 
lower region of the PFC and has connections to areas of the motor cortex 
(Greenlee, 2004), parietal cortex (Asplund et al., 2010) and sub-cortical regions 
(Cieslik et al., 2015).   Anodal tDCS above the left IFG has produced training 
enhancements in face-name association learning (Pisoni et al., 2014) and picture 
naming (Holland et al., 2011) relative to sham tDCS of the same location.  tDCS 
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above the right IFG has elicited augmentation of response inhibition in a stop 
signal task (Ditye et al., 2012; Jabobson et al., 2011).    
 
1.4.1 Cognitive Functions associated with ABM - Attentional control 
 
ABM is predominantly a form of attention training and a widely supported view 
of ABM is that it achieves its intended results via the enhancement of attentional 
control (Heeren, Coussement & McNally, 2016).  Efficient attentional control 
involves the ability to focus attention upon task relevant stimuli and to ignore 
non-relevant information (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).  Basanovic et al., 2017 
demonstrated that individuals with greater inhibition and selection capacity 
(two facets of attentional control) exhibited greater magnitude of change in 
attention bias in the trained direction (Basanovic et al., 2017). From a neural 
perspective, attentional control is associated with a fronto-subcortical/basal 
ganglia network (Verbruggen et al., 2008) in which the frontal cortices exert 
attentional control over a system responsible for valence evaluation (Heeren, de 
Raedt, Kosta & Phillippot, 2013).  FMRI studies using a variety of paradigms to 
explore the neural correlates of attentional control have consistently implicated 
the inferior frontal cortex in this process (e.g. Asplund et al., 2010; Hopfinger, 
Buonocore & Mangun, 2000; Milham et al., 2001) or have focused their analysis 
on the IFG (e.g. Erickson et al., 2005).  However, attention bias research which 
is predicated on the principal that biased attention towards threatening material 
reflects inefficient top-down attentional control of salience evaluation 
mechanisms, has tended to emphasise the role of the DLPFC (e.g. Peers, Simons 
& Lawrence, 2013; Telzer et al., 2008).  Some researchers have emphasised that 
attentional control is not just a function of the frontal cortices but that it is 
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modulated by a network of neural regions across the frontal, temporal, parietal 
and occipital cortices (Scolari et al., 2015).  Within this network, the posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) has also been identified as having an important role in 
spatial attention shifting (Shomstein, 2012).    
 
1.4.1.1  Attentional control and the IFG  
 
Milham et al., (2001) acquired BOLD data from participants while they 
performed a Stroop task in which participants were required to name the colour 
in which a word was printed in some trials but not in others.  Relative to no-
response trials, when a response was required, activation of the right inferior 
frontal gyrus was observed.  This suggests that the rIFG is activated when 
responding to stimuli but not while passively observing them.  Also, increased 
BOLD signal in the left inferior frontal gyrus was noted during incongruent trials 
(when the colour of the word contrasted its semantic meaning).  It is possible 
that this activation represented the inhibition of distracting information.  fMRI 
evidence appears to stress the role of the inferior frontal gyrus in attentional 
control.  However, there is an indication that the nature of its involvement may 
be hemisphere specific with the left inferior frontal gyrus dedicated to the 
resolution of attentional conflict and the right inferior frontal gyrus devoted to 
goal-directed attention (Milham et al., 2001).   
 
1.4.1.2  Attentional Control and the DLPFC 
 
Evidence from fMRI studies has indicated that biased attention towards 
threatening stimuli is related to excessive activation of the amygdala reflecting 
an enhanced emotional response towards the detection of threat related stimuli 
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(see Etkin & Wager, 2007 for review).  It has also been associated with 
impoverished functioning of the PFC which may be suggestive of inefficient 
attentional control and hence impaired down-regulation of limbic system 
response (e.g. Taylor et al., 2013).   One study with a cohort of children and 
adolescents revealed that more pronounced activity in the DLPFC in response to 
threatening faces was positively associated with greater attentional bias towards 
threat (Telzer et al., 2008).  Elevated activity in the DLPFC has been observed in 
threat trials for participants with higher attentional control scores (Peers et al., 
2013).  In a cohort of highly socially anxious participants fMRI data was recorded 
during attentional bias assessment which took place before and after ABM 
training towards neutral faces (Taylor et al., 2013).   There was reduced 
activation in the limbic system following ABM training and increased activity in 
the PFC in response to threatening faces (Taylor et al., 2013).   
 
1.4.1.3  Attentional Control and the PPC 
 
Human lesion studies have demonstrated that lesions of the PPC are associated 
with spatial attention deficits.  Syndromes such as visual neglect and extinction 
are characterised by a difficulty in detecting stimuli in the visual hemifield 
contralateral to parietal lesion (Nachev & Hussain, 2006).  Studies have shown 
that TMS-induced virtual lesions produce similar effects.  In research by Hilgetag 
et al, (2001), inhibitory TMS was applied to P3 or P4 prior to a rectangle 
detection task.  Participants were to detect small rectangles presented for 40 
milliseconds in the periphery of the visual field.  The detection of visual stimuli 
was impaired for stimuli in the contralateral hemifield with greater impairment 
for right hemisphere TMS (left hemifield stimuli).  Attention to stimuli in 
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ipsilateral hemifield improved relative to normal level demonstrating that visual 
stimulus detection efficiency is modulated by the balance between left and right 
PPC activation (Hilgetag et al., 2001).  The ability to direct visual attention is 
therefore impaired by damage to or downregulation of the PPC. 
 
A wealth of neuroimaging studies have implicated the PPC in attentional control 
processes (e.g. Beauchamp et al., 2001; Esterman et al., 2009; Hopfinger et al., 
2000; Ikkai and Curtis, 2007; Thakral & Slotnick, 2009).  Hopfinger et al. (2000) 
collected event-related fMRI data during a cued spatial cueing task.  When 
participants responded to a cue directing attentional to a specific locus of the 
visual display, activation of the superior frontal, inferior parietal and superior-
temporal cortices was observed (Hopfinger et al., 2000).  These results 
highlighted the involvement of the parietal cortex in top-down attentional 
control.  A further study recorded fMRI data during tasks requiring sustained 
focused attention (Thakral & Slotnick, 2009).  The intraparietal sulcus, right 
middle frontal gyrus and right superior temporal gyrus were consistently 
activated during sustained attention (Thakral & Slotnick, 2009).  This suggests 
that, as part of an attentional network, the PPC may be involved in maintaining 
attentional focus on specific stimuli as well as shifting attention to task-relevant 
stimuli.  
 
1.4.1.4  TES studies of Attentional Control - DLPFC 
 
Research which has explored the enhancement of working memory training with 
tES have highlighted the role of attentional control in effective performance of 
these tasks. One study reported that participants receiving 20 minutes of 2mA 
anodal tDCS above the left DLPFC whilst training in a 3-back task provided 
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significantly faster and more accurate responses in a subsequent paced, auditory 
serial addition task (PASAT) than participants who had received sham tDCS (Gill, 
Shah-Basak & Hamilton, 2015).  This effect was not seen when participants had 
trained in a 1-back task whilst receiving atDCS or sham tDCS.  This suggests that 
extent to which attentional control can be enhanced via atDCS of the DLPFC may 
be dependent upon the attentional demand of the training task.   
 
Attentional control is often conceptually divided into two functional processes: 
‘inhibition’ of aversive or task-irrelevant stimuli and ‘shifting’ of attention to 
relevant stimuli (Miyake et al., 2000; Posner & Rothbart, 1998, Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011).  These processes are two key mechanisms of ABM which 
requires the inhibition of aversive stimuli and engagement to non-threatening 
stimuli (Heeren et al., 2015a).  Inhibitory control is often afforded a special role 
in the modification of attentional processes with ABM literature emphasising the 
importance of inhibiting the engagement of threat related stimuli in reducing 
threat bias (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Beard et al., 2012; Heeren, Lievens & 
Philippot, 2011).    
 
1.4.1.5  TES studies of Attentional Control - PPC 
 
Recently, research using tES has investigated whether modulation of activity in 
the PPC impacts upon behavioural outcomes in visual attention tasks (Bolognini 
et al., 2010; Dueker et al., 2017).  In one study, participants received anodal or 
sham tDCS of the left or right PPC during an auditory and visual exploration task 
(Bolognini et al., 2010).  Anodal tDCS of the right but not of the left PPC led to 
greater increases in training-related improvement in a visual exploration task 
relative to sham tDCS.  Anodal tDCS of the right PPC was also associated with 
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improvement in covert visual spatial orienting.  Furthermore, right hemisphere 
stimulation without concurrent training was also associated with an 
improvement in visual exploration task performance.  The authors suggested 
that the modulation of right PPC activity had an effect on top-down visual 
processing capacity and that this modulation (in the absence of training) 
impacted upon visual attentional control capacity (Bolognini et al., 2010).  
 
1.4.2  Cognitive Functions associated with ABM - Inhibitory control 
 
Inhibitory control refers to the stopping of a response which has been initiated 
(Jacobson et al., 2011) or which is overlearned or conditioned (Stramaccia et 
al., 2015).  It has been suggested that the right IFG (rIFG) has functional 
specificity for inhibitory control (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Rubia et al., 
2003) and this notion has received empirical support from brain imaging studies 
(Aron et al.,2004; Menon et al., 2001, Rubia et al., 2003).  However, previous 
studies have also implicated the DLPFC (Krug & Carter; 2012) and the pre-SMA 
(Floden & Stuss, 2006) in inhibitory control function.   Two main paradigms have 
been used to evaluate inhibitory control of motor response. The first is the 
go/go-no task in which participants are instructed to respond to a stimulus if it is 
in one format (e.g. in a particular colour) and to withhold response if it is in a 
different format (Georgiou & Essau, 2011).  The second is the stop signal task 
(SST) in which participants must respond to a stimulus unless it is proceeded by a 
signal (audio or visual) which indicates that the participant must refrain from 
responding (Aron et al., 2003).  Inhibitory control also describes the control of 
pre-potent attentional and/or emotional responses (Meule, 2017).  This might be 
resisting distractor interference from emotionally salient stimuli (Friedman & 
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Miyake, 2004).  One example of a task which assesses attentional inhibitory 
control is the emotional Stroop task in which participants must supress the 
processing of emotionally valenced words in order to report the colour in which 
they are presented (Wingenfeld et al., 2009).   
 
1.4.2.1  Inhibitory Control and the IFG 
 
Evidence in support of an IFG influence in inhibitory control is ubiquitous.  FMRI 
studies have reported an increase in BOLD signal in rIFG during response 
inhibition tasks at the point that stopping is required (Aron et al.,2004; Menon et 
al., 2001, Rubia et al., 2003).  In Brown et al. (2012), healthy adults performed 
an emotional Go/No Go task which used aversive and neutral stimuli.  Response 
inhibition in both neutral and aversive trials elicited IFG activation greater than 
in the simple response baseline (neutral go trials; Brown et al., 2012).  Another 
study scanned participants whilst they underwent a number of inhibitory control 
tasks including the go/no-go paradigm, the stop signal task and the conventional 
Stroop task (Cieslik et al., 2015).  Throughout these tasks there was consistent 
activation the inferior frontal gyrus.  Using the emotional Stroop task, Mohanty 
et al. (2005) reported increased activation in both the IFG and the DLPFC when 
naming the colour of negative words relative to neutral words. 
 
1.4.2.2  Inhibitory control and the DLPFC  
 
In a study by Krug and Carter (2012), participants performed a facial Stroop task 
in which fearful or neutral faces were presented with the word ‘fearful’ or 
‘neutral’ visible across the middle of the face image.  Participants were required 
to indicate the facial expression.  The researchers reported sustained activation 
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of the DLPFC when words were incongruent with facial expression (Krug & 
Carter; 2012).  Whilst the researchers highlighted the activity of the DLPFC 
during trials in which word meaning conflicted with facial expression, their 
results also indicated that there was enhanced activation of the IFG in these 
trials (Krug & Carter; 2012).  
 
1.4.2.3  Inhibitory control and the Pre-SMA 
A number of accounts of the neural mechanisms sub-serving inhibitory control 
stemming from ERP source localisation and fMRI studies suggest that these are 
spread across a network or regions including the DLPFC, IFC, inferior parietal 
cortex, the basal ganglia and the pre-supplementary motor cortex (pre-SMA; 
Albert et al., 2013).  The pre-SMA forms part of the dorsomedial frontal cortex 
and is positioned anterior to the primary motor cortex (Juan and Muggleton, 
2012).  It is an area associated with the inhibition of motor response (Aron and 
Poldrack, 2006).  
  
Evidence from lesion studies suggests that damage to the pre-SMA is linked with 
impaired response inhibition (e.g. Floden and Stuss, 2006; see Mostofsky and 
Simmonds, 2008 for review).  Research which has examined or proposed a role 
for the pre-SMA in response inhibition has often used the stop signal task (SST; 
e.g. Albert et al,. 2013; Chao et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Coxon et al., 2014; 
Hsu et al., 2011; Li et al., 2006).  A number of these studies have studied pre-
SMA activation during the SST using fMRI (e.g. Albert et al., 2013; Chao et al., 
2009; Coxon et al., 2014; Li et al., 2006).  Albert et al. (2013) reported that 
participants who responded more quickly in ‘go’ trials of the SST had greater 
pre-SMA activation during successful infrequent no-go trials.  This suggests that 
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participants with greater pre-potent response tendency required greater 
inhibitory resources to inhibit motor response (Albert et al., 2013).  A further 
study reported that participants with shorter stop signal reaction time (an 
indication of the time taken to elicit the withholding of response, estimated 
using the distribution of ‘go’ reaction times and the probability of responding in 
stop trials) had greater activation in the superior medial frontal cortices 
(including the pre-SMA) than participants with longer stop signal reaction 
time).  Neuromodulation techniques have also been used to investigate the role 
of the pre-SMA in response inhibition (e.g. Chen et al., 2009; Hsu et al., 2011).  
In the study by Chen et al. (2009), inhibitory rTMS to the pre-SMA, to the vertex 
or no rTMS was applied prior to completion of the stop signal task.  Participants 
who had received rTMS above the pre-SMA showed increased error rates.  
Specifically, the number of ‘stop’ trials in which response was withheld was 
lower for participants who received rTMS of the pre-SMA compared to those who 
had received rTMS to the vertex and those who had not received rTMS (Chen et 
al., 2009).  When single pulse TMS was applied to the pre-SMA but not when it 
was applied above the vertex during a stop switch task, inhibition was impaired 
(Obeso et al., 2013). However, this only occurred when sham continuous theta 
burst stimulation was applied to the rIFG prior to the task and not when active 
continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) had been applied to the rIFG.  This 
suggests that the effects of single pulse TMS over the pre-SMA were modulated 
by cTBS.  This indicates a functional connectivity between the pre-SMA and rIFG 






1.4.2.4  TES Studies of Inhibitory Control - IFG 
 
In a study by Chambers et al. (2006), low frequency repetitive (inhibitory) TMS 
to the rIFG resulted in impaired performance in a go-no-go task.  In Jacobson et 
al. (2011) 10 minutes of offline atDCS above the rIFG led to significantly better 
response inhibition in a stop signal task than sham tDCS, ctDCS or control tDCS 
over the right angular gyrus.  In a further study, after receiving atDCS over the 
rIFG for 4 consecutive days during training in a stop signal task, participants 
demonstrated a greater linear improvement in response inhibition across trials 
relative to those who received training with sham stimulation (Ditye et al., 
2012).  Leite et al. (2017) examined whether inhibition of prepotent response is 
lateralised to the rIFG or a function of inter-hemispheric balance between the 
left and right IFG.  Participants received unihemispheric tDCS (anode of 35cm2 
above the rIFG and a cathode of 100cm2 above the lIFG), bihemispheric tDCS 
(anode of 35cm2 above the rIFG and a cathode of 35cm2 above the lIFG), or sham 
tDCS during a proactive control task.  In the task, participants indicated the 
direction in which an arrow was pointing if the arrow was green or indicated the 
opposite direction is the arrow was red.  Accuracy was increased but response 
time reduced following unihemispheric tDCS but not for bihemispheric or sham 
tDCS (Leite et al., 2017).  This signals that the inhibition of prepotent response 








1.4.2.5  TES Studies of Inhibitory Control - DLPFC 
 
Anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC has been seen to ameliorate attentional inhibition 
in a Stroop colour-word matching task (Loftus et al., 2015).  TDCS was delivered 
offline however, between two administrations of the Stroop task and not during 
training for the task (Loftus et al., 2015). In another study, anodal or sham tDCS 
over the left DLPFC was delivered prior to a Cued Emotional Control Task 
(Vanderhasselt et al., 2013).  Participants received the cue word ‘opposite’ or 
‘actual’ followed by a sad or happy face image.  They then had to press a button 
corresponding to the actual or opposite emotion (sad or happy) to the face 
image dependent upon the cue preceding the stimulus.  Response times were 
faster for opposite/happy trials relative to opposite/sad trials for the atDCS 
group but not the sham tDCS group.  The authors suggested that anodal tDCS 
improved the ability to inhibit a habitual response towards positive relative to 
negative face images (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). 
 
1.4.2.6  TES Studies of Inhibitory Control - Pre-SMA 
 
Hsu et al. (2011) applied anodal or cathodal tDCS at 1.5mA above pre-SMA for 10 
minutes to participants before they completed the stop signal task.  The authors 
reported reduced non-cancelled response rates following anodal tDCS and 
increased non-cancelled response rated following cathodal tDCS.  There were no 
such effects when participants received tDCS to a control site (the primary 
motor cortex; M1).  
  
The pre-SMA is associated with the inhibition of pre-potent motor response, 
potentially via it’s links to the basal ganglia which exerts influence over the 
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primary motor cortex (Juan and Muggleton, 2012) or connection to the 
subthalamic nucleus and striatum which are associated with behavioural 
inhibition (Aaron and Poldrack, 2006; Li et al., 2008b).  However, there is little 
evidence of pre-SMA involvement in emotional response inhibition which may be 
of particular relevance to ABM training.  Therefore, it might not be optimal 




1.5 ABM with TES 
 
To my knowledge only a few studies have reported the use of tES delivered 
alone or concurrently with ABM for manipulating attention bias.  In the study 
reported by Ironside, O’Shea, Cowen and Harmer, (2015) participants received 
active tDCS for 20 minutes at 2mA or sham tDCS offline (while the participant 
was at rest and not during training).  Active tDCS was delivered using two 
different montages.  Some participants received bilateral tDCS to the DLPFC 
with the anode placed over the left DLPFC (F3) and cathode over the right DLPFC 
(F4).  Other participants received anodal tDCS with the anode above the left 
DLPFC and the cathode placed over the right supra-orbital ridge.  Stimuli were 
happy-neutral, neutral-neutral or fearful-neutral face pairs and were presented 
for 100ms or 1000ms before participants indicated the orientation of a pair of 
dots which replaced one of the faces.  For trials in which stimuli were presented 
for 100ms there was an effect of tDCS group.  Relative to the sham tDCS group 
participants in the bilateral tDCS group had significantly reduced (smaller) 
attentional bias towards fearful faces. Whereas participants who received sham 
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tDCS had an attentional bias towards fearful faces during subsequent attention 
bias assessment, those in the bilateral tDCS group did not.  Participants who 
received anodal tDCS with the return electrode above the right supra-orbital 
ridge did not have reduced threat bias relative to the sham group (Ironside et 
al., 2015).  In the study by Ironside et al., (2015), no measure of attention bias 
was taken before tDCS and vigilance towards threatening faces in the sham tDCS 
group was used as the baseline measure of bias.  Consequently, it is not possible 
to state with certainty that the disparities in attentional bias between groups 
arose from stimulation group and not simply the result of baseline differences in 
bias levels.  In order to elucidate differential roles for the left and right DLPFC 
in attentional processes, Sagliano et al. (2017) delivered tDCS offline following 
and prior to attention bias assessment using a Modified Posner task.  TDCS or 
sham tDCS was delivered for 15 minutes at 1mA with the anode above the left 
DLPFC (F3) and the cathode above the right DLPFC (F4) or with the anode above 
the right DLPFC (F4) and the cathode above the left DLPFC (F3).  During 
attention bias assessment, threatening or non-threatening images were 
presented before a target for 100ms, 200ms or 500ms.  STAI score at baseline 
(high or low) was used as a between participants factor to examine whether the 
impact of tDCS stimulation was modulated by STAI score. When stimuli were 
presented for 200ms, threat bias was revealed for participants who received 
anodal tDCS of the right DLPFC and cathodal tDCS of the left DLFPC.  
Participants in this group with low anxiety showed delayed disengagement from 
threatening stimuli.  Participants in this group with high anxiety showed 
facilitated engagement to threatening stimuli (Sagliano et al., 2017).  Heeren et 
al. (2017) assessed whether anodal tDCS, delivered at 2mA for 25 minutes above 
the left DLPFC with the cathode on the ipsilateral arm, reduced threat bias in 
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socially anxious participants.  Anodal tDCS or sham tDCS was delivered online 
(during attention bias assessment).  No ABM took place.  Attentional bias 
towards threat was significantly lower in the anodal tDCS group compared to the 
sham tDCS group.  The authors concluded that direct augmentation of activity in 
the DLFPC facilitated attenuation of bias towards threat related stimuli (Heeren 
et al., 2017).  Another study compared the impact of ABM training towards 
neutral stimuli (away from threatening stimuli) combined with atDCS, ctDCS or 
sham tDCS of the left DLPFC on indices of attention bias (Heeren et al., 2015b).  
Response time data revealed no decrease in attention bias towards threat from 
pre- to post ABM in any of the conditions.  However, eye-tracking revealed that 
the amount of time that gaze fixated upon threatening faces was reduced after 
ABM with anodal tDCS but not in the other two tDCS groups (Heeren et al., 
2015b). Clarke et al., (2014) reported that both ABM away from and ABM 
towards threat with anodal tDCS concurrently applied to the DLPFC induced an 
attention bias in the trained direction which was greater than that attained via 
ABM with sham tDCS (Clarke et al., 2014).   
 
Each of the above studies comprised only one experimental session.  There are 
mixed findings concerning how the length of ABM training (the number of ABM 
sessions delivered or the number of trials per session) effects the outcomes of  
ABM training.  Beard et al., (2012) suggested that ABM training over a number of 
sessions is more effective than single-session ABM training for improving 
symptomology (Beard et al., 2012). Other meta-analyses have reported that 
number of sessions was not a significant moderator of the impact of ABM on 
anxiety (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Rusco, 2011) but that a greater 
number of ABM sessions resulted in greater modulation of attention bias 
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(Hakamata et al., 2010).  In contrast an inverse relationship between the length 
of training and the level of symptom change has been reported in ABM studies 
(Cristea et al., 2015; Price et al., 2017).  Price et al. (2017) reported greater 
effect on symptoms for shorter training relative to longer training (Price et al., 
2017).  The moderating influence of number of sessions has not been explored 
for ABM with tES and so a potential progression from these studies would be to 
study the impact of ABM with tES across a number of sessions.   
 
Although ABM seeks to target threat related bias with the aim of reducing 
anxiety, studies using tES to modulate ABM training (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren 
et al., 2015b) included no measure of anxiety.  It is therefore impossible to know 
whether threat bias reductions mediated anxiety attenuation.  Further 
investigation is needed to establish whether attentional bias modulations which 
occur when tES is delivered concurrently with ABM are accompanied by 




Early cognitive models of anxiety predict that information processing biases play 
a crucial part in elevated anxiety (e.g. Williams et al., 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998).  Subsequent research demonstrated that attentional bias towards threat 
related stimuli is implicated in the development, aetiology and maintenance of 
anxiety (Bar Haim, 2010).  In particular, a high level of anxiety is associated with 
more rapid engagement to threatening than to neutral information (Rinck & 
Becker, 2007) and greater difficulty disengaging from threatening material (Fox, 
Russo & Dutton, 2002).  Recent years have seen the emergence of attention bias 
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modification (ABM), a cognitive training paradigm (often computerised) which 
reduces or induces attention bias by directing attention away from or towards 
aversive stimuli (McLeod & Holmes, 2012).  Promisingly, ABM represents a new 
technique for intervening in the formation and consolidation of anxiety.  It can 
produce efficacious results at a sub-clinical level (e.g. Van Bockstaele et al., 
2012), and in clinical populations ABM has been reported to attenuate attention 
bias and to reduce symptoms of general anxiety disorder (e.g. Amir et al., 
2009b) and social anxiety disorder (Schmidt et al., 2009). 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation (TES) is a non-invasive form of brain 
stimulation involving the application of a small current of electricity to selected 
areas of the brain via electrodes (Cohen Kadosh, 2013). TES modulates cortical 
excitability within defined regions of interest (Brunoni et al., 2012).  The 
technique is currently receiving considerable attention in light of its ability to 
augment performance in cognitive tasks when applied during training (Cohen 
Kadosh, 2013).  ABM represents a form of cognitive training and it is therefore 
possible that its mechanisms are susceptible to modulation via TES.  To date few 
studies have examined the impact of tES delivered concurrently with ABM 
training reporting an enhancement of ABM training (Clark et al., 2014; Heeren et 
al., 2015b).  These studies delivered tDCS above the left DLPFC during one 
session of ABM training.  There is therefore the opportunity to explore the use of 
other forms of tES and to target other sites of stimulation.  Additionally, future 
studies can investigate whether ABM training with tES across a number of days is 








1.7 Research Aims 
 
1.7.1  Study 1 
 
The aim of study 1 was to explore whether tES could modulate the impact of 
ABM training in terms of reducing attentional bias towards threat and reducing 
anxiety.  It was anticipated that ABM training towards neutral face images 
(active ABM) would prove more effective at reducing both threat bias and 
anxiety than control ABM.  It was further predicted that active online tES would 
enhance the effects of active ABM only training relative to sham tES. 
 
1.7.1.1  Experiment 1 
 
In experiment 1 participants received high frequency (active) tRNS or sham tRNS 
to the bilateral IFG for 20 minutes at the beginning of three active or control 
ABM training sessions.  Attention bias was assessed at the beginning of day 1, at 
the end of day 3 and at a 30 day follow up.  State anxiety was measured at the 
beginning and end of each experimental session.  It was predicted that 
participants receiving active ABM would have reduced threat-related attention 
bias and anxiety as compared with those receiving control ABM.  It was further 
predicted that these reductions in attention bias and anxiety would be more 






1.7.1.2  Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 extended experiment 1 and studies which have reported 
indistinguishable reductions in anxiety following both ABM training towards 
neutral stimuli and control ABM training (e.g. Carlbring et al., 2012; Cristea et 
al., 2015; Carleton et al., 2015; Enock et al., 2015; Heeren et al., 2013; Heeren 
et al., 2015a; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; McNally, Enock, Tsai & Tousian, 2013).  
Early proponents of ABM training (e.g. Macleod et al., 2002) suggested that the 
mechanism of active ABM training is the contingency (more or all targets 
replacing neutral relative to threatening cues).  This seeks to implicitly train the 
automatic engagement of neutral stimuli and reduce orientation towards threat 
which contributes to the formation and maintenance of anxiety. However, this 
mechanism does not explain anxiety reduction following control ABM.  One 
suggestion is that cognitive training, irrespective of the inclusion of contingency, 
increases attentional control and thus the capacity for attention regulation 
(Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013; Klumpp et al., 2010; Taylor, Cross & 
Amir, 2015).  Experiment 2 replicated experiment 1 except that all participants 
underwent a simplified version of the ABM training paradigm which was designed 
to minimise enhancement of attentional control in lieu of active or control ABM.  
Participants were required to press a single key if a target appeared and to 
withhold response where there was no target.  It was hypothesised that ‘no-
training’ ABM would induce no improvement in attention bias and anxiety 
relative to the active ABM and control ABM groups of experiment 1 which each 
had the capacity to augment attentional control.  This would support the theory 
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that attentional control enhancement is the mechanism via which anxiety 
reduction occurs following ABM training irrespective of training group. 
1.7.1.3  Experiment 3 
 
Previous studies have reported successful modulation of ABM using anodal tDCS 
above the DLPFC (Clarke et al., 2017; Heeren et al., 2015b).  This has not been 
examined across 3 consecutive days however.  Previous studies also failed to 
investigate the impact of ABM with concurrent tDCS on anxiety levels (Clarke et 
al., 2017; Heeren et al., 2015b).  In experiment 3 anodal tDCS replaced active 
TRNS as the mode of tES and was delivered consecutively with active or control 
ABM.  It was predicted that the experiment would support the findings from 
Clarke et al. (2014) and Heeren et al. (2015b) that anodal tDCS enhances ABM 
training towards neutral faces.   
 
1.7.2  Study 2 
 
Findings from studies which have used the emotional dot-probe task to measure 
attentional bias have been mixed (Bantin et al., 2016).  Recent work has 
suggested that the task lacks sensitivity as a measure of attention bias 
(Sigurjonsdottir et al., 2015). It has been shown to have poor internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (Rodebaugh et al., 2016; Schmukle, 2005).  
Moreover, ABM induced attention bias reduction, as measured using the 
emotional dot-probe task, has been found not to transfer to other tasks which 
assess attentional bias (Van Bockstaele et al., 2017).  This may be attributable 
to the poor psychometric properties of the assessment task (Van Bockstaele et 
al., 2017).  Kappenman et al. (2014) reported that reaction time, as assessed by 
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the modified dot-probe task, did not show any indication of automatic 
engagement of threat, demonstrated poor internal consistency and was not 
correlated with trait anxiety.  The inconsistency and unreliability reported 
(Schmukle, 2005) might have less to do with the dot-probe task per se and more 
to do with its reaction time-based output.  Conversely, an event related 
potential index of attention (the N2PC component) measured using EEG did 
reveal an initial shift towards threat related stimuli and was internally reliable 
(Kappenman et al., 2014).  ERPs are considered accurate temporal markers of 
visual spatial attention allocation and stimulus processing (Bar Haim et al., 
2005).  In study 2 anodal or sham tDCS above the left DLPFC was applied during 
one session of active ABM training towards neutral stimuli.  Attention bias was 
measured immediately before training and directly afterwards using the 
modified dot probe task.  During assessment EEG recording was taken. The N2PC 
was isolated as a measure of attention bias in addition to recording reaction 
times.  The aim was to capture a more detailed indication of the impact of 
anodal tDCS versus sham tDCS with ABM on attention bias than could be provided 
by reaction time alone.  It was hypothesised that there would be greater 
attenuation of N2pc amplitude to angry faces following ABM with anodal tDCS 





Modulation of Attention Bias Modification using Transcranial Random Noise 
Stimulation of the Bilateral Inferior Frontal Gyrus. 
Experiment 1 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli is implicated in the development, 
aetiology and maintenance of anxiety (Amir, Taylor & Donohue, 2011).  ABM is a 
computerised cognitive training task which has been seen to manipulate the 
direction and magnitude of attentional biases (Bar-Haim, 2010).  ABM paradigms 
which are intended to reduce attentional bias towards threat have also been 
effective in reducing anxiety (Beard et al., 2012).  TES is a form of non-invasive 
brain stimulation which is known to modulate the effects of cognitive training 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  Since the start of the current project two studies have 
reported successful modulation of ABM using tES (Clark et al., 2014; Heeren et 
al., 2015b).  However, these studies represent the very early stages of ABM with 
tES research.  tES research is still in its infancy and questions remain regarding 
which type, electrode montage and stimulation parameters are best suited to 
the modulation of certain types of cognitive training.  Much is to be done in 
terms of finding the optimal design for ABM and tES as stand-alone 
methodologies.  Yet more is needed to identity the ideal combination of ABM 
and tES for modulating attentional bias and anxiety.  Experiment 1 aimed to 
investigate the modulation of ABM training using tRNS. ABM and tES procedures 
have, individually, been subject to enormous variability in methodology.  Careful 
62 
 
consideration of the design aspects which have created methodological variance 
was necessary to inform procedure.   
 
2.1.1  ABM Design 
 
Although early studies using the emotional dot-probe task to modify attention 
bias were promising (e.g. Macleod et al., 2002), recent reports suggest that 
findings have been variable and have questioned the reliability of the task (Mogg 
et al., 2017).  It has been suggested that this inconsistency of findings is 
attributable to aspects of the ABM task which have been presented differently 
between studies (Hakamata et al., 2010).   
 
2.1.1.1  Stimulus Type 
 
The first designs of the modified dot probe task used to modify attentional bias 
employed negative and positive words as the stimuli (e.g. Macleod et al., 2002) 
and this design has been replicated since with successful outcomes (e.g. Baert et 
al., 2010; Chen et al., 2015; Cret et al., 2013).  However, a review of ABM 
research reported larger effect sizes for faces over words (Bar Haim et al., 
2010).  More recent versions of the emotional dot-probe have typically used face 
stimuli (e.g. Amir et al., 2011; Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; 
Eldar et al., 2008; Heeren et al., 2015a; Li et al., 2008; Suway et al., 2013).  
Browning et al. (2012) suggested that face-based ABM elicits a more emotion-
centred response than word-based training.  They directly compared the impact 
of using face stimuli and word stimuli in ABM training and reported a greater 
decline in depressive symptoms and anxiety symptoms with face-based ABM 
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compared to word-based ABM, with the effect on anxiety maintained at a 4-
week follow-up (Browning et al., 2012).  Traditionally, ABM protocols for use in 
social anxiety have utilised neutral-disgust faces (e.g. Amir et al., 2009b; 
Boettcher et a., 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; Heeren et al., 2015a; Klumpp & 
Amir, 2010).  Evidence suggests that individuals with social anxiety rate disgust 
faces as more negative compared to angry faces (Amir et al., 2010).  This is 
perhaps because disgust faces represent rejection and aversion, constructs 
which are relevant in social anxiety (Amir et al., 2008).  ABM paradigms designed 
to target generalised anxiety or non-anxious individuals have, however, tended 
to use angry faces (e.g. Eldar et al., 2008; O’Toole et al., 2012; Suway et al., 
2013).  Angry faces, which represent potent threat cues, are known to disrupt 
attention in cases of generalised anxiety and in non-anxious individuals (Monk et 
al., 2008).  
 
2.1.1.2  Stimulus Alignment and Size 
 
Another source of variability within ABM designs is stimulus orientation.  Some 
researchers have selected vertical alignment of stimuli (e.g. Amir et al., 2009b; 
Klumpp et al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2010; McNally et al., 2013) whereas others 
have presented stimuli horizontally (e.g. Heeren et al., 2012; Li et al., 2008; 
Wells & Beavers, 2010).  Meta-analyses have reported larger effect sizes for 
studies using vertical orientation (Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al, 2010).  
Face stimuli presented horizontally have tended to be larger e.g. 11cm tall by 
8cm wide (e.g. Amir et al., 2011); 11cm tall by 7.6cm wide (e.g. Heeren et al., 
2012) compared to vertical face stimuli e.g. 3.75cm tall by 5cm wide (e.g. Amir 
et al., 2008); 4cm tall by 5.3cm wide (e.g. Van Bockstaele et al., 2012).  ABM 
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training is an implicit process which aims to manipulate early, pre-conscious 
engagement to stimuli (Bar-haim et al., 2010).  It could be that larger horizontal 
stimuli are more easily visually engaged than smaller vertical stimuli and 
therefore become processed at a conscious, explicit level rather than at an 
automatic level.   
 
2.1.1.3  Length of Presentation of Stimuli 
 
There is little consensus regarding the optimal length of presentation for stimuli 
in ABM protocols.  ABM training for depressive symptoms has tended to present 
stimuli for longer durations e.g. 1500ms (Baert et al., 2010), 3000ms (Wells & 
Beavers, 2010) with successful outcomes.  O’Toole et al. (2012) revealed that, 
for neuro-typical participants who had a pre-existing bias before ABM training, 
ABM in which face stimuli were presented for 100ms before the onset of the 
target letter resulted in effective manipulation of attentional bias in the trained 
direction (towards threat or towards neutral).  Nevertheless, the large majority 
of ABM paradigms for use with anxious or non-anxious individuals have presented 
stimuli for 500ms (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring et al., 
2012; Heeren et al., 2015a; Klumpp & Amir, 2010; Li et al., 2008).   
 
2.1.1.4  Length of training 
 
The number of training sessions in ABM protocols is also purported to be 
influential in research outcomes (Heeren et al., 2015c).  This number ranges 
from 1 (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2015; Cret et al., 2013; Klumpp et 
al., 2010; Macleod et a., 2012) to 15 training sessions (See, Macleod & Bridle., 
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2009).  In addition, sessions have varied in length (number of trials).  For 
example, as few as 160 trials (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Klumpp et al., 2010) and as 
many as 600 trials (Suway et al., 2013) have been included in 1-session studies.  
Where ABM training has comprised a greater number of training sessions, the 
sessions have generally been shorter [e.g. 8 sessions of 160 trials (Amir et al., 
2009b) and 15 sessions of 192 trials (See et al., 2009)].  Early meta-analyses of 
ABM studies have reported that a greater number of sessions produces greater 
effect sizes in terms of post-treatment reduction in attentional bias towards 
threat (Hakamata et al., 2010) and reduction in symptoms (Beard et al., 2012).  
However, number of training has also been found not to modulate the impact of 
ABM on symptoms (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Rusco, 2011). Recent meta-
analyses have, in fact, reported lower effects of ABM training on symptom 
reduction with a greater number of training sessions (Cristea et al., 2015) or 
longer training as calculated by number of sessions multiplied by length of 
sessions (Price et al., 2017).  There is, to date, no consensus regarding the 
optimal number of ABM sessions or session length or whether multi-session ABM 
is more effective than single session ABM necessitating further research. 
 
2.1.2  Transcranial Electrical Stimulation 
 
Chapter 1 includes a comprehensive review of different types of tES and what is 
known of the benefits and potential challenges of each for modulating cognitive 
training.  There is a wealth of evidence in support of the modulation of cognitive 
training using tDCS as outlined in chapter 1 and anodal tDCS has been shown to 
enhance the effects of ABM training towards neutral faces (Clarke et al., 2014; 
Heeren et al., 2015b).  However, tDCS is known to induce discomfort in some 
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participants including itching and tingling of the skin (Ambrus et al., 2010).  This 
might render the receipt of tDCS unpleasant and studies using tDCS may be 
subject to higher rates of attrition.  TDCS-generated discomfort might also 
create difficulties in terms of maintaining experimental blinds (Zaghi et al., 
2009).  TRNS is more recent and less commonly used in research than tDCS 
(Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  However, there is robust evidence that tRNS effectively 
modulates the effects of cognitive training (e.g. Fertonani, Pirulli & Miniussi, 
2011; Snowball et al., 2013).   TRNS is reported to have a higher cutaneous 
perception threshold compared to tDCS (Ambrus et al., 2010).   The use of tRNS 
therefore results in less discomfort for participants and facilitates the 
maintenance of experimental blinds (Cohen Kadosh, 2013). In addition, tRNS, in 
which neurons receive repeated sub-threshold stimulations (Fertonani et al., 
2011), may not result in engagement of the neuronal homeostatic mechanisms 
associated with tDCS whereby membrane potentials adapt to accommodate a 
continuous excitatory or inhibitory input (Miniussi, Harris & Ruzzoli, 2013).  TRNS 
involves the generation of samples of positive and negative going current at 
random frequencies and amplitudes (Cohen Kadosh, 2012).  It may therefore 
enhance the intrinsic oscillatory activity associated with cognitive training with 
greater subtlety than tDCS in which excitatory and inhibitory neurons are held 
within a constant excitatory or inhibitory electrical field.  Furthermore, unlike 
tDCS, tRNS is not direction sensitive (Paulus, 2011).  For a full discussion 





2.1.2.1 Methodological Considerations in tES Application 
Stimulation Dose (Safety) 
 
Dosage is determined by the density of the current (which is a factor of current 
amplitude and electrode size), tES montage (including the positioning of the 
electrodes; Peterchev et al., 2012; Poreisz et al., 2007) and length of the 
stimulation period (Brunoni et al., 2012).   The recommended dosage safety 
regimen has been set out through work at the University of Gottingen (e.g. 
Boggio et al., 2007; Nitsche et al., 2003a), and outlined in Bikson et al. (2009).  
This protocol stipulates that if current density does not exceed 25.46A/m2 then 
stimulation can be applied for 20 minutes with little or no sensation and without 
damage to skin (Bikson et al., 2009).  Typically studies which have used 
transcranial electrical stimulation for neuromodulatory purposes have 
administered current at a density far below the endorsed stimulation density 
limit.  Electrode size has ranged from 9cm2 (e.g. Cohen Kadosh et al., 2010) to 
35cm2 (e.g. Bolognini et al., 2010; Stagg et al., 2011) and stimulation amplitude 
has been between 0.2mA (e.g. Nitsche & Paulus, 2000) and 2mA (e.g. Cattaneo 
et al., 2011; Holland et al., 2011).    These parameters would result in maximum 
stimulation density of 1.25A/m2.    In studies using tRNS, Fertonani et al. (2011) 
safely delivered current densities of between .25A/m2 and .6A/m2 for 22 minutes 
and Snowball et al. (2013) delivered a current density of .4A/m2 for 20 minutes.  
The use of tES within the recommended density guidelines has not been 
associated with injury and the most aversive side-effect arising from studies 
using this protocol is skin irritation beneath the electrode, incidents of which are 




2.1.2.2  The Impact of Stimulation Dose on Cortical Excitability and 
Behavioural Outcomes 
 
A number of studies have used TMS to measure motor evoked potentials (MEPs), 
a measure of corticospinal excitability, following the application of tES at 
different dosages.  In a series of experiments Nitsche and Paulus (2000) applied 
anodal or cathodal tDCS to the motor cortex (return electrode at the 
contralateral supraorbital ridge) with both electrodes measuring 35cm2.  TDCS 
was applied for between 0 and 5 minutes at intensities ranging from 0.2mA 
(.0057mA/cm2) to 1mA (.029mA/cm2).  At least 3 minutes of tDCS at 1mA or 5 
minutes of tDCS at 0.6mA were needed to induce aftereffects.  The authors 
found larger increases in MEP amplitude following tDCS at higher intensities 
compared to tDCS at lower intensities (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000).  Bastani et al. 
(2013) delivered anodal tDCS for 10 minutes at densities of .013mA/cm2, .029 
mA/cm2, .058 mA/cm2 or .083 mA/cm2.  Corticospinal excitability was increased 
compared to baseline following tDCS for all densities.  Like Nitsche and Paulus 
(2000) the relationship between the highest three intensities and corticospinal 
excitability followed a linear pattern with higher intensities associated with 
higher corticospinal excitability.  However, the lowest density (.013mA/cm2) 
resulted in MEPs which were greater than those generated for .029 mA/cm2 and 
.058 mA/cm2.  Comparable findings were reported by Jamil et al., (2017).  For 
anodal tDCS, there was a non-linear relationship between current intensity and 
cortical excitability with the lowest intensity (.5mA) and the highest intensity 
(2mA) producing greater effects following stimulation than 1mA or 1.5mA.  In 
another study, anodal tDCS at 2mA and cathodal tDCS at 2mA resulted in 
increased corticospinal activity but cathodal tDCS at 1mA resulted in decreased 
69 
 
corticospinal excitability (Batsikadze et al., 2013).  Kidgell et al. (2013) reported 
equivalent increases in cortical excitability following 10 minutes of anodal tDCS 
at .8mA, .1mA and 1.2mA.  Evidence from MEP studies therefore suggests a 
complex, non-monotonic relationship between tES application parameters and 
effect on cortical excitability (Esmaeilpour et al., 2017). 
 
Another way to study the impact of differing tDCS dose regimens is to examine 
their impact on behavioural outcomes of training where tDCS has been used to 
modulate the effects of training.  Evidence from such investigations has also 
been varied.  A meta-analysis looked at the effect of tDCS parameters in studies 
on accuracy and reaction time in cognitive tasks for neuropsychiatric and 
neurotypical participants (Dedoncker et al., 2016).  It reported that higher 
densities and density charge [density x stimulation duration (Bikson, 2009)] were 
associated with higher task accuracy in neurotypical participants.  There was no 
such finding for neuropsychiatric participants (Dedoncker et al., 2016).  Teo et 
al. (2011) delivered atDCS 1mA, 2mA or sham tDCS of the left DLPFC for 20 
minutes during working memory training.  Response times were faster for 2mA 
tDCS compared to the sham tDCS during the last 5 minutes of stimulation but 
there was no difference between the 1mA and the 2mA groups.  In contrast, 
following 20 minutes of sham, 1mA or 2mA atDCS to the left DLPFC, faster 
reaction times in the n-back task were observed following 1mA anodal tDCS 
compared to sham or 2mA anodal tDCS (Hoy et al., 2013).  In a study by Nikolin 
et al. (2018) participants received bifrontal tDCS with the anode above the left 
DLPFC (F3) and the cathode above the right DLPFC (F4).  TDCS was delivered for 
15 minutes during the 3-back task at intensities of 2mA (.125mA/cm2), 1mA 
(.0625mA/cm2), .034mA (.0021mA/cm2), .016mA (.001mA/cm2) or 0mA 
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(0mA/cm2).  EEG data were recorded and the P3 component (positive deflection 
between 220ms and 420 post stimulus) was calculated as an indication of 
attention and memory updating (Nikolin et al., 2017).   There was no effect of 
tDCS intensity on task performance.  However, P3 was reduced following training 
with 0mA tDCS and increased following training with 1mA tDCS suggesting that 
tDCS delivered at 1mA during training was associated with the enhancement of 
working memory processing.  Furthermore, increased working memory accuracy 
was associated with increased P3 amplitude following tDCS compared to baseline 
(Nikolin et al., 2017). Similar to the results from studies examining dose 
dependent effects on cortical excitability, evidence related to behavioural 
outcomes suggests a non-linear relationship between tES dose and effects.   It 
may therefore not possible to predict neurophysiological and behavioural 
outcomes by considering tES dosage in isolation.   Instead a complex interaction 
between tES dosage, neural anatomy, and underlying neural state (Esmaeilpour 
et al., 2017) is indicated.  However, studies which have used tES to modulate 
training have tended to apply current at between 1mA and 2mA (Cohen Kadosh, 
2013) using electrodes of between 25cm2 and 35cm2 in size (Turi et al., 2014).  
Despite suggestions that even higher current densities might be tolerable 
(Nitsche & Bikson, 2017), this dosage continues to be the gold standard. 
 
2.1.3  ABM with tES Studies 
 
Since the start of the present study, two studies have modulated the effects of 
ABM using tES (Clarke et al., 2014 & Heeren et al., 2015b).  Both studies 
selected the left DLPFC as the site of stimulation and cited its involvement in 
attentional control processes as the reason for targeting this site (Clarke et al., 
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2014 & Heeren et al., 2015b).  Clarke et al. (2014) pointed to the role of the 
DLPFC in the attentional inhibition as a key factor in its selection.  When 
experiment 1 was commenced, neither Clarke et al. (2014) nor Heeren et al. 
(2015b) had been published and they were therefore not available to inform tES 
procedure.  The DLPFC and IFG were therefore both considered as potential 
target sites of stimulation for the present experiment.  
 
Although tES studies have demonstrated the enhancement of attentional 
inhibitory control with tES of the DLPFC and the modulation of attentional 
control via tES of the PPC, the IFG was selected as the site of stimulation in the 
current experiment due to evidence from FMRI studies which have focused 
predominantly on the role of the IFG in both motor and attentional (emotional) 
inhibitory control.  TRNS rather than tDCS was chosen as the form of stimulation 
as it was felt that it might, from a mechanistic perspective, be suited to 
facilitation of the cognitive processes involved in ABM training. 
 
2.1.4  Aims 
 
The aim the current study was to explore whether tES could enhance the effects 
of ABM training towards neutral stimuli (and away from angry faces) to produce 
greater reductions in threat bias and anxiety than ABM training alone.  
Participants underwent ABM training away from threat or control ABM training on 
three consecutive days whilst receiving high frequency tRNS or sham tES. It was 
predicted that participants who received active ABM would have a greater 
reduction in attentional bias towards threat and a greater diminution of anxiety 
than those who received control ABM. Given evidence for lasting effects of ABM 
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(e.g. Amir et al., 2009b) it was expected that these reductions would be 
maintained at 30-day follow-up assessment.  Further it was predicted that in the 
active ABM group, participants who received active tRNS would demonstrate 
enhanced reductions in attentional bias towards threat and in anxiety relative to 
participants who received sham tES.  Based on findings that tRNS-enhanced 
training effects are lasting (e.g. Snowball et al., 2013) maintenance of these 
effects at follow-up assessment was projected.  For the control ABM group, 
differences between the active and sham tES groups in terms of threat bias and 




2.2.1  Design 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed methods design was employed.  There were 2 between 
subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS and sham 
tES).  
 
ABM training with concurrent tES was delivered on 3 consecutive days.   A 30-day 
follow-up was also included to assess longer-term effects.  Attention bias was 
assessed and self-report measures were administered at three principal time 
points: before ABM training on day 1, following ABM training on day 3 and at a 
follow-up session on day 30.  Between day 3 and day 30 there were no 
experimental sessions.  The within subjects factor was assessment [before 
training (Assessment 1), after training (Assessment 2), at 30-day follow up 




2.2.2  Participants 
 
Participants were 88 students from the University of Roehampton (66 female, 
mean age = 20.99 years, SD = 3.70, range = 18 to 41).   All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision.  Four participants 
did not attend their 30-day follow-up appointment and therefore their data was 
not included in the analysis.   This left 84 participants (61 female, mean age = 
21.14 years, SD = 3.76, range = 18 to 41) whose data were analysed.  
 
The number of participants recruited was based on previous studies using tES to 
modulate cognitive functioning e.g. Ditye et al. (2012), Fertonani, Pirulli & 
Miniussi, (2011) and Snowball et al. (2013).    Participants were divided across 
two ABM groups (active ABM, control ABM) and within each ABM group there 
were two tES groups (active tRNS, sham tES).  This resulted in four sub-groups 
(active ABM with active tRNS, active ABM with sham tES, control ABM with active 
tRNS and control ABM with sham tES).  The number of participants per sub-group 
was 21.   
 
Participants were recruited for the study via posters which included the 
experimenter’s email address and on the university’s online booking system for 
research participation.  Participants who expressed an interest in taking part 
were emailed the tES safety screen (Appendix 5) adapted from the transcranial 
magnetic stimulation adult safety screen (TASS) questionnaire (Keel et al., 
2000).  This was to exclude anyone with an existing neurological condition or 
metal implants which might affect, or who might be affected by the tES 
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procedure.  Participants were asked to reply to the email indicating whether 
they answered ‘yes’ to any of the questions on the screening form.  To ensure 
consistent cerebral lateralization amongst participants, only right-handed 
individuals were selected for the study.   Participants were therefore also asked 
to confirm that they were right handed in their email reply.  Participants who 
did not answer ‘yes’ to any of the tES screen questions and who indicated that 
they were right handed were invited to participate in the study. 
 
Allocation to ABM group was single blinded and allocation to tES group was 
double blinded.  See section 2.2.5 (Procedure) for details. 
 
2.2.3  Ethics 
 
The study was approved by the University of Roehampton ethics committee 
(approval code PSYC 14/ 116; see Appendix 1).  Written informed consent was 
provided by all participants before participation (Appendix 3).  Participants were 
compensated for their participation with course credits.  Participants who did 
not require course credits as they were not part of the University of Roehampton 










2.2.4  Materials 
 
2.2.4.1  Measures 
 
State and trait anxiety scale (Appendix 7) 
 
The state and trait anxiety inventory (STAI: Spielberger et al., 1983) is a widely 
used measure comprising a state anxiety and trait anxiety sub-scale (Quigley et 
al., 2012).  Each sub-scale contains 20 questions rated on a Likert scale from 1 
to 4.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012).  
The STAI was not designed as a diagnostic tool for the categorisation of 
individuals as high or low in anxiety and therefore its manual does not provide 
an indication of what scores might suggest high or low anxiety.  It does however 
stipulate that the normative mean state anxiety scores for university students 
under stressful circumstances (e.g. an exam) are 54.99 for males and 60.51 for 
females (Spielberger et al., 1983). Internal consistency for the STAI is high with 
a median alpha of .87 for the state anxiety scale and .89 for the trait anxiety 
scale (Spielberger et al., 1983).   
 
Attentional Control Scale (Appendix 8) 
 
The Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) has 20 items each 
scored on a Likert scale from 1 and 4 with higher scores indicating higher 
attention control.  The questionnaire comprises 2 subscales which are proposed 
to assess attentional focusing and attentional shifting (Olafsson et al., 2011).  
The scale has been shown to have strong internal consistency (α = .88) and to 
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correlate strongly with measures of positive emotionality e.g. extroversion (r = 
.40) and is negatively associated with indices of negative emotionality e.g. trait 
anxiety (r = -.55; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
     
Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Appendix 9) 
 
The Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE: Watson & Friend, 1969) scale measures 
social anxiety.  It has 30 items which are responded to with “true” or “false”.  
Internal reliability is reported to have a Cronbach alpha of .94 to .98 and a test-
retest reliability of .78 to .94 (Watson & Friend, 1969).   
 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (Appendix 10) 
 
The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale is a 20 item self-report 
questionnaire used to measure depressive symptoms in the general population 
(Radloff, 1977).  Participants are required to answer questions regarding their 
feelings or behaviours, selecting from 4 time-related responses ranging between 
“Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” and “Most or all of the time (5-7 
days)”.  Higher scores indicate a higher level of depression.  A score of 16 or 
above is indicative of depression (Radloff et al., 1977).  Internal consistency for 
the general population sample was reported as .85 and the alpha for psychiatric 
patients was α = .9.  Test-retest reliability over a 2 to 8-week period ranged 






TES intensity scale (from Meinzer et al., 2014; Appendix 11) 
 
Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 signifying ‘none’ and 5 
being ‘very intense’ the extent to which they experienced headache, neck pain, 
aching scalp, tickling, itching, burning, skin irritation, tiredness, loss of 
concentration and mood swings. 
 
Experimental Condition Questionnaire (Appendix 12) 
 
Participants were asked to indicate whether they believed they had been 
allocated to the real ABM or control ABM group and whether they believed they 
were in the active tRNS or sham tES group. 
 
2.2.4.2  Stimuli 
 
The experiment was programmed using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Face images were from the NimStim Face Stimulus set 
(Tottenham et al., 2009).  Photographs of 16 different individuals were selected 
(8 female and 8 male).  A pair of photographs of each actor was used, one with 
an angry expression and one with a neutral expression.   
 
Two photographs of the same individual were presented simultaneously in their 
neutral-angry pairs and were aligned vertically.  Each face image subtended a 
visual angle of 3.44o by 4.58o.  The angle between the fixation point and the 
centre of each image was 4o.  Photographs were centred horizontally.  The 
photographs were trimmed to remove the white background.   
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2.2.4.3  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
Attention bias was assessed via a dot-probe paradigm which had been modified 
to measure attention bias using socially relevant stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews & 
Tata, 1986).  At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross appeared in the 
middle of the screen for 500ms followed by two faces of the same identity, one 
neutral and one threatening for 500ms.  The faces disappeared and a target 
letter (p or q) appeared in the position of one of the faces until the participant 
responded by pressing the p or q on the computer keyboard or until 2000ms 
elapsed. Participants were asked to use the same finger of each hand (index 
finger or middle finger) to press the two keys.  Participants were instructed to 
respond to the target letter as quickly and accurately as possible.  The target 
letter replaced the neutral cue in 50% of trials.  Attention bias assessment 
















 Angry and Neutral Face 500ms 
 














Figure 2.1. Paradigm used for attention bias assessment and ABM training. During attention bias 
assessment the probe replaced the neutral cue in 50% of trials. During ABM training, the probe 
replaced the neutral cue in 95% of trials.   
 
Face identity, target letter (q or p) and target location (top or bottom) were 
randomised.  Each face identity had an equal probability of being presented as 
did each target letter.  There was an equal chance of a target letter appearing 
in each of the target locations. 
 
2.2.4.4  Attention Bias Modification 
 
The paradigm used for ABM training was the same as that employed during 
attention bias assessment with the exception that the target letter appeared in 
the position of the neutral probe in 95% of trials.  In the control ABM group, the 
target letter replaced the neutral face 50% of the time and the angry face 50% of 
the time (as per ABM assessment).  In the absence of the contingency, it was 
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considered that attention was not being directed toward a cue of particular 
valence and therefore no training was taking place. Active ABM or control ABM 
lasted approximately 30 minutes and consisted of 6 blocks of 96 trials with a 
short break between each block.  
 
2.2.4.5  tES 
 
Participants received either active tRNS or sham tES.  TRNS was administered 
through a DC-Stimulator Plus (neuroConn©).  Two electrodes with an area of 
5cm x 7cm (35cm2), each placed inside a saline soaked sponge were attached to 
the scalp and held in place using a rubber headband.  The anodal electrode was 
positioned over the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) which was identified as the 
intersection between the line joining T4 and Fz and the line joining F8 and Cz 
based on the 10-20 EEG system (Ditye et al., 2012; see Appendix 18).  The 
cathode was placed over the left IFG, symmetrical to the anode.  A current 
consisting of high frequency (100-640Hz) random noise was generated at a 
sample rate of 1280 per second and applied at 1500µA (-750 µA to 750 µA).  This 
was normally distributed around a mean of 0.  Stimulation lasted for 20 minutes 
at the beginning of a 30-minute ABM training period.  The current was ramped 
up and down for 20 seconds at the beginning and end of active stimulation.  
Conditions for sham tES matched those for active tRNS except that the hfTRNS 






2.2.5  Procedure 
 
As part of the screening process for the study, participants completed a tES 
safety screening form and the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971; 
Appendix 6).  Participants were invited to participate if they met the safety 
criteria outlined in the safety form and if they were right handed.  At the start 
of day 1, participants were allocated to either active ABM or control ABM.  The 
first 44 participants were allocated to active ABM and the second 44 participants 
allocated to control ABM.  Allocation to tES group was randomised and double 
blind.  A list was provided to the experimenter which contained 5-digit codes to 
generate either active tRNS or sham tES.  These were taken from the NeuroConn 
DC-Stimulator Plus manual.  Twenty codes relating to each stimulation group had 
been selected and randomised within one list by a member of the 
experimenter’s supervisory team.  One stimulation code was allocated to each 
participant and the same code was used for that participant on each of the 3 
days of training.  The first participant to commence the study was allocated the 
first code on the list.   Each time a new participant attended the study they 
were allocated the next code on the list.  Once all 40 codes had been allocated, 
the experimenter began again at the beginning of the list. 
 
The study procedure is outlined in figure 2.2.  On day 1, all participants 
completed the ACS, FNE, CES-D and STAI.  Following this, with the computer 
monitor at approximately 50cm from the participant and the keyboard within 
effortless reach, participants commenced the attention bias assessment lasting 
approximately 10 minutes.  Participants were then fitted with the tES montage.  
The experimenter began stimulation by keying the 5-digit code into the tES 
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machine.  Participants received active tRNS or sham tES for 20 minutes at the 
beginning of a 30-minute active ABM or control ABM training period.  Participants 
then completed the SAS. 
 
On day 2 of the study, participants completed the State Anxiety Scale (SAS) of 
the STAI.  They then completed 30 minutes (6 blocks x 96 trials) of active ABM or 
control ABM with active tRNS or sham tES for the first 20 minutes.  Following 
this, participants again completed the SAS. 
 
On day 3, participants completed the SAS and then 6 blocks of active ABM or 
control ABM with 20 minutes of active or sham tES from the beginning.  At the 
end of the 6 blocks, participants completed 2 blocks of ABM assessment.  These 
2 blocks continued from the 6 training blocks in order that the training and 
assessment blocks would appear part of the same task and participants would 
remain unaware of the transition from training to assessment.  Participants then 
completed the SAS and tES intensity questionnaire.  The researcher then made 
an appointment with the participant for their follow-up appointment. 
 
At 30-day follow-up participants were administered the SAS.  They then 
completed 2 x 96 block trials of attention bias assessment.  This was followed by 
the SAS, ACS and experimental condition questionnaire.  Participants were then 
allocated their credits for taking part and debriefed (see Appendix 17 for 





Figure 2.2: Experimental procedure by day 
 
2.2.6  Data Preparation 
 
Prior to analysis, Data from inaccurate trials were removed.  Mean accuracy 
across attention bias assessments was 94.54% (SD = .047). Reaction times below 
200ms as well as outlying reaction times which were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from each participant’s mean reaction time were excluded as per 
Brown et al. (2014).  This led to the rejection of a further 1.69% of the total 
number of trials.   This was in order to remove the effect of outlying data upon 
analysis and to preclude responses which may have been generated before the 
onset of the stimulus or delayed by an attentional distraction.  Attentional bias 
was calculated by subtracting the mean response time to threatening faces from 




mean response time to neutral faces for each participant.  Greater bias towards 
threatening faces compared to neutral faces was therefore represented by a 
positive score.  
 
2.2.7  Data Analysis 
 
Data Analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 22.  The main 
analysis assessing the effect of ABM training (active or control) and tES condition 
(active tRNS or sham tES) on attention bias and on state anxiety was performed 
using ANOVAs with ABM and tES as the between participants factors and 
assessment session as the within participants factor.  ANCOVAs were also 
conducted with ABM and tES as the between participants factors, assessment 
session as the within participants factor and pre-existing attention bias, pre-
existing trait anxiety and pre-existing attentional control as covariates.  This 
allowed examination of the effects of ABM on attention bias and anxiety whilst 




Throughout the present thesis, results are considered significant for p < .05.  
Results are considered marginally significant for p =/< .058 and approaching 









For all analyses in the present thesis the Bonferroni Correction has been applied 
to adjust for multiple comparisons.  Rather than calculating and reporting an 
adjusted α level, the p value obtained from each relevant analysis output has 
been multiplied by the number of comparisons conducted.  Therefore, the 
significance level (α) remains at p < .05 throughout.  The adjustment applied 
will be indicated as follows: “significant if number of tests conducted*p < .05”.  
For example, if three comparisons have been conducted, reporting of the output 
will be followed with (Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons; significant 
if 3*p < .05). 
  
2.2.8  Baseline Characteristics 
 
Table 2.1 shows for each experimental group the mean and standard deviation 
score at baseline for each self-report measure across groups. 
 
Table: 2.1 









 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
STAI-trait 39.48 9.69 43.10 12.92 39.65 13.12 44.19 11.67 
ACS 50.76 6.50 47.57 7.88 50.90 6.84 46.52 9.48 
CES-D 14.57 12.11 17.10 13.97 15.25 13.12 17.43 13.54 




2.2.8.1  State and Trait Anxiety across Experimental Groups by  
Gender 
 
Table 2. 2 shows the mean and standard deviation state anxiety and trait anxiety 
scores at baseline (before ABM training on day 1). 
 
Table 2.2: 






 Active tRNS Sham tES Active tRNS Sham tES 
N  15 16 14 17 
Females State Anxiety 33.40 (10.51)  32.81 (8.46) 31.00 (9.85)* 35.35 (14.31) 
Trait Anxiety 40.53 (10.14) 42.94 (14.15) 40.14 (10.98) 45.24 (12.13) 
N  6 5 7 4 
Males State Anxiety 33.33 (13.02) 37.40 (6.66) 33.14 (8.67) 26.75 (3.86) 
Trait Anxiety 36.83 (8.73) 43.60 (9.10) 40.14 (17.33) 39.75 (9.54) 
* p < .05 
 
State anxiety mean and standard deviation scores reported for a normative 
sample of undergraduate students are mean = 36.47 (SD = 10.02) for males and 
mean = 38.76 (SD = 11.95) for females (Spielberger, 1983). One sample t-tests 
(results Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons significant if 4*p < .05) 
revealed that for females who received control ABM with active tRNS, baseline 
state anxiety score (M = 31.00, SD = 9.85) was significantly lower than the mean 
normative score (M = 38.76, SD = 11.95), t(13) = 2.95, p = .04.  For females who 
received active ABM with sham tES, baseline state anxiety (M = 32.81, SD = 8.46) 
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was marginally significantly lower than the mean normative score (M = 38.76, SD 
= 11.95), t(15) = 2.81, p = .052.  For females in the active ABM with active tRNS 
and control ABM with sham tES groupss baseline state anxiety score did not 
differ significantly from the normative mean (ts < 1.98, ps > .27).  For males in 
all groups, baseline state anxiety did not differ significantly from the normative 
mean state anxiety score for males (ts < 5.03, ps > .06). 
 
There was no significant difference between baseline trait anxiety across groups.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed no effect of ABM or tES group and no significant 
interaction between these (Fs < 2.18, ps > .14).  The normative mean of trait 
anxiety reported for a sample of undergraduate students is 40.40 (SD = 10.15) 
for females and 38.30 (SD = 9.18) for males (Spielberger, 1983).  One sample t-
tests (results Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons; significant if 4*p < 
.05) revealed that for females in all groups, baseline trait anxiety did not differ 
significantly from the normative mean (ts < 1.64, ps > .48).  For males in all 
groups, baseline trait anxiety did not differ significantly from the normative 
mean (ts < 1.30, ps > 1.05). 
 
2.2.8.2  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (i.e. start of 
day 1, end of day 1, start of day 2, end of day 2, start of day 3, end of day 3, 
start of day 30, end of day 30) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation analysis with SAS data from each of the other assessments.  All 
correlations were significant (all rs > .40, all ps < .001).  The normative test-
retest reliability r values reported by Spielberger (1983) for college students, 
88 
 
with a test-retest interval of 20 days were .54 for males and .27 for females. Our 
results suggest strong test-retest reliability and consistency within the state 
anxiety data.   
 
2.2.8.3  Correlations Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
  
Trait anxiety describes susceptibility to anxiety which is relatively enduring.  
Differing levels of trait anxiety render individuals more or less likely to respond 
to perceived threatening situations with elevations in their state anxiety 
(Spielberger et al., 1983).  The correlations between state and trait anxiety 
reported by Spielberger et al. (1983) in the STAI manual were .65 for males and 
.59 for females for college students. As demonstrated in table 2.3, baseline trait 
anxiety in our sample correlated significantly with state anxiety at each 
assessment.   
 
Table 2.3: 
Bivariate correlations between baseline trait anxiety scale and state anxiety scale (SAS) scores at assessments 1, 2 
and 3 
**   < .001 
 
2.2.8.4  Correlations Between Self-Report Measures at Baseline 
 
Baseline scores from questionnaires assessing trait characteristics were subject 
to a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis (see table 2.4). 
 
 SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 SAS Assessment 3 




Bivariate correlations for trait anxiety scale (TAS), attentional control scale (ACS), Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies depression questionnaire (CES-D) and fear of negative evaluation scale (FNE) scores 
at baseline. 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Trait Anxiety  1.00    
2. Attentional Control  -.515** 1.00   
3. Depression  .387** -.274* 1.00 . 
4. Fear Negative Evaluation  .679** -.381** .219* 1.00 
** p < .001 
*  p < 0.05 
 
Baseline scores across all questionnaires were significantly correlated (all rs > 
.22, ps < .046) suggesting that participants reported consistently across 
measures.  As expected, the Attentional Control Scale correlated negatively with 




2.3.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Participants 
 
2.3.1.1  Attention Bias (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and a within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 




For attention bias there was a main effect of assessment which approached 
significance F(2,160) = 2.75, p = .067, (ηp2 = .034; observed power = .54). This 
indicated a change in mean attention bias across assessment sessions. Paired 
samples t-tests (change in attention bias between assessments 1 and 2, 1 and 3 
and assessments 2 and 3) examined this effect.  There was no significant change 
in attentional bias across assessments (all ts < 2.26, ps > .08; Bonferroni 
corrected; significant if 3*p < .05).  There were no further main effects or 
interactions (Fs < 1.28, ps > .26). 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts the change in attention bias over assessments for each 
experimental group (ABM/active tRNS, ABM/Sham tES, Control ABM/active tRNS, 
Control ABM, Sham tES) along with the change in mean attention bias for all 
participants.  Positive values represent threat bias and negative values represent 
neutral bias. 
   
 








































2.3.1.2  State Anxiety (All Participants) 
 
Replicating the threat bias ANOVA above, a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on state anxiety data with the two between subjects factors of ABM 
(active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and a within subjects 
factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3).  
 
This revealed a trend towards a main effect of assessment, 
F(1.73,138.04) = 2.99, p = .061, (ηp2 = .04; observed power = .56; Greenhouse 
Geisser correction applied).  This suggested a change in state anxiety across 
assessment sessions but the change was independent of ABM or tES group.  
Paired samples t-tests (change in state anxiety between assessments 1 and 2, 1 
and 3 and assessments 2 and 3) examined change in state anxiety across 
assessments.  All results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 3*p < .05).  These revealed a difference in state anxiety between 
assessment 1 and assessment 2, t(83) = 2.89, p = .01.  At assessment 1 
participants reported greater state anxiety (M =33.18, SD = 10.46) compared to 
assessment 2 (M = 30.82, SD = 9.17). The change in state anxiety from 
assessment 1 to assessment 3 was non-significant (t = 1.53, p = .39) as was the 
change in state anxiety level from assessment 2 to assessment 3 (t = .61, p = 
1.63).  There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 
1.53, ps >.22).   
 
Figure 2.4 shows mean state anxiety levels across assessments by ABM/tES group 





* p < .05 
Figure 2.4. Mean (SE) state anxiety levels across assessments for each ABM/tES group and for all 
participants 
 
2.3.1.3 State Anxiety (All Participants) From Start and End of Each 
Experimental Day 
 
Unlike threat bias and other self-report measures, state anxiety measures were 
taken for each day of bias modification training at the start of the experimental 
session and at the end of the experimental session and at the day 30 follow-up 
at the beginning and end of the session.   
 
To further explore changes in state anxiety across sessions, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed 




































factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES(active tRNS, sham tES) and 2 
within subjects factors of time (start of session, end of session) and day (Day 1, 
Day 2, Day 3, Day 30).  There was a main effect of time, F(1,80) = 10.03, 
p = .002, (ηp2 = .11; observed power = .88). participants reported greater state 
anxiety at the start of the session (M =32.05, SD = 9.63) compared to at the end 
of the session (M =30.92, SD = 9.00).  No other main or interaction effects were 
observed (All Fs < 1.67 ps > .18). 
 
Figure 2.5 gives mean and standard error state anxiety scores for the beginning 




Figure 2.5. Mean (SE) state anxiety at the start and end of each experimental day for each 


























State Anxiety at the Start and End of Each Day for All 
Participants
Active ABM/Active tRNS Active ABM/Sham tES





2.3.2 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attention Bias as a 
covariate 
 
2.3.2.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 omnibus ANCOVA was conducted on attention bias data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES), the within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, 
assessment 3) and pre-existing attention bias as a covariate.  The interaction 
between assessment and pre-existing attention bias was significant, 
F(1.62,128.06) = 33.98, p < .001, (ηp2 = .30; observed power = 1.00).  Pearson 
Product Moment Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the 
relationship between pre-existing attention bias and: change in attention bias 
between assessments 1 and 2; change in attention bias between assessments 1 
and 3; change in attention bias between assessments 2 and 3.  Change in 
attention bias was calculated by subtracting attention bias score at the earlier 
assessment from attention bias score at the later assessment e.g. attention bias 
at assessment 2 – attention bias at assessment 1.  A positive score represented 
an increase in attention bias and a negative score represented a reduction in 
attention bias.  Pre-existing attention bias was moderately to strongly, 
negatively correlated with change in attention bias between assessment 1 and 
assessment 2, r(83) = -.57, p < .001 and was strongly, negatively correlated with 
the change in attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 3, r(83) = -.76, p < 
.001.  There was no significant correlation between pre-existing attention bias 
and change in attention bias from assessment 2 to assessment 3 (r = -.14, p = 
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.21).  Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between pre-existing attention bias and 
difference in attention bias between assessments 1 and 2, assessments 1 and 3 
and assessments 1 and 3.  This shows that greater attentional bias towards 
threat at baseline was associated with a greater reduction in threat bias 






























Figure 2.6. The relationship between pre-existing attention bias and a) change in attention bias 
(AB) between assessments 1 and 2, b) change in AB between assessments 1 and 3 and c) change 
in AB between assessments 2 and 3 across experiment 1.  For pre-existing attention bias, positive 
scores indicate attention bias towards threat and negative scores indicate attention bias towards 
neutral.  For difference scores, positive values represent increase in threat bias and negative 
scores represent increase in neutral bias (reduction in threat bias). 




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 2




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 3





























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 




The main effect of pre-existing attention bias was also significant, 
F(1,79) = 37.23, p < .001, (ηp2 = .32; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing 
attention bias was significantly, moderately to strongly and positively correlated 
with mean attention bias, r(83) = .57, p < .001 (see figure 2.7). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The relationship between pre-existing attention bias and mean attention bias across 
experiment 1.  Positive values represent attention bias towards threat and negative values 
represent attention bias towards neutral stimuli.   
 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.65, ps > 
.09). 
 
2.3.2.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 omnibus ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES), a within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, 
assessment 3) and pre-existing attention bias as a covariate.  The main effect of 




























assessment was marginally significant, F(1.73,136.31) = 2.97, 
p = .062, (ηp2 = .04; observed power = 0.57).  This effect was investigated in 
section 2.3.1.2. A reduction in state anxiety at assessment 2 relative to 
assessment 1 was revealed.  There was no change in state anxiety between 
assessments 1 and 3 and assessments 2 and 3.  There were no further significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.51, ps > .23). 
 
2.3.2.3  State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental Day 
   (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 4 x 2 omnibus ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with 
the 2 between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active 
tRNS, sham tES) and a within subjects factors of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 
30) and time (start of session, end of session) and pre-existing attention bias as a 
covariate.  This revealed a main effect of time, F(1,79) = 9.77, p = .002, (ηp2 = 
.11; observed power = .87; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  This effect was 
discussed in section 2.3.1.3.  There were no further main effects or interaction 
effects (Fs < 1.78, ps > .16). 
 
2.3.3 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a 
Covariate 
 
2.3.3.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
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sham tES) and a within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 
2, assessment 3) and pre-existing trait anxiety as a covariate.  There were no 
significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.38, ps > .24).   
 
2.3.3.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
The above ANCOVA was repeated on state anxiety data with pre-existing trait 
anxiety at a covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing trait anxiety was 
significant, F(1,79) = 70.29, p < .001, (ηp2 = .47; observed power = 1.00).  Mean 
state anxiety was highly, positively correlated with pre-existing trait anxiety, 
r(84) = .69, p < .001 (see figure 2.8).    
 
 
Figure 2.8. The relationship between scores on the state anxiety scale of the STAI (Spielberger et 
al., 1983) across experiment 1 and the trait anxiety scale of the STAI at baseline. 
 
The main effect of assessment was no longer marginally significant (F = .27, p = 
.76) suggesting that pre-existing trait anxiety was influential in state anxiety 
























modulation across assessments.  There were no further significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 1.53, ps > .22).   
 
2.3.3.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental Day 
(Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 4 x 2 omnibus ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with 
the 2 between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active 
tRNS, sham tES) and a within subjects factors of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 
30) and time (start of session, end of session) and pre-existing trait anxiety as a 
covariate.  The main effect of trait anxiety was significant, F(1,79) = 85.50, p < 
.001, (ηp2 = .52; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, 
positively correlated with mean state anxiety, r(84) = .69, p < .001 (see figure 
2.20).  The main effect of time which was significant in the main analysis 
(section 2.3.1.3) was no longer significant (F = .68, p = .41) when controlling for 
trait anxiety.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects ((Fs 
< 1.10, ps > .35). 
 
2.3.4 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attentional Control as a 
Covariate 
 
2.3.4.1 Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attentional Control as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 omnibus ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and a within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 
101 
 
2, assessment 3) and pre-existing attentional control as a covariate.  No 
significant main or interaction effects were revealed (Fs < 1.29, ps > .26).   
 
2.3.4.2 State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
The same ANCOVA was performed on state anxiety data with pre-existing 
attentional control as the covariate revealed a significant main effect of pre-
existing attentional control, F(1,79) = 8.30, p = .005, (ηp2 = .10; observed power 
= .81).  There was a moderate, negative correlation between state anxiety and 
pre-existing attentional control, r(84) = -.31, p = .004 (see figure 2.9) suggesting 
that higher levels of pre-existing attentional control were associated with lower 
state anxiety over all.   
 
 
Figure 2.9. The relationship between scores on the attention control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) at baseline and mean scores on the state anxiety scale (Spielberger et al., 1983) across 
experiment 1. 
 




















The Relationship between Pre-existing Attentional Control 
and Mean State Anxiety
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The marginally significant effect of assessment was again abolished, (F = .10, p = 
.91) when controlling for attentional control.  There were no further significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.54, ps > .22).   
 
2.3.4.3 State Anxiety from Start and End of each Experimental 
Day (Pre-existing Attentional Control as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 x 4 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 2 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and a within subjects factors of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and 
time (start of session, end of session) and pre-existing attentional control as a 
covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing attentional control was significant, 
F(1,79) = 9.21, p = .003, (ηp2 = .10; observed power = .85).  Pre-existing 
attentional control was significantly, moderately, negatively correlated with 
mean state anxiety, r(84) = -.31, p = .004 (see figure 2.9).  The main effect of 
time which was significant in the main analysis (section 2.3.1.3) was no longer 
significant (F = .22, p = .64).  There were no further significant main or 
interaction effects ((Fs < .94, ps > .34). 
 
 
2.3.5  tRNS Tolerability 
 
TRNS was well tolerated with no adverse events (see Table 2.5).   Participants 
reported a mild level of ‘tiredness’ and a mild to moderate level of ‘loss of 
concentration’.  It is feasible that these effects were task induced and not 
attributable to the tES.  There was an effect of burning with participants who 
received sham tES reporting a higher level (M =1.19, SD = .46) than those who 
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received active tRNS who reported no burning (M =1.00, SD = .00) t(109) = 4.36, 
p < .001.  Tiredness was higher for sham tES participants (M =2.47, SD = 1.13) 
than active tRNS participants (M =2.16, SD = 2.20, t(214) = 2.06, p = .04 and loss 
of concentration was rated as more severe by sham tES participants (M =2.26, SD 
= .95) than by active tRNS participants (M =1.92, SD = .86, t(214) = 2.81, 
p = .005.  No contrast survived corrections for multiple comparisons however. 
 
Table 2.5: 











































































































2.3.6  Experimental Condition 
 
Overall, 35.71% of participants guessed both their ABM and tES allocation 
correctly.  The percentage of participants who guessed their ABM group 
correctly was 63.10%.  A one-sample t-test revealed that this percentage did not 
significantly differ from chance, t(83) = 1.138, p = .26. The percentage of 
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participants who guessed their tES group correctly was 54.76%. This level was 
also not significantly different from chance, t(83) = .43, p = .67. 
   
2.4 Discussion 
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether active tRNS, delivered 
bilaterally to the inferior frontal gyrus, would enhance the effects of ABM.   
Active or sham tRNS was delivered concurrently with active or control ABM 
across three consecutive days.  It was predicted that active ABM training towards 
neutral faces (away from threatening faces) would generate greater reductions 
in attentional bias towards threat and in state anxiety relative to control ABM.  
It was further hypothesised that active tRNS would enhance the effects of active 
ABM training in terms of producing greater reductions in threat bias and in state 
anxiety compared to sham tES.  ABM training towards neutral faces did not 
produce greater threat bias and anxiety reduction than control ABM.  There was 
also no evidence of the modulation of ABM training with active tRNS relative to 
sham tES.   
 
When data from all participants was analysed, there were no differences in 
attention bias change across assessments as a factor of ABM or tES group. State 
anxiety was reduced after training at the end of day three compared to before 
training on day 1 for all participants, irrespective of ABM or tES group.  When 
pre-existing attention bias was included as a covariate in the analysis, greater 
reduction in threat bias following ABM training for participants with greater pre-
existing attentional bias towards threat was revealed.  Participants with a 
greater pre-existing neutral bias had greater reduction in neutral bias following 
105 
 
training.  These patterns emerged across participants irrespective of ABM or tES 
group.  Potential mechanisms are discussed.   
 
These results do not support findings that ABM is more efficacious in reducing 
attention bias towards threat and anxiety than control ABM training (Amir et al., 
2009b; Bar-Haim, 2010; Beard et al., 2012; Li et al., 2008).  Previously it was 
suggested that in active ABM, a contingency between the cue and stimulus trains 
participants to implicitly attend towards neutral stimuli (Boettcher et al., 2012).  
Evidence from experiment 1 indicates that this mechanism was ineffective in the 
present study.  The findings are also not consistent with previous studies which 
have reported enhanced effects for cognitive training with tRNS (e.g. Fertonani 
et al., 2011; Snowball et al., 2013) or in accord with those which have cited 
differences in the outcomes of ABM training with concurrent tES compared to 
ABM with sham tES (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).   
 
2.4.1  Anxiety Reduction in the Absence of Threat Bias Reduction 
 
Reduction in threat bias, propagated by contingency based ABM was proposed as 
the mechanism responsible for anxiety attenuation in past research (Amir et al., 
2008; Amir et al., 2009b).  In the present study, there was state anxiety 
reduction across all participants but there was no change in attention bias level 
across assessments.  The anxiety reduction which occurred across all 
participants following training cannot therefore be explained by a reduction in 
the involuntary engagement of threatening stimuli.  The finding of anxiety 
reduction in the absence of threat bias reduction is not in isolation.  A recent 
meta-analysis of 34 studies reported that, in many of the studies included in the 
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analysis, anxiety reduction was reported in the absence of threat bias reduction 
(Mogg et al., 2017).  Amongst these was a study by McNally et al. (2013) in which 
speech anxious participants were trained to attend happy faces, disgust faces or 
received control ABM.  All groups had reductions in behavioural, self-report and 
physiological measures of speech anxiety and these reductions were 
indistinguishable between groups.  There were no reductions in threat bias and, 
in fact, none of the groups had threat bias at any assessment (McNally et al., 
2013).  Carleton et al. (2015) trained socially anxious participants to attend 
neutral stimuli or allocated them to receive control ABM twice weekly for four 
weeks.  Social anxiety symptoms declined for all participants and were 
maintained at eight-week follow-up.  Reductions in anxiety did not correlate 
with threat bias reductions.  
 
In the present study, when pre-existing attention bias was included as a 
covariate in the analysis of state anxiety data, pre-existing bias did not interact 
with state anxiety or state anxiety change across assessments.   This brings into 
further question the relationship between change in attentional bias and change 
in anxiety and the suggestion that the mechanism of anxiety attenuation 
observed in past studies was a reduction in threat bias (e.g. Amir et al., 2009b; 
Bar-Haim, 2010; Li, Tan, Qian & Liu, 2008).   
 
2.4.2  Equivalent Anxiety Reductions Across Experimental Groups 
 
Anxiety reduction occurred in all participants irrespective of ABM group.  
Although this result was unexpected, there have been a number of recent 
studies reporting indistinguishable improvements in anxiety for ABM training and 
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control ABM training (Carlbring et al., 2012; Carleton et al., 2015; Cristea et al., 
2015; Enock et al., 2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  In their meta-analysis, Mogg et 
al. (2017) identified that in 23 of the 34 studies included in the meta-analysis, 
attend neutral ABM was not more effective than control ABM.  Klumpp & Amir 
(2010) for example, showed that both participants who underwent ABM training 
towards threat and participants who received training away from threat 
reported less anxiety in response to an impromptu speech task.  Heeren et al. 
(2013) allocated socially anxious participants to ABM towards threat, ABM away 
from threat or control (no-contingency) training.  There were reductions in 
anxiety in response to a speech task and in self-report measures of anxiety in all 
3 groups which were indistinguishable.  In a further study, participants received 
ABM training towards joy faces, towards disgust faces or control ABM (McNally et 
al., 2013).  After four ABM training sessions, participants in all three groups 
reported a decline in ‘stressor’-elicited anxiety.  It is possible, that the 
improvements from these studies were the result of practice effects. The studies 
used anxiety response to stressor tasks as a measure of anxiety reduction and, 
evidently, performing a speech for a second time may not be as stress evoking as 
the first time around.  The present study involved no stressor task and 
improvements occurred across groups in terms of self-report state anxiety.  The 
study by McNally et al. (2013) also reported reductions in self-report and 
physiological measures of anxiety.  Practice effects can therefore be ruled out 
as an explanation for anxiety attenuation.  If anxiety amelioration also cannot 
be explained by threat bias reduction there must therefore be alternative 




2.4.2.1  Exposure 
 
One candidate mode of action is that ABM training, with or without contingency 
represents a form of exposure therapy.  Repeated presentation of threatening 
faces may result in habituation to the stimuli thus reducing their salience and 
anxiety evoking properties (Carleton et al., 2015).  Indeed, exposure to 
threatening stimuli is the foundation of accepted anxiety therapies (McNally et 
al., 2013).  As such, any paradigm which involves the consistent presentation of 
threat-related stimuli could potentially bring about reduction in anxiety.   
 
2.4.2.2  Non-specific Effects 
 
Another possible explanation for the findings is that they were due to non-
specific treatment effects.  Enock et al. (2014) proposed that simply taking part 
in research may bolster the confidence of some participants leading to a 
reduction in anxiety.  In the present project, this may have occurred as a result 
of attending sessions over 3 consecutive days.  Over this time a relationship 
likely formed between the researcher and the participant who, as a consequence 
may have felt more at ease by the end of the process (Patterson, 1985).  
Alternatively, participants may have been responding, consciously or 
subconsciously, to expectation.  If participants perceived that the researcher 
expected to see a reduction in anxiety level then demand characteristics might 
be at play (Cristea et al., 2015).  Alternatively, a placebo effect may have arisen 
if participants themselves had positive expectations regarding the outcome from 




2.4.2.3  Attentional Control 
 
Perhaps the most widely supported theory for why control ABM produces anxiety 
reductions matching those achieved with active ABM is the idea that ABM 
training, regardless of the inclusion of a contingency, increases attentional 
control and thus the capacity for attention regulation (Enock et al., 2014; 
Heeren et al., 2013; Klumpp et al., 2010; Taylor, Cross & Amir, 2015).  It has 
previously been suggested that in anxiety, the ability to voluntarily direct 
attention away from non-threat or to disengage from threat is deficient and that 
this is responsible for maintaining anxiety (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
Attentional training may boost an individual’s attentional control capacity 
encouraging more efficient allocation of attention to non-threatening stimuli 
which will subsequently result in reduced anxiety (Heeren et al., 2013).   Some 
researchers have added measures which have tested this concept.  In addition to 
a contingency and no-contingency condition, Enock et al. (2014) added a wait 
list group in which no training took place but in which anxiety and depression 
scales were administered at baseline and at a later point.  Anxiety and 
depression were reduced in the active ABM and control ABM groups but not in 
the waitlist group (Enock et al., 2014).  This suggests that the remedial factor 
within this design was cognitive training.  Heeren et al. (2015a) trained socially 
anxious participants towards threat, away from threat or with no contingency.  
There were reductions in anxiety response to a speech task and in self-report 
measures of anxiety in all 3 groups which were indistinguishable.  The attention 
network task was used to assess different dimensions of attention. All 3 groups 
demonstrated improvements in alerting and executive components of attention 
after ABM or no-contingency ABM (Heeren et al., 2015a).  In another study, 
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participants underwent dot-probe training with ‘non-emotional’ stimuli in the 
form of geometric shapes (Heeren et al., 2016).  The researchers included a 
contingency condition, a no contingency condition and a control condition which 
involved pressing targets but without any preceding presentation of probes.  All 
three conditions had reduced anxiety in response to a speech task and their 
performances in the task received higher ratings from independent observers 
than at the start of the study.   Participants in all 3 conditions also 
demonstrated improvements in a working memory task which were 
indistinguishable from each other (Heeren et al., 2016).  This latter study not 
only supports the idea that cognitive training regardless of the presence or 
absence of a contingency can lead to anxiety reduction but also suggests that 
the presence of emotionally valenced stimuli is an unnecessary component of 
the training.  The concept of reinforcement of attentional regulation via 
cognitive training as the mechanism for improved inhibition of threat processing 
appears to be the main line of reasoning and exploration in recent ABM research.  
Nonetheless, in the present study, although threat bias reduction was observed 
for participants with pre-existing threat bias and those with high-level anxiety, 
component analysis did not reveal reductions across all participants.  This 
indicates that reduced threat engagement via enhanced attentional control may 
not be responsible for anxiety attenuation.  However, researchers have 
suggested alternative mechanisms via which the enhancement of attentional 
control capacity might attenuate anxiety.  Klumpp et al. (2010) suggested that 
facilitated attentional control may not necessarily reduce engagement to 
threatening stimuli but may attenuate their impact and disrupt threat processing 
via the increase of self-regulation.  Heeren et al. (2016) linked the effects to the 
upregulation of higher-order activity in the frontal cortices.  These structures 
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are associated with attentional control and are known to down-regulate 
reactivity in the emotion-centered limbic system.  As described above, the 
authors demonstrated that a dot-probe task with geometric shapes enhanced 
working memory and led to reduced emotional reactivity to a stressor task.  
Another explanation submitted by Wallace & Newman (1997) is founded on the 
notion that maladaptive cognitions contribute to negative affect.  Negative 
affect can be regulated via controlled information processing which requires the 
availability of attentional resources.  When attention is diverted or captured by 
salient stimuli then attentional resources are depleted and the regulation of 
negative affect is impaired.  By enhancing attentional control capacity, 
attentional processes are rendered more efficient and attentional resources are 
available for controlled information processing (Wallace & Newman, 1997).   
 
The explanations above infer that participants with the greatest enhancement in 
attentional control following ABM training should be those who have the greatest 
improvement in anxiety.  The present study was not able to show that this was 
the case as no measure was administered which allowed the comparison of pre- 
and post-training attentional control.  Previously Basanovic et al. (2017) 
reported a positive association between performance in attentional control tasks 
completed at baseline and degree of attention bias change in the trained 
direction.  The authors proposed that for contingency-based attentional training 
to be effective, participants should be able to competently inhibit one stimulus 
and select another (Basanovic et al., 2017).  In other words, greater pre-existing 
attentional control facilitates adherence to the contingency aspect of active 
ABM and therefore participants with high level attentional control experience a 
‘deeper’ level of training.  In the present study however, when pre-existing 
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attentional control was included as a covariate in the analysis of ABM/tES impact 
on attention bias and state anxiety, there was no indication of a relationship 
between baseline attentional control and change in these dimensions across 
assessments. 
 
2.4.3  TRNS  
 
In the present study tES did not appear to have a modulatory effect on attention 
bias.  This was unlike the findings reported by Ironside et al. (2015) in which a 
reduction in threat bias after bilateral tDCS of the DLPFC (cathode over the right 
DLPFC) but not after unilateral cortical anodal tDCS (cathode over supra-orbital 
ridge) or after sham tDCS was observed.  It is worth noting that in this previous 
study tDCS was delivered offline and no ABM took place.  Additionally, no 
baseline measure of attention bias was taken.  Participants received tDCS or 
sham tDCS and subsequently performed attention bias assessment.  It is not 
possible to state with certainty therefore that performance disparities were due 
to the effect of stimulation and not individual differences.  The fact that 
Ironside et al. (2015) demonstrated that it is possible to attenuate vigilance to 
threat via tES without ABM training, does raise some interesting questions 
regarding the mechanisms of this improvement.  The present research assumed 
that high frequency tRNS would serve to boost the intrinsic neural activity 
associated with learning to engage neutral rather than angry faces.   In the 
model put forward by Ironside et al, (2015) learning is not a necessary part of 
this process.  One possible explanation is that, as previously suggested, there is 
a neural mechanism which sub-serves avoidance of or disengagement from 
threatening stimuli (Heeren et al., 2013).  This system is in frontal areas of the 
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brain and is responsible for inhibiting emotionally driven responses via the 
regulation of a more posterior system which controls attentional allocation and 
processing (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  With the appropriate form of tES and by 
targeting the optimal frontal brain area, it is perhaps possible to bolster or even 
activate this pre-established system without the need for attentional training. 
 
Two previous studies have combined tES with ABM training (Clarke et al, 2014; 
Heeren et al., 2015b).  Clarke et al. (2014) reported a significant reduction in 
threat bias following ABM training away from threat for participants who 
received concurrent active tDCS over the left DLPFC but not for participants who 
received sham tES.  The present study did not replicate this finding.  The 
following section discusses potential explanations for why this may have 
occurred. 
 
2.4.4  Measure of Attention Bias 
 
It is, of course, possible that anxiety reduction across participants was 
attributable to diminished threat engagement but that this effect was 
obfuscated because the procedure used to assess attention bias was ineffective 
in detecting this effect.  It is also possible that active ABM training evoked 
reductions in threat bias which were superior to those induced by control ABM 
but that this was not revealed by the emotional dot-probe used to measure 
attention bias.  Macleod et al. (2016) suggested that a failure to find evidence of 
reduction in threat bias following ABM procedures might be explained by an 
ineffectiveness of the attention bias assessment task to accurately measure 
attention bias (Macleod et al., 2016).  If potential outcome differences between 
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ABM groups were not detected using the attention bias assessment then any 
enhancement of ABM effects via tRNS would also be concealed.  The emotional 
dot-probe task used to measure attention bias in the present study was the same 
as that used to modify it, without the contingency.  Studies such as Amir et al. 
(2008; 2009b) which reported greater reduction of threat bias following active 
ABM compared to control ABM used a different task (the modified Posner or 
‘spatial cueing task’) to assess change in attention bias.  In this task attention 
bias towards threat is indicated by slower reactions times for targets appearing 
in the opposing location to a previously presented single threatening stimulus 
relative to targets appearing opposite to a previously presented neutral stimulus 
(Mogg et al., 2008). This suggests greater difficulty in disengaging from 
threatening stimuli compared to neutral stimuli.  The modified dot probe, on the 
other hand measures engagement to threatening and neutral stimuli with faster 
responses to targets replacing threatening stimuli relative to neutral stimuli 
taken as evidence of threat bias.  Perhaps using the task employed by Amir et al. 
(2008, 2009b) reduced threat bias may have been found.  Alternatively (or 
additionally) a measure of spatial attention with greater temporal specificity 
may have revealed a different pattern of attention bias change.  Heeren et al. 
(2015b) did not find a reduction in the behavioural measure of threat bias after 
ABM training with atDCS or sham tES.  Instead, eye-tracking data revealed a 
greater reduction in gaze time for threatening faces after ABM with atDCS than 
after ABM training with sham tDCS.  It has been posited that reaction time data 
represent a poor psychometric measure of attention bias as the 500ms 
presentation of faces in a standard emotional dot probe provides ample time for 
gaze to be averted from the threatening face before the appearance of the 
target (Kappenman et al., 2014).  Eye-tracking data is perhaps a more precise 
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indication of attentional engagement and shifting within the first few 
milliseconds of cue presentation (Heeren et al., 2015b).   It is possible that a 
measure with more detailed temporal resolution such as eye-tracking or event 
related potential (ERP) data may have uncovered changes in attentional bias and 
differences in these modulations between experimental groups. 
 
2.4.5  Ceiling Effects 
 
Many of the types of cognitive functions which have been previously enhanced 
via the administration of tES during training have been multi-faceted, explicit 
learning tasks such as arithmetic (Snowball et al., 2013) and novel vocabulary 
learning (Meinzer et al., 2014). As such, performance on these tasks were not at 
ceiling, leaving room for tES to boost the impact of training.  In the present 
paradigm, the intended outcome of active ABM (anxiety reduction) was achieved 
irrespective of ABM training group and tES group. The mechanism of this 
reduction is not known.  If, however, it was the enhancement of attentional 
control and control ABM could readily achieve the enhancement of attentional 
control processes then active ABM may not have been able to induce further 
improvements.  Furthermore, there may not have been scope for active tRNS to 
enhance this outcome. From a mechanistic perspective, if neural populations are 
active in a way which generates the desired behaviour, there may be no scope 






2.4.6  State Dependency 
 
Research has drawn attention to the influence of state dependency on the 
outcome of tES research (Horvath et al., 2015b).  Borteletto, Pellicciari, Rodella 
& Miniussi, (2015) reported that tES improved performance in a motor task when 
applied during control training but impaired performance when applied during 
active training.  The authors indicated that the effects of tES are dependent 
upon the task and activation state of the brain during application and that when 
excitatory tES is applied during another excitability enhancing event, one might 
negate the facilitatory impact of the other (Bortoletto et al., 2015).  Certainly. 
in the present research, the application of tRNS did not appear to cancel out the 
effects of active ABM.  However, it is credible that excess excitatory inputs 
might have elicited homeostatic neural mechanisms resulting in a weakening of 
excitatory signals.  
 
2.4.7  TES Stimulation Type 
 
Assuming that the outcomes of ABM were open to modulation, there may be 
other explanations for why active tRNS was not able to provide their anticipated 
intensification.  One rationale may be that tRNS is not the optimal form of 
stimulation for the current paradigm.  TRNS was selected as recent work had 
provided robust evidence of the capacity for tRNS to modulate the effects of 
cognitive training (Fertonani et al., 2012; Snowball et al., 2013).  However, 
previous studies used tDCS with ABM and successfully modulated its impact 
(Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  Although tRNS and tDCS are both 
said to exert their effects via the modification of spontaneous neural activity, it 
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could be that the pattern and distribution of the spontaneous activity elicited 
during ABM are more amenable to fortification via continuous anodal direct 
current than alternating current at random frequencies and amplitudes.  In the 
present study, active ABM did not produce superior reductions in threat bias and 
anxiety than control ABM.  There was therefore no evidence that the process 
previously proposed to be responsible for these improvements (implicit training 
of attention towards neutral stimuli via a contingency between face cues and 
targets) was active.  As such, enhancement of this mechanism with tRNS would 
not have been apparent.  However, there were reductions in anxiety across all 
participants which are likely to have been the result of a mechanism common to 
both active and control ABM.  There was also no evidence of the enhancement of 
this mechanism via active tRNS.  Without knowing the nature of the mechanism 
(e.g. augmentation of attentional control, exposure effect, placebo effect etc.) 
it is difficult to speculate whether it may have been susceptible to enhancement 
using tES and if so, why this did not occur.  Investigating which training 
paradigms are most susceptible to modulation by which forms of tES is an 
avenue for future research.  Such research could prove critical in identifying the 
neural hallmarks of specific cognitive processes. 
 
2.4.8  Site of Stimulation 
 
TRNS may have had a modulatory impact upon ABM had a different site of 
stimulation been chosen.  In the present study the IFG was selected as the site 
of stimulation.  This was because the IFG has been implicated in attentional and 
inhibitory control processes (Aron et al., 2014; Rubia et al., 2003) and because 
anodal tES applied to the right IFG during training previously resulted in more 
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enhanced response inhibition relative to training with sham stimulation (Ditye et 
al., 2012).  Because ABM is intended to train the inhibition of automatic 
engagement to threatening faces, the IFG appeared a logical target for tRNS.  
However, the two studies already discussed which effectively modulated ABM 
using tES targeted the left DLPFC based on its association with top-down 
attentional control (Heeren et al., 2015b) and inhibition (Clarke et al., 2014).  
Additionally, it is reported that in anxious participants, activity of the left DLPFC 
during attentional control is lower than it is for non-anxious individuals (Heeren 
et al., 2015b).  It is therefore possible that the left DLPFC is a more appropriate 
target site for tES during ABM. 
 
In the present study, tRNS was administered to both the right and the left IFG 
simultaneously.  Studies which have sought to pinpoint the neural structures 
which mediate inhibition have tended to implicate either the left DLPFC (e.g. 
Boggio et al., 2007; Clarke et al., 2014; Grimshaw & Carmel, 2014) or the right 
IFG (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Aron Robbins & Poldrack, 2014; Jacobson, 
Javitt & Lavidor, 2011) in this function.  Lateralised stimulation may have been 
more successful in targeting the neural processes involved in ABM.  Perhaps, in 
the case of bilateral stimulation, alteration of neural activity was too 
widespread and lacking in regional focality to target a specific brain function 
(Parkin, Ekhtiari & Walsh, 2015). 
 
2.4.9  Modulatory Capacity of tES 
   
Finally, it cannot be ruled out that the inefficacy of tRNS to modulate ABM did 
not stem from any aspect of methodology.  In a recent quantitative review, 
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Horvath et al. (2015b) reported that, across studies assessing the capacity for 
tDCS to modulate the impact of cognitive training, there was no reliable effect.  
It is plausible therefore that the potential for tES to facilitate cognitive 
enhancement has quite simply been overstated in past research.  A systematic 
review of tDCS studies reported that, of 30 neuro-physiological outcome 
measures including event related potentials (ERPs), electroencephalographic 
(EEG) spectra, motor evoked potentials (MEPs) and blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) signal, tDCS only had a reliable effect on MEP amplitude 
(Horvath et al., 2015a).  A quantitative review by the same authors on the effect 
of single-session tDCS upon cognitive outcome measures including aspects of 
executive function, memory and language, reported no reliable effects on any of 
the measures assessed (Horvath, Forte & Carter, 2015b).  However, rather than 
refuting outright the value of tDCS as a tool in research or therapy, both reviews 
pointed at methodological variability within the studies reviewed as the 
potential source of inconsistent findings which, when summated, failed to 
support the efficacy of tDCS.  It was suggested that, to optimise the 
augmentative impact of tES, methodological factors should be controlled for 
(Horvath et al., 2015b).  This view has been mirrored across tES research with 
much emphasis placed upon the importance of tES intensity (Bestmann et al., 
2015), duration, waveform and electrode shape, size and location (Bikson et al., 
2010).  The role of Individual differences has also not been overlooked with brain 
anatomy [including morphology of gyri and sulci, (Bestmann et al., 2015)] the 
properties and conductance level of grey matter, white matter and CSF (Datta et 
al., 2012), skin conductance, skull thickness (Bikson et al., 2010; Brunoni et al., 
2012), cognitive state e.g. tiredness, alertness (Horvath et al., 2015b) and even 
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scalp temperature (Gholmi-Bouroujeny, Mekonnen, Batkin, & Bolic, 2015) cited 
as critical factors for consideration when designing tES protocols. 
 
2.4.10  Pre-existing Attention Bias Towards Threat 
 
It has previously been demonstrated that the successful modulation of attention 
bias away from threatening stimuli is dependent upon there being bias towards 
threat before training (O’Toole & Dennis, 2012).  It may not be possible (or 
desirable) after all to reverse an attentional bias which is not present.  For this 
reason, ANCOVAs were performed on attention bias data with pre-existing 
attention bias level as a covariate.  Whereas the main analysis revealed no 
reduction in threat bias across all participants, the analysis clearly showed a 
decline in threat bias for participants with a pre-existing bias towards 
threatening stimuli.  These findings support the view that ABM is more effective 
for reducing attentional bias towards threat in participants with a pre-existing 
threat bias.  There were no apparent advantages in terms of anxiety reduction 
for participants with pre-existing threat bias despite threat bias reductions in 
this group.  This is therefore further evidence that reduction in attentional bias 
towards threat is not the mechanism via which anxiety reductions were achieved 
in the present experiment. 
 
2.4.11 Pre-existing Neutral Bias 
 
In the present experiment, greater level of pre-existing neutral bias was 
associated with greater reduction in neutral bias.  It is possible that the 
mechanism behind the reduction in neutral bias might be one already proposed 
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to explain the reductions in threat bias following active ABM (and control ABM) 
training.  The attentional control model is based on the premise that increased 
attentional control capacity facilitates engagement to neutral stimuli (Klumpp et 
al., 2010).  This would not therefore account for the changes in attentional bias 
for participants with pre-existing neutral bias as the engagement to neutral 
stimuli was reduced following ABM training.  Improved attention regulation 
might, however, facilitate the engagement to threat related stimuli where 
threat avoidance is a maladaptive behaviour which may reflect attentional 
avoidance of threat related stimuli (Cisler, 2012).  A reduction in neutral bias 
might signify a ‘balancing’ of attention distribution towards threat and neutral 
stimuli which is arguably a healthier attentional model.  Perhaps more 
applicable to the present findings is the suggestion that ABM and control ABM are 
both a form of exposure training.  As previously suggested, repeated 
presentation of threatening faces may result in habituation to the stimuli thus 
reducing their salience (Carleton et al., 2015).  As such, an ‘avoidant’ individual 
might be better able to engage threatening faces with reduced negative affect 
following ABM or control ABM.  Identifying the mechanism responsible for the 
increase in threat bias for participants with pre-existing neutral bias may be as 
important to understanding the active cognitive processes underlying ABM as 
elucidating the reason for reductions in threat bias for participants with pre-
existing threat bias and warrants further investigation. 
 
2.4.12  Pre-existing Anxiety 
 
In the present study, despite reports that ABM is more effective in individuals 
with high-level anxiety (Bar Haim et al., 2007; Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et 
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al., 2010) it was decided to explore tES with ABM in neuro-typical participants.  
It could therefore be argued that anxiety reduction should not have been 
expected as anxiety was at a normal, arguably ‘healthy’ level.  In studies which 
have not pre-selected for high anxiety, a stressor task has been used to induce 
state anxiety (e.g. Macleod et al., 2002).  However, in the present research, a 
stressor task was not delivered.  The decision to neither select for anxious 
participants nor induce state anxiety via a stress inducing task was a weakness of 
the present research.  Nevertheless, state anxiety reduction did occur following 
three days of participation.  Prior to commencing the research, it was reasoned 
that the effect of pre-existing anxiety on changes induced by the experimental 
protocol could still be explored by including this dimension in post hoc analysis.  
Pre-existing trait anxiety was therefore included as a covariate in the analysis.  
With trait anxiety held constant, the reduction in state anxiety following ABM 
training (irrespective of ABM or tES group) which was seen in the analysis of 
state anxiety without the inclusion of a covariate, was not present.  This 
supports a moderating role for pre-existing trait anxiety in participation induced 
state anxiety reduction.  However, because pre-existing trait anxiety was not 
shown to interact with ABM condition or assessment, there was no indication 
participants with high trait anxiety benefitted more in terms of state anxiety 
reduction or that active ABM was more effective in high anxious participants. 
 
2.5 Summary and Future Work 
 
Studies which have used tRNS to enhance training have reported impressive 
findings (e.g. Snowball et al., 2013).  The present study provided an opportunity 
to build on these promising findings using an exciting new technology.  There 
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was no impact of the stimulation on task performance and measures.  TDCS is 
the most frequently used form of stimulation in the study of cognitive 
enhancement via tES (Horvath et al., 2015b) with many studies publicising its 
neuro-modulatory successes (e.g. Ditye et al., 2012; Meinzer et al., 2014; 
Segrave et al., 2014).  Going forward therefore, tDCS may be a more appropriate 
form of stimulation for the modulation of ABM.  With each form of tES possessing 
its own putative mechanism for the modulation of learning when applied during 
training, it is feasible that tDCS would be more effective in targeting the 
neuronal areas and processes specific to ABM.  In the current study, high 
frequency tRNS was targeted towards the bilateral IFG.  This cortical area was 
selected following careful examination of the literature surrounding the neural 
mechanisms of implicit learning and response inhibition.  Equally, the left DLPFC 
is often the target of stimulation in studies which aim to increase learning (e.g. 
Javadi & Cheng., 2013; Snowball et al. 2013) and improve mood (Segrave, 
Arnold, Hoy & Fitzgerald, 2014).   
 
Superior reductions in threat bias for the participants in the active ABM group 
relative to those in the control ABM group were not revealed in the present 
study.  Neither was diminution of attentional bias towards threat across all 
participants uncovered despite the fact that anxiety reduction was achieved.  
This suggests that active ABM is not more effective than control ABM for 
reducing attentional engagement to threat.  It also indicates that anxiety 
reductions were not mediated by reduced threat engagement.  Future work 
could aim to explain these outcomes which mirror findings from other recent 
ABM studies (Carlbring et al., 2012; Carleton et al., 2015; Cristea et al., 2015; 
Enock et al., 2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).   A previous explanation for these 
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findings that cognitive training, with or without the presence of a contingency 
bolster attentional control leading to anxiety reductions (Mogg et al., 2017).  
Research to date therefore indicates that greater attentional control capacity is 
associated with greater active ABM and control ABM training effects. However, 
the mechanism via which attentional control exerts these effects requires 
clarification.  One way to examine whether attentional training outcomes are 
modulated by changes in task-induced attentional control might be to 
manipulate the degree to which the training augments attentional control 
capacity.  An ABM group in which little or no attentional control training takes 
place could be added.  Alternatively, a condition in which attentional control is 
trained to a greater degree than in the present ABM regimen could be included.  
If smaller or larger relative attention bias and anxiety modifications were 
obtained in these groups then this would further support the notion that the 
degree to which attentional control capacity is altered through training is 
influential in the magnitude of attention bias and anxiety change. 
 
An alternative explanation for why the present experiment did not reveal 
reductions in threat bias following attend neutral ABM is that the emotional dot-
probe task is not a reliable measure of attentional bias (Kappenman et al., 2014; 
Schmukle, 2005; Sigurjonsdottir et al., 2015).  Future studies might use a 
different or additional measure of attentional bias which provides a more 
temporally specific measure of attentional control processes such as eye-





Investigating the ‘attentional control’ theory of ABM.  Are reductions in 
anxiety explained by improved attention regulation? 
Experiment 2 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In Experiment 1 participants received active ABM or control ABM with active 
tRNS or sham tES over 3 consecutive days.  Assessment of attentional bias and 
anxiety from before and after training revealed reduction in anxiety for all 
participants irrespective of ABM allocation following training.  Recent ABM 
investigations have generated similar results (Carlbring et al., 2012; Carleton 
et al., 2015; Cristea et al., 2015; Enock et al., 2015; Heeren et al., 2013; 
Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  Yao et al. (2015) for example, recently found that 
anxiety rating in response to a speech task was reduced for participants who 
had received ABM towards mildly smiling faces (away from angry faces), 
control ABM and ABM training towards geometric shapes.  This demonstrates 
that, not only can anxiety reduction occur independent of contingency in ABM 
but also exclusive of salient or emotional stimuli, a phenomenon also reported 
by Heeren et al., (2016).  If the contingency element of training is not a 
factor in anxiety reduction then this suggests that another mechanism is 
responsible.   
 
Mechanisms discussed in previous chapters include ‘non-specific treatment 
effects’ (Enock et al., 2014).  Another possibility is that repeated exposure to 
126 
 
threatening faces, words or images render these stimuli less salient and 
therefore less likely to capture attention and invoke an anxious response 
(Carleton et al., 2015).  However, this exposure effect would not account for 
the decline in anxiety obtained following dot probe tasks using geometric 
shapes (e.g. Heeren et al., 2016; Yao et al., 2015).   A further explanation is 
that the dot-probe (ABM) task represents a form of cognitive training which 
increases attention regulation capacity.  Participants who undertake such 
training are therefore better able to regulate attentional and emotional 
response towards threatening stimuli (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013; 
Klumpp et al., 2010; Taylor, Cross & Amir, 2015).  Heeren et al. (2016) 
implicated the frontal cortices in this process proposing that intensification of 
higher-order activity in the frontal cortex regulates emotional reactivity via 
projections from this area of the brain to the limbic system (Heeren et al., 
2016).   
 
3.1.1  Attentional Control and Anxiety 
 
Evidence of a relationship between anxiety and attentional control is 
pervasive (E.g. Armstrong et al., 2011; Browning et al., 2010; Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Jones, Fazio & Vasey, 2012; Tang & Posner, 2009; Taylor, Cross & 
Amir, 2016; Weiser et al., 2009). Correlational research has shown that 
individuals with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) have lower self-reported 
attentional control relative to non-anxious controls (Armstrong et al, 2011).  
Moriya & Tanno (2008) reported a negative relationship between social 
anxiety and attentional control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008).  Attentional Control 
Theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) proposes that in 
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anxiety, bottom-up, salience driven mechanisms such as excessive worry or 
rumination interfere with attentional control processes reducing efficiency in 
tasks requiring attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007).  Studies which 
examined how individuals with high anxiety perform in attentionally 
demanding tasks have supported this suggestion (e.g. Sadeh & Bredemeier, 
2011).  Osinsky (2012b) reported that highly trait anxious participants were 
unable to suppress engagement to task-irrelevant stimuli in a face-word 
Stroop task.  Weiser et al., (2009) demonstrated that participants with high 
level social anxiety had difficulty inhibiting prosaccades to face images when 
anti-saccade was required relative to participants with low social anxiety.  
However, because these studies did not manipulate anxiety levels they did 
not establish a direct causal relationship between anxiety and attentional 
control.   
 
Of late, research has begun to investigate whether impaired attentional 
control is, in fact, causally implicated in anxiety.  Sari et al. (2016) delivered 
attentional control training to high trait anxious individuals for three 
consecutive weeks.  Following training, attentional control was improved (as 
assessed using a Flanker task) and anxiety was reduced relative to before 
training (Sari et al., 2016).  This finding indicates that interventions targeting 
attentional control may be effective in reducing anxiety (Taylor et al., 2016).  
Efficient attentional control involves the ability to focus attention upon task 
relevant stimuli and to ignore non-relevant information (Eysenck & Derakshan, 
2011).  These processes are central to ABM training in both its active and 
control format.  Undertaking ABM may therefore facilitate attentional control 
processes (Heeren et al., 2015a).  This potential was demonstrated in an eye-
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tracking study which showed that ABM towards neutral stimuli not only 
reduced attentional bias towards threat but reduced anti-saccade cost in an 
anti-saccade task (the difference between the main anti-saccade latency and 
the mean pro-saccade latency; Chen et al., 2015) a reliable measure of 
attentional control (Ainsworth & Garner, 2013). Given that there is support 
for the attentional control bolstering effects of ABM, researchers have 
proposed that the improvements in anxiety which follow active ABM and 
control ABM training may arise due to the enhancement of attentional control 
capacity (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013).  Some researchers have 
provided empirical support for this suggestion.  Participants in Heeren et al’s 
(2015a) study received ABM training towards neutral faces, ABM towards 
threat faces or control ABM.  All three groups demonstrated reductions in 
stressor-related anxiety and improvements in the alerting and executive 
functions of attention following training as evidenced by performance in the 
attention network task (Heeren et al., 2015a).  In a study by Heeren et al., 
(2015c) participants received contingency dot-probe training or control 
training with geometric shapes (Heeren et al., 2015c).  All participants had 
reductions in stressor related anxiety and improvements in working memory 
following training as measured using the backward digit span task.  The 
authors suggested that the diminution in anxiety might be related to 
enhancement of attentional control, a key function of working memory 
(Heeren et al., 2015c).  Enoch et al. (2014) assigned participants to ABM 
towards neutral stimuli, control ABM or a waitlist group in which no training 
was delivered.  Anxiety and depression were reduced following the training 
period in the active ABM and control ABM groups but not in the wait list 
group. It was therefore suggested that the remedial factor was attentional 
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training irrespective of contingency (Enoch et al., 2014).  Each of these 
findings supports the view that the active mechanism of ABM is not the 
contingency associated with stimulus presentation but the attentional training 
itself which improves aspects of attention control.  With enhanced attention 
regulation, an individual can better control how threatening stimuli are 
processed and thus the impact of threat related stimuli is attenuated (Klumpp 
et al., 2010).  Training which does not enlist attentional control resources 
should not augment self-regulation capacity and reduce anxiety. 
 
3.1.2 Cognitive Control, Attentional Control and Working 
Memory 
 
Cognitive control, attentional control and working memory are interrelated 
cognitive facets.  They are each implicated in top-down regulation and 
associated with shared structures in the pre-frontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). These functions are involved in facilitating the pursuit of goal-relevant 
behaviours and inhibiting goal-irrelevant behaviours which may be triggered 
by external stimuli (Astle & Scerif, 2009). 
 
Cognitive control is defined as the capacity to flexibly modulate cognitive 
function and behaviour to meet task demands.  Where cognitive control has 
been considered in terms of its capacity to down-regulate emotional response 
it has been described as an interaction between working memory and the 
stimulus driven limbic system processes (Brooks et al., 2017).  Associated 
executive processes include attentional shifting, the maintenance and 
updating of working memory and cognitive or reaction conflict resolution 
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(Song et al., 2017).  Cognitive control there encompasses elements of both 
attentional control and working memory.   
 
Attentional control capacity is determined by the ability to focus attention 
upon task relevant stimuli and to ignore non-relevant information (Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011).    Some researchers have conceptualised attentional control 
in terms of its functional components.  Derryberry & Reed (2002) for example 
stated that effective attentional control requires ‘shifting’ which involves 
directing attention away from task irrelevant stimuli and on to task relevant 
stimuli and ‘focusing’ which requires maintaining attention on task relevant 
information (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Others have highlighted the 
importance of attentional ‘inhibition’ and ‘selection’ (e.g. Basanovic et al., 
2017).   
 
Working memory refers to the retention of a small amount of information, 
which is easily accessible in order to facilitate performance in cognitive tasks 
such as problem solving and learning (Baddeley, 1983).  Attentional control is 
considered a principal function of working memory (Course-Choi, Saville & 
Derakshan, 2017) as it allows for the focusing of attention on task-relevant 
information (the information to be retained) and the inhibition of task-
irrelevant stimuli (Sari et al., 2015).   
 
Given the inter-dependency between these functions, it might be expected 
that the manipulation of one would impact upon the efficacy of another.  
Indeed, evidence exists that the augmentation of cognitive control capacity 
via working memory training results in attentional control enhancement 
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(Heeren et al., 2016; Owens et al., 2013).  Furthermore, training related 
improvements have been seen to be related to reduction of emotional 
vulnerability (Sari et al., 2015; Swainston & Derakshan, 2018).  A recent study 
showed that, adaptive cognitive training in a dual n-back task resulted in 
greater reduction in anxiety and rumination following training than control 
training in breast cancer patients (Swainston & Derakshan, 2018).  In another 
study, training-related improvements in the dual n-back task were related 
with working memory improvement and worry symptom reductions for 
participants who received active training but not for those who received 
control training (Hotton, Derakshan & Fox, 2018).   
 
In studies which compare the effects of adaptive working memory training 
with non-adaptive or control training, it is considered that the extent to 
which cognitive resources are recruited and trained is determined by 
characteristics of the task including the task format, task complexity and the 
time pressures inherent to a task (Paas et al., 2003; Paas et al., 2010).  In the 
studies by Hotton et al. (2017), Owens et al. (2013), Sari et al. (2015) and 
Swainston et al. (2018) adaptive working memory training took the form of 
the dual n-back task.  In this task, the participant must attend to a sequence 
of numbers presented in a visual and an auditory format concurrently.  The 
participant must indicate whether a number matches that shown n trials back 
in either the visual or auditory sequence.  This task gets progressively harder 
as ‘n’ increases as performance improves thus explaining the adaptive nature 




In summary, tasks designed to enhance cognitive control by enhancing 
working memory capacity have been seen to improve attentional control.  
These improvements are also associated with reductions in negative affect 
(e.g. Swainston & Derakshan, 2018).  The degree to which as task recruits and 
modulates cognitive resources is determined by the task’s format, complexity 
and time pressures (Paas et al., 2003; Paas et al., 2010).   
 
3.1.3  Attentional and cognitive control requirements of ABM 
 
A potential explanation for the findings of equivalent reductions in anxiety for 
participants in the active ABM and participants in the control ABM groups was 
that both training conditions enhanced attentional control capacity.  During 
active and control ABM the participant responds to a target replacing a 
stimulus.  In doing so they may have to inhibit engagement to an alternative 
stimulus in order to attend to the location of that which the target replaces. 
It could be argued therefore that ABM, irrespective of contingency, trains this 
key facet of attentional control (Basanovic et al., 2017).  In addition, 
participants must select between one of two target identities.  This ‘forced 
choice’ task therefore also encourages speed and accuracy of decision making 
(Woodruff et al., 2012) representing an additional layer of cognitive training.  
If state anxiety reductions are attributable to the enhancement of attentional 
processing capacity then a version of the task which places less demand on 
executive attention resources might not be expected to achieve the same 




There are a limited number of ways in which it is possible to modify the 
attentional or cognitive load of the dot-probe ABM task without significantly 
altering it’s design.  Unlike the dual n-back task (Hotton et al., 2017; Owen et 
al., 2013; Sari et al., 2015; Swainston et al., 2018), the ABM paradigm is non-
adaptive and therefore it is not possible to simplify the task by eliminating an 
adaptive element.  As mentioned, ABM requires attentional inhibition of task 
irrelevant stimuli and the shifting of attention to task relevant stimuli 
(Basanovic et al., 2017), 2 facets of attention control (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002).  Eliminating the inhibition and shifting facets of ABM might be 
achievable by presenting a single stimulus on the computer screen followed by 
a to-be-identified target.  However, this would change the design from a dot-
probe paradigm.  Alternatively, it might be possible for the task to target 
attentional control mechanisms by modulating demands on cognitive control 
or working memory (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  Studies have previously used a 
simple reaction time paradigm as a low demand cognitive control task with a 
choice reaction time paradigm as the more cognitively demanding or active 
condition (e.g. Cooper et al., 1994; Willison & Tombaugh, 2006).   A simple 
reaction task involves making a response to a single stimulus or a single 
feature of a stimulus (Deary, Liewald & Nissan, 2011) for example, to respond 
with a single key press only when the target appears in yellow but to withhold 
response when the target is not in yellow.  This task therefore requires 
detection of a target as opposed to discrimination between targets.  This also 
describes a simple go-no-go task.  When targets are presented for longer 
latencies (e.g. 2 seconds; Sikström et al., 2016) the go-no-go paradigm 
demands a relatively low level of attentional resources.  In studies which aim 
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to compare the effects of high cognitive load and low cognitive load, the 
simple go-no-go has been used as the latter (e.g. Sikström et al., 2016).  
 
3.1.2.1  No-training ABM 
 
Experiment 2 replicated the procedure from experiment 1 except that the 
training task was simplified to minimise cognitive load.  In Experiment 2 
participants were required to press a singular key ({enter}) if a target (either 
p or q) appeared.  There was therefore a shifting aspect to the task but, as it 
was not necessary to identify the target letter, the degree of focus required 
was notably reduced from the experiment 1 task.  There was also no forced 
choice element to the paradigm as participants responded to either target 
letter in the same manner.  Targets appeared in 80% of trials. Participants 
were asked to press the {enter} key if a target appeared and to withhold their 
response if a target did not appear.  A time limit of 2000ms was placed on 
target response (before the target disappeared) and so participants were not 
subject to significant time pressure.  This simple, non-engaging paradigm was 
designed to maintain equivalence with the ABM training paradigm from 
experiment 1 as far as possible but to recruit cognitive resources to a lesser 
degree.   
 
It should be noted that there is no direct evidence that the no-training task 
designed for the present study involves the elimination of attentional control 
as no measure of attentional control was administered before and after the 
task.  An assumption is made based on previous evidence that tasks which 
place fewer demands on cognitive control and working memory resources 
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produce inferior attentional control and emotional response improvements 
relative to more cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Sari et al., 2015; Swainston 
et al., 2018).  If the anxiety reductions observed following active and control 
ABM in experiment 1 were attributable to attentional control enhancement, 
then the ‘no-training’ task should fail to elicit the anxiety reductions seen in 
experiment 1.   
 
3.1.3  Aims 
 
The aim of experiment 2 was to clarify the role of attentional control 
processes in ABM outcomes.  If the reductions in threat bias and anxiety 
observed in experiment 1 were attributable to enhanced attentional control, 
then experiment 2 would not produce these beneficial results due to the 
experiment 2 training task having low cognitive load. If, however anxiety was 
attenuated following no-training ABM this would suggest that another 
mechanism was responsible for these reductions e.g. exposure or ‘non-
specific’ effects.  It was predicted that there would be no reduction in threat 




3.2.1  Design 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed methods design was employed.  All participants underwent ‘no 
training’ ABM.  The between-participants factor was tES group (active tRNS 
and sham tES).  As per experiment 1, attentional bias was assessed and self-
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report measures were administered at 3 principal time points: before ABM 
training on day one (assessment 1), following ABM training on day 3 
(assessment 2) and at a day 30 follow-up (assessment 3). 
 
3.2.2  Participants 
 
Participants were 42 students from the University of Roehampton (32 female), 
mean age = 21.05 years, SD = 5.43, range = 18 to 42).   All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision.   
 
A total of 42 participants were recruited.  This number was based on the 
division of participants across two tES groups resulting in group sizes similar to 
previous studies using tES to modulate cognitive functioning, for example 
Ditye et al. (2012), Fertonani, Pirulli & Miniussi, (2011) and Snowball et al. 
(2013).     
 
The recruitment process replicated that from experiment 1 
 
All participants undertook the no-training ABM task and were allocated to one 
of two tES categories.  This resulted in two experimental groups:  No-training 
ABM with tRNS, and no-training ABM with sham tES.  Allocation to tES group 
was randomised and double blinded (see below). 
 
3.2.3  Ethics 
 
The study was approved by the University of Roehampton ethics committee 
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(approval code PSYC 14/ 116).  Written consent was provided by all 
participants before participation.  Participants were compensated for their 
participation with course credits.   
 
3.2.4  Materials 
 
3.2.4.1  Measures 
  
The self-report measures used were the same as those used in part 1 of the 
study.  The Experimental Condition Questionnaire included ‘no-training 
condition’ as an option where participants indicated which form of training 
they believed they had received (Appendix 13). 
 
3.2.4.2  Stimuli 
 
The stimuli used were identical to those used in experiment 1. 
 
3.3.4.3  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
Attention bias assessment was the same as in experiment 1. 
 
3.3.4.4  No-training ABM paradigm 
 
The paradigm used for the ‘no training’ ABM task was the same as the control 
ABM group in experiment 1 and as that employed during attention bias 
assessment, except that participants were not required to press a key 
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corresponding to the identity of the target.  Instead participants were 
instructed to press the {Enter} key if a target (either q or p) appeared and to 
withhold response if no target was presented.  The target letter replaced the 
neutral face 50% of the time and the angry face 50% of the time.  It was 
considered that the removal of the requirement to identify the target would 
reduce cognitive load.  
 
In experiment 1 each block of training comprised 96 trials.  In the present 
paradigm ‘no-go’ trials were added to this total. Training data were not 
analysed for the present thesis.  However, should training data from 
experiment 2 be subject to analysis in future, reaction time, accuracy and 
attention bias calculations will be based upon the same number of response 
trials in experiment 2 as experiment 1.  It would be possible to compare data 
from the two experiments without making adjustments for differently sized 
data sets.  As per previous go/no-go designs (e.g. Redick et al., 2011; Zhang 
et al., 2016), ‘go’ trials comprised 80% of trials and ‘no-go’ trials made up 20% 
of the total number of trials.  Each block therefore consisted of 96 ‘go’ trials 
and 24 ‘no-go’ trials.  No-training ABM consisted of 6 blocks. The addition of 
trials rendered the training phase of the study longer than training in 
experiment 1 at approximately 40 minutes compared to 30 minutes. 
 
3.2.4.5  TES 
 
The tES procedure matched that used in experiment 1 of the study.  
Stimulation lasted for 20 minutes at the beginning of a 40-minute no-training 
period.  As per experiment 1, allocation to stimulation group was randomised 
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and double blind.  The same list of 5-digit codes which generated active tRNS 
or sham tES in experiment 1 was used.  One stimulation code was allocated to 
each participant and the same code was used for that participant on each of 
the 3 days of training.  The first participant to commence the study was 
allocated the first code on the list.   Each time a new participant attended 
the study they were allocated the next code on the list.  Once all 40 codes 
had been allocated, the experimenter began again at the beginning of the 
list. 
 
3.2.5  Procedure 
 
The experiment procedure replicated that used in experiment 1 except that 
all participants performed the no-training ABM task.    
 
3.2.6  Data Preparation 
 
Data from inaccurate trials were removed.  Mean accuracy across attention 
bias assessments was 95.30% (SD = 2.92). Reaction times below 200ms were 
omitted from analysis.  To remove the effect of outlying data on analysis, 
reaction times which were more than 2.5 standard deviations from each 
participant’s mean reaction time were excluded (e.g. Brown et al., 2014).  






3.2.7  Data Analyses 
 
Data analyses were conducted as per experiment 1.   
 
3.2.8  Baseline Characteristics 
 
3.2.8.1  Baseline Scores for Main Variables of Interest 
 
Findings from experiment 2 will be discussed in light of results from 
experiment 1. Table 3.1 presents baseline attention bias, state anxiety, trait 
anxiety and attentional control scores across all ABM/tES groups from 
experiments 1 and 2.  Independent t-tests compared baseline scores for all 
participants from experiment 1 and all participants from experiment 2.  For 




Baseline mean (SD) scores for major variables of interest 
 Baseline Mean (SD) Scores 
Attention Bias 
(ms) 
State Anxiety Trait Anxiety Attentional Control  
All Participants Experiment 1 .97 (13.70) 33.18 (10.46) 41.73 (11.84) 48.87 (7.84) 
All Participants Experiment 2 -2.25 (14.77) 34.48 (10.59) 44.50 (12.19) 49.48 (7.75) 
Between Subjects Effects 
 
t = 1.21, p = .23 t = .65, p = .51 t = 1.23, p = .22 t = .41, p = .68 
Active ABM/Active tRNS -.30 (18.75) 33.38 (10.94) 39.48 (9.69) 50.76 (6.50) 
Active ABM/Sham tES -.73 (13.69) 33.90 (8.15) 43.10 (12.92) 47.57 (7.88) 
Control ABM/Active tRNS 1.59 (9.77) 31.71 (9.31) 40.14 (12.98) 50.62 (6.79) 
Control ABM/Sham tES 3.33 (11.37) 33.71 (13.34) 44.19 (11.67) 46.52 (9.48) 
No Training ABM/Active tRNS -4.78 (14.59) 33.52 (9.78) 41.24 (10.80) 50.62 (7.26) 





3.2.8.2  Depression and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
 
Table 3.2 shows for each experimental group the mean and standard deviation 
score at baseline for the CES-D and FNE. 
 
Independent t-tests revealed that baseline scores on self-report measures did 
not differ significantly between groups (ts < .43, ps > .67).   
 
Table 3.2: 
Mean (SD) CES-D and FNE score for each self-report measure for each tES group 
 No-training/active tRNS No-training/sham tES 
 M SD M SD 
CES-D 14.42 8.93 15.00 12.05 
FNE 14.21 7.78 13.15 7.66 
 
 
3.2.8.3  State and Trait Anxiety Across Experimental Groups by  
Gender 
 
Table 3.3 shows the mean and standard deviation state anxiety scores before 














Baseline mean (standard deviation) state and trait anxiety scores across experimental groups for females and 
males 
 




There was no significant difference in baseline state anxiety between 
stimulation groups (t = .58, p = .57).   
 
State anxiety mean and standard deviation scores reported for a normative 
sample of undergraduate students are mean = 36.47 (SD = 10.02) for males 
and mean = 38.76 (SD = 11.95) for females (Spielberger et al., 1983). One 
sample t-tests revealed that for females who received active tRNS mean 
baseline state anxiety score did not differ significantly from the mean 
normative score, (t = 1.59, p = .14).  For females who received sham tES, 
mean baseline state anxiety score did not differ significantly from the mean 
normative score, (t = .77, p = .45).  For males who received active tRNS mean 
baseline state anxiety score did not differ significantly from the mean 
normative score, (t = 1.33, p = .23).  For males who received sham tES, mean 
baseline state anxiety score did not differ significantly from the mean 




 Active tRNS Sham tES 
N  14 18 
Females State Anxiety 34.57 (9.87) 36.67 (11.54) 
Trait Anxiety 42.57 (11.19) 49.67 (12.48)* 
N  7 3 
Males State Anxiety 31.43 (11.00) 28.00 (5.69) 






There was no difference in trait anxiety scores between tES groups at baseline 
(t = 1.78, p = .08).   
 
The normative mean of trait anxiety reported for a sample of undergraduate 
students is 40.40 (SD = 10.15) for females and 38.30 (SD = 9.18) for males 
(Spielberger, 1983).  One sample t-tests revealed that for females who 
received active tRNS, baseline trait anxiety did not differ significantly from 
the normative mean (t = .73, p = .48).  Baseline trait anxiety for females who 
received sham tES (M = 49.67, SD = 12.48) was significantly higher than the 
normative mean (M = 40.40, SD = 10.15), t(17) = 3.15, p = .012.  For males 
who received tRNS, baseline trait anxiety did not differ significantly from the 
normative mean (t = .07, p = .95).  For males who received sham tES, baseline 
trait anxiety did not differ significantly from the normative mean (t = .33, p = 




3.2.8.4  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (i.e. start 
of day 1, end of day 1, start of day 2, end of day 2, start of day 3, end of day 
3, start of day 30, end of day 30) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation analysis.  All correlations were significant (rs > .57, all ps < .001).  
The normative test-retest reliability r values reported by Spielberger et al. 
(1983) for college students, with a test-retest interval of 20 days were .54 for 
males and .27 for females. Our results therefore suggest strong test-retest 
reliability and consistency within the state anxiety data.   
 
3.2.8.5  Correlations Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
 
As with the data from experiment 1, baseline trait anxiety score was 
correlated with state anxiety score at each of the principal 3 assessment 
points. As demonstrated in table 3.4, baseline trait anxiety correlated 
significantly with state anxiety at each assessment.   
 
Table 3.4: 









 SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 SAS Assessment 3 
Baseline Trait 
Anxiety 
.626** .636* .724** 
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3.2.8.6  Correlations Between Self-report Measures at Baseline 
 
Baseline scores from questionnaires assessing trait characteristics were subject 
to a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis.  Table 3.5 shows the 
correlation between baseline scores on trait self-report measures. 
   
Table 3.5: 
Bivariate correlations for trait anxiety scale (TAS), attentional control scale (ACS), Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies depression questionnaire (CES-D) and fear of negative evaluation scale (FNE) at baseline. 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Trait Anxiety  1.00    
2. Attentional Control  -.524** 1.00   
3. Depression  .881** -.400* 1.00 . 
4. Fear Negative Evaluation  .694** -.353** .634* 1.00 
*  p < 0.05 
** p < 0.0 
 
Baseline scores across all questionnaires were significantly correlated (all rs > 





3.3.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Participants 
 
3.3.1.1  Attention Bias (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with a 
between subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and a within subjects 
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factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3).  There were 
no significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.79, ps > .17).   
 
Figure 3.1 shows mean attentional bias across assessments for each tES group 
(active tRNS, sham tES) and for all participants.  Positive attention bias scores 
represent threat bias and negative scores represent neutral bias. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for each tES group and for all 
participants 
 
3.3.1.2  State Anxiety (All Participants) 
 
Replicating the threat bias ANOVA above, a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on state anxiety data with between subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham 
tES) and a within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, 
assessment 3).  As demonstrated in figure 3.2 there was a significant main 

























Mean (SE) Attentional Bias
Active tRNS Sham tES All Participants
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.71) suggesting a change in state anxiety across assessments for all 
participants.  Paired samples t-tests examined change in state anxiety across 
assessments.  All results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 3*p < .05).  At assessment 1 participants reported greater state 
anxiety (M = 34.48, SD = 11.38) than at assessment 2 (M = 30.86, SD = 11.38), 
t(41) = 2.63, p = .04.  The change in state anxiety from assessment 2 to 
assessment 3 was marginally significant t(41) = 2.48, p = .054 with increased 
state anxiety at assessment 3 (M =  33.95, SD = 13.46) compared to 
assessment 2 (M = 30.86, SD = 11.38).  Change in state anxiety level between 
assessment 1 and assessment 3 was not significant (t = .34, p = 2.22).   
 
The interaction between assessment and tES was marginally significant 
F(2,80) = 3.10, p = .051, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .58).  A component 
within-participant follow-up analysis for each tES group revealed that there 
was a significant change in state anxiety across assessments for active tRNS 
participants, F(2,40) = 4.50, p = .03, (ηp2 = .18; observed power = .64; 
Greenhouse Geisser Corrected).  For the active tRNS group, paired sample t-
tests examined change in state anxiety across assessments.  Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  These 
revealed a reduction in state anxiety from assessment 1 (M = 33.52, SD = 9.78) 
to assessment 2 (M = 28.43, SD = 8.51) which approached significance, t(20) = 
2.53, p = .06.  There were no further significant changes in state anxiety 
across assessments, (ts < 1.92, ps > .21).  In the sham tES group there was an 
effect of assessment which approached significance, F(2,40) = 2.95, p = .064, 
(ηp2 = .13; observed power = .54).  Follow-up paired samples t-tests did not 
reveal a significant change in state anxiety across assessment sessions (all ts < 
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2.29, ps > .10; Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons; significant if 
3*p < .05).  Independent t-tests examined the impact of tES group on state 
anxiety at each assessment.  After adjusting for multiple comparisons using 
Bonferroni correction (significant if 3*p < .05), there was no difference in 
state anxiety between tES groups at any assessment (ts < 2.14. ps > .12).  
 
The main effect of tES group was non-significant (F = 2.50, p = .12). 
 
 
* p < .05 



























Mean (SE) State Anxiety Across Assessments





3.3.1.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (All Participants) 
 
State anxiety was measured on each day of training at the start and end of each 
session (see figure 3.3). 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with the between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and 2 within subjects factors of 
time (start of session, end of session) and day (Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, Day 30).   
 
This revealed a main effect of day, F(1.98,79.07) = 3.53, p = .03, (ηp2 = .08; 
observed power = .64; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  After allowing for 
multiple corrections (Bonferroni adjustment; significant if 6*p < .05) paired 
samples t-tests revealed no significant changes in state anxiety across 
experimental days (ts < 2.40, ps > 1.26).   
 
The interaction between day and tES approached significance, 
F(1.98,79.07) = 2.92, p = .06, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .55; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  For each tES group, paired samples t-tests were 
performed to assess change in state anxiety across days.  Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  These 
revealed no significant differences in state anxiety across days for active tRNS 
participants (ts < 1.30, ps > 1.25) or for sham tES participants (ts < 2.53, ps > 
.12).  Independent t-tests examined the effect of tES for each day of testing. 
State anxiety did not differ significantly between tES groups on any 
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experimental day (ts < 2.21, ps > 1.40; Bonferroni adjusted for multiple 
comparisons; significant if 4*p < .05). 
 
There was a main effect of time, F(1,40) = 4.37, p = .04, (ηp2 = .10; observed 
power = .53; Greenhouse Geisser corrected). Participants reported greater 
state anxiety at the beginning of the session (M = 33.15, SD = 11.65) compared 
to the end (M = 31.62, SD = 10.92).   
 
The interaction between day and time was significant F(3,120) = 5.48, p = .001, 
(ηp2 = .12; observed power = .93).  A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
carried out on start of session state anxiety to explore changes over days.  For 
start of session state anxiety there was a significant effect of day 
F(2.31,94.68) = 3.88, p = .02, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .73).  Paired samples 
t-tests (Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons; significant if 6*p < .05) 
revealed a significant reduction in state anxiety from start of day 1 (M = 34.38, 
SD = 10.59) to start of day 2 (M = 31.12, SD = 9.49), t(41) = 3.51, p = .001. No 
other change in state anxiety across days for start of session data was significant 
(all ts < 2.65, ps > .07).   
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on end of session data 
to explore changes over days.  There was a significant effect of day 
F(1.77,72.50) = 3.46, p = .04, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .59; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  Paired samples t-tests revealed no significant change in 
state anxiety across days (all ts < 2.48, ps > .11; Bonferroni adjusted for 
multiple comparisons; significant if 6*p < .05).  Paired samples t-tests 
(Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons; significant if 4*p < .05) were 
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used to assess significant differences between start of session and end of 
session state anxiety for each experimental day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30).  
There was a significant reduction in state anxiety from start of day 1 (M = 
34.38, SD = 10.59) to end of day 1 (M = 30.67, SD = 7.71), t(41) = 3.21, p = 
.01.  The comparison of start to end of day state anxiety was not significant 
on any other day (ts < 1.44, ps > .63). 
 
No other main or interaction effects were observed (Fs < 2.31, ps > .08). 
 
 
* p < .05 
Figure 3.3. Mean (SE) state anxiety scores at the start and end of each experimental day for 




























Mean (SE) State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Day





3.3.2 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attention Bias 
as a Covariate 
 
3.3.2.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on attention bias data with a between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and the covariate of 
pre-existing attention bias.  There was a significant interaction between 
assessment and pre-existing attention bias, F(1.31,51.26) = 39.88, 
p < .001, (ηp2 = .51; observed power = 1.00; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  
In order to explore the relationship between pre-existing attention bias and 
change in attention bias across assessments, a Pearson Product Moment 
correlational analysis was conducted with pre-existing attention bias, change 
in attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 2, change in attention bias 
from assessment 1 to assessment 3 and change in attention bias from 
assessment 2 to assessment 3.  Change in attention bias was calculated by 
subtracting attention bias score at the earlier assessment from attention bias 
score at the later assessment e.g. attention bias at assessment 2 – attention 
bias at assessment 1.  A positive score represented an increase in attention 
bias therefore and a negative score represented a reduction in attention bias.  
Pre-existing attention bias was strongly, negatively correlated with change in 
attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 2, r(42) = -.87, p < .001.  Pre-
existing attention bias was strongly, negatively correlated with change in 
attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 3, r(42) = -.78, p < .001.  Pre-
existing attention bias was moderately, positively correlated with change in 
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attention bias from assessment 2 to assessment 3, r(42) = .33, p = .032 (see 
figure 3.10 for regression lines).  Figure 3.10 shows that greater attention bias 
towards threat at baseline was associated with greater reduction in threat 
bias following ABM training relative to before ABM training at assessment 2 






























Figure 3.4. The relationship between pre-existing attention bias (AB) and a) change in AB 
between assessments 1 and 2, b) change in AB between assessments 1 and 3 and c) change in 
AB between assessments 2 and 3 across experiment 2.  For pre-existing attention bias, 
positive scores indicate attention bias towards threat and negative scores indicate attention 
bias towards neutral.  For difference scores, positive values represent increase in threat bias 
and negative scores represent increase in neutral bias (reduction in threat bias). 
 






























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and Change 
in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 2































Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 3




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 2 to Assessment 3
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There was a significant main effect of pre-existing attention bias, 
F(1,39) = 19.11, p < .001, (ηp2 = .33; observed power = .99).  There was a 
moderate, negative correlation between pre-existing attention bias and 
attention bias, r(42) = -.41, p = .006.   
 
The main effect of tES was also significant, F(1,39) = 4.66, 
p < .001, (ηp2 = .11; observed power = .56).  An independent t-test revealed 
no significant difference in attention bias between tES groups (t = 1.18. p = 
.25). 
 
There were no further main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.84, ps > .17). 
 
3.3.2.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with a between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and the covariate of 
pre-existing attention bias.  The main effect of assessment was significant, 
F(2,78) = 4.65, p = .012, (ηp2 = .11; observed power = .77).  The assessment x 
tES interaction was also significant, F(2,78) = 3.74, p = .028, (ηp2 = .09; 
observed power = .67).  These effects are discussed in section 3.3.1.2. 
 
3.3.2.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependant variable A 2 x 4 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), 
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a within subjects factor of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (before 
ABM training, after ABM training) and pre-existing attention bias as the 
covariate.  This revealed a main effect of day, F(1.95,76.17) = 3.40, p = .04, 
(ηp2 = .08; observed power = .62; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  The 
interaction between day and tES was significant, F(1.95,76.17) = 3.15, p = 
.05, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .58; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  There 
was a main effect of time, F(1,39) = 4.19, p = .047, (ηp2 = .10; observed 
power = .52).  The interaction between day and time was significant 
F(3,117) = 6.38, p < .001, (ηp2 = .14; observed power = .96).  Each of these 
main and interaction effects was explored in section 3.3.1.3. 
 
3.3.3 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as 
a Covariate 
 
3.3.3.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with a between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and the covariate of 
pre-existing trait anxiety.   There were no significant main or interaction 
effects, (Fs < 1.24, ps > .30). 
 
3.3.3.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with a between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and the covariate of 
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pre-existing state anxiety.  There was a significant main effect of trait 
anxiety, F(1,39) = 41.77, p < .001, (ηp2 = .52; observed power = 1.00).  
Pearson’s Product Moment correlational analysis revealed that pre-existing 
trait anxiety was significantly, strongly and positively correlated with mean 
state anxiety r(42) = .74, p < .001 (see figure 3.17). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The relationship between scores on the state anxiety scale of the STAI 
(Spielberger et al., 1983) across experiment 2 and the trait anxiety scale of the STAI at 
baseline. 
 
The main effect of assessment seen in the main analysis (section 3.3.1.2) was 
not observed with trait anxiety held constant (F = 1.64, p = .20).  The tES x 
Assessment interaction (section 3.3.1.2) was also no longer significant (F = 
1.88, p = .16). There were no further significant main or interaction effects, 
(Fs < 1.91, ps > .15). 
 



























3.3.3.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Day (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependant variable A 2 x 4 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), 
a within subjects factor of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (before 
ABM training, after ABM training) and pre-existing trait anxiety as the 
covariate.  This revealed a main effect of day, F(2.13,82.97) = 3.94, p = .01, 
(ηp2 = .09; observed power = .71; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For a 
breakdown of this effect see section 3.3.1.3.  The main effect of trait anxiety 
was significant, F(1,39) = 39.79, p < .001, (ηp2 = .51; observed power = 1.00).  
See figure 3.5 for the relationship between pre-existing trait anxiety and state 
anxiety.  The day x time x tES interaction was significant, F(3,117) = 2.85, p = 
.04, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .67).   
 
For each day the interaction between time and tES was explored using 2 x 2 
ANCOVAs with time (start of session, end of session) as the within participants 
factor and tES (active tRNS, sham tES) as the between participants factor and 
trait anxiety as a covariate.  Analysis of day 1 data revealed a significant main 
effect of trait anxiety, F(1,39) = 27.88, p < .001, (ηp2 = .42; observed power = 
1.00).  State anxiety on day 1 was significantly, highly, positively correlated 
with pre-existing trait anxiety, r(42) = .67, p < .001.  The time x trait anxiety 
interaction was significant for day 1 state anxiety, F(1,39) = 5.35, p = .026, 
(ηp2 = .12; observed power = .62).  Follow up bivariate correlational analysis 
revealed that start of day 1 state anxiety was strongly and positively 
correlated with pre-existing trait anxiety, r(42) = .63, p < .001) as was end of 
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day 1 state anxiety, r(42) = .59, p < .001). For day 1 state anxiety, there was 
a significant time x tES interaction, F(1,39) = 4.27, p = .045, (ηp2 = .10; 
observed power = .52).  For each time (start of session, end of session), 
independent t-tests explored the effect of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) on 
state anxiety.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 2*p < .05).  TES groups did not differ in state anxiety at the 
start of day 1 (t = .58, p = 1.13).  However, at the end day 1, state anxiety for 
the active tRNS group (M = 28.05, SD = 6.45) was lower than for the sham tES 
group (M = 33.29, SD = 8.12) at a near significant level, t(40) = 2.32, p = .052.  
For each tES condition (active tRNS, sham tES), paired samples t-tests were 
used to investigate the main effect of time on day 1 state anxiety.   Results 
were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  
For the active tRNS group, state anxiety at the end of day 1, (M = 28.05, SD = 
6.45) was lower than at the start of day 1, (M = 33.52, SD = 9.78), t(20) = 
3.96, p = .002.  The effect of time was not significant for the sham tES group 
(t = 1.13, p = .52).  For day 1 state anxiety, there were no further significant 
main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.89, ps > .18).   
 
For day 2 state anxiety there was a significant main effect of the covariate 
trait anxiety, F(1,39) = 22.33, p < .001, (ηp2 = .36; observed power = 1.00).  
Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, positively correlated with day 2 state 
anxiety, r(42) = .62, p < .001.  The interaction between time and tES 
conditions was significant for day 2 state anxiety, F(1,39) = 4.62, p = .038, 
(ηp2 = .11; observed power = .55).  For each time (start of session, end of 
session) an independent t-test examined the effect of tES condition on day 2 
state anxiety.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons 
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(significant if 2*p < .05).  There were no significant effects (ts < 1.76, ps < 
.17).  For each tES group (active tRNS, sham tES) a paired samples t-test 
investigated the effect of time on day 2 state anxiety.  Results were 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  For 
the active tRNS group, a reduction in state anxiety from start of day 2 (M = 
30.48, SD = 7.55) to end of day 2 (M = 28.52, SD = 7.44) was marginally 
significant, t(20) = 2.26, p = .07.  For the sham tES group, an increase in state 
anxiety at the end of day 2 relative to the start of day 2 was not significant (t 
= 1.27, p = .44).  There were no further main or interaction effects arising 
from the analysis on day 2 state anxiety data (Fs < .12, ps > .73).   
 
For day 3 state anxiety there was a significant main effect of trait anxiety, 
F(1,39) = 28.60, p < .001, (ηp2 = .42; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing 
trait anxiety was highly, positively and significantly correlated with state 
anxiety at day 3, r(21) = .70, p < .001.  There were no further main or 
interaction effects for day 3 state anxiety data, (Fs < .35, ps > .55).  
 
For day 30 state anxiety there was a significant main effect of trait anxiety, 
F(1,39) = 38.72, p < .001, (ηp2 = .50; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing 
trait anxiety was highly, positively and significantly correlated with state 
anxiety at day 30, r(21) = .62, p = .003.  There were no further main or 
interaction effects for day 30 state anxiety data, (Fs < 1.63, ps > .21). 
 
For each time (start of session, end of session) a 4 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with day as the within participants factor (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and 
tES (active tRNS, sham tES) as the between participants factor and with pre-
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existing trait anxiety as a covariate.  For start of session state anxiety, there 
was a significant main effect of trait anxiety, F(1,39) = 40.21, p < .001, (ηp2 = 
.51; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, positively 
and significantly correlated with start of session state anxiety, r(42) = .73, p < 
.001.  For start of session state anxiety there was also a significant day x trait 
anxiety interaction, F(2.45,95.62) = 3.28, p = .033, (ηp2 = .51; observed power 
= 1.00; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Pearson Product moment 
correlational analysis was used to examine the relationship between start of 
session state anxiety on each day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and pre-
existing trait anxiety.  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, positively 
correlated with state anxiety at the start of day 1, r(42) = .59, p < .001, at 
the start of day 2, r(42) = .59, p < .001, at the start of day 3, r(42) = .66, p < 
.001 and at the start of day 30, r(42) = .72, p < .001.  Analysis of start of 
session data revealed no further main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.44, ps > 
.08).  For end of session state anxiety, the main effect of trait anxiety was 
significant, F(1,39) = 31.71, p < .001, (ηp2 = .45; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-
existing trait anxiety was highly, positively correlated with state anxiety at 
the end of session, r(42) = .70, p < .001.  The main effect of day was also 
significant, F(1.92,74.87) = 5.14, p = .009, (ηp2 = .12; observed power = .80; 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  End of day state anxiety was compared 
across days using paired samples t-tests.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted for 
multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  No paired comparisons were 
significant (ts < 2.48, ps > .11).  For end of day state anxiety there was a 
significant day x pre-existing trait anxiety interaction, F(1.92,74.87) = 7.73, p 
= .001, (ηp2 = .17; observed power = .94; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For 
each day, Pearson Product moment correlational analysis was used to examine 
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the relationship between end of session state anxiety (day 1, day 2, day 3, 
day 30) and pre-existing trait anxiety.  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, 
positively correlated with state anxiety at the end of day 1, r(42) = .59, p < 
.001, at the end of day 2, r(42) = .58, p < .001, at the end of day 3, r(42) = 
.64, p < .001 and at the end of day 30, r(42) = .72, p < .001.  For end of day 
state anxiety there were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs 
< 1.22, ps > .28). 
 
For each tES group (active tRNS, sham tES) a 4 x 2 ANCOVA was carried out 
with the within participants factors of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and 
time (start of session, end of session) and with trait anxiety as a covariate.  
Only the main effect of trait anxiety was significant for the active tRNS group, 
F(1,19) = 4.88, p < .001, (ηp2 = .53; observed power = .99).  Pre-existing trait 
anxiety was highly, positively correlated with mean state anxiety for 
participants in the active tRNS group, r(21) = .75, p < .001.  No further main 
or interaction effects arose from analysis of data from the active tRNS group 
(Fs < 2.61, ps > .12).  For the sham tES group there was a significant main 
effect of day, F(1.96,19.00) = 4.73, p = .015, (ηp2 = .20; observed power = 
.75; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Paired samples t-tests examined change 
in state anxiety across experimental days for participants who received sham 
tES.  Following correction for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni adjustment) 
change in state anxiety was not significant across any pairs of days (ts < 2.53. 
ps > .12).  For the sham tES group there was also a significant day x trait 
anxiety interaction, F(1.96,19.00) = 7.78, p = .002, (ηp2 = .29; observed power 
= .93).  For each day, the relationship between pre-existing trait anxiety and 
state anxiety was explored using Pearson Product Moment correlational 
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analyses.  For participants in the sham tES group, pre-existing trait anxiety 
was highly and positively correlated with state anxiety on day 1, r(21) = .68, p 
= .001, on day 2, r(21) = .65, p = .001, on day 3, r(21) = .70, p < .001 and on 
day 30, r(21) = .62, p = .003. For the sham tES group, there were no further 
significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.43, ps > .14).   
 
There were no further main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.43, ps > .08). 
 
 
3.3.4 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attentional 
Control as a Covariate 
 
3.3.4.1 Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with a between 
subjects factor of tES (active tRNS, sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and the covariate of 
pre-existing attentional control.  No main or interaction effects were 
significant, (Fs < 1.24, ps > .30). 
 
3.3.4.2 State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
The ANCOVA above was repeated on state anxiety data with pre-existing 
attentional control as the covariate.  The assessment x tES interaction 
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approached significance, F(2,78) = 3.02, p = .054, (ηp2 = .07; observed power 
= .57).  This effect was explored in section 3.3.1.2. 
 
The main effect of pre-existing attentional control was marginally significant, 
F(1,39) = 3.65, p = .064, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .46).  Pearson Product 
Moment Correlational analysis revealed a weak to moderate, negative 
correlation between pre-existing attentional control and mean state anxiety 
which was significant, r(42) = -.32, p = .04.  This suggested that greater 
attentional control at baseline was associated with lower level state anxiety.  
See figure 3.6 for the relationship between pre-existing attentional control 
and state anxiety. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. The relationship between scores on the attention control scale (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002) at baseline and mean scores on the state anxiety scale (Spielberger et al., 1983) 
across experiment 2. 
 


















The Relationship between Pre-existing Attentional Control 
and Mean State Anxiety
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The main effect of assessment seen in the main analysis (section 3.3.1.2) was 
not observed with pre-existing attentional control as a covariate (F = .70, p = 
.50) 
 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects, (Fs < 1.77, ps > 
.19). 
 
3.3.4.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Day (Pre-existing Attentional Control as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable 2 x 4 x 2 ANCOVA with tES 
(active tRNS, sham tES) as the between participants factor and day (day 1, 
day2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as within 
participants factors was conducted with pre-existing attentional control as a 
covariate.  There was a marginally significant interaction between day and 
time, F(3,117) = 2.45, p = .067, (ηp2 = .06; observed power = .60).  For state 
anxiety data from each day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) a paired samples t-
test examined the effect of time (start of session, end of session).  Results 
were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 4*p < .05).  
State anxiety at the end of day 1 (M = 30.67, SD = 7.71) was significantly 
reduced compared to start of day 1 (M = 34.48, SD = 10.59), t(41) = 3.21, p = 
.009.  The difference between start and end of session state anxiety was not 
significant for any other experimental day (ts < 1.44, ps > .63).  For each 
time, the effect of day was examined using paired samples t-tests.  Results 
were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  
State anxiety was significantly reduced at the start of day 2 (M = 31.12, SD = 
9.49) compared to the start of day 1 (M = 34.48, SD = 10.59), t(41) = 3.51, p = 
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.006.  There was a marginally significant increase in state anxiety at the start 
of day 30 (M = 34.93, SD = 14.42) compared to the start of day 2 (M = 31.12, 
SD = 9.49), t(41) = 2.65, p = .066.  No other change in state anxiety across 
days was significant for start of session state anxiety data (ts < 1.96, ps > 
.34).  For end of day state anxiety there was no significant change across 
experimental days (ts < 2.48, ps > .11). 
 
The day x time x tES interaction was significant, F(3,117) = 2.72, p = .048, 
(ηp2 = .07; observed power = .65).   
 
For each day a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with time 
(start of session, end of session) as the within participants factor and tES 
(active tRNS, sham tES) as the between participants factor and with 
attentional control as a covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing attentional 
control was significant for day 1 state anxiety data, F(1,39) = 5.68, p = .022, 
(ηp2 = .13; observed power = .64).  Pre-existing attentional control was 
significantly, moderately and negatively correlated with state anxiety on day 
1, r(42), p = .014.  There were no further main or interaction effects to 
emerge from analysis of day 1 data (Fs < 2.35. ps > .13).  For day 2 state 
anxiety, there was a significant time x tES interaction, F(1,39) = 4.27, p = 
.045, (ηp2 = .10; observed power = .52).  For each time (start of day 2, end of 
day 2) the effect of tES was examined using an independent t-test.  Results 
were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  
There were no significant effects (ts < 1.76, ps > .17).  For each tES group, 
the effect of time was explored with a paired samples t-test.  Results were 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  For 
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the active tRNS group, a reduction in state anxiety from start of day 2 (M = 
30.48, SD = 7.55) to end of day 2 (M = 28.52, SD = 7.44) was marginally 
significant, t(20) = 2.26, p = .07.  For the sham tES group, an increase in state 
anxiety at the end of day 2 relative to the start of day 2 was not significant (t 
= 1.27, p = .44).  Analysis of day 2 state anxiety data revealed no further main 
or interaction effects (Fs < 2.07, ps > .16).  Analysis of day 3 state anxiety 
data revealed no main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.01, ps > .16).  For day 30 
state anxiety the 2 x 2 ANCOVA with pre-existing attentional control as a 
covariate revealed a marginally significant main effect of tES, F(1,39) = 4.03, 
p = .051, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .50).  State anxiety for the sham tES 
group (M = 38.95, SD = 16.79) was significantly higher than state anxiety for 
active tRNS group (M = 29.93, SD = 8.29), t(40) = 2.21, p = .033.  There were 
no further significant main or interaction effects, (Fs < 2.82, ps > .10).   
 
For each time a 4 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with day 
(day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) as the within participants factor and tES (active 
tRNS, sham tES) as the between participants factor and with attentional 
control as a covariate.  Analysis of start of session state anxiety data revealed 
a day x tES interaction, F(2.42,94.28) = 4.27, p = .012, (ηp2 = .10; observed 
power = .79; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For each tES condition (active 
tRNS, sham tES) paired samples t-tests examined change in start of day state 
anxiety across days.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple 
comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).    For participants in the active tRNS 
group there was no significant change in start of session state anxiety across 
days (ts < 1.82, ps > .50),  For participants in the sham tES group, state 
anxiety at the start of day 2 (M = 31.76, SD = 11.26) was significantly lower 
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than state anxiety at the start of day 1 (M = 35.43, SD = 11.51), t(20) = 3.76, p 
= .006.  State anxiety at the start of day 30 (M = 39.62, SD = 17.57) was 
significantly higher than state anxiety at the start of day 3 (M = 31.76, SD = 
11.26), t(20) = 3.39, p = .018.  There were no further differences across days 
in terms of start of session state anxiety for the sham tES group (ts < 2.30, ps 
> .20).  For each day, independent t-tests examined the effect of tES on start 
of session state anxiety. Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple 
comparisons (significant if 4*p < .05).  There was no significant difference 
between tES groups in terms of start of session state anxiety for any 
experimental day (ts < 2.21, ps > 1.52).  There were no further significant 
main or interaction effects for start of session data (Fs < 2.38, ps > .13). 
Analysis of end of session state anxiety revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions (Fs < 3.31, ps > .08). 
 
For each tES group a 4 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with 
day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as 
within participants factors and attentional control as a covariate.  A main 
effect of the covariate attentional control was revealed from analysis of the 
active tRNS group data, F(1,19) = 5.40, p = .031, (ηp2 = .22; observed power = 
.60).  There was a moderate, negative correlation between pre-existing 
attentional control and mean state anxiety, r(42) = -.32, p = .04 suggesting 
that higher pre-existing attentional control was associated with lower state 
anxiety.  A significant day x time interaction was also revealed, 
F(3.57) = 5.28, p = .003, (ηp2 = .22; observed power = .91).  For each day, the 
effect of time on state anxiety from the active tRNS group was examined 
using a paired samples t-test. Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple 
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comparisons (significant if 4*p < .05).  State anxiety at the end of day 1 (M = 
28.05, SD = 6.45) was significantly reduced compared to state anxiety at the 
start of day 1 (M = 33.52, SD = 9.78) for active tRNS participants, t(20) = 3.96, 
p = .004).  The reduction in state anxiety at the end of day 3 (M = 28.43, SD = 
8.51) relative to the start of day 3 (M = 30.38, SD = 8.72) was marginally 
significant, t(20) = 2.72, p = .052). Change in state anxiety from start to end 
of session for the active tRNS group was not significant for any other day (ts < 
2.26, ps > .14).  For each time (start of session, end of session) the effect of 
day on active tRNS group state anxiety was examined using paired samples t-
tests.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant 
if 6*p < .05).  Change in state anxiety across days was not significant for start 
of day data (ts < 1.82, ps > .50) or for end of session data (ts < 1.54, ps > .84).  
For the active tRNS group there were no further significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < .59, ps > .45).  For the sham tES group there were no 
significant main or interaction effects (Fs < .81, ps > .50). 
 
The main 2 x 4 x 2 ANCOVA with pre-existing attentional control as a 
covariate revealed no further main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.75. ps > 
.071). 
 
3.3.5 Analyses with Cognitive Load as a Between Participants 
Factor 
 
Analysis of data from experiment 2 in isolation has been described.  However, 
the aim of experiment 2 was to explore whether training with low cognitive 
load produced different outcomes in terms of attention bias and state anxiety 
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change than training with a high cognitive load.  In order to directly compare 
the effects of cognitive load on training outcomes, the present analysis 
combined attention bias assessment data and state anxiety data from 
experiment 2 with data from the control ABM group from experiment 1.  Data 
from the control ABM group of experiment 1 were categorised as ‘high 
cognitive load’ data and experiment 2 data as ‘low cognitive load’ data.  
Following experiment 1 it was hypothesised that both active and control ABM 
were tasks which were high in cognitive load.  These tasks had recruited and 
enhanced attentional control and this enhancement had mediated training 
associated effects on state anxiety.  In the present analysis, only data from 
the control ABM were included and data from the active ABM group were 
omitted.  This was so that the high and low cognitive load groups were of 
equivalent size (n = 42).  Whereas the active ABM task differed from the no-
training task in terms of contingency (contingency versus no contingency) and 
response (forced choice versus single response), the control ABM task 
difference from the no-training task in terms of only response.  The control 
ABM group was therefore a more suitable comparison group for the no-training 
group than the active ABM group. 
 
For each dependent variable (attention bias, state anxiety) a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
was conducted with the within participants factor of assessment (assessment 
1, assessment 2, assessment 3), between participants factors of tES (active 
tRNS, sham tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  
Subsequently, three 3 x 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVAs were conducted.  Each had a 
within participants factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, 
assessment 3), between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) 
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and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load) and a covariate of 
pre-existing attention bias or pre-existing trait anxiety or pre-existing 
attentional control. 
 
3.3.5.1 Attention Bias (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and cognitive load 
(high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  There were no significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 2.44, ps > .095). 
 
3.3.5.2 State Anxiety (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a 
significant main effect of assessment, F(1.81,145.05) = 3.31, p = .044, (ηp2 = 
.04; observed power = .59; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Using paired 
samples t-tests, change in state anxiety across assessments was examined.  
Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < 
.05).  State anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 30.91, SD = 10.97) was significantly 
reduced relative to state anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 33.60, SD = 10.98), 
t(85) = 2.89, p = .015.  Change in state anxiety was not significant across 
further assessments (ts <  1.66, ps > .30). There were no further significant 




3.3.5.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (Cognitive Load as Between Participants Factor) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day(day 1, 
day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  There 
was a significant main effect of time, F(1,80) = 6.49, p = .013, (ηp2 = .08; 
observed power = .71).  State anxiety at the end of session (M = 31.67, SD = 
9.89) was reduced compared to state anxiety at the start of session (M = 
33.15, SD = 10.40).  The day x time interaction was also significant, 
F(2.50,199.59) = 4.23, p = .01, (ηp2 = .05; observed power = .80; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  For each day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30), paired 
samples t-tests examined the effect of time (start of session, end of session).  
Results were Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 4*p < 
.05).  State anxiety at the end of day 1 (M = 30.71, SD = 8.33) was 
significantly reduced compared to state anxiety at the start of day 1 (M = 
33.60, SD = 10.98), t(83) = 3.33, p = .004.  No further paired comparisons 
were significant (ts < 1.92, ps > .24).  For each time, paired samples t-tests 
examined change in state anxiety across days.  Results were Bonferroni 
adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  State anxiety at 
the start of day 2 (M = 31.05, SD = 10.51) was significantly reduced compared 
to state anxiety at the start of day 1 (M = 33.60, SD = 10.98), t(83) = 2.77, p = 
.042.  No further paired comparison was significant for start of session data 
(ts < 2.19, ps > .18).  For end of session data, change in state anxiety was not 
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significant across days (ts < 1.75, ps > .51).  There were no further main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 2.50, ps > .08). 
 
3.3.6 Analyses with Cognitive Load as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate 
 
3.3.6.1 Attention Bias (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and cognitive load 
(high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  Pre-existing attention bias was 
included as a covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing attention bias was 
significant, F(1,79) = 42.03, p < .001, (ηp2 = .35; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-
existing attention bias was moderately to highly, positively correlated with 
mean attention bias, r(84) = .57, p < .001.  There was a significant main 
effect of tES, F(1,79) = 5.62, p = .02, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .65).  Mean 
attention bias did not differ significantly between tES groups (t = 1.23, p = 
.22).   The interaction between pre-existing attention bias and assessment 
was significant, F(1.42,112.00) = 35.14, p < .001, (ηp2 = .31; observed power = 
1.00; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Pre-existing attention bias was 
strongly, negatively correlated with change in attention bias from assessment 
1 to assessment 2, r(42) = -.87, p < .001 and change in attention bias from 
assessment 1 to assessment 3, r(42) = -.78, p < .001.  Pre-existing attention 
bias was significantly, moderately, negatively correlated with change in 
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attention bias from assessment 2 to assessment 3, r(42) = -.33, p = .032.  
Higher pre-exiting threat bias was associated with greater reduction in threat 
bias following training.  Greater pre-existing neutral bias was associated with 
greater reduction in neutral bias following training relatively to before 
training.  There were no further main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.77, ps > 
.17). 
 
3.3.6.2 State Anxiety (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a 
significant main effect of assessment, F(1.82,143.53) = 3.28, p = .045, (ηp2 = 
.04; observed power = .59; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  This effect was 
explored in section 3.3.5.2.  With pre-existing attention bias held constant, 
there were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.04, ps > 
.14).     
 
3.3.6.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (Cognitive Load as Between Participants Factor and 
Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day (day 1, 
day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  Pre-
existing attention bias was the covariate.  There was a significant main effect 
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of time, F(1,79) = 6.41, p = .013, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .71; 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected) and a significant time x day interaction, 
F(2.49,197.06) = 4.18, p = .011, (ηp2 = .05; observed power = .80; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  These effects were explored in section 3.3.8.3.  The day 
x tES interaction approached significance, F(2.29,180.81) = 2.65, p = .066, 
(ηp2 = .03; observed power = .56; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For each 
day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) an independent t-test explored whether tES 
groups differed in terms of state anxiety.  Results were Bonferroni adjusted 
for multiple comparisons (significant if 4*p < .05).  There were no significant 
effects (ts < 2.21, ps > .13).  For each tES group, paired samples t-tests 
examined whether state anxiety was changed across days.  Results were 
Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  
Change in state anxiety across days was not significant for the active tRNS 
group (ts < 1.30, ps > 1.25) or the sham tES group (ts < 2.53, ps > .12).  There 
were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.05, ps > .13).  
 
3.3.7 Analyses with Cognitive Load as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate 
 
3.3.7.1 Attention Bias (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and cognitive load 
(high cognitive load, low cognitive load) and pre-existing trait anxiety as the 
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covariate.  Controlling for pre-existing trait anxiety, there were no significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.86, ps > .16). 
 
3.3.7.2 State Anxiety (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a 
significant main effect of trait anxiety, F(1,79) = 59.07, p < .001, (ηp2 = .43; 
observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, positively 
correlated with mean state anxiety r(84) = .67, p < .001.  There were no 
further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.59, ps > .21).     
 
3.3.7.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (Cognitive Load as Between Participants Factor and 
Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day(day 1, 
day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors, between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, sham 
tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load) and pre-
existing trait anxiety as a covariate.  There was a significant main effect of 
trait anxiety, F(1,79) = 70.67, p < .001, (ηp2 = .47; observed power = 1.00). 






3.3.8 Analyses with Cognitive Load as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a Covariate 
 
3.3.8.1 Attention Bias (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a 
Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
tES (active tRNS, sham tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low 
cognitive load) as between participants factors and pre-existing attentional 
control as a covariate.  There were no significant main or interaction effects 
(Fs < 1.96, ps > .15). 
 
3.3.8.2 State Anxiety (Cognitive Load as Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a 
Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a 
significant main effect of pre-existing attentional control, F(1,79) = 7.76, p = 
.007, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .79).  Pre-existing attentional control was 
moderately, negatively correlated with state anxiety, r(84) = -.31, p = .004 
suggesting that higher attentional control at baseline was associated with 
lower mean state anxiety.  There were no further significant main or 




3.3.8.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental 
Day (Cognitive Load as Between Participants Factor and 
Pre-existing Attentional Control as a Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day (day 1, 
day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of tES (active tRNS, 
sham tES) and cognitive load (high cognitive load, low cognitive load).  There 
was a significant effect of pre-existing attentional control, F(1,121) = 11.69, p 
= .001, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .92).  This was explored in section 
3.3.8.2.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 
2.41, ps > .081). 
 
3.3.9  TRNS Tolerability 
 
tRNS was well tolerated with no adverse events (see Table 3.6).   Participants 
reported mild to moderate levels of ‘Tiredness’ and ‘Loss of Concentration’ in 
both tES groups.  There was a significant effect of burning with participants 
who received active tRNS reporting a higher level (M =1.24, SD = .44) than 
those who received sham tES who reported no burning (M =1.00, SD = .00) 
t(40) = 2.5, p = .021.  The sensation of headache was marginally higher in the 
sham tES group (M = 1.81, SD = 1.21) than in the active tRNS group (M = 1.24, 
SD = .44, t(40) = 2.04, p = .052.  The difference in intensity rating between 


































































3.3.10  Experimental Condition 
 
Overall, 26.19% of participants guessed both their ABM and tES group 
correctly.  The percentage of participants who guessed their ABM group 
correctly was 42.86%.  A one-sample t-test revealed that this percentage did 
not significantly differ from chance, t(41) = .48, p = .63. The percentage of 
participants who guessed their tES group correctly was 54.76%. This level was 




In experiment 1 anxiety was reduced following active ABM training towards 
neutral faces and following control ABM which did not contain contingent 
trials.  Previous literature had suggested that an increase in attentional 
control induced by both active and control ABM may have enhanced the 
capacity to disrupt processing of threatening stimuli and reduce its emotional 
impact (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013; Klumpp et al., 2010; Taylor, 
Cross & Amir, 2015).  The emotional dot-probe task from experiment 1 was 
altered to minimise the degree to which cognitive control mechanisms were 
recruited and to reduce the extent of engagement required for participation.  
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It was hypothesised that, unlike the ABM training delivered in experiment 1, 
the experiment 2 task would not result in anxiety diminution. 
 
Analysis of data from the no-training group of experiment 2 revealed no 
reduction in attentional bias towards threat.  It can be assumed that the 
processes of attentional disengagement from threat related stimuli and 
engagement to neutral stimuli were not facilitated across participants.  
However, replicating findings from experiment 1, change in attention bias was 
robustly associated with pre-existing attention bias.  Participants 
demonstrating the greatest threat bias at baseline had the greatest reductions 
in threat bias following training and participants with the greatest pre-
existing neutral bias having the greatest reductions in neutral bias.   State 
anxiety was reduced at assessment 2 compared to assessment 1 and this 
reduction was marginally maintained at assessment 3.  This effect appeared 
to be driven by tES group as state anxiety reductions were revealed for 
participants who received active tRNS during no-training ABM but not 
participants who received sham tES during no-training ABM.  The experiment 2 
task was intended to minimise the extent to which cognitive control was 
enhanced.  Tasks which enhance cognitive control have been seen to result in 
greater improvements in attentional control capacity and in emotional 
vulnerability (e.g. Sari et al., 2015; Swainston et al., 2018).  An assumption 
was made that this low cognitive control task would not bolster attentional 
control resources and therefore that training would therefore have no impact 
on anxiety levels.  Nevertheless, anxiety reductions occurred.  Following on 
from the main analysis, data from experiment 2 were analysed with data from 
the control ABM group of experiment 1 and the effect of cognitive load was 
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explored.  The no-training task represented a low cognitive load condition and 
control ABM represented a high cognitive load condition.  Analysis revealed no 
difference between these groups in terms of attention bias and state anxiety 
outcomes.  State anxiety was reduced, irrespective of cognitive load.  This 
suggests that a mechanism other than enhanced attentional control capacity 
was responsible for anxiety reduction.   
 
The results from experiment 2 will be discussed in light of findings from 
experiment 1. For a baseline attention bias, state anxiety, trait anxiety and 
attention control scores across all experimental groups from experiments 1 
and 2 see table 3.1. 
 
3.4.1  Attentional Control 
 
Experiment 1 revealed that pre-existing threat bias was associated with 
reduced threat bias following training relative to before training and that pre-
existing neutral bias was associated with reduction in neutral bias (increase in 
threat bias) irrespective of ABM training group.  It was argued in chapter 2, 
that an increase in attentional control capacity might facilitate engagement 
to neutral stimuli in participants with pre-existing threat bias and engagement 
to threat in participants with a neutral bias by enhancing self-regulatory 
processes.  Experiment 2 also resulted in larger reductions in threat bias for 
participants with a threat bias at baseline and larger reductions in neutral 
bias for participants with a pre-existing neutral bias despite the delivery of 
training with low cognitive load which was intended to not improve cognitive 
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control capacity.  This suggests that cognitive and attentional control 
enhancement does not explain the findings from experiment 1.   
 
3.4.2  Non-specific Effects 
 
If an improvement in attentional control is not implicated in the attenuation 
of anxiety then another mechanism must be responsible for anxiety reduction 
following attentional training.  O’Toole et al. (2013) suggested that the 
repetitive and predictable nature of ABM training produces general anxiety-
attenuating effects.  The authors reported a reduction in anxiety across all 
participants following ABM training and control ABM irrespective of training 
group.  Although experiment 2 did not include active or control ABM training, 
the task was repetitive and predictable and this facet of the no-training task 
may have attenuated anxiety.  It has also been suggested that simply taking 
part in research can bolster the confidence of participants (Enock et al. 2014) 
and that confidence and a sense of ease may arise as the result of an 
emerging researcher-participant relationship (Patterson, 1985).  More 
investigation is needed to unravel which elements of research participation 
might explain participants’ decline in anxiety.  This might include an 
investigation of whether other repetitive tasks, including those not intended 
to manipulate attention, generate anxiety reductions.  Studies might also 
examine whether the extent to which researchers engage with participants is 
influential in anxiety modification by incorporating experimenter 




3.4.3  Exposure 
 
If anxiety following ‘no-training’ ABM is not attributable to an increase in 
attentional control then an exposure effect cannot be ruled out.  Because no-
training ABM, like active and control ABM, involved the presentation of both 
neutral and angry stimuli then it is possible that participants became 
habituated to angry faces thus reducing their anxiety inducing effect.  In 
order to elucidate the impact of threatening face images on anxiety more 
studies are needed in which neutral-neutral face pairs are included for 
comparison.  No reduction in anxiety following ABM training without 
threatening faces would suggest a role for exposure to threat in anxiety 
reduction.   
 
3.4.4  Placebo Effect 
 
Experiment 2 revealed a reduction in anxiety at the end of a ‘no-training’ 
procedure.  This could also be consistent with a placebo effect.  The effects 
cannot be attributed to the training task as this was not designed to deliver 
benefits in terms of reduced attention bias and anxiety reduction.  However, 
it is possible that they arose as a result of participants positive expectations 
regarding the outcome from their participation (Carleton et al., 2015).   
 
3.4.5  TES Effect 
 
There was a reduction in state anxiety at assessment 2 compared to 
assessment 1 for participants who received active tRNS but not for those who 
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received sham tES.  Furthermore, covariate analysis showed that, even when 
trait anxiety was held constant, state anxiety at the end of day 1 was reduced 
relative to state anxiety at the start of day 1 for the active tRNS group but 
was not changed for the sham tES group.  The same pattern was revealed for 
day 2 state anxiety.  State anxiety at the end of day 1 was lower for the 
active tRNS group than for the sham tES group.  It appears therefore that the 
reduction in state anxiety observed across all participants was driven by 
reductions in the active tRNS group.  Importantly, a component analysis 
revealed that at day 30, state anxiety for the active tRNS group was 
significantly lower than it was for the sham tES group.  This suggests that tES-
induced anxiety reduction may have been lasting.  Although Clark et al. 
(2014) did not measure anxiety before and after ABM, they revealed greater 
reductions in attention bias following active but not control ABM for 
participants who received anodal tDCS relative to participants who received 
sham tDCS and suggested that active tES had enhanced the effects of active 
ABM training.  In the present study, participants did not receive active ABM 
and therefore improvement in state anxiety for the active tRNS group but not 
the sham group cannot be explained by the same mechanism.  Heeren et al. 
(2017) delivered anodal tDCS or sham tDCS during attention bias assessment 
to socially anxious participants.  The authors revealed that threat bias was 
reduced for the atDCS group relative to the sham tDCS group.  Because no 
attention bias training (only assessment) took place, this reduction could not 
be explained by tDCS-induced modulation of training effects suggesting that 
anodal tDCS had a direct impact on mechanisms associated with the reduction 
of threat bias.  In a separate study Ironside et al. (2015) revealed a lower 
level of attention bias towards threat for participants who had received 20 
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minutes of offline bilateral atDCS of the DLPFC (anode above F3 and cathode 
above F4) relative to participants who had received atDCS of the left DLPFC 
with the cathode above the contralateral supraorbital or sham tDCS just prior 
to assessment.   
 
The studies by Heeren et al. (2017) and Ironside et al. (2015) suggest that for 
active tES to produce benefits previously associated with tES related 
enhancement of ABM training (e.g. Clarke et al., 2014), learning is actually 
not a necessary part of the process.  It is possible therefore that active tRNS 
produced its anxiolytic effects independently of the training paradigm 
employed in experiment 2.  Research has produced few examples of tES 
induced improvements in anxiety.  A single case study of a GAD patient who 
received cathodal tDCS above the right DLPFC for 15 consecutive days 
reported a reduction in anxiety symptoms across the study.  One month after 
the start of treatment the patient no longer met the diagnostic criteria for 
GAD (Shiowaza et al., 2013).  As a single case study these results cannot be 
generalised.  There have however, been more investigations into the efficacy 
of tES for treating depression.  Two randomised controlled trials of anodal 
versus sham tDCS above the left DLPFC for up to 10 days reported reductions 
in depressive symptoms for active tDCS relative to sham tDCS (Boggio et al., 
2008; Fregni et al., 2006).  In the study by Fregni et al. (2006) there was a 
69% improvement in Hamilton Depression Rating Scale scores after 5 sessions 
of atDCS and Boggio et al. (2008) reported a 40.5% improvement in scores on 
the same scale.  These improvements persisted at 1 month follow up. (Boggio 
et al., 2008; Fregni et al., 2006).  Also, in a systematic review of 7 
randomised control trials (RCTs) of tDCS as a monotherapy or add-on therapy 
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for major depressive disorder (MDD), response and remission rates were found 
to be superior for active tDCS than sham tDCS for all outcomes (Shiozawa et 
al., 2014).  However, another systematic review of 6 RCTs of tDCS for MDD, 
Berlim et al. (2013) reported no difference between atDCS and sham tDCS in 
terms of response rates and remission rates.  Plazier et al. (2012) reported no 
change in mood score following 20 minutes of active tDCS or sham tDCS to the 
bilateral DLPFC or to the bilateral occipital cortex (O1 and O2).  No change in 
mood scores was also reported following bilateral tDCS of the DLPFC, sham 
tDCS or ‘unbalanced’ tDCS in which the anode was above the DLPFC and the 
cathode above the contra-lateral supra-orbital (Ironside et al., 2016).  There 
are evidently mixed findings from studies investigating the impact of off-line 
tES on mood disorders.  The majority of these findings are from studies which 
have used tDCS however and have focused on its impact in depression.  There 
has been one case report of a trial to treat major depressive disorder with 
tRNS (Chan et al., 2012).  There was greater symptom reduction following 
tRNS across 15 sessions than following 15 sessions of atDCS.  The trial was 
with only one participant who was not blinded as to the type stimulation 
being delivered or study aim (Chan et al., 2012) but this initial finding shows 
that tRNS has potential utility in the treatment of mood disorders.  In the 
studies cited above, tES has been used to alleviate mood disorder by applying 
it to the frontal cortices.  Both anxiety and depression are proposed to be 
characterised by underactivity in this area of the brain (anxiety: Clarke et al., 
2014; Ironside et al., 2016; depression: Koenigs & Grafman, 2009). It is 
proposed that frontal areas of the brain are responsible for inhibiting 
emotionally driven responses via the regulation of a more posterior emotion-
driven system (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  With the appropriate form of tES 
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and by targeting the optimal frontal brain area, it may be possible to bolster 
or even activate this pre-established system without the need for attentional 
training. 
 
Whilst there is support for the effective treatment of negative affect with 
stand-alone tES, in experiment 2, tRNS was delivered concurrently with a 
cognitive task.  The task may not have recruited the same neural mechanisms 
as the active and control ABM paradigms of experiment 1 or may not have 
recruited mechanisms to the same extent.  However, it is probable that some 
level of task-associated activity was present at the time of stimulation. 
 
3.4.6  State Dependency 
 
In opposition to the above suggestion that reductions in anxiety were 
generated by active tRNS and not due to the modulation of training effects by 
active tRNS, experiment 1 did not reveal superior reductions in anxiety for the 
active tRNS group relative to participants who received sham tES.   
 
The importance of neural state dependency on tES outcomes was discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2. A study by Bortoletto et al. (2015) reported that tES 
improved performance in a motor task when applied during control training 
but impaired performance when applied during active training.  The authors 
suggested that when excitatory tES is applied during another excitability 
enhancing event, one might negate the facilitatory impact of the other 
(Borteletto et al., 2015).  Rosenkranzt et al. (2000) suggested that atDCS may 
have the potential to interfere with the maintenance of cortical excitability 
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elicited by a training task.   In experiment 1, active tRNS was delivered 
concurrently with active attentional training.  There was no evidence of a 
‘cancelling out’ effect but tRNS did not facilitate the impact of ABM.  It is 
possible that the neural mechanisms activated by active ABM and control ABM 
were implicated in anxiety reduction and that these had reached a maximal 
level of activation arising from the training in isolation.  Additional excitatory 
input in the form of active tRNS may have been unable to push neurons 
beyond this ceiling of excitation.  However, in experiment 2 the same 
mechanisms may not have been triggered by the no-training ABM task or were 
triggered to a lesser extent.  Active tRNS was therefore able to enhance 
activity in these brain regions.  This might account for the anxiety alleviating 
effect of active tRNS but not sham tES in experiment 2.  Attention bias 
towards threatening information and anxiety have been consistently linked 
with reduced activity in frontal areas of the brain including the DLPFC 
(Bishop., 2008; Clarke et al., 2014) and IFG (Hu & Dolcos, 2017). It is possible 
that more anxious participants had a low level of baseline activity in frontal 
neural regions.  Active tRNS to the IFG provided the greatest ‘boost’ therefore 
to these participants in terms of facilitating the neural mechanisms associated 
with anxiety regulation leading to a greater reduction in anxiety for 
participants who received active tRNS than for participants who received 
active tRNS. These suggestions are precisely in line with findings from a study 
by Sikström et al. (2015).  This study showed that participants with lower self-
report attentiveness benefitted to a larger extent from auditory noise and 
tDCS stimulation in terms of their performance in a go-no-go task than 
participants with high level attentiveness (Sikström et al., 2015).  This 
interaction was not present for an n-back test.  As an explanation the authors 
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pointed to the moderate brain arousal (MBA) model (Sikström & Söderlund, 
2007).  This model suggests that the brain functions at optimal capacity when 
arousal level is maximised.  In certain individuals baseline arousal is lower and 
this may impair performance in some tasks.  However, it is possible to boost 
arousal level using stochastic resonance (Sikström & Söderlund, 2007).  In 
terms of why an interaction between attentiveness and stimulation was 
present for the go-no task but not the n-back task, it was suggested that, 
because the n-back task is more cognitively demanding than the go-no-go 
task, arousal level was optimised and performance maximised, leaving no 
room for enhancement via auditory noise or tDCS (Sikström et al., 2015). 
 
When considered together with previous findings (e.g. Bortoletto et al., 2015) 
these results suggest that tES and cognitive training interact in a system of 
neural activation marked by homeostatic processes and limitations on 
facilitatory excitation.  However, it is important to highlight that when 
cognitive load was included as a between participants factor in the analysis of 
data from the control ABM group of experiment 1 and experiment 2 data, no 
interaction between tES and cognitive load emerged.   
 
3.4.7  Pre-existing Attention Bias 
 
For participants with greater pre-existing threat bias there was greater 
reduction in attentional bias towards threat at the end of training which was 
maintained at follow-up.  Covariate analysis revealed a relationship between 
pre-existing attention bias and attention bias change with greater pre-existing 
threat bias associated with greater reduction in threat bias and greater pre-
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existing neutral bias associated with greater reduction in neutral bias.  
Previously, reduction in threat bias was found across assessments for 
participants with pre-existing threat bias but not for participants with 
attentional bias towards neutral faces at baseline (O’Toole, 2012).  However, 
this was reported following active ABM.  It was argued that participants with 
pre-existing threat bias were more susceptible to the mechanisms of ABM 
(O’Toole, 2012).  In experiment 2, participants did not receive active ABM and 
so this cannot be the explanation.  Again, the exposure effect is a putative 
mechanism (see Carleton et al., 2015) as no-training ABM involved the 
repeated presentation of angry as well as neutral faces.  This might also 
explain the finding from experiment 2 that for those with a pre-existing bias 
towards neutral faces there was a reduction in neutral bias following no-
training ABM.  If a bias towards neutral faces represented attentional 
avoidance of threat then this might be reduced via persistent exposure to 
threatening faces.   
 
3.4.8  Pre-existing Trait Anxiety 
 
When pre-existing trait anxiety was included in analysis of the effects of no-
training ABM (with active or sham tRNS) on state anxiety the main effect of 
assessment was no longer present.  This suggests that pre-existing trait 
anxiety had a modulating effect on state anxiety change.  However, no 
interaction between pre-existing trait anxiety and assessment was revealed 
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and so there was no support for a relationship between pre-existing trait 
anxiety level and change in state anxiety.   
 
3.4.9  Limitations 
 
The purpose of experiment 2 was to examine the impact of attentional 
control modulation on ABM related outcomes and most specifically, anxiety.  
It was predicted that because the experiment 2 task was less cognitively 
demanding than the active or control ABM tasks from experiment 1, 
attentional control capacity would not be enhanced and anxiety reductions 
would not occur.  However, there was no direct indication or test to show 
that the less demanding nature of this training involved the elimination of 
attentional control.  Previous studies which have compared the effect of high 
cognitive load and low cognitive load training on attentional control and 
emotional vulnerability have included measures of attentional control in order 
to support or refute it’s mediating properties (e.g. Course-Choi et al,. 2017; 
Sari et al., 2015; Swainston et al., 2018).  For example, Course-Choi et al. 
(2017) demonstrated that engagement with working memory training was 
associated with improvements in attentional control (as measured using an 
eye-tracking antisaccade task) and with reductions in worry symptoms 
(Course-Choi et al., 2017).  Future attempts to modulate attentional load via 
the manipulation of cognitive load should include a measure or measures of 
attentional control such as the antisaccade task or the attention network task 







To summarise, experiment 2, like experiment 1, revealed a significant 
relationship between pre-existing attention bias and attention bias 
modulation following no-training ABM with active or sham tRNS.  There were 
larger reductions in threat bias for participants with greater pre-existing bias 
towards threatening faces and larger reductions in neutral bias for 
participants with greater pre-existing bias towards neutral faces.  There was a 
reduction in state anxiety across all participants.  Because no-training ABM 
was designed to induce little or no improvement in attentional control 
capacity this suggests that anxiety attenuation was driven by a mechanism 
independent of the modulation of attentional control.  These might include 
exposure to threatening images, a placebo effect or non-specific effects 
related to taking part in research.   
 
Experiment 2 provided evidence of anxiety reduction following active but not 
sham tES.  The fact that this result emerged in the absence of an active ABM 
training condition suggests that the improvements demonstrated could not be 
explained by the modulation of ABM training effects.  It is therefore possible 
that 1.5mA tRNS of the bilateral IFG in isolation has anxiolytic effects.  
Alternatively, active tRNS facilitated the neural mechanisms associated with 
the basic training task.  In experiment 1, anxiety reductions did not differ 
between the active and sham tES groups.  It could be that, at a neuronal level 
no-training ABM was associated with a greater proportion of sub-threshold 
relative to above-threshold signals than both active or control ABM.  In line 
with the proposed mechanisms of high frequency tRNS (e.g. Cohen Kadosh, 
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2013), it is possible that the integration of tES and task-induced signals 
resulted in a greater degree of above-level activation (more action 
potentials).  Thus, the level of neural facilitation produced by the experiment 
1 tasks and the experiment 2 task in conjuction with tRNS became 
comparable.   More research is required to substantiate the present 
interpretation of results.  These findings highlight the need to consider the 
role of neural state at the time of tES application on outcomes.  It is possible 
that when the neural structures associated with anxiety reduction are 
optimally activated as might be the case during active and control ABM, tES is 
unable to further enhance this activity.  Where a cognitive task only 
minimally enlists neural processes as per the no-training group, there may be 
more capacity for tES to augment activation. 
 
Future studies should clarify the role of exposure to threat in anxiety 
reduction in paradigms where threat and neutral face pairs are used.  It would 
also be useful for studies to investigate how participation in research might 
influence anxiety levels across participation by exposing participants to 
varying testing conditions.  There is also the requirement to investigate the 
effects of tRNS and other forms of tES as a stand-alone treatment for anxiety. 
194 
 
Chapter 4  
 
Modulation of Attention Bias Modification using Transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation Above Left DLPFC 
Experiment 3 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The aim of study 1 was to establish whether tES could modulate the impact of 
attention bias modification.  In experiment 1, high-frequency tRNS or sham tRNS 
was delivered bilaterally to the IFG during active or control ABM training.  TRNS 
was selected as an appropriate form of stimulation based on evidence that it can 
produce considerable and lasting augmentations of learning (e.g. Snowball et 
al., 2013).  Researchers had only recently begun to examine the potential for 
tRNS to enhance cognitive training and the present study provided the 
opportunity to contribute to this emerging field.  When selecting the site of 
stimulation, both the DLPFC and the IFG were considered (see chapter 2).  The 
IFG was chosen however due to its involvement in attentional inhibition 
processes (Mohanty et al., 2005; Song et al., 2017).   
 
Results from experiment 1 revealed reductions in anxiety for all participants 
irrespective of ABM group or tES group. There was no evidence of tES induced 
modulation of ABM training.  It was postulated that both active ABM and control 
ABM training enhanced cognitive control capacity and that this effect was 
responsible for anxiety reduction (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b). In 
experiment 2, there were anxiety reductions for participants who received 
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active tRNS during a low cognitive load task but not for participants who receive 
sham tRNS during the task. The task was designed to be minimise the degree to 
which attentional control was enhanced and anxiety reduction following its 
completion was therefore not predicted.  Evidence of anxiety reduction for 
participants in the active tRNS group was indication that active tRNS may have 
evoked anxiolytic effect independently of the training task.  Alternatively, tRNS 
enhanced task-related neural activity thus facilitating the neural mechanisms 
associated with anxiety attenuation.  In both experiments therefore, there was 
no evidence that tRNS applied to the bilateral IFG produced modulations in 
anxiety stemming from the enhancement of ABM training.  These results were in 
contrast to previous studies demonstrating augmentations of ABM effects with 
tDCS (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b). In the study by Clarke et al. 
(2014) participants were allocated to attend-neutral or attend-threat ABM with 
anodal or sham tDCS.  There was change in attentional bias consistent with the 
trained direction for participants who received anodal tDCS only (Clarke et al., 
2016).  In the study by Heeren et al. (2015b) highly trait anxious participants 
received active ABM with concurrent anodal tDCS, cathodal tDCS or sham tDCS.  
There was a reduction in gaze time for threatening faces as measured by eye-
tracking following ABM training compared to before ABM training.  This reduction 
was not present for the cathodal or sham tDCS group (Heeren et al., 2015b).  A 
more recent study examined the impact on attention bias of anodal tDCS 
relative to sham tDCS in socially anxious participants (Heeren et al., 2017).  
TDCS was not applied during ABM training but during attention bias assessment.  
In one session participants received anodal tDCS during attention bias 
assessment and in another, participants received sham tDCS during attention 
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bias assessment.  Attention bias towards threat was lower during the anodal 
tDCS condition compared to during sham tDCS (Heeren et al., 2017).   
 
4.1.1  TES Protocol 
 
TES protocol differed between experiment 1 of the present study and the Clarke 
et al., (2014) and Heeren et al., (2015b) studies.  Both of the published studies 
used tDCS and not tRNS.  Both studies also targeted the left DLPFC (F3) and not 
the IFG.  The authors pinpointed the DLPFC as a neural structure which plays key 
role in the cognitive processes involved ABM training (Clarke et al., 2014).  The 
evidence for the modulation of ABM training using tDCS of the DLPFC and not 
tRNS of the bilateral IFG suggests that the former tES protocol may have 
advantages in terms of its capacity to modulate ABM.   
 
4.1.2  Mechanisms of tRNS and tDCS 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, tDCS and tRNS differ in terms of their putative 
mechanisms of action.  TDCS is proposed to induce a shift in resting membrane 
potential.  Anodal stimulation brings neurons closer to their point of excitation 
thus rendering them more receptive to incoming excitatory input (Brunoni et al., 
2012).  TRNS generates small, consistent bursts of neural excitation which are 
thought to trigger the repeated polarisation of sodium channels (Paulus, 2011), 
bringing neurons closer to their threshold of activation (Fertonani et al., 2011).  
It could be that the neural adaptations generated by tDCS are more appropriate 
for modulating the brain activity associated with ABM and facilitating its effects.  
The answer may lie in the fact that tDCS delivers a constant electrical field 
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(Zaghi, 2009) and may adapt and maintain the potential of stimulated neurons at 
a constant level.  Consequently, all incoming excitatory signals are more likely 
to push neuronal membranes beyond their threshold of excitation.  Proponents 
of tRNS to enhance the effects of cognitive training have preferred to describe 
tRNS in terms of noise upon a background of which sub-threshold signals can 
‘pop-out’ (Van der Groen & Wenderoth, 2016).  However, due to its alternating 
nature, tRNS may have provided a weaker platform for enhancing ABM related 
neural activity. These arguments are speculative and it is necessary to consider 
that high frequency tRNS has been used to enhance the outcomes of cognitive 
training with success (e.g. Fertonani et al., 2011; Snowball et al., 2013).  
Extensive research is needed to establish the precise neural mechanisms of 
different forms of tES and of the cognitive paradigms during which they are 
applied.  It will then be possible to more effectively match type of tES to 
cognitive process. 
 
4.1.3  Site of Stimulation 
 
The methodologies employed by Clarke et al. (2014) and Heeren et al. (2015b) 
also differed from those employed in experiments 1 and 2 in terms of site of 
stimulation.  It is possible that the DLPFC is a more appropriate target location 
for enhancing the learning effects of active ABM or for enhancing the specific 
cognitive mechanisms involved in ABM.  Exciting this area may even serve to 
activate these mechanisms.  Although some studies have treated the IFG and 
DLPFC as part of the same inhibitory control network (e.g. Berkman et al., 2014; 
Song et al., 2017) others have suggested they serve separable roles during tasks 
requiring the attentional inhibition of emotionally salient stimuli.  It has been 
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proposed, for example that the DLPFC subserves goal-directed processes such as 
focusing on task relevant stimuli and inhibition of task irrelevant stimuli whilst 
ventral frontal regions including the IFG deal with emotional processing 
(Corbetta & Schulman, 2002; Dolcos & MacCarthy, 2006).  In one fMRI study, 
participants were required to identify the emotional expression on a target face 
image whilst ignoring a word overlying the face which was either congruent with 
the face (e.g. neutral face with the word ‘neutral’) or incongruent with the face 
(e.g. neutral face with the word ‘fearful’).  During a low expectancy condition in 
which 35% of trials were incongruent, activation of the IFG and the DLPFC was 
observed but during a high expectancy task in which 65% of trials were 
incongruent, only sustained activity of the DLPFC was noted (Krug & Carter, 
2012).  The authors postulated that participants switched from a reactive 
strategy involving the sudden implementation of inhibition during the relatively 
infrequent incongruent trials, to a proactive strategy involving continued 
preparedness for incongruent trials.  Hughes et al. (2014) reported that activity 
in both the IFG and DLPFC was greater for stop trials than go trials in a stop 
signal task.  However, when activity from a passive condition in which 
participants simply watched the task on the screen was ‘partialled out’, this 
effect was only significant for the DLPFC (Hughes et al., 2014).  These reports 
which have directly compared the roles of the IFG and DLPFC in attentional 
inhibition where emotional stimuli interfere with task performance propose that 
there is a role for both.  They suggest that the IFG is involved in emotional 
processing and attentional conflict identification and immediate rectification.  
However, substantial and even sustained activation of the DLPFC is necessary for 
goal-oriented functioning and the ongoing maintenance and control of 
attentional processes including continued vigilance and readiness to inhibit.  In 
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light of the theory that ABM exerts improvements of attentional bias and anxiety 
via the enhancement of attentional control this might explain why studies which 
have attempted to modulate ABM via tES to the DLPFC have done so successfully 
(Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).   
 
4.1.4  Aims 
 
The DLPFC is thought to have a degree of functional specificity for attentional 
inhibition of threat related stimuli and selective engagement of neutral stimuli 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2010), mechanisms which are fundamental to the success of 
active ABM training.  Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether tES 
applied to the DLPFC might enhance or activate these processes.  Although 
reduction in anxiety was observed across participants following all conditions in 
experiment 1, it was considered possible that tRNS of the IFG may not have been 
the most appropriate tES procedure for illuminating differential effects between 
active ABM and control ABM and between active and sham tES.  Experiment 3 
therefore provided a further opportunity to explore the outcomes of active versus 
control ABM and to compare tRNS with anodal tDCS as a means of modulating ABM 
training.   
 
Anodal tDCS to the left DLPFC was delivered concurrently with ABM training or 
control ABM training across 3 consecutive days.  It was hypothesised that anodal 
tDCS would enhance the neural and cognitive mechanisms associated with 
inhibition of threatening stimuli and engagement to neutral stimuli.  The 
prediction was of greater threat bias reduction for active ABM with anodal tDCS 
relative to control ABM with anodal tDCS.  Section 4.3 will analyse data from 
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experiment 3 in isolation.  Therefore, it will not be possible to infer from the 
results whether anodal tDCS is more effective than sham tES or high frequency 
tRNS at enhancing the effects of ABM training.  However, section 4.3.8 will 
summarise the results of an ANOVA performed on data from experiments 1 and 
3.  This will explore the interaction of all ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES 
(active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS) effects. Chapter 5 will analyse data from 




4.2.1  Design 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed methods design was employed.  All participants received anodal 
tDCS and therefore there was one between participants factor of ABM (active 
ABM, control ABM).  The within subjects factor was assessment (assessment 1, 
assessment 2, assessment 3).  The dependent variables were attention bias and 
state anxiety. 
 
A sham tES group was not included in the current design.  A separate post-hoc 
mixed ANOVA was conducted subsequently to the following analyses on 
combined data from experiments 1 and 3.  This provided a comparison of active 
versus sham tES (see section 4.3.8 for a summary of results).  Data from 
experiment 3 will be analysed together with those from experiments 1 and 2 in 
the following chapter allowing comparison of all ABM and tES groups used in 




4.2.2  Participants 
 
A total of 42 participants was recruited.  Twenty-one participants were 
allocated to each ABM group but data from two participants from the control 
ABM group were omitted from analysis as accuracy scores were below 75%. Data 
from 40 participants were therefore analysed (37 female), mean age = 19.68 
years, SD = 3.37, range = 18 to 39.  All participants were right-handed and had 
normal or corrected to normal vision.   
 
Participant recruitment procedure matched that from experiments 1 and 2. 
 
All participants received anodal tDCS but were allocated to either active ABM or 
control ABM. 
 
4.2.3  Ethics 
 
The study was approved by the University of Roehampton ethics committee 
(approval code PSYC 14/ 116).  Written informed consent was provided by all 
participants before participation.  Participants were compensated for their 









4.2.4  Materials 
 
4.2.4.1  Measures 
 
The self-report measures used were the same as those used in experiment 1. 
 
4.2.4.2  Stimuli 
 
The stimuli used were identical to those used in experiment 1. 
 
4.2.4.3  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
Attention bias assessment was the same as in experiment 1. 
 
4.2.4.4  ABM task 
 
Attention bias modification and control attention bias modification were the 
same as part 1 of the experiment 
 
4.2.4.5  TES 
 
Anodal tDCS was applied at an amplitude of 1.5mA.  The anode was placed 
above the left DLPFC (F3 in the 10/20 system of electrode placement) and the 
cathode above the contralateral orbitofrontal cortex (Appendix 18). Stimulation 
lasted for 20 minutes at the beginning of a 35-minute training period.  The 
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current was ramped up and down for 20 seconds at the beginning and end of 
active stimulation.  All participants received anodal tDCS.   
 
4.2.5  Procedure 
 
The experimental procedure replicated that used in experiment 1 except that all 
participants received active or control ABM with anodal tDCS (and not active 
tRNS or sham tRNS). 
 
4.2.6  Data Preparation 
 
Data from inaccurate trials were removed.  Mean accuracy across attention bias 
assessments was 96.04% (SD = 4.21). Reaction times below 200ms were removed.  
To remove the effect of outlying data on analysis, reaction times which were 
more than 2.5 standard deviations from each participant’s mean reaction time 
were excluded (Brown et al., 2014).  These further data removals constituted 
2.07% of the total number of trials. 
 
4.2.7  Data Analyses 
 
Attention bias and state anxiety data were subjected to mixed ANOVAs with ABM 
(active ABM, control ABM) as the between participants factor and assessment as 
the within subjects factor.  These ANOVAs were performed on data from all 
participants.  Subsequently the ANOVAs were repeated with pre-existing 
attention bias or pre-existing trait anxiety or pre-existing attentional control as 




In three omnibus ANOVAs attention bias and state anxiety data from experiments 
1 and 3 were analysed.  These was to enable comparison of all tES conditions 
applied across the 2 experiments (active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS) with 
active or control ABM on state anxiety and attention bias.  Assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2 and assessment 3) was included as the within 
participants factor and tES (active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS) and ABM (active 
ABM, control ABM) were between participants factors.  These were then 
repeated with pre-existing attention bias, pre-existing trait anxiety and pre-
existing attentional control as covariates.   
 
4.2.8  Baseline Characteristics 
 
4.2.8.1  Baseline Scores for Main Variables of Interest 
 
Findings from experiment 3 will be discussed in light of results from experiments 
1 and 2.  Baseline attention bias, state anxiety, trait anxiety and attentional 
control from all 3 experiments and for all experimental groups are detailed in 
table 4.1.  One-way ANOVAs compared baseline scores for all participants from 
experiments 1, 2 and 3 and revealed no differences between participants across 
experiments in terms of their baseline attention bias, state anxiety, trait anxiety 









Baseline mean (SD) scores for major variables of interest 
 Baseline Mean (SD) Scores 
 Attention Bias (ms) State Anxiety Trait Anxiety Attentional 
Control 
All Participants Experiment 1 .97 (13.70) 33.18 (10.46) 41.73 (11.84) 48.87 (7.84) 
All Participants Experiment 2 -2.25 (14.77) 34.48 (10.59) 44.50 (12.19) 49.48 (7.75) 
All Participants Experiment 3 -4.45 (13.13) 33.80 (8.96) 45.74 (13.61) 47.08 (8.10) 
Between Subjects Effects 
 
F = 1.57, p = .21 F = .25, p = .78 F = 1.58, p = .21 F = .97, p = .38 
Active ABM/Active tRNS -.30 (18.75) 33.38 (10.94) 39.48 (9.69) 50.76 (6.50) 
Active ABM/Sham tRNS -.73 (13.69) 33.90 (8.15) 43.10 (12.92) 47.57 (7.88) 
Control ABM/Active tRNS 1.59 (9.77) 31.71 (9.31) 40.14 (12.98) 50.62 (6.79) 
Control ABM/Sham tRNS 3.33 (11.37) 33.71 (13.34) 44.19 (11.67) 46.52 (9.48) 
No Training ABM/Active tRNS -4.78 (14.59) 33.52 (9.78) 41.24 (10.80) 50.62 (7.26) 
No Training ABM/Sham tRNS .28 (14.87) 35.43 (11.51) 47.76 (12.87) 48.33 (8.22) 
Active ABM/Anodal tDCS -2.64 (11.10) 33.24 (7.92) 47.75 (14.22) 47.20 (8.95) 
Control ABM/Anodal tDCS -6.44 (15.11) 34.42 (10.17) 43.63 (12.97) 46.95 (7.34) 
 
4.2.8.2  Depression and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
 
Table 4.2 shows for each experimental group the mean and standard deviation 
score at baseline for the CES-D and FNE.  Baseline scores on the CES-D and FNE 
scales did not differ significantly between groups (ts < 1.21, ps > .23).   
 
Table 4.2: 
Mean (SD) score for each self-report measure per tES group 
 Active ABM /atDCS Control ABM /atDCS 
 M SD M SD 
CES-D 18.35 13.76 16.58 11.21 






4.2.8.3  State and Trait Anxiety Across Experimental Groups by  
Gender 
 
Table 4.3 shows the mean and standard deviation state anxiety scores at 
baseline for males and females. 
 
Table 4.3 
















There was no significant difference in baseline state anxiety between ABM 
groups (t = .41, p = .68).   
 
As previously reported, state anxiety mean and standard deviation scores 
reported for a normative sample of undergraduate students are mean = 36.47 
(SD = 10.02) for males and mean = 38.76 (SD = 11.95) for females (Spielberger et 
al., 1983). One sample t-tests revealed that for females who received active 
ABM/anodal tDCS, mean baseline state anxiety score was significantly lower than 
  
                    Anodal tDCS 
 
 Active ABM Control ABM 
N  19 18 
Females State Anxiety 33.58 (8.16)* 34.06 (10.33) 
Trait Anxiety 48.33 (14.83)* 41.94 (11.00) 
N  2 1 
Males State Anxiety 30.00 (5.66) 41.00 
Trait Anxiety 42.50 (6.36) 74.00 
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the normative mean t(18) = 2.77, p = .013.  For females who received control 
ABM/anodal tDCS, mean baseline state anxiety score did not differ significantly 
from the mean normative score, t = 1.93, p = .07.  For males who received 
active ABM/anodal tDCS, mean baseline state anxiety score did not differ 
significantly from the mean normative score, t = 1.33, p = .23.  As there was 
only one male in the control ABM group it was not possible to perform a one 




There was no difference in trait anxiety scores between ABM groups at baseline 
(t = .94, p = .35).   
 
The normative mean of trait anxiety reported for a sample of undergraduate 
students is 40.40 (SD = 10.15) for females and 38.30 (SD = 9.18) for males 
(Spielberger, 1983).  One sample t-tests revealed that for females who received 
active ABM, baseline trait anxiety (M = 48.33, SD = 14.83), was significantly 
higher than the normative mean t(17) = 2.27, p = .037. Baseline trait anxiety for 
females who received control ABM was not significantly different to the 
normative mean (t = .60, p = .56).  For males who received active ABM, baseline 
trait anxiety did not differ significantly from the normative mean (t = 1.44, p = 
.17).  There was only 1 male in the control ABM group and therefore mean 
baseline trait anxiety could not be compared to the normative mean for a 




4.2.8.4  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (i.e. start of 
day 1, end of day 1, start of day 2, end of day 2, start of day 3, end of day 3, 
start of day 30, end of day 30) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation analysis with SAS data from each of the other assessments.  All 
correlations were significant (all R’s ≥ .54, all ps < .001).  The normative test-
retest reliability r values reported by Spielberger et al. (1983) for college 
students, with a test-retest interval of 20 days were .54 for males and .27 for 
females. Our results therefore suggest strong test-retest reliability and 
consistency within the state anxiety data.   
 
4.2.8.5  Correlations Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
 
Baseline trait anxiety score was correlated with state anxiety score on days 1 
and 3 but not at assessment 3 (day 30; see table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4: 
Bivariate correlations between baseline trait anxiety scale and state anxiety scale (SAS) scores at assessments 1, 2 
and 3 




  SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 SAS Assessment 3 
Baseline Trait Anxiety  .400* .365* .301 
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4.2.8.6  Correlations Between Self-Report Measures at Baseline 
 
Baseline scores from questionnaires assessing trait characteristics were subject 
to a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis.  Table 4.5 shows the 
correlation between baseline scores on trait self-report measures.  Baseline 
scores across all questionnaires were significantly correlated (all rs > .52, ps < 
.005) suggesting that participants reported consistently across measures.   
 
Table 4.5: 
Bivariate correlations for trait anxiety scale (TAS), attentional control scale (ACS), Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies depression questionnaire (CES-D) and fear of negative evaluation scale (FNE) scores at baseline. 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Trait Anxiety  1.00    
2. Attentional Control  -.714** 1.00   
3. Depression  .829** -.719* 1.00 . 
4. Fear Negative Evaluation  .786** -.521** .579* 1.00 
*  p < 0.05 




4.3.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Participants 
 
4.3.1.1  Attention Bias (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with a between 
subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3).  The main effect of 
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assessment approached significance, F(2,72) = 2.97, p = .058, (ηp2 = .08; observed 
power = .56).  Paired samples t-tests revealed no significant changes in attentional 
bias across assessments (all ts < 1.86, ps > .21; Bonferroni adjusted for multiple 
comparisons; significant if p*3 < .05). 
 
There were no further main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.34, ps > .27). 
 
Figure 4.1 shows mean attentional bias across assessments for each ABM group 
(active ABM, control ABM) and for all participants.  Positive values represent 
threat bias and negative values represent neutral bias 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for each ABM group and for all 


































Mean (SE) Attentional Bias
Active ABM Control ABM All Participants
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4.3.1.2  State Anxiety (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with one between 
subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3).  The main effect of 
assessment was marginally significant, F(2,74) = 3.10, p = .051, (ηp2 = .08; 
observed power = .58).  Paired samples t-tests (Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons; significant if 3*p < .05) revealed a difference in state anxiety 
between assessment 1, and assessment 2, t(39) = 2.46, p = .044.  State anxiety 
was greater at assessment 1 (M = 33.80, SD = 8.96) compared to assessment 2 (M 
= 30.90, SD = 9.00).  No other change in state anxiety across assessments was 
significant (ts < 1.88, ps > .20). 
 
The interaction between assessment and ABM approached significance, 
F(2,74) = 2.91, p = .061, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .55).  For each ABM group 
paired samples t-tests examined change in attention bias across assessments.  
All results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (result significant 
if 3*p < .05).    This revealed a significant increase in state anxiety at assessment 
3 (M = 35.19, SD = 9.86) compared to assessment 2 (M = 31.51, SD = 10.09) for 
participants in the active ABM group, t(20) = 3.24, p = .012.  No further change 
in state anxiety across assessments for active ABM participants was significant 
(ts < 1.21, ps > .72).  No change in state anxiety across assessments was 
significant for participants in the control ABM group (ts < 2.19, ps > .13).  To 
further explore the ABM x assessment interaction, state anxiety scores for 
participants in the active ABM group and participants in the control ABM group 
were compared for each assessment point using independent t-tests.  There was 
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no significant difference in state anxiety score between the groups at any 
assessment (ts < 1.44, ps > .47; Bonferroni adjusted for multiple comparisons; 
significant if 3*p < .05). 
 
The main effect of ABM was not significant (F = .21, p = .65). 
 
Figure 4.2 shows mean state anxiety levels across assessments by ABM group. 
 
 
* p < .05 
Figure 4.2. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for each ABM group and for all 
participants 
 
Due to the unexpected nature of this finding (increase in state anxiety at 
assessment 3 relative to assessment 2 for active ABM participants), data related 
to change in state anxiety from assessment 2 to assessment 3 was examined for 
outliers.  For the active ABM group one participant had an increase in state anxiety 
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all state anxiety scores from the outlying participant were removed, there was no 
longer an ABM x assessment interaction effect (F = 2.47, p = .09).  This suggests 
that the increase in state anxiety at follow-up relative to at the end of training 
for the active ABM group was driven by change in state anxiety for one participant.   
 
4.3.1.3 State Anxiety (All Participants) From Start and End of Each 
Experimental Day 
 
As in experiments 1 and 2, state anxiety measures were taken for each day of 
attention bias modification training before and after the training.  Figure 4.3 gives 
the mean and standard error state anxiety score for the beginning and end of each 
experimental session, for each experimental group. 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 
between subjects factor of ABM (Active ABM, control ABM) and 2 within subjects 
factors of time (start of session, end of session) and day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 
30).   
 
This revealed a main effect of day, F(3,111) = 3.38, p = .02, (ηp2 = .08; observed 
power = .75).  Follow-up paired samples t-tests (results Bonferroni corrected; 
significant if 6*p < .05) revealed that state anxiety on day 3 (M = 30.65, SD = 
8.53) was significantly reduced compared to state anxiety on day 1 (M = 33.03, 
SD = 8.68), t(39) = 3.09, p = .024.  State anxiety on day 30 (M = 33.90, SD = 9.22) 
was increased compared to state anxiety on day 3 (M = 30.65, SD = 8.53), t(38) = 




There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 3.40, ps > .11). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean (SE) state anxiety scores at the start and end of each experimental day for each 
ABM group and for all participants 
 
4.3.2 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attention Bias as a 
Covariate 
 
4.3.2.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With attention bias as the dependant variable a 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a 
within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) 
and pre-existing attention bias as the covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing 























State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Day for all 
Participants
Active ABM/Anodal tDCS Control ABM/Anodal tDCS All Participants
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power = .99. Pre-existing attention bias and mean attention bias across 
experiment 3 were highly, positively correlated, r(40) = .62, p < .001.  There 
was a significant interaction between pre-existing attention bias and 
assessment, F(1.54,53.77) = 7.18, p = .004, (ηp2 = .17; observed power = .86; 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  To explore the relationship between pre-
existing attention bias and change in attention bias across assessments, a 
Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis was conducted with pre-existing 
attention bias, change in attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 2, 
change in attention bias between assessment 1 and assessment 3 and change in 
attention bias between assessments 2 and 3 as the variables.  Change in 
attention bias was calculated by subtracting attention bias score at the earlier 
assessment from attention bias score at the later assessment e.g. attention bias 
at assessment 2 – attention bias at assessment 1.  A positive score represented 
an increase in attention bias therefore and a negative score represented a 
reduction in attention bias.  Pre-existing attention bias was significantly, 
strongly, negatively correlated with change in attention bias from assessment 1 
to assessment 2, r(40) = -.63, p < .001 and moderately, negatively correlated 
with change in attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 3, r(38) = -.54, p 
= .001.  Pre-existing attention bias and change in attention bias between 
assessments 2 and 3 were not significantly correlated (r = .17, p = .31).  Figure 
4.4 shows the relationships between pre-existing attention bias and change in 













Figure 4.4. The relationship between pre-existing attention bias a a) change in attention bias 
between assessments 1 and 2, b) change in attention bias between assessments 1 and 3 and c) 
change in attention bias between assessments 2 and 3 across experiment 3.  For pre-existing 
attention bias, positive scores indicate attention bias towards threat and negative scores 
indicate attention bias towards neutral.  For difference scores, positive values represent 
increase in threat bias and negative scores represent increase in neutral bias (reduction in threat 
bias). 




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 2 



























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 
Change in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 3




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and 




No further main or interaction effects were significant (Fs < .79, ps > .38). 
 
4.3.2.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependant variable A 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a 
within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) 
and pre-existing attention bias as the covariate.  The main effect of assessment 
was marginally significant, F(2,72) = 2.80, p = .067, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = 
.54).  There was also a significant interaction between assessment and ABM 
condition, F(2,72) = 3.29, p = .04, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .61; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  These effects were investigated further in section 4.3.1.1.  
No further main or interaction effects were significant, (Fs < .86, ps > .42). 
 
4.3.2.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 4 x 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end 
of session) as within participants factors and ABM (active ABM, control ABM) as a 
between participants factor.  Pre-existing attention bias was included as a 





4.3.3 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a 
Covariate 
 
4.3.3.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With attention bias as the dependant variable a 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a 
within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3)  
with pre-existing trait anxiety as the covariate.  There were no significant main 
or interaction effects (Fs < 1.58, ps > .21).   
 
4.3.3.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependant variable A 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a 
within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) 
and pre-existing trait anxiety as the covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing 
trait anxiety was significant, F(1,35) = 6.20, p = .018, (ηp2 = .15; observed power 
= .68).  There was a significant, moderate, positive correlation between pre-
existing trait anxiety and state anxiety, r(39) = .42, p = .009 suggesting that 
higher pre-existing trait anxiety was associated with higher mean state anxiety 





Figure 4.5. The relationship between scores on the state anxiety scale of the STAI (Spielberger et 
al., 1983) across experiment 3 and the trait anxiety scale of the STAI at baseline. 
 
With trait anxiety held constant, the main effect of assessment was no longer 
present.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 
2.48, ps > .092). 
 
4.3.3.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with day (day 1, 
day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as within 
participants factors and ABM (active ABM, control ABM) as a between 
participants factor.  Pre-existing trait anxiety was the covariate.  There was a 
significant main effect of pre-existing trait anxiety, F(1,35) = 6.85, 
p = .013, (ηp2 = .16; observed power = .72).  There was a significant, moderate, 
positive correlation between pre-existing trait anxiety and state anxiety, r(39) = 























.42, p = .009 (see figure 4.5 for the relationship between pre-existing trait 
anxiety and mean state anxiety). 
 
4.3.4 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attentional 
Control as a Covariate 
 
4.3.4.1 Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
With attention bias as the dependant variable a 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with a between subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a 
within subjects factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3)  
with pre-existing attentional control as the covariate.  There were no significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.62, ps > .21).   
 
4.3.4.2 State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with a between 
subjects factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and pre-existing 
attentional control as the covariate.  There was a significant main effect of pre-
existing attentional control, F(1,35) = 5.82 p = .021, (ηp2 = .14; observed power = 
.65).  A Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis revealed a significant, 
moderate, negative correlation between pre-existing attentional control and 
state anxiety, r(39) = -.38, p = .019 suggesting that higher baseline attentional 





Figure 4.6. The relationship between scores on the attention control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) at baseline and mean scores on the state anxiety scale (Spielberger et al., 1983) across 
experiment 3. 
 
Controlling for pre-existing attentional control the effect of assessment was no 
longer significant.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects 
(Fs < 2.27, ps > .11). 
 
4.3.4.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Attentional Control as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 4 x 2 x 2 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end 
of session) as within participants factors and ABM (active ABM, control ABM) as a 
between participants factor and pre-existing attentional control as a covariate.  
There was a significant main effect of pre-existing attentional control, 
F(1,35) = 5.66, p = .023, (ηp2 = .14; observed power = .64).  A Pearson Product 



























Moment correlational analysis revealed a significant, moderate, negative 
correlation between pre-existing attentional control and state anxiety, r(39) = -
.38, p = .019 (see figure 4.6). 
 
4.3.5 Analyses with tES as a Between Participants Factor 
 
In sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 analysis of data from experiment 3 in isolation was 
described.  However, the aim of experiment 2 was to explore whether the 
application of anodal tDCS above the DLPFC might better facilitate the neural 
mechanisms associated with ABM training than active tRNS of the bilateral IFG or 
sham tES.  This would be reflected in greater attention bias and state anxiety 
reductions following ABM with anodal tDCS relative to ABM with active tRNS or 
sham tES.  In order to directly compare the effects of stimulation type on 
training outcomes the present analysis combined experiment 3 and experiment 
1.   For each dependent variable (attention bias, state anxiety) a 3 x 2 x 3 
ANOVA was conducted with the within participants factor of assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and between participants factors of 
ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS).  
Subsequently, three 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVAs were conducted with the within 
participants factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3), 
the between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES 
(active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS) and the covariate of pre-existing attention 





4.3.5.1 Attention Bias (tES Group as Between Participants Factor) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active 
tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES).  The interaction between assessment and tES 
condition was significant, F(4,232) = 2.95, p = .021, (ηp2 = .05; observed power = 
.79).  Attention bias data for each assessment was subject to an independent 
ANOVA to examine the effect of tES group.  Attention bias did not differ 
between tES groups at assessment 1 (ts < 2.02, ps > .14), assessment 2 (ts < 
1.81, ps > .23) or assessment 3 (ts < .21, ps > 2.51).  For each tES group (active 
tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) paired samples t-tests examined change in 
attention bias across assessments.  All results were Bonferroni corrected for 
multiple comparisons (result significant if 3*p < .05).  There were no significant 
changes in attention bias across assessments for the active tRNS (ts < .87, ps > 
1.17) or anodal tDCS (ts < 1.64, ps > .33) groups.  For the sham tES group, the 
reduction in threat bias between assessments 1 (M = 1.30, SD = 12.60) and 
assessment 2 (M = -5.81, SD = 18.21) approached significance, t(41) = 2.40, p = 
.063.  For the sham tES group there were no further significant changes in 
attention bias across assessments (ts < 1.55, ps > .39).  There were no further 
significant main or interaction effects (Fs < .95, ps > .43). 
 
4.3.5.2 State Anxiety (tES Group as Between Participants Factor) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a significant 
main effect of assessment, F(1.80,210.14) = 5.38, p = .007, (ηp2 = .04; observed 
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power = .81; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Paired samples t-tests [Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (result significant if 3*p < .05)] revealed that 
state anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 30.85, SD = 9.08) was significantly reduced 
compared to state anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 33.38, SD = 9.97), t(123) = 3.79, 
p < .001.  There was no further significant change in state anxiety across 
assessments (ts < 1.61, ps > .11). There were no further significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 1.78, ps > .14).     
 
4.3.5.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental Day 
(tES Group as Between Participants Factor) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day (day 1, day 
2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, 
control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES).  There was a 
significant main effect of time, F(1,117) = 11.03, p = .001, (ηp2 = .09; observed 
power = .91).  State anxiety at the end of session (M = 31.26, SD = 7.93) was 
reduced compared to state anxiety at the start of session (M = 32.31, SD = 7.88).  








4.3.6 Analyses of Covariance with tES as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate 
  
4.3.6.1 Attention Bias (tES group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active 
tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and pre-existing attention bias as a covariate.  The 
main effect of pre-existing attention bias was significant, F(1,115) = 57.84, p < 
.001, (ηp2 = .34; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-existing attention bias was 
moderately to highly, positively correlated with mean attention bias, r(124) = 
.57, p < .001.  The interaction between pre-existing attention bias and 
assessment was significant, F(1.60,183.800) = 38.40, p < .001, (ηp2 = .25; 
observed power = 1.00; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  Pre-existing attention 
bias was strongly, negatively correlated with change in attention bias from 
assessment 1 to assessment 2, r(124) = -.61, p < .001 and change in attention 
bias from assessment 1 to assessment 3, r(122) = -.71, p < .001 but was not 
significantly correlated with change in attention bias from assessment 2 to 
assessment 3 (r = .011, p = .91).  The significant negative correlations indicated 
that higher pre-exiting threat bias was associated with greater reduction in 
threat bias following training and greater pre-existing neutral bias was 
associated with greater reduction in neutral bias following training relatively to 





4.3.6.2 State Anxiety (tES group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a significant 
main effect of assessment, F(1.80,208.40) = 5.32, p = .007, (ηp2 = .044; observed 
power = .81; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  This effect was explored in section 
4.3.5.2.  With pre-existing attention bias held constant, there were no further 
significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.81, ps > .14).     
 
4.3.6.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental Day 
(tES group as Between Participants Factor and Pre-existing 
Attention Bias as a Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day(day 1, day 
2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, 
control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES).  Pre-existing 
attention bias was the covariate.  There was a significant main effect of time, 
F(1,116) = 11.06, p = .001, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .91; Greenhouse Geisser 
corrected).  State anxiety at the end of session (M = 31.26, SD = 7.93) was 
reduced compared to state anxiety at the start of session (M = 32.31, SD = 7.88).  
The interaction between time, day and pre-existing attention bias was also 
significant, F(2.67,309.97) = 3.00, p = .036, (ηp2 = .025; observed power = .67; 
Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For each day, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted with the within participants factor of time (start of session, end of 
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session) and pre-existing attention bias as a covariate.  For day 1 state anxiety, 
there was a significant main effect of time, F(1,112) = 9.39, p = .003, (ηp2 = .07; 
observed power = .86).  State anxiety at the start of day 1 (M = 33.38, SD = 9.97) 
was higher than at the end of day 1 (M = 33.38, SD = 9.97).  For day 1 state 
anxiety, there were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 2.32, 
ps > .13). For day 30 state anxiety, there was a significant main effect of time, 
F(1,121) = 4.13, p = .044, (ηp2 = .03; observed power = .52).  State anxiety at 
the end of day 30 (M = 32.00, SD = 9.47) was reduced compared to state anxiety 
at the start of day 30 (M = 32.76, SD = 9.25). There were no further main or 
interaction effects emerging from the analysis of day 30 state anxiety (Fs < .27, 
ps > .61). There were no significant main or interaction effects for day 2 state 
anxiety (Fs < 3.19, ps > .08) or for day 3 state anxiety (Fs < 3.13, ps > .08).  For 
each time, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the within 
participants factor of day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and pre-existing 
attention bias as a covariate.  For start of session state anxiety there was a 
significant main effect of day, F(2.72, 329.38) = 3.51, p = .019, (ηp2 = .03; 
observed power = .75; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).    Paired samples t-tests 
examined change in start of day state anxiety across days.  Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (result significant if 6*p < .05).  
State anxiety at the start of day 3 (M = 31.20, SD = 9.23) was significant reduced 
compared to state anxiety at the start of day 1 (M = 33.38, SD = 9.97), t(123) = 
2.97, p = .024.  Change in start of day state anxiety was not significant across 
further comparisons (ts < 1.94, ps > .33).  For start of session state anxiety there 
were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < .59, ps > .61).  No 
significant main or interaction effects emerged from the analysis of end of 




There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.94, ps > 
.13).  
 
4.3.7 Analyses of Covariance with tES as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate 
 
4.3.7.1 Attention Bias (tES Group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active 
tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and pre-existing trait anxiety as the covariate.  
The interaction between assessment and tES condition was significant, 
F(4,228) = 2.71, p = .031, (ηp2 = .045; observed power = .75).  This effect was 
explored in section 4.3.5.1.  There were no further significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 1.10, ps > .30). 
 
4.3.7.2 State Anxiety (tES group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a significant 
main effect of trait anxiety, F(1,115) = 59.93, p < .001, (ηp2 = .34; observed 
power = 1.00).  Pre-existing trait anxiety was highly, positively correlated with 
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mean state anxiety r(124) = .59, p < .001.  There were no further significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.70, ps > .15).     
 
4.3.7.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental Day 
(tES group as Between Participants Factor and Pre-existing 
Trait Anxiety as a Covariate 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day(day 1, day 
2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors, between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, control 
ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and pre-existing trait anxiety 
as a covariate.  There was a significant main effect of trait anxiety, 
F(1,115) = 67.58, p < .001, (ηp2 = .37; observed power = 1.00). This effect was 
explored in section 4.3.7.2.  
 
4.3.8 Analyses of Covariance with tES as a Between Participants 
Factor and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a Covariate 
 
4.3.8.1 Attention Bias (tES Group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor, 
ABM (active ABM, control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) as 
between participants factors and pre-existing attentional control as a covariate.  
The interaction between assessment and tES condition was significant, 
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F(4,228) = 2.60, p = .037, (ηp2 = .044; observed power = .72).  This effect was 
explored in section 4.3.8.1.    There were no further significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 1.09, ps > .36). 
 
4.3.8.2 State Anxiety (tES group as Between Participants Factor 
and Pre-existing Attentional Control as a Covariate) 
 
The above analysis was repeated on state anxiety data.  There was a significant 
main effect of pre-existing attentional control, F(1,115) = 14.06, p < .001, (ηp2 = 
.11; observed power = .96).  Pre-existing attentional control was moderately, 
negatively correlated with state anxiety, r(124) = -.34, p < .001 suggesting that 
higher attentional control at baseline was associated with lower mean state 
anxiety.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 
1.61, ps > .18).     
 
4.3.8.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of Each Experimental Day 
(tES group as between participants factor and Pre-existing 
Attentional Control as a Covariate) 
 
A 4 x 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on attention bias data with day (day 1, day 
2, day 3, day 30) and time (start of session, end of session) as the within 
participants factors and between participants factors of ABM (active ABM, 
control ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES).  There was a 
significant main effect of pre-existing attentional control, F(1,115) = 15.05, p < 
001, (ηp2 = .12; observed power = .97).  This effect was explored in section 
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4.3.8.11.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 
1.55, ps > .21).     
 
4.3.9  tRNS Tolerability 
 
TDCS was well tolerated overall (see table 4.6).   Participants who received 
active ABM reported mild to moderate levels of tickling (M = 2.10, SD = .97), 
itching (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14), burning (M = 2.40, SD = .99), tiredness (M = 2.45, 
SD = 1.36) and loss of concentration (M = 2.25, SD = 1.12).  Control ABM 
participants reported mild to moderate levels of tickling (M = 2.47, SD = 1.12), 
itching (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30), burning (M = 2.00, SD = 1.41), tiredness (M = 2.74, 
SD = 1.19), loss of concentration (M = 2.26, SD = 1.19). Independent t-tests 
compared the intensity scores for each ABM group.  The effect of ABM group on 
neck pain approached significance with participants who received control ABM 
reporting a higher level (M =1.53, SD = .90) than those who received active ABM 
(M =1.10, SD = .31) t(37) = 1.99, p = .064.   
 
Table 4.6:  















































1.42 (.69) 2.74 
(1.19) 






4.3.10  Experimental Condition 
 
The percentage of participants who guessed their ABM group correctly was 
42.50%.  A one-sample t-test revealed that this percentage did not significantly 
differ from chance, (t = .95, p = .35).  Of the active ABM participants, 19.05% 
correctly guessed their ABM group correctly.  This was significantly below chance 
level, t(20) = 3.53, p = .002.  Of the control ABM participants 68.42% correctly 
guessed their ABM group.  This percentage did not significantly differ from 
chance, (t = 1.68, p = .11). 
 
The percentage of participants who correctly reported that they had received 
tDCS was 77.5%.  This was significantly above chance level, t(39) = 4.11, p > .01.   
A total of 35% of participants correctly guessed both their ABM and tDCS 





Experiment 3 was designed to explore the efficacy of anodal tDCS of the left 
DLPFC for enhancing the effects of ABM.  Based on findings from previous studies 
(Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b) it was predicted that anodal tDCS 
with attend-neutral ABM would generate greater reductions in attentional bias 
towards threat and anxiety than anodal tDCS with control ABM.   There was no 
reduction in threat bias irrespective of condition but there was a reduction in 
state anxiety at assessment 2 compared to assessment 1 across all participants.  
The finding of no reduction in threat bias was in opposition to findings from 
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previous studies in which tES has been used to modulate the effects of ABM 
training (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  However, the findings were 
completely consistent with the results from experiments 1 and 2 which also did 
not find threat bias reduction but noted reduction in state anxiety following 
training.  State anxiety reduction in the absence of reduction in attentional bias 
towards threat has been demonstrated across participants from all three 
experiments of study 1.  This has occurred irrespective of training paradigm 
(active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, 
sham tES).  As per experiments 1 and 2 of the present study, threat bias 
reduction was positively associated with threat bias at baseline with greater pre-
existing threat bias predicting greater reduction in threat bias across 
assessments. 
 
A second series of analyses of data from experiment 3 combined with 
experiment 1 allowed for comparison of effects across tES groups.    These 
analyses also included pre-existing attention bias, trait anxiety and attentional 
control as covariates.  Like the analyses from experiments 1 and 2 these 
revealed a reduction in state anxiety across participants irrespective of ABM or 
tES group.  There was greater threat bias reduction for participants with greater 
pre-existing threat bias and greater neutral bias reduction for participants with 
greater pre-existing neutral bias irrespective of ABM or tES group.  
 
4.4.1  Experimental Procedure 
 
In the study by Clarke et al. (2014) participants who received anodal tDCS and 
attend-neutral ABM training had significant reductions in attentional bias 
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towards threat but those who received anodal tDCS in the attend threat group 
did not.  In experiment 3 of the present study all participants received anodal 
tDCS.  There was however, no indication of threat bias reductions in participants 
who received attend-neutral ABM.  Heeren et al. (2015b) only delivered active 
ABM towards neutral stimuli (away from threatening stimuli).  In their study 
participants who received anodal but not cathodal or sham tDCS of the left 
DLPFC did not demonstrate reductions in threat bias as assessed by reaction 
time to targets during attention bias assessment but had enhanced 
disengagement from threat as evidenced by eye-tracking.  In the present 
experiment, eye-tracking data was not taken and it is therefore not possible to 
claim that results from the experiment did not replicate those reported by 
Heeren et al. (2015b).  Failure to replicate the outcomes of Clarke et al. (2014) 
might be explained by methodological differences between their study and the 
present experiment.  Clarke et al. (2014) delivered ABM training over one session 
whereas the present experiment consisted of 3 consecutive days of ABM training.  
The finding of threat bias reduction for tES with active ABM following one session 
but not after three sessions is unexpected in light of early meta-analyses of ABM 
studies which reported larger effect sizes for studies conducted over a number 
of days (Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010).  It was still more surprising 
given empirical support for the modulation of cognitive training with tES over a 
number of days (Meinzer et al., 2014; Snowball et al., 2013).  However, the 
finding was consistent with reports from recent meta-analyses of lower effects 
sizes in terms of symptom reduction with a greater number of training sessions 
(Cristea et al., 2015) or longer training as calculated by the number of sessions 
multiplied by length of sessions (Price et al., 2017).  As stated by Cohen Kadosh 
(2012) little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying single-session 
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versus multi-session training with tES.  It is possible that, when combined with 
tES, single-session ABM is more successful than multi-session ABM.  It is also 
feasible that, had attention bias been assessed at the start and end of each day, 
there may have been threat bias reductions following ABM training on day 1, 
with superior reductions for active ABM training compared to control ABM.  This 
may also have revealed greater modulation of active ABM with active tES. 
However, attention bias assessment was not administered at the end of days 1 
and 2 as this may have negated training effects.   
 
State anxiety, in contrast, was measured at the start and end of each 
experimental session.  There was no evidence that active ABM with anodal tDCS 
produced greater reductions in state anxiety than control ABM with anodal tDCS.  
Neither the study by Clarke et al. (2014) nor that by Heeren et al. (2015b) 
included a measure of anxiety and it is therefore not be possible to make a 
comparison between these and the present study in terms of the impact on 
anxiety of single session ABM versus multiple session ABM with anodal tDCS. 
 
4.4.2  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
Attention bias was calculated by subtracting reaction time for angry faces from 
reaction time for neutral faces.  When calculated in the same way, threat bias 
was also found not to be reduced across assessment in the study by Heeren et al. 
(2015b).  However, eye tracking data revealed reduced gaze time for angry faces 
relative to neutral faces following ABM training towards neutral stimuli.  Rather 
than providing a measure of attentional engagement (time taken to visually 
engage threatening faces relative to neutral faces), the eye tracking data was 
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used to calculate attentional disengagement (length of time between engaging a 
stimulus and removing visual attention from it; Heeren et al., 2015b).  It is 
possible that if disengagement latency as opposed to engagement speed had 
been assessed and calculated as a measure of attentional bias in the present 
experiment, a reduction in attentional bias towards threat following ABM 
training may have been observed.  It is also viable that eye-tracking or another 
measure with greater temporal specificity than behavioural reaction time data 
such as ERP data (e.g. Kappenman et al., 2014), may have revealed a reduction 
in threat bias as indicated by engagement speed. 
 
4.4.3  TES Montage 
 
Unlike in the present experiment and in Heeren et al. (2015b), in the study by 
Clarke et al. (2014) reaction time data did indicate that attention bias was 
modulated in the trained direction (towards neutral or towards threat).  There 
were disparities between the studies in terms of tES montage which might have 
been influential in this finding.  Each of the previous studies and experiment 3 
administered anodal tDCS to the left DLPFC.  The present experiment and that 
by Heeren and colleagues (for the anodal tDCS group) placed the anode above 
the left DLPFC (F3) and the cathode above the right, contralateral supra-orbital 
ridge.  In the Clark et al., (2014) study however, the return electrode was 
positioned in an extra-cephalic position (near the base of the neck on the left-
hand side).  Researchers have previously emphasised the importance of return 
electrode positioning in determining current flow (e.g. Datta et al., 2009; 
Sadleir et al., 2010).  Some advocate the use of extra-cephalic placement of the 
return electrode as a means of ensuring that any effects of tES can be attributed 
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specifically to the active electrode (Shin, Foerster & Nitche, 2015).  When 
cephalic cathode placement is applied (in the case of anodal tDCS), it is difficult 
to rule out the possibility of changes in excitability beneath the cathode and 
cephalic placement may result in unintentional alterations of neural activity 
between this and the active electrode (Moliadze et al., 2010).  Any modulations 
of cognitive training elicited by active tES might not be solely accorded to 
changes beneath the “stimulating” electrode.  It has also been suggested that 
extra-cephalic placement of the return electrode might produce greater cortical 
modulation relative to cephalic placement as more of the current enters the 
brain rather than being shunted across the scalp (Bikson et al., 2010).  The same 
authors predicted the directionality of current flow using computer modelling.  
With the anode above the left primary motor cortex and the cathode above the 
contralateral forehead there was significant electrical field beneath and 
between the electrodes but particularly in the right frontal lobe.  With the 
anode over the left primary motor cortex and the cathode on the contralateral 
mastoid, the electrical field distribution was predominantly constrained to the 
left hemisphere and had a posterior trajectory (Bikson et al., 2010).  Based on 
these predictions, placement of the return electrode on the left trapezius 
muscle in the Clarke et al. (2014) study may have confined tES effects to the left 
hemisphere.  This pattern of stimulation might better target the neural 
mechanisms associated with reducing bias towards threat via ABM than one in 
which electrical field is distributed across the right frontal cortex.  Grimshaw 
and Carmel (2014) posited that emotional processing is characterised by neural 
frontal lobe asymmetry.  Informed by EEG data they concluded that left-
lateralised control mechanisms are responsible for inhibiting negative stimuli 
whereas right-lateralised control inhibits positive stimuli (Grimshaw & Carmel, 
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2014).  If this model is accurate then left-lateralised activation induced by 
Clarke et al’s tES montage may have been more proficient at promoting the 
inhibitory processes which are central to ABM training.  However, there is 
evidence from a study by D’Alfonso et al. (2000) which would oppose this view.  
The study reported that a rTMS induced virtual lesion to the left PFC resulted in 
attentional inhibition of angry faces whereas rTMS of the right PFC was 
associated with attention bias towards angry faces.  More research in the domain 
of frontal hemispheric specificity is required before attempting to map neural 
activity changes induced by different tES protocols and montages onto 
behavioural change.  Whilst techniques for computer modelling of tES effects 
are increasingly sophisticated (Bikson et al., 2010) these models are predictive.  
There is a need for more ‘real-time’ measurements of tES effects on neural 
activity using brain scanning techniques such as fMRI.   
 
4.4.4  Analogous Findings 
 
Whilst there is a chance that methodological issues explain discrepancies 
between findings from studies using tES to modulate ABM, it is also possible that 
Clarke et al. (2014) and Heeren et al. (2015b) are anomalies in a growing body of 
research showing no effect of ABM training on attention bias.  A recent meta-
analysis examining the impact of multisession ABM on attention bias and anxiety 
in high trait anxious individuals reported three main findings; 1) anxiety 
reduction consistently occurred without reduction in attention bias towards 
threat, 2) both active and control ABM often resulted in anxiety reduction, 3) 
participants often demonstrated no pre-training attentional bias towards threat 
(Mogg, Waters & Bradley, 2017).  Outcomes from the present experiment 
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perfectly reflect these findings and it is therefore, perhaps, not necessary to 
rationalise them.   The discussion above speculates as to why in the present 
experiment tES failed to enhance the effects of ABM focusing particularly on 
methodological differences in tES protocol.  If, however, ABM is ineffective in 
reducing threat bias (possibly because participants had no pre-training bias; see 
discussion below) then a discussion regarding the enhancement of ABM via tES is 
redundant.   
 
4.4.5  State Anxiety Increase 
 
An unexpected finding from experiment 3 was an increase in state anxiety at 
assessment 3 compared to assessment 2 for active ABM with anodal tDCS but not 
control ABM with anodal tDCS.  There was no increase in threat bias for the 
active ABM group at assessment 3 therefore there was no indication that the 
increase was related to increased engagement to threatening stimuli.  Analysis 
of the data revealed that the increase was driven by one outlier.  The 
participant in question was not outlying in terms of their anxiety score at 
assessment 3 but in terms of change in state anxiety score from assessment 2 to 
assessment 3.  There was a large increase in their state anxiety score. When the 
participant’s state anxiety scores were omitted from analysis the increase in 
state anxiety across participants in the anodal tDCS group was no longer present.  
This finding highlights the need for a discussion regarding the removal of outliers 
in self-report data.  The large increase in state anxiety score may have reflected 
personal situational factors for the participant in question.  Alternatively, it may 
have been indicative of that participant’s experience of the study in which case 
it may be important for their data to remain in the analysis.  In the present 
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discussion, the most appropriate solution was deemed the reporting of results 
with and without the outlying data.  This illustrates the extent to which the 
inclusion or omission of one participant’s data can change a result and may be 
relevant to discussions regarding discrepancies in findings from previous ABM 
studies which have tended to focus on methodological issues (e.g. Hakamata et 
al., 2010). 
 
4.4.6  Pre-existing Attention Bias 
 
As mentioned, in experiments 1 and 2 and as previously reported in an ABM study 
(O’Toole et al., 2012) participants with greater pre-existing bias towards threat 
had greater reduction in threat bias following attentional training.  This was 
irrespective of ABM or tES group.  Across the experiments of the present study, 
participants who began the experiment with a bias towards neutral stimuli had 
reduced neutral bias following attentional training.  This suggests that baseline 
attention bias level is important in the outcome of ABM training.  Interestingly, 
in the aforementioned study by Clarke et al. (2014) participants who received 
anodal tDCS and attend neutral ABM had a slight pre-existing threat bias and 
participants allocated to anodal tDCS with attend threat ABM had a neutral bias 
at baseline.  Of those who received sham tDCS, the mean baseline attention bias 
for participants who performed attend-threat ABM was towards threat stimuli 
and for those who undertook attend-neutral ABM was towards neutral stimuli.  
The outcome reported was greater increase in bias in the trained direction for 
participants who received anodal tDCS relative to participants who received 
sham tDCS (Clarke et al., 2014). However, it is possible that the post-training 
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inter-group differences reported were a factor of group differences related to 
pre-existing attention bias. 
 
4.4.7  Attentional Control 
 
There is converging evidence that attentional control capacity has a role in 
determining the efficacy of ABM training.  Previous studies have demonstrated 
the enhancement of attentional control capacity following ABM training 
compared to before ABM training (Chen et al., 2015; Heeren et al., 2016).  These 
findings supported the suggestion that the mechanism via which both active ABM 
and control ABM generated reductions in threat bias (Chen et al., 2015) and 
stressor related anxiety (Heeren et al., 2016) following training, was the 
enhancement of attentional control capacity.  Furthermore, attentional control 
level has been seen to predict the magnitude of attention bias change following 
ABM training relative to pre-training (Basanovic et al., 2017).  It is proposed that 
higher level attentional control facilitates the process of attention bias 
modification by enhancing goal-directed deployment of attention (Basanovic et 
al., 2017).  This might expedite or increase learning of the ‘rules’ implicitly 
imparted by contingency-based ABM training.  In the present experiment there 
was no evidence that pre-existing attentional control level had an impact on 
ABM-induced attention bias.  When pre-existing attentional control was included 
as a covariate in the analysis on state anxiety data, the main effect of reduction 
in state anxiety following training relative to before training disappeared.   This 
suggests that pre-existing attentional control influences state anxiety and it’s 
modulation.  However, given the lack of interaction effects between pre-existing 
attentional control and change in attention bias, if pre-existing attentional 
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control did indeed mediate state anxiety reduction, this was not via the 
mechanism proposed by Basanovic et al. (2017). 
 
4.4.8  Limitations 
 
There were aspects of the experimental sample which were stronger for 
experiments 1 and 2 than for experiment 3.  In the first two experiments of the 
present study, 21 participants per experimental group were recruited and 
attended follow-up.  For the present experiment, of the 21 participants 
recruited and allocated to the tDCS with control ABM group, attention bias data 
from 2 participants were omitted from analysis due to low accuracy.  Three of 
the remaining 19 participants did not attend their follow-up appointment and, 
consequently follow-up data from only 16 participants was analysed.  Another 
recruitment issue which may have been instrumental in the results was that only 
3 of the 42 participants recruited were male.  Male representation was low 
throughout the study.  In both experiments 1 and 2 approximately 25% of all 
participants were male.  For the present experiment only 7% of participants 
were male.  Of primary concern therefore is the fact that the results cannot be 
generalised.  Additionally, comparison of results with those from experiments 1 
and 2 is compromised.  Furthermore, gender differences have been reported for 
both attention bias and anxiety.  Rates of depression and anxiety disorders are 
known to be higher in women compared to men (McLean, Asnaani, Litza, & 
Hofmann, 2011; Van de Velde, Bracke, & Levecque, 2010).  Women are twice as 
likely as men to develop GAD (Kinney, Boffa & Amir, 2017).  Pintzinger et al. 
(2016) demonstrated that males had a greater tendency to engage positive 
stimuli relative to negative stimuli during an emotional dot probe task but this 
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pattern was not present in women.  They also reported that stronger effortful 
control (as assessed using the automatic thoughts questionnaire) was associated 
with greater avoidance of negative stimuli for males only (Pintzinger et al., 
2016).  An ERP study showed faster engagement to threatening stimuli than 
pleasant stimuli for males as indicated by elevated P100 amplitude for threat 
(Sass et al., 2010).  Women had prolonged P300 latency suggesting that they 
were prone to more elaborate processing of threat related stimuli (Sass et al., 
2010).  One study which compared attentional bias assessment using an 
emotional dot-probe task reported that faster engagement to threat occurred in 
women and was positively correlated with anxiety (Tran et al., 2013).  Men, 
however, demonstrated a difficulty disengaging from threat and this was 
unrelated to anxiety level (Tran et al., 2013).  It is also possible that gender 
might influence the impact of ABM on attentional bias and anxiety.  There is 
limited but mixed evidence in this regard.  Liu et al. (2017) reported that gender 
was a moderator in the effectiveness of cognitive bias modification (including 
ABM) in social anxiety with females benefitting more from participation.  
Conversely, a meta-analysis of ABM studies did not find gender to be a 
moderator of ABM success (Hakamata et al., 2012).  These mixed but pertinent 
findings suggest that measures of both anxiety and attentional bias might be 




Experiment 3 was designed to extend findings from experiment 1 of the present 
study.  In experiment 1, active tRNS or sham tES was applied above the bilateral 
IFG during ABM training.  There was no difference between ABM groups in terms 
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of attention bias and anxiety level change and there was no evidence of an 
enhancement of ABM effects with active tRNS. However, two studies produced 
since the commencement of experiment 1 demonstrated that that the 
administration of anodal tDCS during active ABM training enhanced the extent to 
which attention was trained in the intended direction (Clarke et al., 2014; 
Heeren et al., 2015b).  Both of these studies used anodal tDCS above the left 
DLPFC during ABM training.  Experiment 3 sought to explore whether anodal 
tDCS of the left DLPFC could modulate ABM training where active tRNS of the 
bilateral IFG did not.  Analysis of data from experiment 3 alone revealed no 
change in attention bias following training but did show a reduction in state 
anxiety for all participants.  As per experiment 1, these results suggested that 
active ABM was not more successful than control ABM in reducing attentional 
bias towards threat and anxiety.  A secondary analysis conducted on combined 
data from experiments 1 and 3 also suggested no impact of ABM group on 
attention bias and state anxiety change.  The results suggested that sham tES 
but not active tRNS or anodal tDCS resulted in attention bias reduction following 
ABM training (irrespective of ABM group).  Potential mechanisms of this finding 









This chapter combines in analysis all data from experiments 1, 2 and 3.  The 
analysis compares the effect of 3 forms of ABM training (active ABM, control ABM 
and no-training ABM) on attention bias and state anxiety.  Active ABM and 
control ABM were delivered concurrently with active tRNS, anodal tDCS or sham 
tES.  No-training ABM was delivered with either active tRNS or sham tES.  A 
limitation of the following analysis is the omission of an anodal tDCS group with 
no-training ABM.  There is less data related to anodal tDCS than for active or 
sham tRNS and therefore tES group sizes are not comparable.  However, 




5.2.1  Design  
 
The study was a 3 x 3 x 3 mixed design.  The between participants factors were 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham TES) and ABM (active ABM, control ABM, 
no-training ABM).  The within subjects factor was assessment [before training on 
day 1(Assessment 1), after training on day 3 (Assessment 2), at 30 day follow up 




Two forms of active tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS) were applied across 
experiments.  However, only one sham condition was included.  In the sham 
group, hfTRNS current was ramped up for 20 seconds and then stopped.  As the 
sham condition involved only a very brief application of active tRNS, it will be 
treated as a sham (comparison) group for both the active tRNS group and the 
anodal tDCS group throughout the analysis.  This approach was also taken by 
Fertonani et al. (2011). 
 
5.2.2  Participants 
 
Participants were 172 students from the University of Roehampton (137 female), 
mean age = 20.75 years, SD = 4.17, range = 18 to 42).   All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision.   
 
The recruitment process was as outlined in the previous chapters. 
 





The number of study participants in each experimental group 
ABM group tES Group Number of Participants 
Active ABM Active tRNS 21 
Active ABM Anodal tDCS 21 
Active ABM Sham tES 21 
Control ABM Active tRNS 20 
Control ABM Anodal tDCS 19 
Control ABM  Sham tES 21 
No-training ABM Active tRNS 21 
No-training ABM Sham tES 21 
 
5.2.3  Ethics 
 
The study was approved by the University of Roehampton ethics committee 
(approval code PSYC 14/ 116; see appendix 1).  Written informed consent was 
provided by all participants before participation.  Participants were 
compensated for their participation with course credits.  Participants who were 
not eligible for course credits received a £20 payment. 
 
5.2.4  Materials, Stimuli and Procedure 
 
The present chapter will present an analysis of all the data collected in 
experiments 1, 2 and 3.  The materials and stimuli used and procedure followed 




5.2.5  Data Preparation 
 
Data from 165 participants were analysed.  Response times below 200ms were 
removed prior to analysis.  To remove the effect of outlying data on analysis, for 
each participant reaction times which were more than 2.5 standard deviations 
from that participant’s mean reaction time were excluded (Brown et al., 2014).  
Previous chapters provide the percentage of data retained for each experiment. 
 
5.2.6  Data Analyses 
 
As per experiments 1, 2 and 3, attention bias and state anxiety data were 
subjected to mixed ANOVAs with ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training 
ABM) and tES (active tRNS, sham tES, anodal tDCS) as between participants 
factors and assessment as the within subjects factor.  These ANOVAs were 
performed on data from all participants.  The main ANOVAs were repeated with 
pre-existing attention bias, pre-existing trait anxiety and pre-existing attentional 
control as covariates.   
 
5.2.7  Baseline Characteristics 
 
5.2.7.1  Baseline Scores for Main Variables of Interest 
 
For baseline attention bias, state anxiety, trait anxiety and attentional control 




5.2.7.2  State and Trait Anxiety Across Experimental Groups by  
Gender 
 
Table 5.2 shows baseline mean and standard deviation state anxiety scores with 
participants as a factor of experimental group and sex. 
 
Table 5.2: 
Baseline mean (standard deviation) state and trait anxiety scores across experimental groups for females and 
males  

































































































Note: There is no standard deviation for males who received control ABM with anodal tDCS due 




There was no significant difference in baseline state anxiety between 







A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was no difference in trait anxiety scores 
between experimental groups at baseline (F = 1.41, p = .21).   
 
5.2.7.3  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (i.e. start of 
day 1, end of day 1, start of day 2, end of day 2, start of day 3, end of day 3, 
start of day 30, end of day 30) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation analysis.  All correlations were significant (all r’s > .52, all ps < 
.001).  The normative test-retest reliability r values reported by Spielberger 
(1983) for college students, with a test-retest interval of 20 days were .54 for 
males and .27 for females. Our results therefore suggest strong test-retest 
reliability and consistency within the state anxiety data.   
 
5.2.7.4  Correlations Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
 
Baseline trait anxiety score was significantly correlated with state anxiety score 









Table 5.3:  
Bivariate correlations between baseline trait anxiety scale (TAS) and state anxiety scale (SAS) scores at assessments 
1, 2 and 3 
**   < .001 
 
5.2.7.5  Correlations Between Self-Report Measures at Baseline 
 
Baseline scores from questionnaires assessing trait characteristics were subject 
to a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis.  Table 5.4 shows the 
correlation between baseline scores on trait self-report measures.   
 
Table 5.4: 
Bivariate correlations for trait anxiety scale (TAS), attentional control scale (ACS), Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies depression questionnaire (CES-D) and fear of negative evaluation scale (FNE) scores 
at baseline. 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Trait Anxiety  1.00    
2. Attentional Control  -.568** 1.00   
3. Depression  .604** -.413** 1.00 . 
4. Fear Negative Evaluation  .716** -.408** .395** 1.00 
** p < 0.001 
 
Baseline scores across all questionnaires were significantly correlated (all rs > 
.41, ps < .001) suggesting that participants reported consistently across 
measures.   
 
 SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 SAS Assessment 3 





5.3.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Participants 
 
5.3.1.1  Attention Bias (All Participants) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with between 
subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and tES 
(active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES) and a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3).  There was a significant 
assessment x tES interaction, F(3.84,297.35) = 3.41, p = .011, (ηp2 = .042; 
observed power = .84; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  For each tES group a 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with assessment (assessment 1, 
assessment 2, assessment 3) as the within participants factor.  For the sham tES 
group there was a significant main effect of assessment, F(2,124) = 4.25, p = 
.016, (ηp2 = .064; observed power = .74).  Paired samples t-tests examined 
change in attention bias across assessments.  All results were Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  Participants in the 
sham tES group were significantly more biased towards neutral faces at 
assessment 2 (M = -6.01, SD = 16.02) compared to assessment 1(M = .96, SD = 
13.28), t(62) = 2.91, p = .015.  There was no further change in attention bias 
across assessments for participants who had received sham tES (ts < 1.76, ps > 
.08).  The effect of assessment was not significant for participants who had 




There were no further significant main effects or interactions (Fs < .88, ps > 
.51). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows mean attentional bias across assessments for each experimental 
group and for all participants.  Positive values represent threat bias and negative 
values represent neutral bias. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Mean (SE) attentional bias across assessments for each experimental group and for all 
participants.  
 
5.3.1.2  State Anxiety (All Participants) 
 
Replicating the threat bias ANOVA above, a 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on the state anxiety data with between subjects factors of ABM 
(active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS 
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assessment 2, assessment 3).  The main effect of assessment was significant, 
F(1.85,290.88) = 8.93, p < .001, (ηp2 = .054; observed power = .96; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected) suggesting a change in state anxiety across assessments.  
Paired samples t-tests examined change in state anxiety across assessments.  All 
results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < 
.05).  At assessment 1, participants reported greater state anxiety (M = 33.66, 
SD = 10.11) compared to assessment 2 (M = 30.85, SD = 9.68), t(165) = 4.62, p < 
.01. State anxiety was significantly higher at assessment 3 (M = 32.50, SD = 
10.11) compared to assessment 2 (M = 30.85, SD = 9.68), t(164) = 2.44, p = .048. 
The change in state anxiety between assessments 1 and 3 was not significant (t = 
1.56, ps =.36). There were no further main or interactions effects (Fs < 1.91, ps 
> .09). 
 
Figure 5.2 shows state anxiety across assessments by experimental group and for 





* p < .05 
Figure 5.2. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for each experimental group and for all 
participants 
 
5.3.1.3 State Anxiety (All Participants) From Start and End of Each 
Experimental Day 
 
State anxiety measures were taken for each day of bias modification training 
before and after the training and on day 30 at the start and end of the session 
(see figure 5.3). 
 
A 3 x 3 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 
between subjects factors of ABM (Active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and 2 within subjects factors of time 
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revealed a main effect of day, F(2.42,379.89) = 4.89, p = .005, (ηp2 = .03; 
observed power = .86; Greenhouse Geisser Corrected).  Paired samples t-tests 
examined change in state anxiety across days.  Results were Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  State anxiety on 
day 3 (M = 31.14, SD = 9.37) was significantly reduced compared to state anxiety 
on day 1 (M = 32.40, SD = 8.56), t(165) = 2.78, p = .036.  There were no further 
significant changes in state anxiety across days (ts < 2.44, ps > .10).  There was 
also a significant main effect of time, F(1,157) = 14.62, p < .001, (ηp2 = .09; 
observed power = .97).  State anxiety was reduced at the end of session (M = 
31.36, SD = 8.44) compared to the start of session (M = 32.52, SD = 8.56), t(165) 
= 3.94, p < .001.  There was a significant day x time interaction, 
F(2.70,242.22) = 4.63, p = .005, (ηp2 = .03; observed power = .87).  For each day 
(day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) the effect of time was examined using paired 
samples t-tests.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 4*p < .05).  On day 1 state anxiety was significantly reduced at the 
end of session (M = 31.14, SD = 8.51) compared to at the start of session (M = 
33.66, SD = 10.11), t(165) = 4.34, p < .001.    On day 30 state anxiety was 
marginally significantly reduced at the end of session (M = 32.50, SD = 10.67) 
compared to the start of session (M = 33.31, SD = 10.80), t(164) = 2.51, p < .052. 
The effect of time was not significant for any further day (ts < 1.38, ps > .60).  
Paired samples t-tests examined change in state anxiety across days for start of 
session state anxiety and for end of session state anxiety.  Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  State 
anxiety at the start of day 2 (M = 31.77, SD = 9.70) was significantly reduced 
compared to at the start of day 1 (M = 33.66, SD = 10.11), t(165) = 3.19, p < 
.012.    State anxiety at the start of day 3 (M = 31.43, SD = 9.83) was 
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significantly reduced compared to at the start of day 1 (M = 33.66, SD = 10.11), 
t(165) = 3.56, p < .001.    No further change in state anxiety across days for start 
of day data was significant (ts < 2.54, ps > .072).  For end of session data, there 
was no significant change in state anxiety across days (ts < 2.44, ps > .10). 
 





































5.3.2 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attention Bias as a 
Covariate 
 
5.3.2.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and pre-existing 
attention bias as a covariate.  There was a significant assessment x pre-existing 
attention bias interaction, F(1.54,237.79) = 67.11, p < .001, (ηp2 = .30; observed 
power = 1.00; Greenhouse Geisser corrected).  In order to investigate the 
relationship between pre-existing attention bias and change in attention bias 
across assessments, a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis was 
conducted with pre-existing attention bias, change in attention bias from 
assessment 1 to assessment 2, change in attention bias from assessment 1 to 
assessment 3 and change in attention bias from assessment 2 to assessment 3 as 
the variables.  Change in attention bias was calculated by subtracting attention 
bias score at the earlier assessment from attention bias score at the later 
assessment e.g. attention bias at assessment 2 – attention bias at assessment 1.  
A positive score represented an increase in attention bias therefore and a 
negative score represented a reduction in attention bias.  There was a 
significant moderate, negative correlation between pre-existing attention bias 
and change in attention bias from assessment 1 to assessment 2, r(166) = -.39, p 
< .001 and between pre-existing attention bias and change in attention bias from 
assessment 1 to assessment 3,  r(163) = -.53, p < .001.  Pre-existing attention 
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bias was not significantly correlated with change in attention bias between 
assessments 2 and 3 (r = .024, p = .76).  Figure 5.4 shows the relationship 
between pre-existing attention bias and change in attention bias across 
assessments.  This suggests that higher pre-existing attention bias towards 






























Figure 5.4. The relationship between pre-existing attention bias and a) change in attention bias 
between assessments 1 and 2, b) change in attention bias between assessments 1 and 3 and c) 
change in attention bias between assessments 2 and 3 across study 1.  For pre-existing attention 
bias, positive scores indicate attention bias towards threat and negative scores indicate 
attention bias towards neutral.  For difference scores, positive values represent increase in 
threat bias and negative scores represent increase in neutral bias (reduction in threat bias). 
 





























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and Change 
in Bias from Assessment 1 to Assessment 2




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and Change 
in Bias from Assessments 1 to Assessment 3




























Relationship between Pre-existing Attention Bias and Change 
in Bias from Assessment 2 to Assessment 3
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The main effect of pre-existing attention bias was significant, F(1,154) = 70.96, 
p < .001, (ηp2 = .32; observed power = 1.00).  There was a significant, moderate 
to strong, positive correlation between pre-existing attention bias and mean 
attention bias, r(166) = .57, p < .001. 
 
No further main or interaction effects were significant (Fs < 2.26, ps > .11). 
 
5.3.2.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-
training ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects 
factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and a covariate 
of pre-existing attention bias.  The main effect of assessment was significant, 
F(1.84,295.46) = 8.75, p < .001, (ηp2 = .053; observed power = .96; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  Post hoc analysis are described in section 5.3.1.2. 
 
The interaction between assessment, ABM and tES approached significance, 
F(5.53,295.46) = 2.16, p = .052, (ηp2 = .04; observed power = .74; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  For state anxiety data at each assessment a 3 x 3 univariate 
ANOVA was conducted with the between participants factors of ABM (Active 
ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham 
tES).  Analysis of assessment 1 state anxiety data revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < .42, ps > .66).  This was also the case for analysis of 
assessment 2 state anxiety data (Fs < .88, ps > .42) and assessment 3 state 




For each ABM group, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with the 
between participants factor of tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and the 
within participants factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2 and 
assessment 3).  For the active ABM group, there was a significant main effect of 
assessment, F(2,120) = 4.03, p = .02, (ηp2 = .06; observed power = .71).  Paired 
samples t-tests examined change in state anxiety across assessments.  All results 
were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  
State anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 30.97. SD = 8.37) was significantly reduced 
compared to state anxiety at assessment 1(M = 33.51. SD = 8.96), t(62) = 3.01, p 
= .012. No further change in state anxiety across assessments was significant for 
the active ABM group (ts < 2.09, ps < .12).  There were no further significant 
main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.64, ps > .17).   
 
For the no-training ABM group, there was a significant main effect of 
assessment, F(2,80) = 4.12, p = .02, (ηp2 = .09; observed power = .71).  Paired 
samples t-tests explored change in state anxiety across assessments.  All results 
were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  
State anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 30.86. SD = 11.38) was significantly reduced 
compared to state anxiety at assessment 1(M = 34.48. SD = 10.59), t(41) = 2.63, 
p = .036.  The increase in state anxiety at assessment 3 (M = 33.95. SD = 13.64) 
relative to assessment 2 (M = 30.86. SD = 11.38) approached significance, t(41) = 
2.48, p = .054.  State anxiety at assessment 3 (M = 33.95. SD = 13.64) did not 
differ significant from state anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 34.48. SD = 10.59; t = 
.34, p = 2.21.  For the no-training ABM group, the assessment x tES interaction 
approached significance, F(2,80) = 3.10, p = .051, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = 
.58).  For each tES group the main effect of assessment was assessed using 
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paired samples t-tests.  All results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  For participants who received no-training 
ABM with active tRNS, state anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 33.95. SD = 13.64) was 
marginally significantly reduced compared to state anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 
33.95. SD = 13.64), t(20) = 2.53, p = .06.  There were no further significant 
changes across assessments for the no-training ABM with active tRNS group (ts < 
1.92, ps > .21).  Following application of the Bonferroni correction no change in 
state anxiety across assessments for the no-training ABM/sham tES group was 
significant (ts < 2.29, ps > .099).   
 
State anxiety data from each assessment for participants who received no-
training ABM were subject to an independent t-test to examine difference in 
state anxiety between tES groups (tRNS, sham tES).  Results were Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  tES groups did not 
differ significantly in terms of state anxiety at any assessment (ts < 2.15. ps > 
.12). 
 
For the no-training group the main effect of tES was not significant (F = 2.50, p = 
.12).   
 
No significant main or interaction effects were revealed from the analysis of 
data from the control ABM group (Fs < 2.42, ps > .09).   
 
For each tES group, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with the 
between participants factor of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) 
and the within participants factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2 
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and assessment 3).  For the tRNS group there was a significant main effect of 
assessment, F(2,120) = 4.87, p = .009, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .79).  This 
was assessed using paired samples t-tests.  All results were Bonferroni corrected 
for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  State anxiety at assessment 2 
(M = 29.68. SD = 9.26) was marginally significantly reduced compared to state 
anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 32.87. SD = 9.90), t(62) = 3.06, p = .009.  For the 
active tRNS group, there were no further significant changes in state anxiety 
across assessments (ts < 2.09, ps > .12).  For the active tRNS group there were 
no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.19, ps > .32).   
 
For the anodal tDCS group, the main effect of assessment approached 
significance, F(2,74) = 3.10, p = .051, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .58).  State 
anxiety at assessment 2 (M = 30.95. SD = 8.90) was marginally significantly 
reduced compared to state anxiety at assessment 1 (M = 34.00, SD = 8.94), 
t(40) = 2.63, p = .036.  For the anodal tDCS group, there were no further 
significant changes in state anxiety across assessments (ts < 1.88, ps > .20).  For 
the anodal tDCS group, the assessment x ABM interaction was marginally 
significant, F(2,74) = 2.91, p = .061, (ηp2 = .07; observed power = .55).  State 
anxiety data for each assessment was subject to a one-way ANOVA to examine 
the effect of ABM.  There was no significant effect of ABM on state anxiety at 
any assessment for participants who received anodal tDCS (Fs < 2.08, ps > .16).  
For each ABM condition a repeated measures ANOVA examined the effect of 
assessment on state anxiety.  For participants who received anodal tDCS and 
active ABM there was a marginally significant effect of assessment, 
F(1.59,31.74) = 3.14, p = .068, (ηp2 = .14; observed power = .50).  Paired 
samples t-tests assessed change in state anxiety across assessments for 
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participants in the anodal tDCS/active ABM group.  All results were Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 3*p < .05).  State anxiety at 
assessment 3 (M = 35.19, SD = 9.86) was significantly higher than state anxiety at 
assessment 2 (M = 31.52, SD = 10.09), t(20) = 3.24, p = .012.  State anxiety did 
not change significantly across further assessments (ts < 1.21, ps > .72).  For the 
anodal tDCS group, the main effect of ABM was not significant (F =  
21. p = .65).  For the sham tES group, there were no significant main or 
interaction effects (Fs < 2.29, ps > .11). 
 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.64, ps > 
.20). 
 
5.3.2.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 2 x 4 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 
between subjects factors of ABM (Active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and 2 within subjects factors of time 
(start of session, end of session) and day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and pre-
existing attention bias as a covariate.  There was a significant main effect of 
day, F(2.43,377.11) = 4.31, p = .009, (ηp2 = .03; observed power = .81; 
Greenhouse Geisser Corrected).  There was a also a significant main effect of 
time, F(1.00,420.65) = 14.11, p < .001, (ηp2 = .08; observed power = .96; 
Greenhouse Geisser Corrected).  These effects are explored in section 5.3.1.3. 
 
The day x time interaction was significant, F(2.71, 420.65) = 3.86, p = .012, (ηp2 
= .024; observed power = .79; Greenhouse Geisser Corrected).  For each day 
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(day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) the effect of time was explored with paired 
samples t-tests.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 4*p < .05).  State anxiety at the end of day 1 (M = 31.20, SD = 
8.51) was significantly reduced relative to at the start of day 1 (M = 33.71, SD = 
10.10), t(166) = 4.35, p < .001).  State anxiety at the end of day 30 (M = 32.50, 
SD = 10.67) was marginally significantly reduced relative to at the start of day 30 
(M = 33.30, SD = 10.80), t(164) = 2.51, p = .052).  The change in state anxiety 
from the start to end of session was not significant for any other experimental 
day (ts < 1.47, ps > .57).  For each time (start of session, end of session) the 
effect of day was explored using paired samples t-tests.  Results were Bonferroni 
corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 6*p < .05).  State anxiety at 
the start of day 2 (M = 31.81, SD = 9.69) was significantly reduced relative to at 
the start of day 1 (M = 33.71, SD = 10.10), t(166) = 3.21, p = .012).  State anxiety 
at the start of day 3 (M = 31.43, SD = 9.80) was significantly reduced relative to 
at the start of day 30 (M = 33.71, SD = 10.10), t(164) = 3.64, p < .001).  Change 
in start of session state anxiety was not significant across further experimental 
days (ts < 2.54, ps > .072).  For end of session state anxiety, there was no 
significant change across days (ts < 2.44, ps > .10).   
 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.74, ps > 






5.3.3 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a 
Covariate 
 
5.3.3.1  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and pre-existing trait 
anxiety as a covariate.  There was a significant assessment x tES interaction, 
F(3.84,293.98) = 3.07, p = .018, (ηp2 = .04; observed power = .79; Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected).  Post hoc investigation of this interaction effect is reported 
in section 5.3.1.1. 
 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 4.29, ps > 
.26). 
 
5.3.3.2  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was 
conducted with between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-
training ABM) and tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects 
factor of assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and a covariate 
of pre-existing trait anxiety.  The main effect of pre-existing trait anxiety was 
significant, F(1,155) = 96.54, p < .001, (ηp2 = .38; observed power = 1.00).  Pre-
existing trait anxiety was significantly, strongly and positively correlated with 





Figure 5.5. The relationship between scores on the state anxiety scale of the STAI (Spielberger et 
al., 1983) across study 1 and the trait anxiety scale of the STAI at baseline. 
 
There were no further significant main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.81, 
ps > .10).   
 
5.3.3.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 2 x 4 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 
between subjects factors of ABM (Active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and 2 within subjects factors of time 
(start of session, end of session) and day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and pre-
existing trait anxiety as a covariate.  There was a significant main effect of pre-
existing trait anxiety, F(1,155) = 104.03, p < .001, (ηp2 = .40; observed power = 
1.00).  Pre-existing trait anxiety was significantly, strongly and positively 
correlated with state anxiety, r(166) = .63, p < .001.   
 






























There were no further significant main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.39, 
ps > .22).   
 
5.3.4 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attentional 
Control as a Covariate 
 
5.3.4.1 Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with 
between subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects factor of 
assessment (assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and pre-existing 
attentional control as a covariate.  The assessment x tES interaction from the 
main analysis remained significant, F(1.92,3.84) = 3.06, p = .019, (ηp2 = .04; 
observed power = .79; Greenhouse Geisser corrected) (see section 5.3.1.1 for 
post hoc analysis of this interaction effect).  No further main or interaction 
effects were significant (Fs < .95, ps > .46). 
 
5.3.4.2 State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 3 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on state anxiety data with between 
subjects factors of ABM (active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and tES 
(active tRNS, anodal tDCS and sham tES), a within subjects factor of assessment 
(assessment 1, assessment 2, assessment 3) and a covariate of pre-existing 
attentional control.  The main effect of pre-existing attentional control was 
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significant, F(1,155) = 17.24, p < .001, (ηp2 = .10; observed power = .99).  There 
was a significant, moderate, negative correlation between pre-existing 
attentional control and state anxiety, r(166) = -.32, p < .001.  This relationship is 
shown in figure 5.6 and suggests that higher pre-existing attentional control was 
associated with lower state anxiety. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The relationship between scores on the attention control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) at baseline and mean scores on the state anxiety scale (Spielberger et al., 1983) across 
study 1. 
 
There were no further significant main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.78, 
ps > .11).   
 
5.3.4.3 State Anxiety at Start and End of each Experimental 
Session (Pre-existing Attentional Control as Covariate) 
 
A 3 x 3 x 2 x 4 mixed ANCOVA was conducted on the state anxiety data with the 
between subjects factors of ABM (Active ABM, control ABM, no-training ABM) and 
tES (active tRNS, anodal tDCS, sham tES) and 2 within subjects factors of time 






























(start of session, end of session) and day (day 1, day 2, day 3, day 30) and pre-
existing attentional control as a covariate.  The main effect of pre-existing 
attentional control was significant, F(1,155) = 17.16, p < .001, (ηp2 = .10; 
observed power = .99).  There was a significant, moderate, negative correlation 
between pre-existing attentional control and state anxiety, r(166) = -.32, p < 
.001.  There were no further significant main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 
1.43, ps > .22).   
 
5.3.5  tRNS Tolerability 
 
The tES intensity scale was based on that used by Meinzer et al. (2014).  As per 
the Meinzer et al. (2014) study, differences in tES intensity scale ratings 
between experimental groups was examined.  For this analysis each ABM/tES 
pairing was treated as an experimental group resulting in 8 group (active 
ABM/active tRNS, active ABM/anodal tDCS, active ABM/sham tES, control 
ABM/active tRNS, control ABM/anodal tDCS, control ABM/sham tES, no-training 
ABM/active tRNS, no-training ABM/sham tES).  For each item of the tES intensity 
scale, a one-way ANOVA with the between participants factor of group (active 
ABM/active tRNS, active ABM/anodal tDCS, active ABM/sham tES, control 
ABM/active tRNS, control ABM/anodal tDCS, control ABM/sham tES, no-training 
ABM/active tRNS, no-training ABM/sham tES) was conducted.  There was a 
significant effect of group on ratings of ‘tickling’ F(7,155) = 6.38, p < .001.  
Paired samples t-tests examined differences between experimental groups in 
terms of tickling intensity.  As there were 8 groups, 28 paired comparisons were 
conducted.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 28*p < .05).   Participants who received active ABM with anodal 
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tDCS reported significantly higher levels of tickling (M = 2.10, SD = .97) than 
participants who received active ABM with active tRNS (M = 1.19, SD = .40), 
t(25.12) = 3.89, p = .029.  There were higher levels of tickling reported by 
participants who received control ABM with anodal tDCS (M = 2.47, SD = 1.12) 
than participants who received active ABM with active tRNS (M = 1.19, SD = .40), 
t(22.15) = 4.71, p < .001.  Participants who received control ABM with anodal 
tDCS reported a higher level of tickling (M = 2.47, SD = 1.12) than those who 
received active ABM with sham tES (M = 1.43, SD = .60), t(26.81) = 3.62, p = 
.029.  A higher level of tickling was reported by control ABM with anodal tDCS 
participants (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30) than no-training with active tRNS participants 
(M = 1.43, SD = .60), t(26.81) = 3.62, p = .029.  The control ABM with anodal 
tDCS group reported higher levels of tickling (M = 2.47, SD = 1.12) than the no-
training with sham tES group (M = 1.00, SD = .00), t(28.05) = 4.05, p <.001. 
The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference in ‘itching’ ratings 
between groups, F(7,155) = 10.03, p < .001.  Paired samples t-tests examined 
differences between experimental groups in terms of itching intensity.  Results 
were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 28*p < .05).   
Itching was reported as being higher by participants who received active ABM 
with anodal tDCS (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14) compared to participants who received 
active ABM with active tRNS (M = 1.29, SD = .64), t(29.74) = 4.70, p < .001).  
Participants who received control ABM with anodal tDCS (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30) 
reported higher levels of itching than participants who received active ABM with 
active tRNS (M = 1.29, SD = .64), t(25.73) = 4.08, p < .001.  Higher levels of 
itching were reported by active ABM with anodal tDCS participants (M = 2.65, SD 
= 1.14) than active ABM with sham tES participants (M = 1.29, SD = .56), t(27.42) 
= 4.84, p < .001.  Control ABM with anodal tDCS participants reported a higher 
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level of itching (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30) than active ABM with sham tES participants 
(M = 1.29, SD = .56), t(23.96) = 4.18, p < .001. 
 
There was a marginally significant difference in reported level of itching 
between the active ABM with anodal tDCS groups (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14) and the 
control ABM with active tRNS groups (M = 1.63, SD = .68), t(37) = 3.37, p = .058.  
Higher levels of itching were reported by active ABM with anodal tDCS 
participants (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14) than control ABM with sham tES participants 
(M = 1.38, SD = .74), t(32.42) = 4.21, p < .001.  The control ABM with anodal 
tDCS group reported a higher level of itching (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30) than the 
control ABM with sham tES group (M = 1.38, SD = .74), t(27.94) = 3.69, p = .029.  
Itching was significantly higher for participants who received active ABM with 
anodal tDCS (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14) than for those who received no-training with 
active tRNS (M = 1.43, SD = .60), t(28.45) = 4.28, p < .001.  The control ABM with 
anodal tDCS group reported higher levels of itching (M = 2.63, SD = 1.30) than 
the no-training ABM with active tRNS group (M = 1.43, SD = .60), t(28.45) = 4.28, 
p < .001.  Active ABM with anodal tDCS participants reported higher levels of 
itching (M = 2.65, SD = 1.14) than no-training with sham tES participants (M = 
1.33, SD = .73), t(32.15) = 4.39, p < .001.  There were higher reported higher 
levels of itching for control ABM with anodal tDCS participants (M = 2.63, SD = 
1.30) than no-training with sham tES participants (M = 1.33, SD = .73), t(27.71) = 
3.84, p < .001. 
 
There was also a significant difference in ratings of ‘burning’ between 
experimental groups, F(7,155) = 13.38, p < .001.  Paired samples t-tests 
examined differences between experimental groups in terms of burning 
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intensity.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 28*p < .05).   Participants who received active ABM with anodal 
tDCS reported significantly higher levels of burning (M = 2.40, SD = .99) than 
participants who received active ABM with active tRNS (M = 1.00, SD = .00), 
t(19.00) = 6.29, p < .001.  The active ABM with anodal tDCS group reported 
significantly higher levels of burning (M = 2.40, SD = .99) than the active ABM 
with sham tES group (M = 1.05, SD = .22), t(20.74) = 4.84, p < .001.  Higher 
levels of burning were reported by active ABM with anodal tDCS participants (M 
= 2.40, SD = .99) than by control ABM with active tRNS participants (M = 1.00, SD 
= .00), t(19) = 6.29, p < .001.  The active ABM with anodal tDCS group (M = 2.40, 
SD = .99) experienced a greater degree of burning than the control ABM with 
sham tES group (M = 1.29, SD = .56), t(29.66) = 4.39, p < .001.  Burning was 
significantly higher for the active ABM with anodal tDCS group (M = 2.40, SD = 
.99) than for the no-training with active tRNS group (M = 1.24, SD = .44), 
t(25.78) = 4.80, p < .001.  There was a higher reported level of burning for 
active ABM with anodal tDCS participants (M = 2.40, SD = .99) than for no-
training with sham tES participants (M = 1.00, SD = .00), t(19) = 6.29, p < .001. 
 
Groups also differed significantly in terms of ‘skin-irritation’ ratings, F(7,155) = 
5.49, p < .001.  Paired samples t-tests revealed no significant differences in skin 
irritation ratings between experimental groups (ts < 2.89. ps > .26). 
There were no further significant differences between experimental groups in 




5.3.6  Experimental Condition 
 
The percentage of participants who guessed their ABM group correctly was 
53.9%.  Chi square test of difference established that this was not significantly 
different from chance level (X2 = .50, p = .48.) .  From the active ABM group, 
30.2% of participants reported their ABM group correctly.  This was significantly 
lower than chance, X2(1) = 5.1, p =.02. From the control ABM group, 85% of 
participants correctly reported their ABM group.  This was significantly above 
chance level, X2(1) = 16.61, p < .0.001. A total of 45.2% of participants in the no-
training ABM group reported their ABM group accurately.  This did not differ 
significantly from chance X2(1) = .19, p < .0.66. 
 
60% of participants correctly guessed whether they had received active or sham 
tES.  The difference from chance level of this proportion approached 
significance, X2(1) = 3.32, p <.07. Of those who received active tRNS, 56.5% 
correctly guessed their tES group. A Chi square test of difference established 
that this was not significantly different from chance level (X2 = .52, p = .47).  A 
total of 52.4% of participants who received sham tES correctly reported their tES 
group.  This was not significantly different from chance (X2 = .07, p = .79).   
Finally, 77.5% of participants who received anodal tDCS correctly reported their 
tES group.  This was significantly above chance level, X2(1) = 6.46, p =.01. 
 
The percentage of participants who guessed both their ABM and tES group 
correctly was 33.3%.  This proportion was significantly lower than chance X2(1) = 






The present analysis included data from experiments 1, 2 and 3 of study 1.  
These experiments assessed the impact of three forms of ABM training (active 
ABM towards neutral faces, control ABM and no-training ABM) with concurrent 
tES on attention bias and anxiety.  Active ABM and control ABM were delivered 
concurrently with active tRNS, anodal tDCS or sham tES.  No-training ABM was 
delivered with either active tRNS or sham tES.  The analysis provided no 
evidence that active ABM confers any advantages in terms of threat bias and 
anxiety reductions over control and no-training ABM.  Threat bias was reduced 
for participants in the sham tES group but not for participants in either active 
tES group.  State anxiety was reduced for all participants but this was not 
maintained at 30-day follow up.  There was greater threat bias reduction for 
participants with larger pre-existing threat bias and greater reduction in neutral 
bias for participants with larger pre-existing neutral bias following training but 
anxiety was reduced irrespective of pre-existing bias. 
 
5.4.1  Threat Bias Reduction for Sham tES Group 
 
There was a reduction in threat bias for participants who had received sham tES 
but not for those who had received active tRNS or anodal tDCS.  This was an 
unexpected finding which is in contrast with studies which have found tES to 
enhance the impact of ABM training (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  
It is also in opposition to the many studies which have reported the 
enhancement of cognitive training with active tES (e.g. Ditye et al., 2012; 
Fertonani et al., 2011; Snowball et al., 2013; see Cohen Kadosh, 2013 for 
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review).  Previous chapters have discussed the need to consider existing neural 
activation state when applying tES (Horvath et al., 2015b).  It has been proposed 
that the neural systems associated with cognition favour one state (inhibitory or 
excitatory) at one time (Silvanto, Muggleton & Walsh, 2008). In order to 
maintain stable function when neural circuits are subject to excess inhibition or 
excitation, homeostatic plasticity mechanisms are activated which may involve 
local synaptic and post-synaptic adaptations (Turrigiano, 2012).  These 
mechanisms might involve, for example, synaptic scaling in which calcium-
dependent sensors allow neurons to distinguish changes in the rate at which they 
are firing and increase or decrease the number of synapses available at relevant 
locations (Turrigiano, 2012).  In support of this notion, studies have shown that 
when anodal tDCS is applied prior to ‘facilitatory’ 5-Hz repetitive TMS, 
corticospinal excitability is reduced relative to baseline and that priming of a 
neural system with cathodal tDCS results in increased cortico-spinal facilitation 
following 5-Hz repetitive TMS (Lang et al., 2004; Silvanto et al., 2008).  It is 
possible that in the present study, when added to the neural activation 
concomitant with attentional training (active, control and no-training ABM), 
excitatory tES triggered homeostatic neural mechanisms resulting in abolition of 
the facilitatory effects of the training alone.  However, with sham tES, neural 
activity enhancement generated by attentional training was not hampered and 
threat bias reduction was facilitated.  A recent meta-analysis of the impact of 
single-session tDCS on cognitive training reported that tDCS had no significant 
effect proposing that null results might be due to state-dependent effects 
(Horvath et al., 2015).  It was suggested that in future these effects could be 
controlled for (Horvath et al., 2015).  More research related to state-
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dependency is needed before state dependent effects can be identified, 
quantified and incorporated into analyses.   
 
5.4.2  Pre-existing Attention Bias 
 
There is another, arguably more likely explanation for threat bias reductions 
which were exclusive to participants who received sham and not active tES.  It 
was evident from findings in the present study that greater threat bias at 
baseline was associated with greater reduction in threat bias and that greater 
neutral bias at baseline was related to larger decline in neutral bias.  This 
occurred irrespective of ABM or tES group. Where ABM and tES group were not 
influential in attention bias change, pre-existing attention bias was.  Across the 
study more participants who received sham tES had a pre-existing threat bias 
than had a neutral bias and more participants who received active tES had pre-
existing neutral bias than had threat bias.  In the active tES groups therefore, 
any reductions in threat bias achieved for participants with pre-existing threat 
bias may have been ‘cancelled out’ by increases in threat bias for participants 
with pre-existing neutral bias who made up a larger proportion of this group.  As 
previously discussed, this highlights the importance of considering baseline 
attention bias when interpreting change in attention bias following training.  It 
suggests that where attention bias manipulation is the principal focus of an 
investigation, screening for a particular ‘direction’ of bias might be advisable.  
Differences in pre-existing attention bias between experimental groups may play 
a large part in explaining variability amongst previous ABM studies.  When pre-
existing bias was included as a covariate in the analysis, the interaction between 
tES group and change in attention bias across assessments disappeared.  The 
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interaction remained significant when pre-existing trait anxiety and pre-existing 
attentional control were included as covariates.  This further supports the role 
of pre-existing attention bias in determining ABM-related attention bias 
modulation. 
 
5.4.3  Mechanism of Attention Bias and State Anxiety Change 
 
As discussed, the above findings indicate that a mechanism common to all forms 
of ABM training is responsible for neutral bias reduction in participants with pre-
existing neutral bias and threat bias reduction for participants with a pre-
existing threat bias.  This could be an enhancement of attentional control 
capacity.  Attentional bias towards neutral stimuli has also been termed 
attentional avoidance (Koster et al., 2006) a behaviour which has been observed 
in high trait anxious individuals (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2006).  
Given that some attentional engagement to threat is considered adaptive and 
necessary to ensure an individual’s safety and survival (Koster et al., 2006), 
attentional avoidance of threat might indicate a maladaptive lack of vigilance.  
If, as previously argued, ABM training and control ABM training augment 
attentional control capacity then the likely outcome might be a more ‘healthy’ 
pattern of attention distribution.  In the case of attentional avoidance 
therefore, this might be an increase in attentional engagement to threat.  In the 
case of biased attention towards threat, this might be enhanced engagement to 
neutral stimuli.  Derryberry & Reed (2002) suggested that effective coping 
requires shifting attention between sources of threat and safety. This might be 
disengaging from threat or disengaging from safety (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  
This line of reasoning contradicts the notion that a reduction in threat 
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engagement is necessary for anxiety reduction to occur.  It suggests instead that 
if a more adaptive attentional strategy can be adopted, anxiety reduction will 
ensue. 
 
5.4.3.1  Exposure 
 
Habituation to stimuli might also explain the pattern of attention change 
observed for participants with threat and neutral bias (Carleton et al., 2015).  
Familiarity with repeatedly presented threatening faces might render the 
participant less likely to preferentially engage or avoid them.  This might also 
result in a reduced stress response towards emotionally salient stimuli as 
reflected in reduced anxiety.   
 
5.4.3.2  Exposure and Attentional Control Enhancement 
 
Alternatively, a combination of exposure and attentional control enhancement 
may explain the ‘balancing out’ of attentional bias across participants and the 
accompanying reductions in state anxiety.  Macleod & Grafton (2016) recently 
endorsed making a clear distinction between procedure and process when 
determining and interpreting the effectiveness of ABM.  In their review, the 
term ‘procedure’ refers to the methodology employed with the intention of 
modifying attention bias and ‘process’ the action of achieving attention bias 
modification.  This is applicable in the present discussion.  The ABM dot-probe 
paradigm involves the repeated presentation of stimuli.  Repeated exposure may 
therefore be the procedure via which threatening stimuli become less salient 
and anxiety inducing.    This may occur via a process of habituation as stimuli 
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which have been experienced before no longer present (or need to be treated 
as) a threat.  At this point, attentional control processes may be activated and 
attention deployed towards or away from stimuli which were previously 
preferentially selected or avoided. 
 
5.4.3.3  Attentional Control at Baseline 
 
In a study by Basanovic et al. (2017), greater capacity for attentional inhibition 
and attentional selectivity (2 facets of attentional control) at baseline predicted 
the magnitude of attention bias change in the trained direction (towards neutral 
or towards threatening stimuli).  In order to further investigate whether 
attentional control level modulates the success of ABM training, pre-existing 
high attentional control was included as a covariate in each study 1 analysis.  
Across these analyses pre-existing attentional control did not predict change in 
attention bias or state anxiety following attentional training.  Study 1 therefore 
does not provide conclusive support for baseline attentional control level as a 
mediator of ABM effects.  However, the findings do not preclude the possibility 
that training-induced enhancement of attentional control capacity is implicated 
in state anxiety reduction across the three experiments of study 1.  In order to 
further explore this possibility, future ABM research should incorporate a 
measure (or measures) of attentional control before and after ABM training. 
 
5.4.4  TES Intensity 
 
The physical experience of receiving each form of TES was assessed.  There was 
a greater degree of discomfort for anodal tDCS than for active tRNS and sham 
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tES.  This confirmed previous reports of a higher cutaneous perception threshold 
for tRNS than for tDCS (Ambrus et al., 2010).  There was more tickling, itching 
and burning for anodal tDCS than active tRNS and sham tES.  This will 
undoubtedly have contributed to the finding that the number of people who 
guessed their tES group correctly in the anodal tDCS group was above chance.  In 
the present study there was no evidence of the enhancement of ABM with tES 
but there was some indication of anxiety attenuation with active tRNS.  Given 
the relative undetectability of tRNS and a potential anxiolytic effect, there is 
scope for examining the efficacy of high frequency tRNS as a treatment for 
anxiety in future.  Although there is no evidence that the negative sensations 
reported for participants who received anodal tDCS in the present study induced 
negative affect, a factor for consideration is the impact that the discomfort 
related to anodal tDCS may have in future research involving its use.  This 
problem might be mitigated by carefully evaluating tDCS montage prior to its 
use.  Studies which have modelled tDCS in the brain have reported that shorter 
distance between the anode and the cathode (e.g. anode at F3 and cathode at 
the contralateral supraorbital) is associated with greater risk of current being 
shunted across the scalp (Bai et al., 2014).  Greater distance between electrodes 
(i.e. with the ‘return’ electrode in an extracephalic position; e.g. Clarke et al., 
2014) results in a larger amount of current entering the brain as the degree of 
shunting is reduced (Bai et al., 2014).  In experiment 3 there was a short 
distance between electrodes during the application of anodal tDCS.  A larger 
degree of shunting of electrical current across the scalp may have been 
responsible for the discomfort experienced by participants who received anodal 
tDCS and prevented more current from entering the brain.  As previously 
postulated (Bestmann et al., 2014), prior to commencing a tES study, computer 
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modelling of any tES montage and parameters being considered is advisable.  
This would provide an indication of the effects of an intended tES application in 
terms of electrical field distribution and intensity across the brain.  It would also 
allow the mapping of electrical field predictions on to behavioural outcomes 
(Bikson, 2010). 
 
5.4.5  Limitations 
 
A key weakness of study 1 was that, despite investigating the role of attentional 
control in state anxiety reduction, a measure of attentional control was not 
included.  In experiment 2 it was predicted that an adaptation of the traditional 
dot-probe ABM training with reduced cognitive load would not lead to anxiety 
reduction.  Based on previous studies which have shown that improvement in 
tasks which enhance cognitive control is related to the augmentation of 
attentional control and the attenuation of negative effect (e.g. Sari et al., 2015; 
Swainston et al., 2018) the assumption was that low cognitive load training 
would fail to elicit attentional control improvements and as such, there would 
be no effect of the training on anxiety.  However, in previous studies, the 
relationship between training-induced cognitive control enhancement and 
increase in attentional control capacity was substantiated via the inclusion of 
measures of attentional control.  A study by Sari et al. (2015) demonstrated that 
improvements in working memory capacity following adaptive working memory 
training using the dual n-back task, in highly trait anxious participants, was 
associated with enhanced attentional control.  This was indicated via transfer 
effects on an EEG index of attentional control and on the Flanker task (Sari et 
al., 2015).  Previously, Owens et al. (2013) had shown that, following training 
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with the same task used by Sari et al. (2015), dysphoric individuals had 
improvements in working memory performance and increased attentional 
inhibition as indicated by the contralateral delay activity (CDA) an ERP 
associated with attentional filtering (Owens et al., 2013).  Because study 1 failed 
to test for transfer effects by including an attentional control measure, any 
assertions made regarding the impact of attentional control modulation on 
anxiety based on study 1 results are unsubstantial.   
  
The putative role of attentional control modulation in anxiety reduction was 
discussed and investigated in light of findings from experiment 1.  Prior to 
experiment 1 attentional control as a modulator or mediator of ABM effects had 
not been considered and therefore a measure of attentional control was not 
included in the study 1 design from the outset.  As experiments 2 and 3 were 
designed as extensions to experiment 1, it was deemed important to have 
consistency across experiments in terms of experimental procedure.  To have 
altered the design may have compromised the opportunity to compare data and 
findings across the 3 experiments.  Adding an extra attentional control measure 
may have introduced confounding variables to the study.  For example, there 
may have been changes in self-report measure outcomes attributable to 
differences in session duration.  It is for this reason that a measure of 
attentional control was not introduced part-way through study 1.  Instead, 
experiment 2 attempted to explore the causal role of attentional control 
modulation in anxiety attenuation by manipulating task-induced attentional 
control modulation.  Going forward, research wishing to investigate the same 






The hypotheses from study 1 were not met and some unexpected findings 
emerged.  Active ABM did not induce superior reductions in threat bias and 
anxiety than control ABM or no-training ABM.  The question of whether tES 
modulates the effects of active ABM training was therefore inapplicable.  
Anxiety reduction across participants following attention training was a 
consistent finding in study 1.  The attenuation of anxiety was not accompanied 
by reductions in threat bias raising doubt over the theory that a decline in threat 
engagement is responsible for anxiety attenuation in ABM paradigms.  
Alternatively, it is possible that threat bias reduction is implicated in anxiety 
reduction but that the emotional dot-probe task used to assess attention bias 
failed to capture attention bias change accurately (Kappenman et al., 2014; 
Schmukle et al., 2005). 
 
Across study 1, threat bias was reduced following training for participants who 
began their experiment with greater threat bias and neutral bias was reduced 
for participants with a greater neutral bias at baseline.  Study 1 did not pre-
select participants for attention bias towards threat and, in parts of study 1, the 
number of participants with pre-existing neutral bias outweighed the number of 
participants with pre-existing threat bias.  The study was therefore unlikely to 
reveal a reduction in threat bias across all participants.  This repeated outcome 
suggests that attention bias assessment is in fact measuring attention bias with 
some accuracy as it has captured a ‘phenomenon’.  If the emotional dot-probe 
was unreliable (Kappenman et al., 2014) then such a consistent pattern would be 
unlikely to emerge.  Nonetheless, there is scope for future studies to test other 
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measures of attentional response towards threatening and non-threatening 
stimuli which may be more accurate than reaction time data.  The question 
which remains unanswered is whether state anxiety reductions occurred 
independently of threat bias reductions for participants with pre-existing threat 
bias and neutral bias reductions for participants with pre-existing neutral bias or 
whether state anxiety reduction and attention bias reduction were driven by a 
common mechanism.  Whether attentional control enhancement or habituation 
to the ABM stimuli or, more likely, an integration of the two might account for 
attention bias adjustments and reductions in state anxiety, has been discussed.  
This is a worthy avenue for future investigation.  Studies might employ 
additional measures of attentional control to assess the extent to which 
attentional control change is coupled with anxiety modulation.  Also, as 
previously suggested, future versions of the ABM task could omit threatening 
stimuli or face stimuli altogether to assess the extent to which exposure to these 
is linked to anxiety attenuation. 
 
It was revealed that tRNS might elicit or promote anxiolytic effects as in 
experiment 2 state anxiety was reduced for the active tRNS group but not for 
the sham tRNS group.  It is unclear whether this effect is attributable directly to 
tRNS stimulation or whether tRNS achieved this benefit by modulating the 
effects of the training it was delivered with.  This warrants investigation in 
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ABM studies have reported superior threat bias reduction for participants who 
received attend-neutral ABM relative to those who received control or attend-
threat ABM (Hakamata et al., 2010).  Research which has used tES to enhance 
the effects of ABM training has reported that this effect is enhanced with anodal 
tDCS relative to sham tDCS (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  Study 1 
failed to replicate these findings.  It did not reveal greater threat bias reduction 
for active ABM with active tES than for active ABM with sham tES.  In fact, there 
was no evidence of threat bias reduction following ABM training for participants 
irrespective of condition.  Macleod and Grafton (2016) argued that evidence of 
the successful modulation of attention bias using active ABM is so pervasive (e.g. 
Hazen et al., 2009; Najmi & Amir, 2010; See, Macleod & Bridle, 2009) that 
failure to find this effect might be due to inefficacy of the procedure used to 
assess attention bias.  A study by Schmukle (2005) found the modified dot-probe 
task to be an unreliable measure of attention allocation.  Others have suggested 
that it is the reaction time data which it produces which represent a poor 
psychometric measure of attention bias as there is typically enough time during 
facial cue presentation for gaze to be averted from threatening stimuli before 
the appearance of the target (Kappenman et al., 2014).  The present study 
aimed to eliminate this potential confound by introducing a measure which more 
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closely reflected the time-course of neural processes associated with attention 
allocation. 
 
6.1.1  Event Related Potentials (ERPs) 
 
ERPs are recordings of electrical brain processes, time and phase-locked to 
specific events (Helfinstein et al., 2008).  They are measured using electrodes on 
the scalp during electroencephalography (EEG), a non-invasive imaging 
technique.  Often observed within the first 500ms after the appearance of a 
stimulus in attention experiments, ERPs are believed to provide specific 
temporal indices of visual spatial attention allocation and stimulus processing 
(Holmes, Kragh Nielsen & Green, 2009).  As outlined in chapter 1, ERP studies 
have supported the presence of selective attention to threat related stimuli 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy & Glickman, 2005; Eldar et al., 2010; Fox, Derakshan & Shoker, 
2008; Moser et al., 2008).  Threat bias is generally inferred from larger 
amplitudes or shorter latencies for ERPs associated with attentional selection 
which are time and phase-locked to the presentation of threatening stimuli, 
relative to those which are time and phase-locked to the presentation of non-
threatening stimuli (e.g. angry-neutral face pairs relative to neutral-neutral 
faces pairs; Bar Haim et al., 2005). 
 
Some ERP studies have produced findings indicative of greater threat bias in high 
anxious compared to low anxious individuals (Bechor et al., 2018). High anxious 
participants presented with individual happy, sad, angry, fearful or neutral faces 
images followed by a target to be identified elicited greater P2 amplitude for 
angry faces than low anxious participants who performed the same task (Bar 
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Haim et al., 2005).  Using an emotional dot-probe task with angry-neutral, 
happy-neutral and neutral-neutral faces pairs, Eldar et al. (2010) reported more 
enhanced C1 to face pairs containing angry faces for anxious participants 
relative to non-anxious participants.  Also, during an emotional dot-probe task, 
anxious youths displayed larger P1 amplitude for threatening stimuli than for 
neutral stimuli whereas non-anxious youths showed the opposite pattern (Bechor 
et al., 2018).  These studies show that high anxious individuals tend to show 
enhanced early and automatic perceptual processing of threatening stimuli, 
thought to be a result of preferential attentional allocation.  However, 
investigations which have used ERPs to clarify the neural signatures of attention 
bias have also demonstrated this tendency in non-anxious cohorts (e.g.  elevated 
C1 for threatening stimuli; Eldar et al., 2010 Pourtois et al., 2014; and enhanced 
P1 for threatening stimuli; Pourtois et al., 2014; Santesso et al., 2008). 
 
 6.1.1.1  The N2pc Component 
 
The N2pc is an ERP component which is typically elicited at posterior electrodes 
between 180 and 300ms after stimulus onset, contralateral to visual stimuli.  It 
is associated with shifts in visual attention to a specific locus of the right or left 
visual hemifield (Eimer, 1996).  An advantage of this feature of the N2pc is that, 
if stimuli are presented laterally, it is possible to make an inference regarding 
attentional selection of a specific visual stimulus based on N2pc calculated from 
EEG data collected at electrodes contralateral to the stimulus.  An example of 
this type of lateralised presentation would be an angry-neutral face pair, 
presented in a horizontal alignment with each face image to the left or right of 
central fixation.  Shorter N2pc latency or an enhanced N2pc amplitude at 
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electrodes contralateral to the angry stimulus than at the neutral stimulus might 
indicate faster, or preferential attentional engagement to threat.  In some of 
the studies cited above with components of interest such as the P1, N1 or P2, 
threat bias was inferred by enhanced ERP components to face pairs containing 
threatening stimuli (e.g. Bechor et al., 2018; Eldar et al., 2010).   
 
Research has shown that the N2pc is elicited earlier (e.g. Holmes et al., 2009) 
and has greater amplitude (e.g. Weymar et al., 2011; Kappenman et al., 2014) 
for threatening relative to happy or neutral faces.  In a recent study, 
participants performed a task in which they identified a threatening or friendly 
face target in an array of neutral faces or a neutral target in an array of 
threatening or friendly faces.  Participants with high social anxiety had higher 
detection rates for threatening faces and participants with low social anxiety 
had higher detection rates for friendly stimuli.  The high socially anxious group 
had a higher N2pc amplitude for emotional faces but low anxious participants 
elicited no reliable N2pc for stimuli of any valence (Wieser et al., 2018).  In an 
emotional dot-probe task with angry-neutral and happy-neutral face pairs, high 
trait anxious but not low trait anxious participants had an enhanced N2pc 
amplitude for angry faces (Fox, Derakshan & Shoker, 2008).  There was no N2pc 
for happy faces in either trait anxiety group.  Attention bias calculated using 
reaction time data was, however, not reported and therefore it is not possible to 
state whether N2pc outcomes may have supported behavioural outcomes.   Using 
the same paradigm but without categorising participants as high or low trait 
anxious, Holmes et al. (2009) demonstrated faster reaction times for targets 
replacing emotional faces compared to targets replacing neutral faces.  There 
was enhanced negativity contralateral to the angry face during angry-neutral 
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face pairs in the early N2pc time bracket (180-250ms post stimulus).  This 
negativity was sustained into the late N2pc time phase (250-320ms post 
stimulus) and continued until the offset of face pairs at 500ms.  N2pc was 
observed for happy faces in the late N2pc time phase and this also continued 
until stimulus offset.  These results suggest that both angry and happy faces 
received preferential attentional selection which was maintained throughout 
stimulus presentation but that angry stimuli were more rapidly attentionally 
engaged (Holmes et al., 2009).  In a later study (Holmes et al., 2014) 
participants performed an emotional dot-probe task whilst remembering a 
simple (low memory load) or a more difficult, random (high memory load) digit 
sequence.  The authors reported more enhanced N2pc and SPCN amplitudes for 
threatening faces compared to neutral faces during high memory load trials 
relative to low memory load trials.  The reaction time measure of attention bias 
was positively correlated with each ERP measure of attention bias.  These 
results indicated the presence of an attentional bias towards threat which is 
greater when cognitive control is depleted leaving less attentional resources 
available to inhibit the engagement to threatening stimuli.  In a task delivered 
by Eimer and Kiss (2007) a fixation cross was flanked to the left and right by an 
array of face images containing a fearful singleton (a single fearful face amongst 
an array of neutral faces) or a neutral singleton (a single neutral face amongst 
an array of fearful faces).  Participants were instructed to detect and indicate 
an infrequent luminance change to the central fixation cross.  Response time 
was not affected by singleton type or location.  During trials in which there was 
no luminance change, there was enhanced negativity in the early N2pc time 
phase for singleton and non-singleton fearful faces next to fixation.  For trials in 
which there was a luminance change the N2pc was still present for fearful faces 
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but was attenuated suggesting that attentional capture by task-irrelevant fearful 
faces was reduced during target processing (Kiss & Eimer, 2007).  In a further 
study, participants were presented with an array of schematic neutral faces with 
straight (vertical) noses except one face which had a slanted nose (Burra et al., 
2016). The participant was required to indicate the direction of the nose slant.  
In some trials an angry or happy distractor face was included in the array in a 
position contralateral or ipsilateral to the target.  Irrespective of valence, 
reaction times were slowed by the presence of a distractor.  Analysis revealed a 
significant N2pc for angry distractors but not happy distractors (Burra et al., 
2016).  In summary, studies have shown that the N2pc, an electrophysiological 
marker of attentional selection is enhanced for aversive stimuli relative to non-
aversive stimuli.  Furthermore, it is possible that the N2pc component is more 
sensitive to attentional selectivity than reaction times (e.g. Kiss & Eimer, 2007).  
In the present study therefore, measuring N2pc in conjunction with reaction 
time during attention bias assessment may provide a more detailed and sensitive 
illustration of attentional engagement to threatening and neutral stimuli. 
 
6.1.2  Use of ERPs in ABM Studies 
 
The number of studies which have used ERPs to reflect the impact of ABM on 
attention bias is limited.  In a study by O’Toole et al. (2012), participants 
received ABM training towards threatening faces or towards neutral faces (away 
from threatening faces).  ABM training led to the modulation of attention bias in 
the trained direction.  However, these changes were exclusive to participants 
with a pre-existing attention bias towards threat.  Across all participants there 
was a reduction in early ERP (P1 and N170) amplitudes following attend-neutral 
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ABM training but not attend-threat training.  However, there was no evidence 
that this response was elicited specifically for threatening stimuli (O’Toole et 
al., 2012). Sass et al. (2017) delivered ABM training towards positive words 
(away from threat words) or control ABM training to participants who scored high 
on measures of GAD and panic disorder.  Following training, attention was biased 
towards threat in the control ABM group and biased towards positive stimuli for 
participants in the active training (attend-positive) condition as indicated by 
reaction time data.  For participants who received attend-positive ABM training, 
positive bias was significantly enhanced post-training relative to pre-training.   
Contrary to expectation, the P100 was not enhanced for targets replacing 
positive stimuli following attend-positive ABM training.  However, the P100 
amplitude was increased for targets replacing neutral words in threat-neutral 
word pairs following attend-positive but not control training.  The authors 
suggested that the outcome reflected facilitated early attentional processing of 
non-threatening stimuli following active training (Sass et al., 2016).  Other 
research has however, failed to reveal modulation of ERPs associated with early 
attentional processing following ABM training.  Eldar and Bar Haim (2010) 
measured EEG in high and low trait anxious participants during an emotional dot-
probe task with threat-neutral and neutral-neutral face pairs before and after 
ABM training towards neutral faces or control ABM.  Reaction time data revealed 
that, across training trials there was a linear reduction in response time to 
neutral stimuli in high trait anxious participants in the active ABM group but not 
for high trait anxious participants who received control ABM training.  There was 
no change in response time to threatening or neutral faces for low trait anxious 
participants and reaction time to angry stimuli did not change across 
participants.  No differences from pre to post training or between conditions or 
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anxiety categorisations were apparent for early ERPs (P1 and N1).  For anxious 
participants there was a reduced P2 amplitude and an increased N2 amplitude 
for the active training group following active ABM and an enhanced P2 and a 
reduced N2 amplitude following training for the control ABM group.  These 
changes were irrespective of face pair type (angry-neutral, neutral-neutral).  
The authors concluded, based on training-induced modulation of ERPs associated 
with attentional processes occurring after initial attention orienting, that active 
ABM affected top-down mechanisms of attentional control as opposed to early 
attention orienting processes (Eldar & Bar Haim, 2010).  In another study, 
neurotypical participants received ABM training towards threatening stimuli or 
control ABM (Suway et al., 2013).  Reaction time data from attention bias 
assessment with threat-neutral faces pairs revealed that in the attend-threat 
group there was an increase in threat bias following training.  The control group 
showed no change in attentional bias from pre-to post-training.  Training groups 
did not differ in terms of the P1 and N1 components following training but the 
P2 amplitude was greater following training for participants in the train towards 
threat condition.  The authors highlighted that the P2 is a component previously 
associated with attention bias towards threat (Bar-Haim, Lamy, & Glickman, 
2005; Carretie et al., 2001; Eldar et al., 2010).  Furthermore, change in P2 
amplitudes from before to after training correlated positively with change in 
depression vulnerability from pre-to post training with greater increase in P2 
amplitudes associated with greater increase in depression vulnerability.  Osinsky 
et al. (2014) examined N2pc response to angry versus neutral facial expressions 
during attend-neutral or control ABM training.  They revealed no change in the 




There is therefore mixed evidence from ERP studies of ABM training with some 
research outcomes suggesting a modulation of ERPs linked to initial attentional 
allocation following ABM training (Sass et al., 2016), other research suggesting 
that ABM training may have an impact on the neuro-electrophysiological 
correlates of post-selection (attentional control) processes (Eldar et al., 2010; 
Suway et al., 2013) and research revealing no effect of ABM training on ERP 
components (Osinsky et al., 2014).  It could be argued that the status of ERP-
based research on the effects of ABM training reflects that of research which has 
used only behavioural data.  However, the use of ERPs in ABM research is a 
relatively recent exploratory domain and, as with traditional (reaction time 
based) ABM research, there is scope for development and improvement.  
Undoubtedly, ERPs are a useful tool in increasing our understanding of the 
neural processes involved in attentional selection. 
 
6.1.3  Use of ERPs in tES Studies 
 
Few studies have examined the potential modulation of attentional training with 
tES using ERPs.  Tseng et al. (2012) delivered anodal or sham tDCS to the right 
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) prior to a visual short-term memory task.  
Participants were required to indicate whether there was a change to an array 
of coloured rectangles.  For naturally low-performing participants, anodal tDCS 
above the right PPC but not sham tDCS improved change detection.   N2pc 
amplitude was enhanced across participants during change detection relative to 
change non-detection.  For naturally low-performing participants this 
augmentation of amplitude was greater for participants who had received anodal 
tDCS compared to participants who had received sham tDCS.  For high 
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performing individuals, N2pc amplitude was elevated during change detection 
relative to change non-detection but did not differ between tDCS groups (Tseng 
et al., 2012).   The results therefore suggested state-dependent effects with 
low-performing participants who received anodal tDCS experiencing enhanced 
change detection capacity which was reflected in an enhanced N2pc.  For high-
performing participants anodal tDCS did not facilitate change detection, perhaps 
because neural processes involved in change detection were optimised, leaving 
no scope for anodal tDCS-induced enhancement.  In a study by Lafontaine et al. 
(2013) participants received 15 minutes of offline, 1.5mA tDCS with the anode 
above the left DLFPC and the cathode above the right DLPFC (F3 anodal/F4 
cathodal), the anode above the right DLPFC and the cathode above the left 
DLPFC (F4 anodal/F3 cathodal) or as sham tDCS (with a bi-frontal montage).  
Participants subsequently performed an ‘unfamiliar face’ encoding exercise 
during which EEG data were recorded to allow assessment of the N170 and P3 
components.   P3 was measured to assess tDCS-induced changes in DLPFC 
function.   Recognition of faces was tested 3 days after encoding.  TDCS 
delivered with the F4 anodal/F3 cathodal montage was associated with more 
reduced N170 and more enhanced P3 during encoding relative to the other tDCS 
groups.  During recognition testing, the F4 anodal/F3 cathodal condition had 
faster recognition reaction time relative to the other tDCS conditions.   
Previously, N170 amplitude and latency had been seen to vary as a function of 
face novelty/familiarity (Heisz, Watter & Shedden, 2006).  Specifically, there is 
evidence of N170 amplitude reduction across repeated presentations of the same 
unfamiliar face (Caharel et al., 2011).  The authors suggested that F4 anodal/F3 
cathodal tDCS facilitated N170 reduction and P3 enhancement leading to faster 
face recognition (Lafontaine et al., 2013).   
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6.1.4  Rationale for Use of ERPs in Study 2 
 
Reaction time data obtained from the emotional dot-probe task has proven to be 
an unreliable index of attention bias.  However, ERP components have 
demonstrated good internal consistency.  Kappenman et al. (2014) recorded 
both reaction time data and EEG data in order to assess the N2pc component 
during emotional dot-probe based attention bias assessment.  Behavioural data 
did not reveal a threat bias and reaction time data were not internally reliable.  
EEG data did however reveal a significant N2pc for threat relative to neutral 
stimuli and the N2pc was internally reliable.  Neither the reaction time based 
measure of attention bias nor N2pc amplitude or latency correlated with trait 
anxiety however.  Reutter et al. (2017) also compared reaction time measure of 
attention bias with the N2pc component during attention bias assessment in 
participants with high levels of self-report social anxiety.  In replication of the 
Kappenman et al. (2014) results, the N2pc component, but not reaction time 
data indicated an attention bias towards threat reflected in a higher N2pc 
amplitude at electrodes contralateral to threatening stimuli compared to 
electrodes contralateral to neutral stimuli.  Moreover, in contrast to the 
reaction time measure of attention bias, the N2pc measure was shown to be of 
high internal consistency.  The later study also showed that greater threat-
induced N2pc amplitude and earlier peak latency were associated with greater 
social anxiety level (Reutter et al., 2017).   
 
There are difficulties with using ERP measurements in conjunction with 
behavioural measures such as reaction time data.  At times, ERP-based findings 
will conflict slightly with results derived from reaction time data.  For example, 
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in the study by Wieser et al. (2018) participants had higher detection rates for 
threatening but not happy faces.  However, a greater N2pc amplitude was 
elicited for emotional (both threatening and happy) faces.  In light of non-
convergent evidence, it is difficult to produce a confident interpretation of 
findings.   At times, ERPs are elicited in the absence of behavioural effects (e.g. 
Kappenman et al., 2014).  It is, perhaps, easy to assume that because ERPs are 
based on neuro-physiological rather than behavioural measurements that ERPs 
more accurately represent the cognitive events with which they are associated.  
However, assumptions regarding the cognitive processes reflected in ERP 
components are based on repeated observations of a specific ERP component 
during a specific cognitive process measured behaviourally.  For example, P2 is 
an ERP component previously associated with threat bias (Suway et al., 2013).  
This is based on evidence of greater P2 amplitude or shorter P2 latency for 
threatening stimuli relative to non-threatening stimuli (e.g. Bar Haim et al., 
2005).   Woodman (2010) points out that the presentation of different stimuli 
may activate different neurons, for example, perception of a white square 
activates different neurons to the perception of a black square (Woodman, 
2010).  It may also be the case, that a different set of neurons in the visual 
system react to the presentation of threatening stimuli to those which respond 
to neutral stimuli.  Therefore, a greater P2 amplitude for threat relative to non-
threat may be a factor of the location or characteristics (physical, chemical, 
electrical etc.) of neurons activated during threatening stimulus presentation 
relative to those activated during non-threatening stimuli and not of attention 




Behavioural responses in cognitive tasks are usually observed at the end of a 
sequence of ERPs.  Therefore, early ERP effects may not have any discernible 
effect on reaction times.  This might also explain conflicting ERP and reaction 
time based evidence. 
 
Nevertheless, using methodologies such as EEG alongside behavioural tasks to 
illuminate the impact of attentional training can help to improve our 
understanding of neural processes linked to attention (Torrence & Troup, 2017). 
Continued research will assist in the unravelling of associations between 
cognitive and neural attentional mechanisms.  
 
6.1.5  Aims 
 
Study 1 revealed no evidence of threat bias reduction following ABM training 
towards neutral (away from threatening) stimuli.  It has been suggested that 
failure to find this effect might be due to inefficacy of the procedure used to 
assess attention bias (Macleod & Grafton, 2016) which in study 1 was an 
emotional dot-probe paradigm.  However, others have argued that it is the data 
used to calculate attention bias (reaction time data) from this task and not the 
task per se which lacks reliability (Schmukle, 2005).  As an adjunct to the 
analysis of attention bias across assessments, derived from reaction time data, 
N2pc was measured from EEG data collected during attention bias assessment.  
The present study procedure was similar to that of Heeren et al. (2015b).  Active 
ABM was delivered across participants.  Anodal tDCS or sham tDCS was delivered 
concurrently with training.  Heeren et al. (2015b) reported that reduction in 
threat bias following ABM training was not apparent based on analysis of reaction 
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time data and no differences emerged between tDCS conditions.  However, eye-
tracking data did reveal a reduction in threat bias following ABM training with 
anodal tDCS but not following ABM training with sham tDCS.  In line with these 
findings and, based on the results from study 1, it was not expected that 
reaction time data would reveal superior reduction in threat bias for participants 
receiving anodal tDCS concurrently with ABM training than for participants 
receiving sham tDCS with ABM training.  However, it was predicted that EEG 
data might reveal modulation of N2pc from pre-to post-ABM training which 
differed between tDCS groups.  This would be indicative of more reduced 
attentional selection of threatening stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli) for 
participants who received anodal tDCS compared to participants who received 
sham tDCS following ABM training towards neutral faces. 
 
It was posited, following study 1, that reduction in anxiety following training 
(irrespective of ABM group or tES group) might be attributable to an 
enhancement of attentional control mechanisms which allowed participants to 
more effectively regulate the emotional impact of threatening stimuli.  In order 
to examine whether attentional control enhancement was implicated in anxiety 
reduction, the digit span task was administered before and after ABM training as 
a behavioural measure of attentional control.  Previously, the backward digit-
span task was used as a measure of attentional control before and after active 








6.2.1  Design 
 
The present study employed a 2 x 2 mixed methods design with one between 
subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS and sham tDCS).  Attentional bias was 
assessed with reaction time data and using ERP data before and after active ABM 
training towards neutral faces.  The within subjects measure was assessment 
(pre ABM, post ABM).  Trait self-report measures were administered before ABM 
training and a state measure of anxiety was taken before and after ABM training.  
The principal dependent variables were attention bias (measured using reaction 
time data and N2pc) and state anxiety.  Attention bias was measured using 
reaction time data from the assessment bias (emotional dot-probe) task by 
subtracting reaction time for targets replacing threatening faces from reaction 
time for neutral faces.  The N2pc was also measured from EEG data recorded 
during attention bias assessment as an additional indicator of attention bias.  
 
6.2.2  Participants 
 
Participants were 39 students from the University of Roehampton (27 female), 
mean age was 24.77 (SD = 6.30), age range was 19 to 44.  The number of 
participants recruited was based on previous studies which have used ERPs in 
their assessment of tES-induced training effects (e.g. 14 participants per 
condition: Lafontaine et al., 2013).  Sample size was also in line with previous 
studies in which ERP data have been used as a measure of selective attention 




Data from 15 participants were omitted from analysis due to excessive artifact in 
the EEG data.  EEG data from 24 participants (18 female), mean age 23.63 (SD = 
4.98), age range 18 to 35 were subject to analysis.  Twelve of these participants 
received anodal tDCS and twelve received sham tDCS.  All participants were 
right-handed and had normal or corrected to normal vision.   
 
Participants were recruited for the study via posters which included the 
experimenter’s email address and on the university’s online booking system for 
research participation.  Participants who expressed an interest in taking part 
were emailed the tES safety screening form.  Participants were asked to reply 
via email indicating whether they answered ‘yes’ to any of the questions of the 
form and whether they were left or right handed.  Only participants who did not 
answer ‘yes’ to any of the tES screen questions and who indicated that they 
were right handed were invited to participate in the study. 
 
Participants were allocated to 1 of 2 groups:  ABM with anodal tDCS or ABM with 
sham tDCS.  Allocation to tES group was double blinded.  The experimenter 
began stimulation by keying a 5-digit code into the tES machine.  Each code used 
had been programmed by the stimulator manufacturer to trigger anodal tDCS 
stimulation or sham tDCS and stimulation group relating to the code was 
unknown to the experimenter.  Unlike in experiment 1, all participants 
underwent active ABM training towards neutral stimuli.  The primary aim of the 




6.2.3  Ethics 
 
The study was approved by the University of Roehampton ethics committee 
(approval code PSYC 14/ 157; see Appendix 2).  Written informed consent was 
provided by all participants before participation (Appendix 4).  Participants were 
compensated for their participation with course credits.  Participants who did 
not require course credits were paid £20 for participation. 
 
6.2.4  Materials 
 
6.2.4.1  Measures 
 
Participants completed a tES safety screening form and the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Appendix 6).  Participants were invited to participate if 
they met the safety criteria outlined in the safety form and if they were right 
handed.  Participants completed the state scale of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI: Speilberger, 1983; Appendix 7) at the beginning and end of the 
session.  As in study 1 participants also completed the attentional control scale 
(ACS: Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Appendix 8), the trait scale of the STAI and the 
Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969; Appendix 9) at 
the beginning of the session.  The depression inventory employed in study 1, the 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977; 
Appendix 10) was not used in the present study.  This was because a number of 
participants during study 1 had expressed discomfort answering some the more 
sensitive questions in the CES-D or indicated that they did not feel that certain 
questions were an appropriate measure of depression.  Instead the Beck 
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Depression Inventory 2 (BDIii; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) was used to assess 
depression.   
 
Beck Depression Inventory 2 (Appendix 14) 
 
This is a 21-item scale, each item containing 4 statements pertaining to a 
symptom of depression.  For example, for the depression criteria “Sadness” 
participants are asked to select from the responses 0. I do not feel sad, 1. I feel 
sad much of the time, 2. I feel sad all the time or 3. I am so sad or unhappy that 
I can’t stand it.  For each item, a higher rating indicates a higher level of 
depression.  The maximum possible score for the questionnaire is 63.  Internal 
consistency for the questionnaire has been reported as high (α’s = .9; Wang & 
Gorenstein and .84; Kühner et al., 2007) as has test-retest reliability (r’s = .73 to 
.96 Wang & Gorenstein, 2013 and > .75; Kühner et al., 2007.  The BDI-ii has also 
been shown to be highly correlated with STAI (r = .69, p < .001; Storch et al., 
2004).  A total score of 0-13 represents minimal range depression, 14-19 suggests 
mild depression, 20-28 moderate depression and a score between 28 and 63 
denotes severe depression.   
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Appendix 14) 
 
Participants also completed the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer 
et al., 1990), not previously used in study 1.  The PSWQ is a 16-item inventory 
which assesses worry on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 representing ‘Not at all typical 
of me’ and 5 ‘Very typical of me’.  Example statements include items 6 “When I 
am under pressure I worry a lot” and item 12 “I have been a worrier all my life”.  
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Items 1, 3, 8, 10 and 11 are positively worded and therefore reverse scored.  
The PSWQ has demonstrated strong internal consistency (α =.95) and test-retest 
reliability (r = .93, p < .001), (Meyer et al., 1990; Stöber, 1998).  The authors of 
the PSWQ reported that it correlated relatively strongly with the STAI-trait (r = 
.64, p < .001) and moderately with the STAI-state (r = .49, p < .001) and BDI (r = 
.36, p < .001), (Meyer et al., 1990).   
 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Appendix 16) 
 
The Liebowitz social anxiety scale (LSAS; Leibowitz, 1987) was also 
administered.  LSAS assesses individuals on 24 situations likely to elicit social 
anxiety.  For each situation 2 responses are required.  The first asks participants 
to rate on a scale of 0 to 3 how strongly they experience fear or anxiety in the 
anxiety provoking situation e.g. Telephoning in public with 0 representing None 
(no fear/anxiety) and 3 representing Severe.  For the same situation participants 
must then indicate how regularly they avoid performing that action or entering 
that situation on a scale of 0 (Never 0%) to 3 (Usually 67-100%).  Studies 
examining the psychometric properties of the LSAS have yielded alphas of .94 
(Fresco et al., 2001) to .96 (Heimberg et al., 1999) demonstrating strong internal 
consistency.  Test-retest reliability has been reported as .81 (Santos et al., 
2013).  Moderate convergent validity has been reported with correlation with 
the FNE scale of r = .49, p < .003 (Heimberg et al., 1999) and with the BDI of r = 
.43, p < .05 (Fresco et al., 2001). 
 
After ABM training participants completed a tES intensity scale (Appendix 11) in 
which they indicated the intensity with which they experienced physiological 
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sensations such as headache and aching scalp during tDCS application.  They also 
completed the Experimental Condition (Appendix 12) questionnaire which asked 
participants to indicate whether they felt they had received anodal tDCS or 
sham tDCS.  These measures were as described in the study 1 report. 
 
6.2.4.2  Stimuli 
 
The stimuli used were identical to those used in experiment 1. 
 
ABM training and attention bias assessment were based on the same task as 
study 1 except that response targets and response keys were altered as were the 
positioning and size of the face stimuli (the rationale for these changes is 
outlined below). 
 
6.2.4.3  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the 
screen for 500ms followed by two faces of the same identity, one neutral and 
one threatening for 500ms.  The two photographs of the same individual were 
presented simultaneously in their neutral-angry pairs and were aligned 
horizontally.  The N2pc component is an EEG measure of cerebral response to 
visual stimuli contralateral to horizontally positioned posterior electrodes (e.g. 
P7 P8; Holmes, Bradley, Kragh Nielsen & Mogg, 2009; PO7 and PO8: Kiss, Van 
Velzen & Eimer, 2008; PO3 and PO4; Hilimire et al., 2011).  Electrodes on the 
right of the scalp measure response to stimuli in the left visual hemifield and 
electrodes on the left of the scalp measure response to stimuli in the right visual 
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hemifield (Woodman et al., 2009).   It is for this for this reason that stimuli and 
targets were horizontally positioned for the present study and not vertically 
positioned as per study 1.   Each face image subtended a visual angle of 11.42 o 
by 15.94o.   The photographs were trimmed to remove the white background 
which might draw excess attention to the images.   
 
After 500ms the faces were replaced by an arrow pointing upwards (↑) or an 
arrow pointing downwards (↓) appeared in the position previously occupied by 
either the left or right-hand stimulus.  Participants were asked to respond by 
pressing key 1 on a computer keypad for an upward pointing arrow or key 3 for a 
downward pointing arrow using the index and ring fingers of the right hand 
respectively.  Targets remained on screen until response or until 2000ms 
elapsed.  This change in response protocol from study 1 (in which participants 
were required to use the same finger of each hand to press p or q on the 
computer keyboard) was made to avoid response bias i.e. faster key pressing by 
the right (dominant) hand than the left.  Participants were instructed to respond 
to the target arrow as quickly and accurately as possible.   
 
During attention bias assessment, the target replaced the neutral cue in 50% of 
trials.  Attention bias assessment comprised 2 blocks of 96 trials which lasted 









Angry and Neutral Face 500ms 
 
















Figure 6.1. Paradigm used for attention bias assessment and ABM training. During attention bias 
assessment the target replaced the neutral cue in 50% of trials. During ABM training, the probe 
replaced the neutral cue in 95% of trials.   
 
Face identity, target symbol (↑ or ↓) and target location (left or right) were 
randomised.  Each face identity had an equal probability of being presented as 
did each target symbol.  There was an equal chance of a target appearing in the 





6.2.4.4  Attention Bias Modification 
 
In the present study all participants undertook active ABM training.  There was 
no control ABM group. The paradigm used for ABM training was the same as that 
employed during attention bias assessment with the exception that the target 
letter appeared in the position of the neutral probe in 95% of trials.  ABM 
training lasted approximately 30 minutes and consisted of 6 blocks of 96 trials 
with a short break between each block.  
 
6.2.4.5  Digit Span Task 
 
A computerised digit span task was used as a measure of attentional control (see 
figure 6.2). The task was programmed using E-Prime software (Schneider, 
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002).   The task consisted of 6 levels and each level 
comprised 5 trials.  In each trial participants were played a string of numbers 
through headphones and were required to type the numbers in the order in 
which they had been played.  In level 1 participants were presented with strings 
of 3 numbers in each of the 5 trials.  At each level, the length of the number 
string increased by 1 until the number string reached a maximum of 8 digits.  If, 
however, the participant answered more than 3 trials in a level incorrectly, the 
number of digits at the proceeding level was reduced by 1.  For example, if, 
when presented with 7 number digit strings the participant answered 4 out of 
the 5 trials incorrectly, the following level would contain 6 string digit strings 
(see figure 6.2).  For each level, participants were scored according to the 
length of the number string and the number of trials performed correctly (in 
level 1 where 3 number strings were presented, if participants answered all 5 
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trials correctly they would receive 15 points). If the participant reached the 
maximum string length possible without errors therefore they would score 165 
points (3 x 5) + (4 x 5) + (5 x 5) + (6 x 5) + (7 x 5) + (8 x 5). A higher score would 
indicate better attentional control. 
 
Example structure of Digit Span Task  
 
Figure 6.2. Example stimuli from Digit Span task.  TOP: No adjustment in level 4 for 1 incorrect 





6.2.5  TDCS 
 
Participants received either anodal tDCS or sham tDCS.  TDCS was administered 
through a DC-Stimulator Plus (neuroConn©).  Two electrodes with an area of 
5cm x 7cm (35cm2), each placed inside a saline soaked sponge were attached to 
the scalp and held in place using a rubber headband.  The anodal electrode was 
positioned over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (lDLPFC), F3 based on the 
10-20 EEG system (Clarke et al., 2014).  The cathode was placed over right 
supraorbital ridge (above the right eyebrow).  Current was applied at an 
amplitude of 1.5mA.  Stimulation lasted for 20 minutes at the beginning of a 30-
minute ABM training period.  The current was ramped up and down for 20 
seconds at the beginning and end of active stimulation.  In the sham TES group, 
the current was ramped up for 20 seconds and then stopped.   
 
6.2.6  EEG Data Collection   
 
Continuous EEG data were collected using the Biosemi Active Two EEG recording 
system (Biosemi B.V., Amsterdam, the Netherlands).  Scalp EEG was recorded 
from 32 electrodes mounted in an elasticated head-cap according to the 10-20 
system.  The common mode sense (CMS) electrode was positioned at site C1 and 
the driven right leg (DRL) electrode was placed at site C2.  Horizontal and 
vertical electrooculographs (EOGs) were recorded for the detection of eye blinks 
and eye movements using four bipolar electrodes.  Vertical EOG was measured 
using electrodes above and below the left eye and horizontal EOG was recorded 
from electrodes positioned on the outer canthus of each eye.  Two additional 
electrodes were applied (one on each earlobe) for offline referencing.  All 
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electrodes were bandpass filtered online at .01 to 100 Hz.  The data were 
bandpass filtered offline with cut off frequencies of 1-30Hz.  DC offsets at 
critical electrodes (P3, P4, P7, P8, PO3, PO4, O1, O2) were kept within a +/-
10mV range.  EEG and EOG were digitised online at 2048Hz and down-sampled 
following recording to 250Hz to reduce later processing time.   
 
6.2.7  Procedure 
 
Upon attending the laboratory, participants were informed of the experimental 
schedule and then provided with a consent form to read and sign.  All 
participants completed the ACS, FNE, BDIii, PSWQ, LSAS and STAI.  Participants 
were then asked to mount a set of headphones in order to undertake the digit 
span task.  Participants performed the task which lasted approximately 10 
minutes.   
 
Participants were then fitted with the EEG headcap, a process which took 
approximately 20 minutes.   Electrode holders were filled with an electrolyte gel 
(saline based Signa gel) using a syringe.  The electrodes were then mounted into 
the holders.  The skin around the eyes and the earlobes were wiped with an 
abrasive electrolyte gel (Nuprep EEG & ECG Skin Prep Gel) and then cleansed 
using alcohol to improve contact by the electrodes recording eye movement or 
acting as offline reference electrodes.  Participants were instructed to inform 
the experimenter if at any point during the procedure they experienced 
discomfort as a result of the gel or electrodes.  The experimenter then began 
recording EEG data.  With the computer monitor at approximately 50cm from 
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the participant and the keypad within effortless reach, participants commenced 
the attention bias assessment lasting approximately 10 minutes.   
 
Participants then washed and dried their hair to remove any remaining 
electrolyte gel which might impact current flow and intensity during the tDCS 
procedure.   Once the hair was dry, participants were fitted with the tDCS 
montage.  Allocation to tDCS group was randomised and double blind.  A list was 
provided to the experimenter which contained 5-digit codes to generate either 
anodal tDCS or sham tDCS.  These were taken from the NeuroConn DC-Stimulator 
Plus manual.  Twenty codes relating to each stimulation group had been 
selected and randomised within one list by a member of the experimenter’s 
supervisory team.  The first participant to commence the study was allocated 
the first code on the list.   Each time a new participant attended the study they 
were allocated the next code on the list. The experimenter began stimulation by 
keying the 5-digit code into the tES machine.  Participants received anodal tDCS 
or sham tDCS for 20 minutes at the beginning of a 30-minute ABM training period 
comprising 6 blocks of 96 trials of ABM training.   
 
After ABM training, participants washed and dried their hair to remove saline 
solution from the tDCS application.  This took approximately 15 minutes.  They 
were fitted with the EEG headcap and completed a second attention bias 
assessment while EEG recording was taken.  Fitting of the headcap and 
completion of attention bias assessment took around 30 minutes in total.  The 
EEG headcap was removed and participants washed and dried their hair before 
continuing.  Participants once again completed the SAS and filled in the tES 
intensity questionnaire and experimental procedure questionnaire. They then 
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completed the digit span task again.  Finally, participants were allocated their 
credits or paid £20 for taking part and debriefed.  The complete experimental 




































Figure 6.3.  Experimental procedure: Pre-study and outline of study 
Pre-Study Study 
Screening questionnaires 
completed – Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory and tES 
screening form 
Appointments booked with eligible 
participants 
Digit Span task (10 minutes) 
EEG headcap fitted (20 minutes) 
Completion of STAI, FNE, ACS, PSWQ 
and CES-D (15 minutes) 
Pre-training attentional bias 
assessment with EEG recording (10 
minutes) 
Hair washed and dried (15 minutes) 
tDCS montage fitted (10 minutes) 
TDCS/sham tDCS (20 minutes)  
during 
ABM training (30 minutes) 
Hair washed and dried (15 minutes) 
EEG headcap fitted (20 minutes) 
Post ABM training attentional bias 
assessment with EEG recording (10 
minutes) 
Digit Span Task (10 minutes) 
Completion of SAS, tDCS intensity 
questionnaire and Experimental 
condition questionnaire (20 minutes) 
Debrief (5 minutes) 
Total Time: 3hrs 10 minutes 
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6.2.8  Data Preparation 
 
6.2.8.1  Behavioural Data 
 
Data from incorrect trials were removed prior to analysis.  Mean accuracy across 
assessments was 96.29% (SD = 2.42). Prior to analysis, reaction times below 
200ms were also removed.  Outlying reaction times from the modified dot-probe 
task which were more than 2.5 standard deviations from each participant’s mean 
reaction time were excluded as per study 1.  This led to the rejection of a 
further 2.3% of the total number of trials.  Attention bias was calculated by 
subtracting the mean response time to threatening faces from mean response 
time to neutral faces for each participant.  Greater bias towards threatening 
faces compared to neutral faces was therefore represented by a positive score.  
 
6.2.8.2  EEG Data 
 
EEG and EOG were digitised online at 2048Hz and down-sampled following 
recording to 250Hz to reduce later processing time.  A digital low-pass filter of 
30Hz was applied to the data collected and electrodes were referenced to an 
averaged signal from the left and right earlobe (A1 and A2).  Data were 
segmented offline to 600ms epochs relative to a 100ms pre-stimulus (face cue) 
baseline extending to 500ms post- stimulus.  Post-stimulus data were baseline 
corrected relative to the 100ms prior to stimulus presentation.   
 
Data from 15 participants were omitted from analysis due to excessive noise.  
Data from the remaining 24 participants were subject to analysis.  To avoid 
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contamination of data by ocular artifacts, trials containing HEOGs exceeding +/-
30µv were rejected as were trials in which VEOGs, blinks or other artifacts 
exceeding +/-60µv.  This resulted in a mean rejection of 16% of trials across the 
24 participants whose EEG data were subject to analysis.  ERP analysis was 
focused on the N2pc component elicited in response to the presentation of visual 
stimuli.  Visual inspection of grand average waveforms identified the optimal 
source of this component as P7 for the left posterior cerebral hemisphere and P8 
for the right hemisphere (as per Holmes et al., 2014).  Grand average ERPs were 
calculated for combinations of tDCS (anodal vs sham), laterality of face stimuli 
relative to position of electrodes (ipsilateral vs contralateral) and assessment 
(Pre-ABM, Post-ABM).  N2pc onset was identified as the time-point at which the 
lateralised posterior ERPs differed.  This was determined using a ‘neuron-anti-
neuron’ analysis (Fuggetta, Bennett & Duke, 2015; Purcell et al., 2013).  For 
every 4 milliseconds post stimulus onset a t-test was carried out to compare ERP 
amplitude at P7 and P8.  Selection time in the present study was defined as the 
point at which the waveforms were significantly different at a p value of <.001 
followed by 10 consecutive t-tests with an outcome of p < .005.  This 
represented a period of 168ms to 212ms post stimulus onset.  
 
6.2.9  Data Analyses 
 
Data Analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 22.  The main 
analysis assessing the effect of active ABM with anodal tDCS and control ABM 
with anodal tDCS on attention bias and on state anxiety was performed using 
ANOVAs with ABM as the between participants factor and assessment session 
(pre-ABM training, post-ABM training) as the within participants factor.  In order 
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to investigate the role of pre-existing attention bias, trait anxiety and 
attentional control on ABM with tES outcomes the ANOVAs were replicated on 
data from participants with pre-existing threat bias and pre-existing neutral 
bias, data from participants with pre-existing high trait anxiety and participants 
with pre-existing low trait anxiety and on data from participants with pre-
existing high attentional control and pre-existing low attentional control.  
Participants were categorised as high or low in trait anxiety/attentional control 
based on a median split on baseline scores.  ANCOVAs were also conducted with 
ABM as the between participants factor, assessment as the within participants 
factor and pre-existing attention bias, pre-existing trait anxiety and pre-existing 
attentional control as covariates.   
 
A second analysis was conducted on data from a subset of participants whose 
EEG data were suitable for analysis.  Mixed ANOVAs were carried out with ABM 
(active ABM, control ABM) as the between participants factor and assessment 
(pre-ABM training, post ABM training) as the within participants factor.  This 
analysis was conducted on attention bias and state anxiety data.  N2pc was 
calculated from EEG data and subject to the same analysis. 
 
6.2.10  Reporting of Data 
 
Of the 39 participants recruited, EEG data from 15 participants contained 
excessive ocular artefact or contamination and therefore only EEG data from the 
remaining 24 participants were subject to analysis (12 participants received 
anodal tDCS and 12 participants received sham tDCS).  It was believed that the 
excessive artefact arose because of a technical issue (faulty electrodes) rather 
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than anomalous cortical activity.  It was therefore assumed that behavioural and 
self-report data from all 39 participants would still be suitable for analysis.  As it 
was not possible to confirm the source of the excessive artefact, two separate 
analyses were conducted.  For the first part of the results section, analysis of 
behavioural and self-report data from all 39 participants will be reported.  For 
the latter part of the section, behavioural and self-report data from only the 24 
participants whose EEG data were subject to analyses will be reported and this 
will be followed by reporting of the EEG analysis. 
  
6.2.11  Baseline Characteristics 
 
6.2.11.1  Baseline Scores Across Self-Report Measures 
 
Table 6.1 shows for each tDCS group the mean and standard deviation score at 
baseline for each self-report measure. 
 
Table 6.1: 
 Mean (SD) score in each self-report measure per tES group 
 Active ABM/anodal tDCS Active ABM/sham tDCS 
 M SD M SD 
STAI-trait 40.05 11.29 44.85 10.86 
ACS 52.95 8.80 49.45 10.65 
BDI-ii 9.84 7.26 9.60 8.76 
FNE 12.68 8.06 14.85 8.05 
LSAS 43.11 24.58 56.25 24.15 




6.2.11.2  State and Trait Anxiety across Experimental Groups by  
Gender 
 
Table 6.2 shows the mean and standard deviation self-report scores at baseline 
(before ABM training) per gender for each tDCS group. 
 
Table 6.2: 
Baseline mean (standard deviation) self-report scores by gender and across experimental groups 












































































Baseline state anxiety did not differ between tDCS groups (ts < .40, ps > .69).  
One sample t-tests revealed that mean baseline state anxiety score for females 
who received anodal tDCS (M = 33.20, SD = 9.09) did not differ significantly from 
mean normative score reported by Spielberger et al. (1983) for female 
undergraduate students (M = 38.76, SD = 11.95), (t = 1.93, p = .09).  However, 
mean baseline state anxiety score for females who received sham tDCS (M = 
30.65, SD = 6.25) was significantly lower than the normative mean, t(16) = 5.35, 
p < .001. Males who received anodal tDCS had significantly lower state anxiety at 
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baseline (M = 30.11, SD = 5.99), than the normative mean state anxiety score for 
males reported by Speilberger et al. (1983; M = 36.47, SD = 10.02), t(8) = 3.19, p 
= .013.  For males who received sham tDCS, baseline state anxiety did not differ 




There was no significant difference in baseline trait anxiety between the anodal 
tDCS group and the sham tDCS group (ts < 1.35, ps > .18).  One sample t-tests 
revealed that mean baseline trait anxiety for females who received anodal tDCS 
(M = 43.40, SD = 12.60) and females who received sham tDCS (M = 45.71, SD = 
11.38) did not differ significantly from the normative mean for female 
undergraduate students reported by Spielberger et al. (1983; M = 40.40, SD = 
10.15), (ts < 1.92, ps > .07).  Baseline trait anxiety for males who received 
anodal tDCS (M = 36.33, SD = 8.87) and for males who received sham tDCS (M = 
46.50, SD = 28.99) did not differ significantly from the normative mean (M = 
40.00, SD = 6.56), (ts < .67, ps > .15). 
 
6.2.11.3  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (Pre-ABM, 
Post ABM) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment Correlation analysis.  The 
correlation was significant, r(39) = .70, p < .001 suggesting strong test-retest 





6.2.11.4  Correlation Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
  
In previous literature, the correlations reported between state and trait anxiety 
have been significant and moderately strong (.65 for males and .59 for females 
for college students; Speilberger et al., 1983).  In the present study there was a 
moderate correlation between trait anxiety and state anxiety before ABM, r(39) 
= .32, p = .046 and a slightly stronger but moderate correlation between trait 
anxiety and state anxiety after ABM, r(39) = .41, p = .01 (see table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3: 
Bivariate correlations between baseline trait anxiety scale and state anxiety scale (SAS) scores pre-ABM training 









6.3.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Participants 
 
The following analyses of behavioural and self-report data is from all 39 
participants.  Although data from 15 participants were omitted from EEG 
analysis, this was due to contamination which was isolated to EEG data.  Based 
on accuracy levels (see above) and reactions times across all 39 participants 
there is no suggestion that the contamination was indicative of (or affected) 
performance in the attention bias assessment task.  Therefore, conclusions 
  SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 
Baseline Trait Anxiety  .322* .406* 
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regarding behavioural outcomes of the procedure employed in study 2 (attend-
neutral ABM with anodal or sham tDCS) will be based on analysis of data from all 
39 participants. 
 
6.3.1.1  Digit Span Score (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre-ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects 
factor and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
performed on scores from the digit span task.  There were no significant main 
effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.35, ps > .25) indicating that there was no 
change in digit span score between assessments and that scores were not 
significantly modulated by tDCS. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the mean digit span scores before and after ABM training for 
each tDCS group and across all participants. 
  
 




























Digit Span Scores Across Assessments




6.3.1.2  Attention Bias (All Participants) 
 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with the 
between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and a within subjects 
factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM). 
 
For attention bias there was no main effect of assessment (F = .18, p = .68) 
indicating that attentional bias did not differ between attention bias assessment 
before ABM training and attention bias assessment after ABM training.  The 
interaction between assessment and tDCS was also not significant (F = .82, p = 
.37) and there was no main effect of tDCS (F = .02, p = .89). 
 
Figure 6.5 depicts attention bias across assessments for each experimental group 
and mean attention bias for all participants.  Positive values represent threat 




   
Figure 6.5. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for each tES group and for all 
participants. A positive attention bias score represents attentional bias towards threat 
 
6.3.1.3  State Anxiety (All Participants) 
 
Replicating the threat bias ANOVA above, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on state anxiety data with the between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, 
sham tDCS) and a within subjects factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM). 
 
The interaction between assessment and tDCS group was significant, 
F(1,37) = 4.71, p =.036, (ηp2 = .11; observed power = .56).  For each tDCS group, 
a follow-up paired samples t-test examined change in state anxiety across 
assessments.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 2*p < .05). State anxiety was significantly increased for the sham 
tDCS group following ABM training (M = 32.60, SD = 1.37) compared to before 
ABM training (M = 30.85, SD = 1.77), t(19) = 2.31, p = .032.  For the anodal tDCS 
group, there was no significant change in state anxiety between assessments (t = 




































differed significantly between tDCS groups before ABM training and after ABM 
training.   Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
(significant if 2*p < .05).  There was no significant difference in state anxiety 
between the two tDCS groups either before ABM training (ts = .40, ps = 1.38) or 
after ABM training (ts = 1.26, ps = .44). 
 
Neither the main effect of assessment (F = .012, p = .91) nor the main effect of 
tDCS (F = .16, p = .69) were significant. 
 
Figure 6.6 depicts state anxiety across assessments for each experimental group 
(anodal tDCS and sham tDCS) and change in state anxiety for all participants. 
 
* p < .05 




































6.3.2  Analyses of Variance for Participants with Pre-existing  
Threat and Neutral Attention Bias 
 
Analyses of variance were repeated separately for participants with threat bias 
at baseline and participants with attention bias towards neutral faces at 
baseline.  This was based upon a previous finding that the capacity of ABM for 
manipulating attention bias in a particular direction has been shown to be 
restricted to individuals with an existing attention bias in the opposite direction 
(e.g. O’Toole & Dennis, 2012).   
 
Table 6.4 shows the number of participants in each experimental group with a 
pre-existing threat bias and the number of participants in each experimental 
group with a pre-existing neutral bias and mean (SD) attention bias and state 
anxiety score for each attention bias group. 
 
Table 6.4:   
Number of participants in each experimental group and mean attention bias and state anxiety scores for 
participants with an attentional bias towards threat at baseline and participants with attentional bias towards 
neutral at baseline 
 Baseline Measures: Threat bias Neutral bias 
Anodal tDCS N 9 10 
Mean (SD) Digit Span Score 118.11 (19.98) 113.50 (26.12) 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) 18.15 (11.76) -16.91 (12.19) 
Mean (SD) State Anxiety  33.44 (6.80) 30.20 (8.54) 
Sham tDCS N 7 13 
Mean (SD) Digit Span Score 115.14 (31.74) 116.67 (20.30) 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) 8.76 (6.91) -9.00 (4.39) 




6.3.2.1  Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing Threat  
Bias) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham 
tDCS) and the within participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) was 
conducted on digit span data from participants with pre-existing threat bias.  
There were no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.14, ps > .30).   
 
Figure 6.7 shows digit span score at each assessment for participants with a pre-
existing bias towards threat in each tDCS group and across all participants with 
pre-existing threat bias. 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Mean (SE) digit span score across assessments for participants with pre-existing 
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6.3.2.2  Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing Threat Bias) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted on data related to participants with pre-existing threat bias.  For 
participants with pre-existing threat bias there was a significant effect of 
assessment, F(1,14) = 22.58, p <.001, (ηp2 = .62; observed power = .99).  
Attention bias towards threat was significantly reduced following ABM training 
(M = -.86, SD = 6.10) compared to before ABM training (M = 14.04, SD = 10.78).  
There was also a near significant assessment x tDCS interaction, F(1,14) = 4.46, 
p =.053, (ηp2 = .24; observed power = .50).  For each tDCS group, a paired 
samples t-test examined change in attention bias across assessments.  Results 
were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  
Threat bias for participants who received anodal tDCS was significantly reduced 
following ABM training (M = -2.24, SD = 7.16) compared to before ABM training 
(M = 18.15, SD = 11.76), t(8) = 4.40, p = .004.  For participants who received 
sham tDCS, change in attention bias was not significant (t = 2.54, p = .088).   
 
Independent t-tests were conducted to assess the effect of tDCS group on 
attention bias before ABM training and following ABM training for participants 
with pre-existing threat bias.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  For participants with a pre-existing threat 
bias there was no significant difference in attentional bias between tDCS groups 
(anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) before ABM (t = 1.87, p = .16) or after ABM (t = 1.03, p 




The main effect of tDCS was non-significant (F = 1.14, p = .30). 
 
Figure 6.8 shows attention bias before and after ABM for participants with pre-
existing threat bias in each tDCS group and across all participants.  Positive 
values represent threat bias and negative values represent neutral bias. 
 
  
* p < .05 
** p < .001 
Figure 6.8. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with pre-existing 
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6.3.2.3  State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing Threat Bias) 
 
The ANOVA conducted above on attention bias data was replicated on state 
anxiety data.  For participants with baseline threat bias there were no main 
effects or interaction effects (Fs < 2.07, ps > .17) indicating that state anxiety 
did not change between assessments or as a factor of tDCS stimulation.   
 
Figure 6.9 shows mean and standard error state anxiety for participants with 
pre-existing threat bias in both tDCS groups (and for all participants) before and 
after ABM training. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing 
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6.3.2.4  Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing Neutral  
Bias) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham 
tDCS) and the within participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) was 
conducted on digit span data for participants with a pre-existing attention 
neutral bias.  There were no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < .61, ps 
> .44). 
 
Figure 6.10 shows digit span score at each assessment for participants in each 
tDCS group and for all participants with a pre-existing neutral bias. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Mean (SE) digit span score across assessments for participants with pre-existing 
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6.3.2.5  Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing Neutral Bias) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted on data related to participants with pre-existing attentional bias 
towards neutral faces.   
 
For participants with a pre-existing attention bias towards neutral faces there 
was a significant effect of assessment, F(1,21) = 14.99, p =.001, (ηp2 = .42; 
observed power = .96).  Neutral bias was significantly reduced following ABM (M 
= .35, SD = 14.03) compared to before ABM training (M = -12.44, SD = 9.35).  
There was no main effect of tDCS (F = 2.40, p = .91).  The interaction between 
assessment and tDCS was also not significant (F = .46, p = .14).   
 
Figure 6.11 shows attention bias from before ABM to after ABM training for 
participants with a pre-existing neutral bias in each tDCS group and for all 
participants with a pre-existing neutral bias.  Positive values represent threat 





* p < .05 
Figure 6.11. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with pre-existing 
attention bias towards neutral in each tDCS group and all pre-existing neutral bias participants  
 
6.3.2.6  State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing Neutral Bias)  
 
The ANOVA conducted above on attention bias data was replicated on state 
anxiety data.  For participants with a pre-existing neutral bias there were no 
significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 2.59, ps > .12). 
 
Figure 6.12 shows mean and standard error state anxiety for participants with 
pre-existing neutral bias in each tDCS groups and for all participants before and 
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Figure 6.12. Mean (SE) state anxiety for participants with pre-existing neutral bias in each tDCS 
group and for all pre-existing neutral bias participants 
 
6.3.3 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attention Bias as a 
Covariate 
 
6.3.3.1  Digit Span Score (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With digit span score as the dependent variable a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as the within participants variable and 
tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between participants and pre-existing 
attention bias as the covariate.  There was a significant assessment x pre-
existing attention bias interaction, F(1,20) = 5.70, p =.027, (ηp2 = 22; observed 
power = .62).  For each assessment the relationship between pre-existing 
attention bias and digit span score was examined using bivariate correlational 
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either assessment (rs < .18, ps > .29).   Correlational analysis was also used to 
examine whether pre-existing attention bias was related to change in digit span 
score between assessments.  There was no significant correlation (r = .1, p = 
.51).   There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs < .33, ps 
> .58).   
 
6.3.3.2  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With attention bias as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as the within participants variable and 
tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between participants and pre-existing 
attention bias as the covariate.  There was a significant main effect of pre-
existing attention bias, F(1,36) = 76.74, p <.001, (ηp2 = 68; observed power = 
1.00).  Pre-existing attention bias was strongly, positively correlated with mean 
attention bias (r = .86, p < .001).  There was also a significant assessment x pre-
existing attention bias interaction, F(1,36) = 76.74, p <.001, (ηp2 = 68; observed 
power = 1.00).  Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis was used to 
explore the relationship between pre-existing attention bias and change in 
attention bias from pre to post-ABM.  Change in attention bias was calculated by 
subtracting attention bias score at the earlier assessment from attention bias 
score at the later assessment e.g. attention bias at assessment 2 – attention bias 
at assessment 1.  A positive score represented an increase in attention bias 
therefore and a negative score represented a reduction in attention bias.  Pre-
existing attention bias was significantly, highly and negatively correlated with 
change in attention bias score following ABM relatively to before ABM, r(39) = -
.83, p < .001) suggesting that greater attention bias towards threat at baseline 
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was associated with greater threat bias reduction following ABM.  Figure 6.13 
shows the relationship between pre-existing attention bias and change in 
attention bias from pre to post-ABM training. 
 
 
Figure 6.13. The correlation between pre-existing attention bias and change in attention bias 
from pre to post ABM training across study 2.  For pre-existing attention bias positive scores 
represent attention bias towards threat and negative scores represent attention bias towards 
neutral.  For attention bias change, positive scores represent threat bias increase and negative 
scores represent threat bias reduction. 
 
No further main or interaction effects emerged from the analysis on attention 
bias data with attention bias as a covariate (Fs < .82, ps > .37).  
 
6.3.3.3  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attention Bias as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as a within subjects factor and tDCS 
(anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as a between participants factor and with pre-existing 
attention bias as a covariate.  There was a significant assessment x tDCS 

































interaction, F(1,36) = 5.39, p = .026, (ηp2 = 13; observed power = .62).  This 
effect was explored in section 6.3.1.3 revealing an increase in state anxiety for 
the sham tDCS group but not for the anodal tDCS group following ABM compared 
to before ABM.  There were no further significant main or interaction effects (Fs 
< 2.37, ps > .13). 
 
6.3.4  Analyses of Variance for Participants with Pre-existing  
High and Low Trait Anxiety 
 
Given the evidence that ABM is more effective in participants with high-level 
anxiety (Bar Haim et al., 2007; Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010) data 
were filtered so that separate analyses were conducted on participants with high 
level trait anxiety at baseline and participants with low level trait anxiety at 
baseline.   
 
Division of participants into high trait anxiety and low trait anxiety was based 
upon a median split on baseline trait anxiety scores.  The median baseline trait 
anxiety score was 42.  Therefore, participants with a trait anxiety score of 43 or 
above were categorised as high in trait anxiety and those with a baseline score 
of 41 or below as low in trait anxiety.  Table 6.5 shows the number of 
participants in each trait anxiety category as a factor of experimental group and 
baseline attention bias and state anxiety scores across experimental groups/pre-







Number of participants in each experimental group and mean attention bias and state anxiety for participants 
with high trait anxiety at baseline and participants with low trait anxiety at baseline 
 Baseline Measures: High Trait Anxiety Low Trait Anxiety 
Anodal tDCS N 8 9 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) 2.09 (16.72) 3.67 (22.89) 
Mean (SD) State Anxiety  33.13 (8.10) 28.22 (5.36) 
Sham tDCS N 10 10 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) -2.46 (10.99) -3.11 (9.80) 
Mean (SD) State Anxiety  34.00 (6.04) 27.70 (4.19) 
 
The mean trait anxiety score for high trait anxious participants was 52.50 (SD = 
7.12) and the mean trait anxiety score for low trait anxious participants was 
33.11 (SD = 4.83). 
 
6.3.4.1  Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing High Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor, was 
conducted on scores from the digit span task for high trait anxious participants. 
 
For participants with pre-existing high anxiety there were no significant main 
effects or interactions (Fs < 1.31, ps > .27).   
 
Digit span score across assessments for each experimental group and digit span 





Figure 6.14. Mean (SE) digit span score for participants with pre-existing high trait anxiety in 
each tDCS group and for all high trait anxious participants 
 
6.3.4.2  Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing High Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, Post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted for participants with high baseline anxiety.  No main effects or 
interactions were revealed (Fs < 1.32, ps > .28).   
 
Figure 6.15 shows attention bias before ABM and after ABM training for high trait 
anxious participants who received anodal tDCS and for high trait anxious 
participants who received sham tDCS and for all high trait anxious participants.  
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Figure 6.15. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
trait anxiety in each tDCS group and for all high trait anxious participants 
 
6.3.4.3  State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing High Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted on state anxiety data for high trait anxious participants.  This 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < .88, ps > .36). 
 
Figure 6.16 shows mean and standard error state anxiety for participants with 
baseline high anxiety in each tDCS group and for all high trait anxious 
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Figure 6.16. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
trait anxiety in each tDCS group and for all high trait anxious participants 
 
6.3.4.4  Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing Low Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted on scores from the digit span task for participants with low anxiety at 
baseline. 
 
For low trait anxious participants, the main effect of assessment was significant 
suggesting a change in digit span score following ABM training compared to 
before ABM training, F(1,17) = 10.42, p = .005 (ηp2 = .38; observed power = .86).  
Digit span score was significantly increased following ABM training (M = 131.47, 
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an improvement in attentional control capacity following ABM training for 
participants with low trait anxiety.   
 
The interaction between assessment and tDCS was also significant for low trait 
anxious participants, F(1,17) = 5.80, p = .028 (ηp2 = .25; observed power = .62).  
For each tDCS group, a paired samples t-test examined change in digit span 
score across assessments.  Results were Bonferroni corrected for multiple 
comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  For participants who received sham tDCS 
during ABM training, change in digit span score following ABM training was not 
significant (t = .89, p = .80).  Participants who had received anodal tDCS during 
ABM training however showed a significant increase in digit span score following 
ABM (M = 134.00, SD = 19.12) compared to before ABM training (M = 115.44, SD = 
21.49), t(8) = 3.05, p = .032.  Independent samples t-tests were conducted to 
explore whether the difference in digit span scores between tDCS groups was 
significant either before ABM training or after ABM training.  Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  TDCS 
groups did not differ in pre-ABM training digit span score (t = .42, p = .23) or 
post ABM training digit span score (t = .15, p = .54).   
 
For low trait anxious participants, the main effect of tDCS group was not 
significant (F = .17, p = .68).   
 
Figure 6.17 gives digit span score at each assessment for participants with low 





* p < .05 
Figure 6.17. Mean (SE) digit span score across assessments for participants with low trait anxiety 
in each tDCS group and for all low trait anxious participants 
 
6.3.4.5  Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing Low Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
conducted on attention bias data from low trait anxious participants.  There 
were no significant main or interaction effects (Fs < 1.76, ps > .22).   
 
Figure 6.18 shows attention bias before and after ABM training for participants 
with low pre-existing trait anxiety for each tDCS group and for all low trait 
anxious participants.  Positive values represent threat bias and negative values 
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Figure 6.18. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with low trait anxiety in 
each tDCS group and for all low trait anxious participants 
 
6.3.4.6  State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing Low Trait  
Anxiety) 
 
The ANOVA conducted above on attention bias data was replicated on state 
anxiety data.  This revealed no significant main effects or interactions for 
participants with low baseline anxiety (Fs < 2.92, ps > .11). 
 
Figure 6.19 shows mean and standard error state anxiety for participants with 
baseline low trait anxiety in both tDCS groups and for all low trait anxious 
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Figure 6.19. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing low 























Mean (SE) State Anxiety for Participants with Pre-
existing Low Trait Anxiety
Anodal tDCS Sham tDCS Low Anxiety All
347 
 
6.3.5 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as a 
Covariate 
 
6.3.5.1  Digit Span Score (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on digit span data with assessment (pre-ABM, 
post-ABM) as the within participants variable and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) 
as the between participants and pre-existing trait anxiety as the covariate.  The 
main effect of assessment was significant, F(1,35) = 5.06, p =.031, (ηp2 = .13; 
observed power = .59).  However, a paired samples t-test revealed no significant 
change in digit span score across assessments, (t = 1.00, p = .33).  The 
interaction between assessment and pre-existing trait anxiety was also 
significant, F(1,35) = 4.23, p =.047, (ηp2 = 11; observed power = .52).  For each 
assessment, the relationship between pre-existing trait anxiety and digit span 
score was examined using Pearson’s Product Moment correlational analysis.  The 
relationship between pre-existing trait anxiety and change in digit span score 
across assessments was also examined.  Digit span score post-ABM was 
significantly, moderately, negatively correlated with pre-existing trait anxiety, 
r(39) = -.37, p = .021.  This suggests that lower trait anxiety at baseline was 
associated with greater digit span score following ABM training.  Change in digit 
span score was significantly, moderately, negatively correlated with pre-existing 
trait anxiety, r(39) = -.35, p = .03 suggesting that lower trait anxiety at baseline 
was associated with greater increase in digit span score from pre to post-ABM.  
The relationship between pre-existing trait anxiety and digit span score at 




Based on results from section 6.3.3.4 which showed an increase in state anxiety 
for participants with pre-existing low trait anxiety who received anodal tDCS but 
not for participants with pre-existing low trait anxiety who received sham tDCS, 
change in digit span score across assessments and pre-existing trait anxiety was 
subject to correlational analysis for each tDCS group in isolation.  In support of 
the findings reported in section 6.3.3.4, there was a moderate, negative 
correlation between pre-existing trait anxiety and change in digit span score 
following ABM relative to before ABM for the anodal tDCS group r(19) = -.48, p = 
.04 but not for the sham tDCS group (r = -.15, p = .53).  This suggests that lower 
trait anxiety at baseline was associated with greater improvement in the digit 
span score following ABM relative to before ABM for the anodal tDCS group but 
for participants with low pre-existing trait anxiety who received sham tDCS.  
There were no further significant main effects of interaction effects arising from 
the above ANCOVA (Fs < 2.30, ps < .14). 
 
6.3.5.2  Attention Bias (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With attention bias as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as the within participants variable and 
tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between participants factor and pre-
existing trait anxiety as the covariate.  With trait anxiety held constant, there 









6.3.5.3  State Anxiety (Pre-existing Trait Anxiety as Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as a within subjects factor and tDCS 
(anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as a between participants factor and with pre-existing 
trait anxiety as a covariate.  The main effect of trait anxiety was significant, 
F(1,36) = 6.36, p = .016, (ηp2 = 15; observed power = .69).  Pre-existing trait 
anxiety and mean state anxiety were significantly, moderately and positively 
correlated, r(39) = .39, p = .014. Figure 6.20 shows the relationship between 
pre-existing trait anxiety and mean state anxiety with higher pre-existing trait 
anxiety associated with greater mean state anxiety. 
 
  
Figure 6.20. The relationship between baseline scores on the trait anxiety scale of the STAI 
(Spielberger et al,. 1983) and mean scores on the state anxiety scale of the STAI across study 2. 
 

























The assessment x tDCS interaction was also significant, F(1,36) = 4.47, p = .041, 
(ηp2 = 11; observed power = .54).  This effect was explored in section 6.3.1.3. 
 
No further significant main or interaction effects emerged (Fs < .019, ps > .89). 
 
 
6.3.6  Analyses of Variance for Participants with Pre-existing  
High and Low Attentional Control 
 
As reported previously, the extent to which it is possible to regulate an 
individual’s attentional bias is dependent upon their level of attentional control 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002). In order that this phenomenon could be explored, 
participants were divided into those with high pre-existing attentional control 
and those with low pre-existing attentional control.  Categorisation of 
participants as high in attentional control or low in attentional control was based 
upon a median split (also employed by Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  The median 
attentional control score was 51.  Therefore, participants with an attentional 
control score of 52 or above were categorised as high in attentional control and 
participants with a score of 50 or below were considered as low in attentional 
control. 
 
Table 6.6 shows the number of participants with high attentional control and 
with low attentional control at baseline as a factor of tDCS group and baseline 




Table 6.6:   
Number of participants in each experimental group and mean attention bias, state anxiety and trait anxiety for 
participants with high attention control and participants with low attentional control at baseline 




Anodal tDCS N 10 8 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) 2.65 (7.06) -4.15 (8.00) 
Mean (SD) State Anxiety  31.30 (2.45) 31.75 (3.04) 
Sham tDCS N 9 10 
Mean (SD) Attention Bias (ms) -2.57 (3.97) -2.82 (3.01) 
Mean (SD) State Anxiety  29.00 (1.74) 32.70 (2.10) 
 
The mean attentional control score for participants in the high attentional 
control group was 58.84 (SD = 6.57) and the mean attentional control score for 
participants in the low attentional control group was 43.06 (SD = 5.87). 
 
6.3.6.1 Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing High Attentional 
Control) 
 
For participants with high attentional control at baseline, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was 
conducted with the between participants factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham 
tDCS) and the within participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM).  
There were no main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.63, ps > .22). 
 
Figure 6.21 shows mean (SE) digit span score for participants with high 






Figure 6.21. Mean (SE) digit span score across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all high attentional control participants 
 
6.3.6.2 Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing High 
Attentional Control) 
 
With attention bias as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was carried out 
with the between participants factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and one 
within participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) on data from 
participants with high attentional control at baseline.  This revealed no 
significant main effects or interaction effects (Fs < .38, ps > .55).   
 
Attention bias across assessments for participants with high attentional control 
in each tDCS group and for all participants with baseline high attentional control 
is shown in figure 6.22.  Positive values represent threat bias and negative 
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Figure 6.22. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all high attentional control participants 
 
6.3.6.3 State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing High 
Attentional Control) 
 
State anxiety data were subject to a 2 x 2 ANOVA with one between subjects 
factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and one within participants factor of 
assessment (pre ABM, post ABM).  No main effects or interactions emerged from 
the analysis of data from participants with high level attentional control at 
baseline (Fs < 1.49, ps > .24).  
 
State anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all participants with pre-existing 
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Figure 6.23. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing high 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all high attentional control participants 
 
6.3.6.4 Digit Span Score (Participants with Pre-existing Low 
Attentional Control) 
 
For participants with low level attentional control at baseline, a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
was conducted with the between participants factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham 
tDCS) and the within participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM).  
This revealed no significant main effect or interaction effect (Fs < .93, ps > .35). 
 
Digit span score from before ABM training and after ABM training for participants 
with pre-existing low attentional control in each tDCS group and for all 
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Figure 6.24. Mean (SE) digit span score across assessments for participants with pre-existing low 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all low attentional control participants 
 
6.3.6.5 Attention Bias (Participants with Pre-existing Low 
Attentional Control) 
 
With attention bias as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANOVA was carried out on 
data from participants with low pre-existing attentional control with the 
between participants factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and one within 
participants factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM).   No significant main 
effects or interaction effects were apparent (Fs < .92, ps > .35). 
 
Change in attention bias across assessments for participants with low attentional 
control in each tDCS group and for all participants with baseline low attentional 
control is shown in figure 6.25.  Positive values represent threat bias and 
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Figure 6.25. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for participants with pre-existing low 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all low attentional control participants 
 
6.3.6.6 State Anxiety (Participants with Pre-existing Low 
Attentional Control) 
 
State anxiety data from participants with low level attentional control at 
baseline were subject to a 2 x 2 ANOVA with one between subjects factor of 
tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and one within participants factor of assessment 
(pre ABM, post ABM).  There were no main effects or interaction effects (Fs < 
1.37, ps > .26). 
 
Change in state anxiety across assessments for participants with low pre-existing 
attentional control in each tES group and for all participants with pre-existing 
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Figure 6.26. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for participants with pre-existing low 
attentional control in each tDCS group and for all low attentional control participants 
 
6.3.7 Analyses of Covariance with Pre-existing Attentional 
Control as a Covariate 
 
6.3.7.1 Digit Span Score (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
A 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on digit span data with assessment (pre-ABM, 
post-ABM) as the within participants variable and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) 
as the between participants and pre-existing attentional control as the 
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6.3.7.2 Attention Bias (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
A 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on attention bias data with assessment (pre-ABM, 
post-ABM) as the within participants variable and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) 
as the between participants factor and pre-existing attentional control as the 
covariate.  No main or interaction effects were significant (Fs < .70, ps > .41).   
 
6.3.7.3 State Anxiety (Pre-existing Attentional Control as 
Covariate) 
 
With state anxiety as the dependent variable, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted 
with assessment (pre-ABM, post-ABM) as a within subjects factor and tDCS 
(anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as a between participants factor and with pre-existing 
attentional control as the covariate.  As with the previous analyses, the 
assessment x tDCS interaction was significant, F(1,36) = 4.24, p = .047, (ηp2 = 11; 
observed power = .52).   
 
There were no further main effects or interaction effects (Fs < .78, ps > .39). 
 
6.3.8 tDCS Tolerability 
 
TDCS was well tolerated overall with no adverse events (see Table 6.7).   
Participants who received anodal tDCS reported mild tickling and itching and 
participants in both tDCS groups reported mild loss of concentration. 
Participants who received anodal tDCS reported a higher level of tickling (M 
=2.16, SD = .83) than those who received sham tDCS (M =1.65, SD = .88), 
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t(37) = 2.01, p = .052.  Participants in the sham tDCS group reported a 
significantly higher level of tiredness (M = 2.75, SD = 1.16) than those in the 
anodal tDCS group (M = 1.84, SD = 1.26), t(37) = 2.34, p = .025. Anodal tDCS and 
sham tDCS groups did not differ significantly on any other measure of tDCS 
intensity (all ts < 1.85, ps > .076). 
 
Table 6.7:  


























































6.3.9   Experimental Condition 
 
Overall, 61.54% of participants guessed their tDCS group correctly.  A Chi-
Squared Goodness of Fit test revealed that this percentage did not differ 
significantly from chance, X2 = 1.32, p = .15.  
 
6.4 Analysis of Data from Subset of Participants 
 
As mentioned above, of the 39 participants recruited for study 2, a subset of 24 
participants yielded EEG data which were suitable for analysis.  The following 
section includes an analysis of the behavioural and self-report data from just 





6.4.1  Baseline Characteristics 
 
6.4.1.1  Baseline Scores Across Self-Report Measures 
 
Table 6.8 shows the mean and standard deviation self-report scores at baseline 
(before ABM training) for the subset of 24 female and male participants. 
 
Table 6.8: 
Baseline mean (standard deviation) self-report scores by gender and across tDCS groups for study 2 EEG sub-set 
































































An independent t-test examined whether baseline state anxiety differed 
between the tDCS groups.   There was no significant difference between the 
groups (ts = .32, p = .75).  A one sample t-test revealed that mean baseline state 
anxiety score for females who received anodal tDCS (M = 32.83, SD = 11.39) did 
not differ significantly from mean normative score reported by Spielberger et al. 
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(1983) for female undergraduate students (M = 38.76, SD = 11.95), (t = 1.27, p = 
.26).  However, mean baseline state anxiety score for females who received 
sham tDCS (M = 30.08, SD = 5.79) was significantly lower than the normative 
mean, t(11) = 5.19, p < .001. Baseline state anxiety for males who received 
anodal tDCS (M = 29.33, SD = 6.95), was marginally significantly lower than the 
normative mean state anxiety score for males reported by Speilberger et al. 




An independent t-test examined whether baseline trait anxiety differed between 
the tDCS groups.   There was no significant difference between the groups (ts = 
1.84, p = .08).  One sample t-tests revealed that baseline trait anxiety for 
females who received anodal tDCS (M = 40.00, SD = 12.31) and females who 
received sham tDCS (M = 47.33, SD = 12.24) did not differ significantly from the 
normative mean for female undergraduate students reported by Spielberger et 
al. (1983; M = 40.40, SD = 10.15), (ts < 1.96, ps > .08).  Baseline trait anxiety for 
males who received anodal tDCS (M = 37.33, SD = 9.91) did not differ 
significantly from the normative mean (M = 40.00, SD = 6.56), (ts < .66, ps > 
.54). 
 
6.4.1.2  Correlations Between State Anxiety Scores 
 
Data from each administration of the state anxiety scale of the STAI (Pre-ABM, 
Post ABM) were subject to a Pearson Product Moment Correlation analysis.  The 
correlation was significant r(24) = .60, p = .002 suggesting strong test-retest 
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reliability.   
6.4.1.3  Correlation Between State Anxiety and Trait Anxiety 
  
In previous literature, the correlations reported between state and trait anxiety 
have been significant and moderately strong (.65 for males and .59 for females 
for college students; Speilberger et al., 1983).  In the present study trait anxiety 
was not significantly correlated with state anxiety before ABM, (r = .22, p = .30) 
or state anxiety after ABM (r = .31, p = .13; see table 6.9). 
 
Table 6.9: 
Bivariate correlations between baseline trait anxiety scale and state anxiety scale (SAS) scores before and after 





6.5 Results  
 
The following analysis includes just the results from participants whose data 
were included in ERP analysis. 
 
6.5.1  Analyses of Variance Across all Sub-set Participants 
 
6.5.1.1  Digit Span Score 
 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA with assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) as the within subjects factor 
and tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) as the between subjects factor was 
  SAS Assessment 1 SAS Assessment 2 
Baseline Trait Anxiety  .220 .314 
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performed on scores from the digit span task.  Neither the main effect of 
assessment, the main effect of tDCS nor the assessment x tDCS interaction were 
significant (Fs < 1.62, ps > .22) indicating that there was no change in digit span 
score between assessments and that scores were not significantly modulated by 
tDCS. 
 
Figure 6.27 shows the mean and standard error digit span scores for participants 
who received anodal tDCS and participants who received sham tDCS before and 
after ABM training along with mean and standard error digit span scores for all 
participants whose EEG data were subject to analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6.27. Mean (SE) digit span scores across assessments for participants in each tDCS group 







































6.5.1.2  Attention Bias  
 
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on the attention bias data with the 
between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, sham tDCS) and a within subjects 
factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM).  There were no significant main 
effects or interaction effects (Fs < 1.49, ps > .23).  
 
Figure 6.28 depicts attention bias across assessments for each tDCS group and 
attention bias for all participants whose EEG data were subject to analysis.  
Positive values represent threat bias and negative values represent neutral bias. 
 
   
Figure 6.28. Mean (SE) attention bias across assessments for each tDCS group and for all 
participants in the study 2 EEG subset.  A positive attention bias score represents attentional 













































6.5.1.3  State Anxiety   
 
Replicating the threat bias ANOVA above, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on state anxiety data with the between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal tDCS, 
sham tDCS) and a within subjects factor of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM). 
 
The interaction between assessment and tDCS was marginally significant 
F(1,22) = 4.19, p =.053, (ηp2 = .16; observed power = .50).  Following Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05) the difference 
between pre-ABM and post-ABM state anxiety was not significant for the anodal 
tDCS group (t = 1.16, p = .54) or for the sham tDCS group (t = 2.15, p = .11).  
Independent t-tests examined whether state anxiety differed significantly 
between tDCS groups before ABM training and after ABM training.   Results were 
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (significant if 2*p < .05).  There 
was no significant difference in state anxiety between the 2 groups either before 
ABM training (ts = .32, ps = .1.51) or after ABM training (ts = 1.62, ps = .24). 
 
Neither the main effect of assessment (F = .00, p = 1.00). nor the main effect of 
tDCS (F = .32, p = .58) were significant. 
 
Figure 6.29 depicts state anxiety across assessments for each tDCS group and 




   
Figure 6.29. Mean (SE) state anxiety across assessments for each tDCS group and for all 
participants in the study 2 EEG subset. 
 
6.5.2  Analysis of Filtered data  
 
By analysing a subset of participants, group size was reduced and power 
compromised.  Analyses were not conducted for data relating to pre-existing 
threat bias/pre-existing neutral bias participants or for data split by high and 
low scores on the self-report measures as this would have divided the reduced 
sample into yet smaller groups and compromised the power of the analysis.   
 
6.5.3  Analysis of EEG Data 
 
Data from 15 participants were rejected from the following analysis due to 
contamination.  The analysis will therefore encompass data from 24 participants 
































Grand averaged ERPs to angry-neutral face pairs at electrodes P7 and P8 are 
shown in figure 6.30.  Each chart overlays waveforms at electrodes contralateral 
to the angry face and ipsilateral to the angry face.  The charts illustrate ERP 
response for the anodal tDCS group and sham tDCS group prior to ABM training 
and for the anodal tDCS group and sham tDCS group following ABM training.  
N2pc is defined as the time window between 168ms to 212ms post face stimulus 
onset.  As detailed section 6.2.8.2, this time window was determined using a 
‘neuron-anti-neuron’ analysis (Fuggetta, Bennett & Duke, 2015; Purcell et al., 
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Figure 6.30.  Grand Averaged ERPs from posterior sites (P7, P8) elicited to angry-neutral face 
pairs a) before ABM training in the anodal tDCS group, b) after ABM training in the anodal tDCS 
group, c) before ABM training in the sham tDCS group and c) after training in the sham tDCS 
group are shown.  ERPs are shown at electrodes contralateral and ipsilateral to the angry face.  
The N2pc is defined as the time window between168ms to 212ms post face stimulus onset. 
 
N2pc   N2pc 
N2PC  N2PC  
N2pc  N2pc  
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A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on ERP amplitudes with the within subjects 
factors of assessment (pre ABM, post ABM) and laterality (electrodes ipsilateral, 
contralateral to angry face) and the between subjects factor of tDCS (anodal 
tDCS, sham tDCS).  The dependent variable was mean amplitude between 168 
and 212ms for the cue-locked ERP.  There was a significant main effect of 
assessment, F(1,22) = 12.41, p =.002, (ηp2 = .36; observed power = .92).  
Negativity was significantly more enhanced before ABM training (M = -.26, SD = 
1.24) compared to following ABM training (M = .96, SD = 1.50).  The main effect 
of laterality was also significant, F(1,22) = 12.93, p <.002, (ηp2 = .37; observed 
power = .93) with the contralateral signal (M = .21, SD = 1.10) significantly more 
enhanced than ipsilateral signal (M = .49, SD = 1.06). 
 
No further main effects or interactions were significant (Fs < 2.81, ps > .11). 
 
6.5.4  Correlational Analysis 
 
Pre-ABM measures of N2pc for angry faces and attention bias (reaction time 
based) and pre-existing trait anxiety were subject to correlational analysis (r 
values are shown in table 6.10).   
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Bivariate correlations between pre-existing trait anxiety scale, pre-ABM attention bias (calculated from reaction 







Post-ABM measures of N2pc for angry faces and attention bias (reaction time 
based) and pre-existing trait anxiety were subject to correlational analysis (r 
values are shown in table 6.11).  There were no significant correlations (rs < .31, 
ps > .14). 
 
Table 6.11: 
Bivariate correlations between pre-existing trait anxiety scale, post-ABM attention bias (calculated from reaction 








Study 2 sought to examine the effect of attend-neutral ABM with anodal tDCS 
and attend-neutral ABM with sham tDCS on attention bias and anxiety.  
  1 2 3 
1. Pre-existing Trait Anxiety     
2. Pre-ABM Attention Bias  -.078   
3. Pre-ABM N2pc  -.023 -.010  
  1 2 3 
1. Pre-existing Trait Anxiety     
2. Post-ABM Attention Bias  -.087   
3. Post-ABM N2pc  .16 -.31  
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Following study 1, the reliability of reaction time data from the emotional dot-
probe attention bias assessment task was questioned (Schmukle, 2005).  Concern 
stemmed from two major findings.  Firstly, there was no evidence of enhanced 
threat bias reduction following active ABM relative to control or no-training ABM.  
Secondly, reduced anxiety was revealed in the absence of threat bias reduction.  
By some reports these findings were not anomalous (Mogg et al., 2017).  Based 
on others, the results might be attributable to inaccuracy of the attention bias 
assessment procedure (Macleod et al., 2016).   
 
Previous research measured the N2pc ERP component in conjunction with 
reaction time data (Kappenman et al., 2014).  The study reported that reaction 
time data recorded during an emotional dot-probe attention bias assessment 
task did not reveal attentional bias towards threat and had poor internal 
reliability.  The N2pc did suggest an initial orienting towards threat and was 
internally reliable.  The results suggested that, in isolation, reaction time data 
may not present the whole picture in terms of attentional processes and that, to 
develop a broader knowledge, an understanding of the neural mechanisms of 
attentional selection is necessary (Kappenman et al., 2014).  In the present 
study, the N2pc was measured to provide information about the underlying 
cortical processes linked to selective attention.  Reaction time data from all 
participants did not reveal a reduction in threat bias following attention bias 
modification with active or sham tDCS compared to before training.  Despite 
revealing greater N2pc for angry faces relative to neutral faces overall, 
suggesting greater attentional capture by angry faces as previously reported 
(Kappenman et al., 2014), ERP data indicated neither a reduction in threat bias 
following ABM training nor the facilitation of ABM with anodal tDCS.  There was a 
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reduction in N2pc amplitude following ABM compared to before ABM but this was 
in response to both angry and neutral faces potentially reflecting reduced 
attentional capture for both stimuli.  Caution must be taken when interpreting 
ERP outcomes in light of behavioural outcomes from the present study.  
Behavioural findings were based on analysis of data from the 39 participants 
recruited to study 2.  However, ERP data from only a subset of 24 participants 
were analysed due to contamination issues.  Conclusions should not therefore be 
formed on the basis of comparison of these two datasets. 
 
In contrast to study 1, there was no reduction in anxiety across participants.  
Anxiety was increased following ABM training for participants who had received 
sham tDCS with ABM and there was no change in anxiety level for participants 
who had received anodal tDCS with ABM.  There was a reduction in threat bias 
for participants with a pre-existing bias towards threat following ABM which was 
driven by participants in the anodal tDCS group.  Neutral bias was reduced for 
participants with a pre-existing neutral bias following ABM training.  Finally, for 
participants with low pre-existing anxiety, digit span score was significantly 
increased following ABM training compared to before ABM.  Covariate analysis 
showed that lower trait anxiety at baseline was associated with greater 
improvement in digit span performance following ABM.  Component analysis 
revealed that this effect was driven by the anodal tDCS group as it was not 
present for the sham tDCS group. 
 
6.6.1  Attention Bias 
 
Attention bias was not altered by ABM training with anodal or sham tDCS as 
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indexed by reaction time data and ERP data.  Early ABM studies produced robust 
findings in terms of the successful manipulation of attention bias in the intended 
direction (e.g. Macleod et al., 2002; MacLeod & Bridle, 2009; Van Bockstaele et 
al., 2012; see Beard et al., 2012, for a review).  However, later studies failed to 
replicate this early success (e.g. Boettcher et al., 2012; Bunnell, Beidel & Mesa, 
2013; Julian et al., 2012).  Recently, studies have reported a lack of threat bias 
reduction following ABM training towards neutral faces (see Mogg et al., 2017 for 
review).  The present thesis adds support to this recent evidence.    
 
6.1.1.1  Attention Bias Assessment 
 
Previously, it has been suggested that inconsistency in findings in ABM studies 
may be due to the unreliability of the dot-probe task for assessing attention bias 
(Schmukle, 2005).  It was proposed that the 500ms presentation of faces 
provides time for gaze to be averted from threatening stimuli before the 
appearance of the target (Kappenman et al., 2014).  In study 2, the N2pc 
substantiated findings from reaction time analysis of no alteration in attention 
bias following ABM.  This supported the efficacy of reaction time data for 
measuring the construct it intended to measure i.e. the visual engagement of 
threat versus neutral stimuli.  However, the possibility remains that speed of 
attentional engagement is not the most accurate measure of attentional bias 
(Rudaizky, Basanovic & Macleod, 2014).  Attention bias towards threat has been 
described as enhanced allocation of attention towards threatening stimuli 
relative to neutral stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2007; Cisler, 2010).  This suggests that it is 
not just the speed at which a stimulus is attended which defines threat bias but 
all aspects of attention allocation including the amount of time stimuli are 
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attended.  Fox, Russo & Dutton (2002) challenged the view that measures of 
attentional engagement are optimal for detecting attentional bias.  The authors 
suggested that, due to the relatively long presentation time of the neutral and 
threatening cue in the dot-probe task, and given that both stimulus positions are 
task relevant, participants may visually alternate between them before dwelling 
on one stimulus.  Reaction time to the target may therefore not represent the 
stimulus initially engaged or that to which the participant’s attention is biased 
(Fox et al., 2002).  The authors measured attentional disengagement using the 
modified Posner (spatial cueing) task reporting attentional bias for threatening 
and happy faces.  Using the same task, another study compared attentional 
distribution to neutral and threatening images in high and low anxious 
individuals (Koster et al., 2006).  The results were enhanced attentional 
engagement to and delayed disengagement from highly threatening pictures for 
high anxious participants compared to low anxious participants as well as greater 
attentional avoidance between 200ms and 500ms for highly anxious participants.  
Sagliano et al. (2014) also reported facilitated engagement to threatening 
stimuli for high anxious participants but early avoidance of and later difficulty 
disengaging from threat for low anxious participants. This demonstrates that 
attentional bias may be characterised by a complex array of attentional 
tendencies and yet studies generally only measure and report one facet of 
attentional bias when assessing the impact of ABM training (e.g. engagement: 
Clarke et al., 2014: dwell time: Heeren et al., 2015b; disengagement: Amir et 
al., 2008).  In the present study, the choice of emotional dot-probe task to 
measure initial engagement to stimuli may explain the lack of threat bias 
reduction following ABM training.  However, it is not useful to compare this 
result to studies which have reported the successful reduction of threat bias 
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using different indices of attention bias (e.g. Amir et al., 2008;2009b).  Moving 
ahead, ABM research should seek to standardise training and assessment tasks.  
Ideally, attention bias assessment should gauge all dimensions of attention bias.     
 
6.6.1.2  Pre-existing Attention Bias 
 
As previously suggested (Mogg et al., 2017; O’Toole et al., 2012) it is important 
to consider pre-existing bias across participants when interpreting results 
relating to attention bias change.  Study 1 revealed a consistent pattern related 
to baseline attention bias and change in attention bias across assessments.  
Greater pre-existing threat bias was associated with greater reduction in threat 
bias following training with tES and greater neutral bias at baseline was 
associated with great reduction in neutral bias.  Study 2 revealed the same 
pattern.  As there was a relatively even split between participants with an 
attentional bias towards threat at baseline and participants with a bias towards 
neutral stimuli at baseline any reductions in threat bias for participants with 
pre-existing threat bias were likely ‘cancelled out’ by increases in threat bias for 
participants with pre-existing neutral bias.  This is a viable explanation for why 
no reduction in threat bias across participants was obtained. 
 
6.6.1.3  Efficacy of ABM Training 
 
Explanations have been submitted for why attend-neutral ABM failed to induce a 
reduction in attentional bias towards threat however, none of these have 
implicated the ABM training task itself.  It is possible that the result directly 
reflects the inefficacy of attend-neutral ABM for evoking the ABM process.  
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Heeren et al. (2011) measured indices of attention bias and anxiety following 
four types of attentional training: disengagement from threat, engagement to 
non-threatening stimuli, disengagement from threat and engagement of non-
threat (dot-probe task) and control.  They reported that training in both the 
disengagement from threat and in the disengagement from threat and 
engagement of non-threat groups elicited a reduction in threat bias as assessed 
using the modified Posner task following training but that the other two forms of 
attentional training did not.  This result indicates that ABM training which trains 
disengagement from threat might be superior for reducing threat bias than 
training which targets attentional engagement (Heeren et al., 2011). However, 
it is important to note that the authors used a modified Posner task to assess 
attention bias which is a measure of attention disengagement.  A measure which 
assessed attentional engagement may have shown superior results for training 
which facilitated attentional engagement to non-threat.  From a mechanistic 
point-of view it could be argued that identifying the attentional component 
which underlies attention bias is necessary so that ABM paradigms can target it.  
However, from a therapeutic perspective if the ultimate aim of ABM training 
(anxiety reduction) is achieved, even in the absence of threat bias reduction, 
then perhaps this is not essential.  Nevertheless, a failure to target the 
appropriate attentional processes through ABM training alongside inconsistency 
of attention bias assessment methods might explain why superior threat bias 
reductions have not been observed in studies 1 and 2 and in prior research (see 
Mogg et al., 2017 for review) for participants receiving ABM training towards 
neutral stimuli relative to participants receiving other forms of ABM training 




6.6.2  EEG Data 
 
EEG data from each participant were recorded during attention bias assessment 
so that the N2pc could be isolated and measured.  As reported, EEG data from a 
number of participants were omitted due to contamination.  This compromised 
the power of the N2pc analysis.  Furthermore, the data which were kept were 
subject to extensive filtering in order to remove the effects of contamination 
and 16% of trials were rejected.  It was suspected that faulty electrodes were 
responsible for much of the contamination.  For this reason, analysis of ERPs was 
minimised and data are interpreted with caution.   
 
6.6.3  tDCS Related Effects 
 
Study 2 revealed findings which suggested the facilitation of ABM effects with 
anodal tDCS. 
 
6.6.3.1  State Anxiety 
 
Anxiety was increased following ABM training for participants who had received 
sham tDCS but not for those who had received ABM with anodal tDCS.  This result 
differed from the findings from study 1 of reduced state anxiety across all 
participants, irrespective of condition.  It also contrasted with findings from 
research showing anxiety reduction, across participants following active or 
control ABM (e.g. Boettcher et al., 2013; Enock et al., 2014; McNally et al., 
2013).  Aspects of the experimental procedure may have contributed to the 
enhancement of anxiety following ABM training.  Although the study only 
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comprised one session, unlike study 1 which was conducted over 3 consecutive 
days, the session was lengthy.  Occasionally, participants attended for over 3 
hours.  Secondly, each session involved some cumbersome procedures.  Set-up of 
the EEG system and fitting of the head cap took up to 30 minutes.  EEG 
recording was taken during the first attention bias assessment.  Following this, 
participants washed and dried their hair to remove electrolyte gel.  The tDCS 
montage was then fitted to the participant and tDCS was administered for 20 
minutes of a 30-minute training period.  The EEG headcap was then fitted again 
for the final attention bias assessment.  Participants experienced a relatively 
high level of physical ‘interference’ therefore in addition to performing 
repetitive tasks and may have found the experiment protracted, tiring and 
stressful.  Thirdly, participants performed a digit-span task near the start and 
end of the experimental session.  This was not intended as a ‘stressor’ task but 
may have acted as such.  State anxiety at the start of the session was measured 
before the task.  State anxiety assessment at the end of the experiment was 
administered before the second completion of the digit span task.  This was to 
avoid any anxiety arising from performance of the task being reflected in the 
anxiety measure.  However, participants were aware that they were required to 
complete the task again and this may have induced anxiety. 
 
Compared to study 1 therefore, the study 2 procedure was anxiety-provoking.  It 
appears, however, that this effect may have been mitigated for participants who 
received anodal tDCS.  Areas of the brain which are consistently associated with 
anxiety response are the pre-frontal cortex and the amygdala (Davidson, 2002).  
The amygdala is thought to be involved in threat detection and conditioned fear 
response (Gold et al., 2015).  As such, anxiety is associated with hyperactivity of 
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the amygdala (Etkin & Wager, 2007).  It is widely accepted that effective 
anxiety regulation is driven by top-down processes requiring the recruitment of 
the DLPFC (Bishop et al., 2007; Bruhl et al., 2014; Clarke et al., 2014; Fitzgerald 
et al., 2017; Schmid et al., 2015; Tang et al., 2012).   Part of the role of the 
DLPFC is to attenuate performance impairments resulting from threat-induced 
anxiety by regulating amygdala hyperactivity (Gold et al., 2015).  For such 
regulation to take place, neural connectivity between the PFC and the amygdala 
must be adequate.  The strength of the amygdala-prefrontal pathway is 
predictive of trait anxiety with a stronger neutral pathway linked to low anxiety 
(Gold et al., 2015; Kim & Whalen, 2009).  Anodal tDCS was applied directly to 
the DLPFC during ABM training.  This suggests that excitatory stimulation of the 
DLPFC facilitated anxiety attenuating neural mechanisms and may have 
enhanced signalling in the amygdala-prefrontal pathway.  As anodal tDCS was 
applied during active ABM it can be assumed that the frontal cortices were 
already engaged.  This therefore suggests the enhancement of active ABM with 
anodal tDCS.  As threat bias was not reduced for the ABM with anodal tDCS group 
as indicated by reaction time and EEG analysis, the mechanism enhanced does 
not appear to have been that which promotes disengagement from threatening 
stimuli and the engagement to neutral stimuli.  However, it is possible that 
anodal tDCS bolstered the activation of structures more generally implicated in 
top-down control which were simultaneously recruited by the ABM task.  
 
6.6.3.2  Attention Bias 
 
For participants with a pre-existing attention bias towards threat, threat bias 
was reduced following ABM training.  There was a tES x assessment interaction 
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which revealed that this reduction was present for the anodal tDCS group but 
not for the sham tDCS group.  Had study 2 been conducted prior to study 1 then 
the discussion with relation to this finding may have centered on how anodal 
tDCS had facilitated active ABM to produce greater threat bias reduction for 
participants with pre-existing threat bias than that generated by sham tDCS with 
ABM.  However, study 1, consistently showed reduction in threat bias following 
attentional training, irrespective of ABM or tES group for participants with pre-
existing threat bias.   The question should perhaps be therefore, how did sham 
tDCS prevent the diminution of threat bias which has so consistently followed 
ABM training in this group?  Analysis of data across all participants revealed an 
increase in state anxiety for participants who received sham tDCS but not for 
participants who received anodal tDCS during ABM training.  One possibility is 
that elevated anxiety prevented the reduction of threat bias.  In accordance 
with theories which propose a positive relationship between anxiety and 
attentional bias towards threat (Beck et al., 1985; Bower, 1981; Williams et al., 
1988, 1997) it could be that persistent or augmented anxiety resulted in 
continued engagement to threat for participants who received sham tDCS.  
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) purports that in anxiety there is 
an imbalance between the top-down attentional control system and the bottom-
up stimulus driven system.  Typically, the top-down system exerts control over 
the bottom-up system attenuating the influence of aversive stimuli.  In anxiety, 
it is the bottom-up system which has more influence over attentional processes.  
However, top-down processes can regain their control over bottom-up processes 
if they are bolstered via training (Heeren et al., 2013).  This might also be 
possible using tES to enhance activation in the brain areas associated with top-
down control.  In the present study, increased anxiety may have strengthened 
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the influence of bottom-up processes.  It follows that anodal tDCS provided the 
facilitation of top-down mechanisms necessary to redress the balance between 
top-down control and salience driven mechanisms.  However, for participants 
who received sham tDCS, this ‘boost’ was not provided and attentional processes 
remained impaired. 
 
6.6.3.3  Digit Span 
 
Separate analyses were conducted on data from participants with higher level 
trait anxiety at baseline and participants with lower level trait anxiety at 
baseline.  For low trait anxious participants who had received anodal tDCS there 
was an increase in digit span score following ABM training compared to before 
training.  For low trait anxious participants who had been administered sham 
tDCS during ABM, there was no change in digit span score.  This suggests that 
anodal tDCS facilitated the attentional control enhancing effects of ABM training 
in participants with low-level anxiety.  Digit span score was not changed for 
participants with high trait anxiety.  This supports the argument made above 
that higher-level anxiety may have impaired attentional control processes or 
prevented their enhancement.  For low trait anxious participants who received 
anodal tDCS but not those who received sham tDCS, the frontal-cortex based 
mechanisms of top-down regulatory control were enhanced redressing the 
balance between top-down and bottom-up processes resulting in the fortification 





6.6.4  The Role of Attentional Control  
 
Previous chapters explored the role of attentional control in the outcomes of 
ABM training.  This discussion followed two lines of reasoning.  The first was 
based on findings of indistinguishable improvements in anxiety for ABM training 
and control ABM training (Carlbring et al., 2012; Carleton et al., 2015; Cristea et 
al., 2015; Enock et al., 2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  It was also motivated by 
results showing state anxiety reduction across participants, irrespective of 
condition in study 1.  It had been suggested that ABM training, regardless of the 
inclusion of a contingency, increases attentional control and thus the capacity 
for attention regulation (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013; Klumpp et al., 
2010; Taylor, Cross & Amir, 2015).  Klumpp et al., 2010 suggested that 
facilitated attentional control may not necessarily reduce engagement to 
threatening stimuli but may attenuate their impact and disrupt threat processing 
via the increase of self-regulation.  Heeren et al. (2016) linked the effects to the 
upregulation of higher-order activity in the frontal cortices.  These structures 
are associated with attentional control and are known to down-regulate 
reactivity in the emotion-centered limbic system.  In order to investigate these 
ideas further, study 2 included the digit-span task to the battery of pre-and post 
ABM training measures.  Heeren et al. (2016) had previously used the backward 
digit span task as a measure of working-memory/attentional control.  It was 
reasoned that, if top-down regulatory processes are bolstered by ABM training, 
irrespective of contingency then an improvement in digit-span performance 
might be expected following ABM training.  Furthermore, if the facilitation of 
these processes is driven by the upregulation of higher-order frontal lobe activity 
then this improvement might be greater for participants who received anodal 
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tDCS during ABM training.  Across all participants, there was no change in digit 
span performance from baseline to after ABM training.  There was also no 
improvement in state anxiety following ABM training as was seen in study 1.  On 
the one hand, this does not support the notion that ABM training, irrespective of 
condition enhances attentional control capacity.  On the other, it could be 
argued that the failure of the ABM procedure to attenuate state anxiety might 
be due to its failure to elicit attentional control improvement.  As discussed 
above, there was an augmentation of digit span performance for participants 
with low trait anxiety and this appeared to be driven by the anodal tDCS group.  
However, because there was no evidence of state anxiety reduction for this 
group, there is no support for the theory that attentional control enhancement is 
implicated in state anxiety improvements.   
 
The second line of reasoning explored in preceding chapters is that pre-existing 
attentional control level is predictive of ABM training outcomes.  In a study by 
Basanovic et al. (2017), greater capacity for attentional inhibition and 
attentional selectivity (2 facets of attentional control) at baseline predicted the 
magnitude of attention bias change in the trained direction (towards neutral or 
towards threatening stimuli).   The authors suggested that greater attentional 
control facilitated adherence to the training task resulting in enhanced training 
related outcomes.   However, analysis of data across the experiments of study 1 
did not reveal this pattern.  The present study also looked at the impact of ABM 
training with anodal or sham tDCS on participants with high level attentional 
control at baseline and participants with pre-existing low level attentional 
control.  There was no evidence of change in attention bias, state anxiety or 
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attentional control (digit span score) for either group suggesting that the success 
of ABM training is not modulated by pre-existing attentional control capacity.   
 
6.6.5  Methodological Issues 
 
This chapter has revealed differences between the findings from study 1 and the 
findings from study 2.  In study 2, effects which were present across all 
participants in study 1, were constrained to participants who had received 
anodal tDCS. Procedural differences may have been responsible for these 
discrepancies.  Study 2 comprised one experimental session whereas study 1 
included four.  In study 1, stimuli were small facial images presented vertically 
on the computer screen.  For study 2 stimuli were presented horizontally.  This 
was because the N2pc is a cerebral response to visual stimuli contralateral to 
horizontally positioned posterior electrodes (Woodman & Luck, 1999).  The size 
of the face images was increased as in previous studies, face stimuli presented 
horizontally have tended to be larger (e.g. Amir et al., 2011; Heeren et al., 
2012).  It is possible that it was more difficult to inhibit the processing of larger 
faces compared the smaller faces from study 1.  This might explain why, for 
participants with an attentional bias towards threat at baseline who did not 
receive anodal tDCS, threat bias was not reduced.  Moreover, if anodal tDCS 
facilitated better regulation of emotional response to threatening stimuli, 
participants who did not receive anodal tDCS may have had greater adverse 
reaction to these more conspicuous threat images as reflected by anxiety 
increase. Another methodological difference between studies 1 and 2 was that in 
study 2 participants responded to target identity by pressing one of two response 
keys on a key pad using two fingers from the same hand rather than one of two 
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keys on a computer keyboard with the same finger from each hand as per study 
1.  This was to eliminate the possibility of faster responses for the dominant 
hand.  Although it is unlikely that this impacted upon results related to state 
anxiety this may have influenced response time measure of attention bias 
leading to either a slowing or speeding of responses. 
 
6.6.6  Limitations 
 
It is evident from figure 6.28 showing grand-averaged ERPs from study 2 that the 
baseline period (100ms prior to stimulus onset) is noisy showing large 
deflections.  It is likely that this is due to the use of a relatively short inter-
stimulus interval (ISI).  There was an ISI of 500ms between the offset of the 
fixation cross and the onset of face stimuli.  The baseline activity may therefore 
have been contaminated by carry-over signal from the presentation of the 
fixation cross.   
 
A further limitation of the present study was that only active ABM training was 
delivered with anodal or sham tDCS.  A control ABM condition was not included.  
This prevents analysis of training related effects and assumes that active ABM 





In study 2, anodal or sham tDCS of the left DLPFC was delivered concurrently 
with active ABM training during one experimental session.  Attention bias was 
386 
 
measured before and after ABM training using the emotional dot-probe 
paradigm.  EEG data were taken during assessment and the N2pc was isolated as 
a measure of attentional capture.  Neither reaction time data nor the N2pc 
indicated a reduction in threat bias following ABM training.  Behavioural results 
suggested the facilitation of ABM with anodal but not sham tDCS.  Anxiety was 
increased following ABM training for participants in the sham tDCS group but not 
for participants who received anodal tDCS during ABM.  For participants with a 
pre-existing threat bias, threat bias was reduced following ABM with anodal tDCS 
but not following ABM with sham tDCS.  Finally, for low anxious participants, 
attentional control capacity (as indexed by the digit span task) was increased 
following ABM training with anodal tDCS but not for ABM training with sham 
tDCS.  The most plausible explanation for each of these findings is that anodal 
tDCS enhanced activity in the pre-frontal cortex which is involved in top-down 
regulatory control.  Where this extra activation was not provided (in the sham 









The present research explored the potential of tES for modulating ABM training.  
Specifically, studies investigated whether tES could enhance the effects of ABM 
in terms of reducing attention bias towards threatening stimuli and attenuating 
anxiety.  Given the prevalence of anxiety disorders (Craske & Zucker, 2002; 
MacDonald & Feifel, 2014) and their debilitating effect on social functioning, 
mental and physical health (Angulo et al., 2017; Bishop, 2007; Hill, Waite & 
Cresswell, 2016; Kizilcik et al., 2016) the need to investigate potential 
treatments for anxiety is of great importance.  In pursuit of this aim, two studies 
were conducted.  The first study comprised three experiments.  Experiment 1 
was unique in investigating the effects of active or sham high frequency tRNS on 
ABM training towards neutral faces or control ABM training.  The results 
supported findings from recent ABM studies showing equivalent reductions in 
anxiety for attend neutral and control ABM (Carlbring et al., 2012; Enock et al., 
2015; Cristea et al., 2015; Carleton et al., 2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  There 
was no reduction in threat bias for any experimental condition and anxiety was 
reduced across participants irrespective of ABM group and tES group.  
Experiment 2 sought to explore whether anxiety reduction across all participants 
was attributable to an enhancement of attentional control induced by both 
forms of ABM training (active ABM, control ABM).  This mechanism was suggested 
by researchers who had achieved similar results to those revealed following 
experiment 1 (e.g. Enock et al., 2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  A no-training 
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condition was administered to all participants which was designed to engage and 
facilitate cognitive control processes to a lesser extent than active or control 
ABM.  This was delivered with active or sham tRNS.  The results showed that 
anxiety reductions occurred even where cognitive control was not intentionally 
enhanced.  However, anxiety reduction was driven by the active tRNS group.  
This introduced the possibility that anxiety reduction was activation dependent.  
It was proposed that task-induced activation, enhanced by active tRNS was 
sufficient to trigger top-down mechanisms associated with anxiety regulation.  In 
contrast, task-relevant activation with sham tRNS was not.  Experiment 3 added 
to a body of work examining the potential of anodal tDCS for enhancing the 
effects of ABM training (Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  These 
studies, published since the start of the present research had demonstrated 
greater acquisition of attention bias in the trained direction when ABM training 
was administered with concurrent anodal tDCS than when it was delivered with 
sham tDCS.  The outcome from experiment 3 was state anxiety reduction 
without differentiation between experimental groups.  No change in attention 
bias was observed.  As might be expected, analysis of data from all three 
experiments from study 1 confirmed reduction of state anxiety across all 
participants irrespective of ABM or tES group.  Unexpectedly, threat bias was 
reduced for participants who had received sham tES but not participants who 
received active tES.  It was identified that, at baseline, participants in the sham 
tES group had had an attentional bias towards threat and participants who had 
received active tES had a pre-existing neutral bias.  As will be discussed, pre-
existing attention bias was a key determinant of attention bias outcome 
following ABM training.  Study 2 involved the measurement of attention bias 
before and after one session of attend-neutral ABM training with anodal or sham 
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tDCS, using EEG recordings.  The N2pc represented an index of attentional 
selection and by calculating the difference between N2pc response to neutral 
faces and N2pc response to angry faces an additional measure of attention bias 
was provided.  There was no indication of training-induced threat bias reduction 
following analysis of reaction time data nor arising from analysis of ERP data.  
Anxiety increase was limited to participants who had received sham tDCS.  Other 
results from the study suggested the facilitation of ABM training with anodal but 
not sham tDCS. 
 
Each experiment was analysed and discussed in detail in its respective chapter.  
This final chapter will therefore review the key themes arising from the present 
research.  These will focus predominantly on findings common to all phases of 
the research and the most probable mechanistic explanations for the findings.  
The implications of these issues will be explored.  Limitations of the research 
will be outlined and finally suggestions for future research will be made. 
 
7.2 Key Results and Discussion Points from Studies 1 and 2 
 
7.2.1  Equivalent Findings across Training Groups 
 
The present research consistently failed to reveal a difference in the outcomes 
of attentional training between training groups (attend-neutral ABM, control 
ABM and no-training ABM) replicating findings from other recent ABM studies 
(Carlbring et al., 2012; Enock et al., 2015; Cristea et al., 2015; Carleton et al., 
2015; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).  Consistently, anxiety was reduced for all 




Early findings from assessments of attention bias in anxiety using the emotional 
dot probe confirmed faster responses to threatening stimuli relative to neutral 
stimuli (Bradley et al., 1998, Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988, Mogg, Philipott & 
Bradley, 2004).  ABM training paradigms were founded on the basis that by 
introducing a contingency to the emotional dot-probe task whereby the target 
consistently replaced the stimulus of one particular valence, attention bias 
towards stimuli of that valence could be induced (Macleod et al., 2002).  
Preliminary studies showed that ABM training towards neutral faces generated 
greater reduction in threat bias relative to control ABM training and that greater 
reductions in anxiety were also observed for participants in the active ABM group 
compared to those in the control ABM group (see Beard et al., 2012 and Bar-
Haim et al., 2010 for review).  Findings from the present research challenge the 
efficacy of contingency-based ABM for inducing attentional bias.  In line with a 
number of recent ABM studies (see Mogg et al., 2017 for a review), anxiety 
reduction was reported in the absence of threat bias reduction at all stages of 
study 1.  The suggestion that attentional threat bias may be causally related to 
the development and maintenance of anxiety is therefore also challenged (Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2012) as is the long-held belief that threat bias and anxiety 
are positively related (e.g. Beck et al., 1983; Bower et al., 1981).   Although the 
present study failed to find a causal or correlational relationship between 
attention bias and anxiety this does not preclude the possibility of a relationship 
between these variables.  It is feasible that the procedure or measures used in 
the present research were responsible for the failure to capture an association 
between attention bias and anxiety accurately.  Alternatively, attention bias and 
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anxiety are related but the nature of their relationship is more complex than 
previously suggested. 
 
7.2.2  The Importance of Pre-existing Attention Bias 
 
When pre-existing attention bias was included as a covariate in analyses of 
attention bias data, a reduction in the level of pre-existing bias was observed 
irrespective of tES or ABM group.  This lends further dispute to models of ABM 
which propose that the outcome of attend-neutral ABM is reduction in threat 
bias (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2010).  It suggests instead that the result of active 
ABM training is reduction in attention bias (irrespective of the direction of pre-
existing attention bias).  A singular mechanism may have been responsible for 
attention bias reduction for participants at each end of the attention bias 
spectrum. The same process may have been involved in anxiety reduction across 
participants.    A candidate mechanism is attentional control enhancement 
(Heeren et al., 2013).  Another candidate mechanism is habituation to 
threatening stimuli via exposure (Carleton et al., 2015).  It is also possible that 
during attentional training, attentional control and exposure mechanisms 
interacted to induce anxiety reduction.  An enhancement in attentional control 
capacity should facilitate effective shifting between sources of threat and 
safety.  This mechanism, it has been suggested, is necessary for successful 
emotional coping (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  The exposure element of the ABM 
task may further facilitate this process with repeated presentation of 
threatening faces rendering these stimuli less potent signals of danger allowing 
attentional control processes to better regulate their engagement or avoidance.  
The present study was not able to implicate attentional control or exposure in 
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anxiety reduction following ABM training with tES and therefore these arguments 
are speculative.  Further research with the aim of disentangling the roles (if any) 
of attentional control and exposure processes in anxiety attenuation is 
warranted.   
 
Given the consistency with which attention bias (threat or neutral) was reduced 
following ABM training, this pattern of attentional change needs to be 
considered when designing ABM studies.  If the aim of the study is to elicit 
reduction in threat bias then participants should be selected with a pre-existing 
threat bias as previously suggested (O’Toole et al., 2012).  Alternatively, pre-
existing bias should be accounted for during analysis of attention bias data.  
When comparing results to those from previous ABM studies, researchers should 
take into account pre-existing bias from their own and previous studies as these 
might explain similarities and differences in attention bias outcomes. 
 
7.2.3  Attentional Control 
 
As mentioned above, a proposed mechanism for anxiety attenuation following 
ABM training (irrespective of condition) is the enhancement of attentional 
control (Enock et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2013; Klumpp et al., 2010; Taylor, 
Cross & Amir, 2015).  It has been suggested that facilitated attentional control 
disrupts threat processing via the increase of self-regulation (Klumpp et al., 
2010).  Heeren et al. (2016) purported that anxiety reductions following active 
ABM training and control ABM may be related to ABM-induced upregulation of 
higher-order activity in the frontal cortices which down-regulates reactivity in 
the emotion-centered limbic system (Heeren et al., 2016).  Following findings 
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from experiment 1 (study 1) of equivalent reductions in anxiety across training 
groups, this idea was explored.  In experiment 2 of study 1 participants 
completed a training paradigm which had been designed to minimise the degree 
to which cognitive control was engaged and enhanced.  Previous studies had 
shown that tasks which place fewer demands on cognitive control and working 
memory resources produce inferior attentional control and emotional response 
improvements relative to more cognitively demanding tasks (e.g. Sari et al., 
2015; Swainston et al., 2018).  An assumption was made that the less cognitively 
demanding task would fail to bolster attentional control mechanisms.  It was 
hypothesised that without attentional control enhancement, state anxiety 
attenuation would not be present following training. However, there were, 
again, reductions in anxiety across participants.  This suggested that an 
alternative mechanism might be responsible for anxiety attenuation following 
attentional training.  It is possible that, perhaps, attentional control mechanisms 
were unintentionally recruited during the ‘no-training’ ABM task delivered in 
experiment 2 and that attentional control enhancement might still be a 
candidate mechanism in the diminution of anxiety.  Study 2 provided the 
opportunity to explore the potential modulatory impact of attentional control in 
ABM outcomes further.  The study included a task which gauged attentional 
control before and after ABM training.  There was no enhancement in digit span 
score following active ABM training relative to before active ABM training.  This 
result therefore did not support the theory that ABM training enhances 
attentional control capacity.  However, surprisingly, there was also no reduction 
in state anxiety revealed by study 2 data.  Therefore, it could not be concluded 
that state anxiety reduction is independent of attention control enhancement.  
When study 2 participants’ data were filtered by pre-existing trait anxiety, 
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participants with low baseline trait anxiety who received anodal tDCS did 
demonstrate an increase in digit span score following ABM training but 
participants with low trait anxiety who received sham tDCS and participants with 
high trait anxiety did not.  Potential mechanisms of this outcome are discussed 
below (section 7.2.5) but the discussion does not propose a simple model of ABM 
whereby the effect of ABM training on anxiety is mediated by attentional 
control.  Instead a complex interaction of pre-existing neural and cognitive 
state, anxiety and activation of top-down regulatory mechanisms is proposed. 
 
In each experiment from the present research, the attentional control scale was 
completed by participants at baseline allowing for the investigation of baseline 
attentional control level as a predictor of ABM-related outcomes.  Previous 
research has shown that higher levels of attentional control at baseline are 
associated with more successful ABM-related outcomes (Basanovic et al., 2017).  
The authors suggested that efficient attentional control facilitates performance 
in the ABM training task leading to a deeper level of training.  A relationship 
between baseline attentional control and ABM effects on attention bias and 
state anxiety was not observed across the studies.  On balance therefore, 
findings from the present research did not support those reported by Basanovic 
et al. (2017).   
 
The predictive or mediating role of attentional control in ABM training outcomes 
remains unclear.  The present research failed to provide convincing evidence 
that attentional control is a determinant of ABM success.  However, the present 
research was not wholly focused on the role attentional control in ABM.  Instead 
it explored different aspects of the modulation of ABM training with tES (for 
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example, the impact of different forms of tES, different training procedures, the 
reliability of attention bias measures). It is possible that future research which is 
more intensely oriented towards determining the part played by attentional 
control in ABM outcomes will be more informative. 
 
7.2.4  Activation Dependent Effects 
 
Across studies 1 and 2, a number of tES effects were demonstrated which might 
be explained via a common mechanism.  Experiment 2 of study 1 revealed a 
reduction in state anxiety for participants who received active tRNS but not for 
participants who received sham tRNS.  In study 2 there was an increase in 
anxiety for participants who had received attend-neutral ABM with sham tDCS 
but not for participants who had received attend-neutral ABM with anodal tDCS.  
Also in study 2, for participants with a pre-existing threat bias, reduction in 
threat bias was restricted to those who had received anodal tDCS.  Finally study 
2 revealed an increase in digit span score for participants with low anxiety who 
had received anodal tDCS but not for participants who had received sham tDCS.   
 
7.2.5  Putative Mechanisms 
 
At the outset of the present research it was hypothesised that tES would 
enhance the impact of ABM by strengthening signals associated with the learning 
imparted by active ABM.  This was based on previous evidence of facilitated 
learning following cognitive training with tES relative to cognitive training 
without tES (e.g. Snowball et al., 2013; Meinzer et al., 2014).  Previously, 
researchers suggested that ABM implicitly trains participants to visually engage 
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neutral stimuli and inhibit engagement to threatening stimuli (Beard et al., 
2012).  However, there was no evidence of superior threat bias reduction 
following ABM with tES or indeed, following any combination of ABM group and 
tES group.  It was therefore speculated in previous chapters that the reductions 
in anxiety obtained across the research following attentional training was 
attributable to the enhancement of attentional control capacity (Enock et al., 
2014; Klumpp & Amir, 2010).   However, increased attentional control might also 
be expected to yield reductions in threat bias as it would facilitate the visual 
disengagement from threatening stimuli and engagement to neutral stimuli. 
 
The present thesis submits that it was not the enhancement of the learning 
effects from the ABM procedure nor an increase in attentional control 
specifically which were responsible for the tES effects summarised above or the 
reductions in anxiety observed across participants at almost all phases of the 
research.  This idea is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 and so a summary is 
presented here.  Frontal brain areas are proposed to be responsible for down-
regulating anxiety response (Tang et al., 2012).  Part of the role of the PFC is to 
attenuate performance impairments resulting from threat induced anxiety by 
regulating amygdala hyperactivity (Gold et al., 2015).  It is suggested therefore 
that a general elevation of activity in frontal brain areas associated with top-
down regulatory control might explain these results.  Via projections to the 
limbic system (Kim & Whelan, 2009) these neural structures, when optimally 
activated were able to attenuate emotional response to threatening stimuli.  
Where the interaction of attentional training with sham tES did not elicit the 
beneficial effects induced by training with active tES, then frontal activation 
was insufficient to down-regulate the influence of anxiety evoking stimuli or 
397 
 
circumstances.  It was also insufficient to overcome the aversive influence of 
anxiety on attentional processes.  
 
Future research examining the impact of tES on cognitive training should not 
assume that tES will modulate the impact of the training but start from the 
premise that neural activation elicited by the interaction between tES and 
training determines outcomes.  Where task-induced neural activation is 
sufficient to achieve the desired result (e.g. anxiety reduction) then tES may 
have no discernible impact (as in experiment 1 of study 1).  However, where a 
task does not in itself evoke the necessary neural activation (as in experiment 2 
of study 1) the additive impact of tES may be required to realise the same 
effect. 
 
7.2.6 Putative Neural Mechanisms 
 
Models of cognitive training facilitation using tES (Fertonani et al., 2017) are 
compatible with an account of anxiety reduction as a factor of the interaction 
between ABM and tES.  TDCS and tRNS are purported to evoke a shift in neuronal 
resting membrane potential which renders neurons more sensitive to incoming 
excitatory signals (Cohen Kadosh, 2013).  If task-relevant neurons are not 
sufficiently depolarised for example in the case of sham tES, then sub-threshold 
training related signals will remain sub-threshold and no facilitation of the 
‘desired’ behaviour would occur.  If tES is sufficient to generate resting 
membrane alteration and provide a platform for raising sub-threshold task-
related signals beyond the threshold of excitation (or if task-relevant or tES-




To gain insight into how (and where) the tES protocols from studies 1 and 2 may 
have impacted on neural activity in a way which might have influenced 
behavioural outcomes, computational modelling was conducted using HD Explore 
4.0 (Soterix Medical).  Field intensity maps are shown in appendix 19.  For the 
stimulation protocol used in the first two experiments of study 1 (1.5mA tRNS of 
the IFG with electrodes 35cm2 in size) it was not possible to specify tRNS as the 
form of stimulation using the HD Explore software.   A prediction of electrical 
fields based on tDCS with the anode above the right IFG and the cathode above 
the left IFG was produced (see appendix 19) but was not informative regarding 
the present research.  For the protocol used in the third experiment of study 1 
and in study 2 (1.5mA tDCS with the anode above F3 and the cathode above the 
contralateral supra-orbital, each electrode 35cm2) electrical field distribution 
across the frontal cortices was shown with slightly greater field intensity in the 
right frontal cortex.  The results suggest that tES effects are not confined to the 
area directly beneath the activating electrode (Klooster et al., 2016).  However, 
they are consistent with a model of ABM/tES effects in which the interaction 
between ABM and tES induced frontal cortex activation facilitates anxiety 
reduction.  TES modelling studies (e.g. Bikson et al., 2010, Bestmann et al., 
2015) are beginning to contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of 
tES.  Nevertheless, tES modelling techniques require development.  
Furthermore, the findings described here are relatively crude given that tES was 
modelled on an adult, male head template and did not take into account aspects 
of inter-individual variability such as anatomical differences which might 
influence tES-induced electrical field alterations.  Major inferences therefore 






7.3.1  Clarification of Mechanisms of State Anxiety Reduction 
 
Experiment 1 revealed reductions in anxiety across participants, irrespective of 
ABM or tES group.  Experiment 2 sought to discover whether the mechanism 
responsible for this anxiety reduction was enhanced attentional control.  The 
results neither confirmed nor opposed the ‘attentional control’ theory of anxiety 
reduction.  It might therefore have been beneficial for experiment 3 to provide 
further clarity on this matter.  For example, a condition designed to extensively 
train attentional control could have been administered in order to examine 
whether this produced greater anxiety attenuation than the ABM tasks previously 
administered.  Additionally, a behavioural measure of attention control could 
have been added to the procedure.  An alternative explanation for anxiety 
attenuation was that repeated exposure to threat faces had rendered them less 
anxiety evoking.  The inclusion of an ABM task presenting neutral-neutral face 
pairs would have endorsed this or ruled it out as a putative mechanism.  A 
smaller degree of anxiety reduction following ABM with neutral-neutral face 
pairs compared to ABM training with neutral-angry face pairs would indicate that 
habituation to threatening faces does occur as a result of their repeated 






7.3.2  Unreliability of Assessment and Training Task 
 
The study may have been limited by the use of the emotional dot-probe task to 
measure and train attention bias.  As discussed in chapter 6, the task is a 
measure of attentional engagement based on the concept that threat bias is 
reflected in faster responses to targets replacing threat related stimuli (Macleod 
et al., 2002).  However, a number of studies have demonstrated successful 
reduction of threat bias using measures of attentional disengagement (e.g. Amir 
et al., 2008; 2009b) and dwell time recorded by eye-tracking (Heeren et al., 
2015b).  Study 2 attempted to address this limitation by including an ERP 
measure, the N2pc component as an indication of the neural processes 
underlying attentional selection.  However, there is scope for more research 
using measures of attentional engagement, dwell and disengagement to help 
with an understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in ABM. 
 
7.3.3  Study 2 Design 
 
A weakness of the study 2 design was that only attend-neutral ABM was 
delivered with active or sham tDCS.  There was no control ABM group.  The aim 
of the study was to examine the modulatory effect of tES on ABM training rather 
than to compare the outcomes of active ABM with control ABM.  The study 
design was based on that of Heeren et al., (2015b).  In study 2 the anodal tDCS 
group had better outcomes in terms of state anxiety attenuation, threat bias 
reduction (for those with a pre-existing threat bias) and increase in digit span 
score (for participants with low anxiety).  Without a non-active ABM group, it is 
not possible to discern whether these effects were attributable to the 
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interaction between active ABM and anodal tDCS or whether they may have 
occurred in the absence of attend-neutral ABM.  A control group may have shed 
further light on this matter.  Indeed, the inclusion of a ‘no-task’ condition in 
which participants were inactive during tDCS would have been even more telling 
in terms of identifying the extent to which results were uniquely attributable to 
tDCS and the extent to which they were induced by the ABM/tDCS interaction. 
 
7.3.4  Lack of tES Control Site 
 
 Previous studies assessing the impact of tES on cognitive training have included 
a control tES group.  Where the enhancement of training effects is induced via 
tES of the active site and not via tES of the control site this suggests that the 
active site has functional specificity for the task in which performance is 
augmented.  For example, Barbieri et al. (2016) and Fertonani et al. (2011) 
applied the same stimulation parameters above Cz as above their active tES site 
revealing the modulation of training effects only with tES of the chosen active 
site.  In the present research tES effects were deemed attributable to the tES 
protocol applied if they differed from results arising from a sham tES group.  
However, without evidence that the same effects would not have been achieved 
with stimulation of a different neural area, it cannot be concluded with 






7.3.5 The Adaptive Nature of Threat Bias and the Dangers of 
Reducing Threat Bias in Non-anxious, Neutral Biased 
Participants 
 
It could be argued that the attempt to reduce attention bias towards threat in a 
population without a discernible threat bias, or who were not high in or 
clinically anxious was flawed both ethically and in terms of its rationale.  As 
discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.1.4) anxiety and vigilance of threatening 
stimuli possess innate and privileged roles in human cognition (Bar Haim et al., 
2007; Gilbert, 2000; LoBue & Rakinson, 2013).  These have the aim of promoting 
mental preparedness and high arousal so that potential threats can be quickly 
responded to (Gilbert, 1998).  However, it is proposed that individuals with 
anxiety are abnormally sensitive to threat-related stimuli and are thus more 
likely to perceive benign or ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Barry, 2015).  
With this in mind, a large proportion of ABM research has been conducted with 
high or clinically anxious cohorts who are more likely to have a threat bias and 
who have more to gain from the reduction of threat bias than non-anxious 
individuals (e.g. Amir et al., 2011; Amir et al., 2009; Amir et al., 2010; Baert et 
al., 2010; Boettcher et al., 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2010; 
Heeren et al., 2012; Li et al., 2008; Neubauer et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2010; 
Wells et al., 2010).  Meta-analyses have supported that ABM training away from 
threat is more effective in anxious individuals than in neuro-typical participants 




In summary, the evolutionary and automatic fear system plays an important part 
in priming behavioural responses to potential stressors and in relieving negative 
emotional state (Rosen & Shulkin, 1998).  Studies with the aim of reducing 
anxiety by increasing engagement to non-threatening stimuli have thus focused 
on individuals with maladaptive levels of anxiety and elevated sensitivity to 
threat related stimuli.  Delivering ABM training to participants without elevated 
threat bias and anxiety in the present study, risked reducing attention bias 
towards threat to a level at which it was no longer adaptive.  Furthermore, 
there may have been a danger of reinforcing or inducing attentional avoidance, 
a form of attention bias which is, like threat bias, considered maladaptive 
(Koster et al., 2006).  It has been proposed that certain individuals overtly orient 
away from threatening stimuli in order to avoid the emotion of fear or anxiety 
which might arise from the cognitive evaluation of risk (Aue et al., 2013).  
However, this attentional (and emotion regulation) strategy may prevent the 
adoption of active coping skills in reaction to threat (Barlow et al., 2004) as it 
prevents engagement to stimuli which might oppose the expectation of aversive 
consequences (Barry et al., 2015).  For the avoidant individual therefore, 
anxiety and fear for stimuli of an ambiguous or threatening valance may persist 
as there is no disconfirmation that these stimuli are harmful (Helbigland et al., 
2010).  ABM training away from threat in such individuals may therefore be 
contraindicative (Evans et al., 2016).   
 
It is important to highlight that in the present research ABM training away from 
threatening stimuli did not maintain or enhance attentional avoidance in 
participants with a pre-existing attention bias towards neutral stimuli.  In fact, 
consistently, there was a reduction in neutral bias for these participants 
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following training (irrespective of ABM or tES condition).  There was evidence for 
state anxiety reduction following training for participants with a pre-existing 
neutral bias rather than an increased or preserved level of state anxiety.   
Moreover, in defence of the decision to use ABM with non-clinically anxious 
participants, study 1 was not exclusively an ABM study.  The aim was to explore 
the modulation of ABM using tES.  Although, tES has been safely used with 
clinically anxious individuals (e.g Heeren et al., 2017; Shiozawa et al., 2013) the 
interaction effects of applying tES with a task designed to modify anxiety were 
unknown.  The assay of this combined methodology in non-anxious participants 
was therefore necessary before applying this treatment to high or clinically 
anxious individuals.  Previous studies which have used tES to enhance ABM 
training effects have also been conducted in non-anxious participants (e.g. 
Clarke et al., 2014; Heeren et al., 2015b).  Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that 
inducing threat avoidance in already avoidant individuals may have had 
unfavourable implications.  
 
7.3.6 Expectation of State Anxiety Reduction in Non-anxious 
Participants 
 
Cognitive models of anxiety emphasise the positive relationship between 
attention bias towards threat and trait or clinical anxiety (Beck et al., 1983; 
Bower, 1981; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1988, 1997).  A wealth of 
evidence supports this relationship (e.g. Amir, Taylor & Donohue, 2011; Bradley, 
Mogg & Millar, 2000; De Voogd, Wiers, Prins & Salemink, 2014; Fox, Russo & 
Dutton, 2002; Mathews & Macleod, 1985; Macleod et al., 1986; Mogg, Mathews & 
Weinman, 1989).  In their 2007 meta-analysis, Bar-Haim et al., reported that 
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threat bias was of equivalent magnitude across clinical and high trait anxiety 
populations and that the bias was not present in non-anxious participants (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007).  For this reason, ABM research with the aim of training 
attention towards non-threatening stimuli and away from non-threatening 
stimuli has often recruited participants with high level trait anxiety or with 
clinical anxiety (Amir et al., 2009b; Amir, Taylor & Donohue., 2011; Hazen, 
Vasey & Schmidt, 2009; Heeren et al.,2015b; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner & 
Timpano, 2009).  Meta-analyses of ABM studies have reported that ABM is more 
effective at reducing attention bias and anxiety in high or clinically anxious 
cohorts (e.g. Beard et al., 2012).  In low anxious individuals who are not 
characterised by attention bias towards threat, increasing threat value results in 
increased attention allocation to potentially threatening stimuli (Mogg & 
Bradley. 1998).  In ABM studies therefore, where trait anxiety has not been 
selected for, researchers have often employed a stressor task to assess whether 
increasing the capacity to attend non-threatening stimuli attenuates the 
reinforcement or elevation of anxious arousal in a stressful situation (e.g. 
Macleod et al., 2002; Van Bockstaele et al., 2012).   
 
In the present research, participants were not pre-selected for high level trait 
anxiety.  Without selecting for a population likely to demonstrate attention bias 
towards threat the reduction of threat bias was less likely to be successful.  
Therefore, anxiety reduction was also less probable.  In addition, a stressor task 
was not included in the experimental design.  There was therefore no reason to 
believe that threat bias and anxiety were elevated and susceptible to 
manipulation using ABM training.  To anticipate state anxiety reduction where 
state anxiety was not induced or elevated was a weakness of the present 
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research.  Nevertheless, state anxiety was reduced following ABM training, 
albeit irrespective of tES of ABM condition.  It is possible that state anxiety may 
have been elevated before ABM training, perhaps due to experiment 
participation.   It could be argued that factors other than attentional training 
were responsible for the observed reduction in state anxiety (e.g. non-specific 
effects, placebo).  This argument could be countered by highlighting that in 
studies where state anxiety is artificially elevated (for example using a stressor 
task) factors other than ABM training could explain anxiety attenuation.  For 
example, state anxiety reduction could be the result of practice effects (Heeren 
et al., 2015c).   
 
The decision to recruit participants who did not demonstrate high trait anxious 
participants was based on the aim of studying the applicability of ABM with tES 
in a non-anxious population.  It was however, also felt that the modulating 
effect of trait anxiety could be assessed by including pre-existing trait anxiety as 
a covariate in follow-up analyses.   
 
7.3.7 The Decision to Continue with ABM Without Evidence for a 
Relationship Between Attention Bias and Anxiety 
 
The present research consistently failed to support a relationship between trait 
anxiety and attentional bias.  Given this, it is reasonable to question why ABM 
was done.  ABM was designed as a cognitive task to attenuate anxiety via the 
reduction attention bias towards threat (Macleod et al., 2002).  Without showing 
that anxiety and attention bias were related, the assumption that the 
modulation of one would have an effect on the other was unjustified.  This lack 
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of a relationship was only ascertained upon analysis of data from experiment 1.  
Had this been established prior to commencing the research, investigations may 
have taken a different course.  For example, participants may have been 
selected for pre-existing threat bias or high-level trait anxiety.  Following 
experiment 1, the decision could have been taken to abandon ABM as a 
methodology.  However, at this point there were findings such as the reduction 
state anxiety across participants following training, irrespective of ABM or tES 
group, which warranted investigation.  Additionally, prior to experiment 1, a 
wealth of studies had demonstrated a relationship between attention bias and 
anxiety (e.g. Amir, Taylor & Donohue, 2011; Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 2000; De 
Voogd, Wiers, Prins & Salemink, 2014; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Mathews & 
Macleod, 1985; Macleod et al., 1986; Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989).  
Cognisant that the lack of an effect is not proof that an effect does not exist, it 
was deemed important to continue with ABM (even if to further investigate the 
lack of association between anxiety and attention bias).  Indeed, the fact that 
consistently, across experiments a relationship between attention bias and 
anxiety failed to emerge in the population tested (healthy participants) is a 
finding which warrants reporting and one which may be of interest to 
researchers planning to undertake ABM research. 
  
7.4 Future Research 
 
Future studies should continue to explore the mechanism or mechanisms 
responsible for anxiety reduction following attentional training.  Moreover, 
research should focus on whether improved anxiety is related to, or mediated by 
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reductions in threat bias for participants with pre-existing threat bias and 
reductions in neutral bias for participants with pre-existing neutral bias. 
 
Research might investigate whether attentional control processes specifically, 
are augmented via ABM training.  This might be done by adding additional 
measures of attentional control such as the attention network task (ANT: Fan et 
al., 2002) which assesses the alerting, orienting and executive functions of 
attention, before and after ABM training.  The training task might also be 
modified to vary the level to which attentional control processes are recruited 
and trained.  Experiment 2 of study 1 attempted to reduce the level of 
attentional control required for the training task delivered in order to examine 
whether this eliminated anxiety amelioration following training.  However, 
studies have not increased cognitive load and investigated the impact of this on 
behavioural and affect measures.   
 
As suggested above, the anxiety inducing effects of ABM training with concurrent 
tES may have been due to the facilitation of neural structures in the frontal 
cortices associated with top-down regulatory mechanisms.  Once activated these 
may exert control over hyperactivity of the limbic system leading to anxiety 
reduction.  This interpretation of findings is appealing given the lack evidence 
(from the present research) that anxiety reduction was mediated by task-
induced threat bias reduction.  It is further appealing given that the present 
research provided little evidence that attentional control mediated training 
effects on anxiety.  If, as proposed the anxiety attenuating effects of attentional 
training in the present study were independent of contingency effects and were 
attributable to the facilitation of neural mechanisms associated with top-down 
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processes (which might include but are not confined to attentional control), 
then any cognitive task which increases activity in frontal cortices might be 
effective in reducing anxiety.  For example, arithmetic learning (Peters & De 
Smedt, 2018) and lexical processing (Edwards et al., 2005) tasks are known to 
recruit the DLPFC.  Anxiety reduction following participation in such tasks would 
support the notion that a bolstering of general top-down regulatory capacity is 
implicated in anxiety reduction.  Furthermore, tES has the potential to induce 
such facilitation without concurrent training.  Studies might therefore explore 
whether excitatory tES delivered offline, during rest has an impact on anxiety.  
Training which does not use emotional stimuli would also indicate whether 
repeated exposure to threatening stimuli is implicated in training outcomes. 
 
Finally, to obtain a comprehensive picture of attention bias and attentional 
processes, studies could use measures which assess all aspects of attention 
distribution including engagement to, disengagement from and gaze time to 
stimuli.  Eye-tracking, for example might reliably capture each of these 




The aim of this chapter was to outline the key findings and issues arising from 
the current research and their implications.  In doing so, the discussion 
illuminates how the results contribute to existing research and theory around 
ABM and the modulation of ABM training using tES.  Study 1 revealed equivalent 
outcomes for all forms of ABM training (attend-neutral, control and no-training).  
Across all participants anxiety was reduced.  Attention bias was modified but 
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this modification was characterised by reduced threat bias for participants with 
pre-existing threat bias and reduced neutral bias for participants with pre-
existing neutral bias.  These findings challenge original models of ABM which 
purported that anxiety attenuation occurs as a result of reduced engagement of 
threat.  They suggest instead that it may stem from reduced attention bias 
irrespective of the direction of bias.  Study 2 produced several findings which 
suggested the facilitation of ABM with anodal tDCS.  The purported mechanism 
for these findings was enhanced top-down control of ‘bottom up’ emotional 
response produced by the interaction between task-relevant neural activation 
and anodal tDCS.   
 
The present findings have implications for the future of ABM research.  Promising 
findings from early ABM studies led to speculation that ABM might represent an 
easily accessible, non-invasive and effective treatment for anxiety.  However, if, 
as indicated by the present study, the mechanism via which ABM achieves the 
modulation of anxiety level is not that which was originally purported (Amir et 
al., 2008, Bar-Haim et al., 2010, Hakamata et al., 2011; Macleod et al., 2002) 
then the study of ABM as a potential treatment for anxiety may not be a 
worthwhile occupation.  Identifying the ‘active’ element(s) of ABM on the other 
hand, that which is responsible for anxiety attenuation, is undoubtedly a 
constructive pursuit and the present thesis has suggested ways in which this 
could be approached.  Nevertheless, the current thesis represents a relatively 
small body of work amidst a wealth of ABM research, much of which empirically 
supports the view that contingency-based ABM training induces attention bias 
modulations which lead to anxiety increase or attenuation, depending on the 
direction in which attention was trained (towards threatening or towards non-
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threatening stimuli).  Findings from the present study did not support this 
previous account of ABM however that is not to say that they disprove it.  It is 
acknowledged that many factors may have been responsible for the disparities in 
findings across ABM studies including methodological factors.  In summary, 
continued exploration of ABM for the reduction of anxiety would be valuable 
along with investigation of the mechanisms via which ABM induces anxiety 
reduction.  It is hoped that the present thesis has contributed to a broader 
understanding of the cognitive processes underlying attention bias modification 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: Brain Stimulation and attention.  
 
You are invited to take part in a research study in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Roehampton. The study aims to further our understanding of how we attend 
to information and how brain stimulation can affect this. The study will take place in the 
cognitive laboratory at the University of Roehampton Whitelands campus.  You will be 
asked to take part on three consecutive days; the entire procedure should not take longer 
than 90 minutes each day. 
 
Before you decide to take part, please take as much time as you need to ask any 
questions and discuss this study with the researchers or with family, friends, your personal 
physician or other health professional. 
 




Before you take part you will need to fill in two screening questionnaires. The first regards 
which hand you use most often as we are only looking for right-handed participants. The 
second is a safety screening questionnaire that will allow us to determine whether it is 
safe for you to take part. You will also be asked to complete a short questionnaire which 
contains questions relating to how you are feeling. You will also be asked to complete 
questionnaires which contain questions relating to your attention, to how you feel about 
other peoples’ opinion of you and to how you have been feeling recently. Please note that 
the questionnaires are designed simply to look at normal variation in aspects of mood and 






You will be asked to view some pictures of faces and letters on a computer screen. The 
faces will have threatening or neutral expressions. One of the faces will be replaced with a 
letter and your task will be to respond to the location of the letter as quickly and as 
accurately as possible using a computer keypad. You will be asked to do this task before, 
after and during the brain stimulation.  
 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tES) 
 
The next part of the study will involve a technique called transcranial Electical Stimulation 
(tES) that can change brain processing for a temporary period of time. It works by 
applying a very small current (1.5 milliamps) to your scalp that passes through your head 
and brain and changes the electrical properties of the brain cells under the electrode. The 
amount of current that is discharged from the device across your scalp is very small and 
poses no physical danger. However, you should tell us if you have a cardiac pacemaker 
or other implanted medical devices, any metal clips on blood vessels, or pieces of metal 
inside your body, since the electrical current might have an effect on these. It is important 
that you realise that transcranial Electrical Stimulation is not the same as procedures used 
in clinical practice such as ECT (electroconvulsive therapy). You should complete the 
transcranial Electrical Stimulation Adult Safety Screen (TASS) questionnaire before taking 
part; this will allow the experimenter to judge if it is safe or not for you to take part. 
 
TES is carried out by applying two soft and wet sponges, one on either side of the front of 
your scalp, just above your eyebrows. These sponges contain the electrodes and are held 
in place with a rubber band much like a hair band. A very small current is then passed 
through the electrodes: exactly 1.5 milliamps. The machine, for the first 20 seconds, 
slowly ramps up the current from zero to one milliamp so as to accustom you to the 
sensation of the electricity. During the ramp up period, which lasts 20 seconds, you will 
likely feel a tingling or an itching sensation under the sponges. The current will be applied 
to your scalp for a total of 20 minutes. Should you wish to withdraw during this period, or 
any other time, you can of course do so without any negative consequences. 
 
Possible Side Effects and Hazards of Electrical Stimulation 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation can be harmful in people who have a pacemaker or 
other devices in the heart, significant heart disease, an implanted medication pump, a 
metal plate in the skull, a cochlear (ear) implant, an implanted brain stimulator, increased 
pressure inside the head, or metal objects inside the eye or skull (for example after brain 
surgery or a shrapnel wound). Please inform the investigators if you might have any of 
these. Since the effects of electric current stimulation on the fetus are unknown, we will 
ask you if there is a chance that you might be pregnant. We will use a screening form to 
evaluate these and other conditions. 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation has been used safely in thousands of individuals around 
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the world. The common side effects of tES are a slight discomfort at the site on your skull 
where we are applying the stimulation. In healthy human subjects, tES is regarded as a 
safe and non-invasive method. If you currently suffer from or suffered in the past from any 
neurological or psychiatric disease, you have to report this to the investigators. If you have 
any significant adverse event, we will stop the study, even if you are willing to continue. 
 
Benefits of your participation 
 
Information learned from this study will be used to help our understanding of attention, 
and may eventually lead to advances in the treatment of mental disorders. 
 
Right to withdraw 
 
You are under no obligation to finish the experiment and can withdraw from participation 
from the whole experiment or any part of it at any point without needing to justify your 
decision. You can also request for your data to be withdrawn at any time after participation 
in the study. In order to do this, please contact the investigator with your participant number, 
which you will find on the Debrief Form. Please be aware, however, that data may already 
have been published in a collated form at the time of request. Finally, if you are a student 
who is volunteering for course credits as part of an undergraduate module, please be 
advised that there will be no adverse consequences in relation to assessment for your 
degree if you decide to withdraw. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
All data relating to your participation in this study will be held and processed in the strictest 
confidence, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). All data will be held securely 
in password protected computer files and locked filing cabinets. No one outside of the 
research team will have access to your individual data. Your identity will not be passed on 





This study will be performed under the supervision of Dr. Margot Crossman and Dr. 
Jonathan Silas at The Department of Psychology, Roehampton University. This project 
has been approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics 
Committee. This study is part of a research protocol, and is not intended to provide a 
clinical examination of the brain or a clinical evaluation in any respect. 
 
a. I have read and received a copy of this consent form and have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions. You have given me: (i) an explanation of the 
procedures to be followed in the project, including an identification of those which 
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are experimental; and (ii) answers to questions I have made. 
 
b. I understand that there may be no direct benefit to me from my participation in this 
study as described above. 
 
c. I understand that my participation will not cost me anything other than the time and 
effort involved. 
 
d. I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers are held and processed in 
the strictest confidence, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
e. I understand that by signing this agreement, I do not waive any legal rights or 
release Roehampton University, its agents, or you from liability for negligence. 
 
f. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing 
to justify my decision and without prejudice. Furthermore, I am at liberty to 
withdraw my data at any time following participation in the study. 
 
g. My identity will not be passed on to anyone who is not involved in this study, and 
will be protected in the publication of any findings. Researchers involved in the 
study will be unaware of any links between my identity and the data collected and 
accordingly no individual feedback will be given. 
 
h. I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my 
participation and agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
 
I hereby give my consent to be the subject of your research. 
-------------------------------- -------------------------------- ------------------------------ 
signature Name Date 
If you require advice, information or reassurance about a technical or health related 
matter, or have a concern about any other aspect of your participation, please raise this 
with the researcher: 
Researcher Contact Details: 
Email Sara Pretorius:   pretoris@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Sara Pretorius 
PhD Research Student 
Psychology department 







Supervisors: Director of Studies: 
Dr. Margot Crossman 
Psychology department 




020 8329 3757 
margot.crossman@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Jonathan Silas Dr Amanda Holmes  
Psychology department Psychology department 
University of Roehampton University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College Whitelands College 
Holybourne Ave. Holybourne Ave. 
SW15 4JD SW15 4JD 
020 8329 3784 020 8392 3784 
j.silas@roehampton.ac.uk            a.holmes@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
  
However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of 
Department Dr. Diane Bray [email: d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk; 020-8392 3627; Room 











PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Research Project: Brain Stimulation and attention 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Roehampton. The study aims to further our understanding of how the brain 
functions when we attend to information and how brain stimulation can affect this. The 
study will take place in the cognitive laboratory at the University of Roehampton 
Whitelands campus and will last approximately three and a half hours. 
 
Before you decide to take part, please take as much time as you need to ask any 
questions and discuss this study with the researchers or with family, friends, your personal 
physician or other health professional. 
 




Before you take part you will need to fill in two screening questionnaires. The first regards 
which hand you use most often as we are only looking for right-handed participants. The 
second is a safety screening questionnaire that will allow us to determine whether it is 
safe for you to take part. You will also be asked to complete a few short questionnaires 
containing questions relating to how you are feeling, how you have been feeling lately, 
your attention and to how you feel about other peoples’ opinion of you. Please note that 
the questionnaires are designed simply to look at normal variation in aspects of mood and 









You will be asked to view some pictures of faces and letters on a computer screen. One of 
the faces will be replaced with a letter and your task will be to respond to the location of 
the letter as quickly and as accurately as possible using a computer keypad. The 
computer task has been divided into ‘blocks’.  Between each block you will be given a 




Whilst performing the first 2 blocks of the computer task your electroencephalography 
(EEG) will be recorded.  Small electrical signals known as event related potentials or 
ERPs, will be measured from your scalp.  In order to do this, the experimenter will fit you 
with a head cap which looks like bathing cap with small holes (electrode holders).  
Electrodes (sensors) with wires attached will be slotted into the electrode holders.  These 
sensors will pick up electrical activity from your brain.  In order to ensure good contact 
between your skin and the sensors, the skin beneath some of the sensors will be cleaned 
with alcohol, and a conductive gel (a completely harmless saline solution) will be injected 
into each of the electrode holders before the electrodes are attached.  If you find this at all 
uncomfortable, please inform the experimenter and the procedure will be stopped.  
Following EEG you will be able to wash any remaining gel out of your hair using the 
private facilities which are available in the department.  The EEG equipment has been 
fully tested by the manufacturers and is regularly checked by a technician.  Please note 
that EEG only measures electrical activity from the brain and does not apply any electricity 
to you and that the process is entirely safe.  
 
Transcranial Electrical Stimulation  (TES) 
 
The next part of the study will involve a technique called transcranial Electrical Stimulation 
(tES) that can change brain processing. It works by applying a very small current (1.5 
milliamps) to your scalp that passes through your head and brain and changes the 
electrical properties of the brain cells under the electrode. The amount of current that is 
discharged from the device across your scalp is very small and poses no physical danger. 
However, you should tell us if you have a cardiac pacemaker or other implanted medical 
devices, any metal clips on blood vessels, or pieces of metal inside your body, since the 
electrical current might have an effect on these. It is important that you realise that 
transcranial electrical stimulation is not the same as procedures used in clinical practice 
such as ECT (electroconvulsive therapy). You should complete the transcranial Electrical 
Stimulation Adult Safety Screen (TASS) questionnaire before taking part; this will allow 
the experimenter to judge if it is safe or not for you to participate. 
 
TES is carried out by applying two soft and wet sponges, on your scalp. These sponges 
contain the electrodes and are held in place with a rubber band much like a hair band. A 
very small current is then passed through the electrodes: at 1.5 milliamps. The machine, 
for the first 20 seconds, slowly ramps up the current from zero to one milliamp so as to 
accustom you to the sensation of the electricity. During the ramp up period, which lasts 20 
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seconds, you will likely feel a tingling or an itching sensation under the sponges. The 
current will be applied to your scalp for 20 minutes.  After this time, the tES electrodes will 
be removed and you will continue with the study.  Should you wish to withdraw during this 
period, or any other time, you can of course do so without any negative consequences. 
 
Towards the end of the computer task (the last 2 blocks), we will once again measure 
your brain activity.  The EEG head cap will be fitted and electrical signals will be recorded  
 
Possible Hazards of EEG 
 
EEG is a safe and non-invasive procedure.  The experimenter will however check that you 
are not susceptible to skin inflammation caused by the application of the cleansing alcohol 
or conductive gel by applying a small amount to the back of your hand before the 
procedure begins.  If you have any reaction to these substances then the session will not 
continue.   
 
You may experience discomfort if the alcohol or gel is applied over sensitive skin or 
breaks in the skin’s surface.  The positioning of an electrode above such areas might also 
affect your EEG recordings.  It is therefore important that you inform us if you have any 
moles, scars, pimples or cuts on the face or scalp before taking part in the study. 
 
Possible Side Effects and Hazards of Electrical Stimulation 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation can be harmful in people who have a pacemaker or 
other devices in the heart, significant heart disease, an implanted medication pump, a 
metal plate in the skull, a cochlear (ear) implant, an implanted brain stimulator, increased 
pressure inside the head, or metal objects inside the eye or skull (for example after brain 
surgery or a shrapnel wound). Please inform the investigators if you have any of these. 
Since the effects of electrical stimulation on the fetus are unknown, we will ask you if there 
is a chance that you might be pregnant. We will use a screening form to evaluate these 
and other conditions. 
 
Transcranial electrical stimulation has been used safely in thousands of individuals around 
the world. The common side effects of tES are a slight discomfort at the site on your skull 
where we are applying the stimulation. In healthy human subjects, tES is regarded as a 
safe and non-invasive method. If you currently suffer from or suffered in the past from any 
neurological or psychiatric disease, you have to report this to the investigators. If you have 




The computer task that you will do has been used in large numbers of research projects 
before and is also available on a number of downloadable apps. It is possible that the 
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computer task will have a long lasting effect on the way you allocate your attention and 
that the extent and length of any effect may be increased by tES. It is highly unlikely that 
you will notice any effect and there is no evidence to suggest that if there is a lasting 
effect, it would be harmful in any way. 
 
Benefits of your participation 
 
Information learned from this study will be used to help our understanding of attention, 
and may eventually lead to advances in the treatment of mental disorders.  
 
Right to withdraw 
 
You are under no obligation to finish the experiment and can withdraw from participation 
from the whole experiment or any part of it at any point without needing to justify your 
decision. You can also request for your data to be withdrawn at any time after participation 
in the study. In order to do this, please contact the investigator with your participant number, 
which you will find on the Debrief Form. Please be aware, however, that data may already 
have been published in a collated form at the time of request. Finally, if you are a student 
who is volunteering for course credits as part of an undergraduate module, please be 
advised that there will be no adverse consequences in relation to assessment for your 
degree if you decide to withdraw. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
All data relating to your participation in this study will be held and processed in the strictest 
confidence, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). All data will be held securely 
in password protected computer files and locked filing cabinets. No one outside of the 
research team will have access to your individual data. Your identity will not be passed on 





This study will be conducted by researcher Sara Pretorius under the supervision of Dr. 
Margot Crossman and Dr. Jonathan Silas at The Department of Psychology, Roehampton 
University. This project has been approved under the procedures of the University of 
Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. This study is part of a research protocol, and is not 
intended to provide a clinical examination of the brain or a clinical evaluation in any 
respect. 
 
a. I have read and received a copy of this consent form and have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions. You have given me: (i) an explanation of the 
procedures to be followed in the project, including an identification of those which 
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are experimental; and (ii) answers to questions I have made. 
 
b. I understand that my participation will not cost me anything other than the time and 
effort involved. 
 
c. I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers are held and processed in 
the strictest confidence, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
d. I understand that by signing this agreement, I do not waive any legal rights or 
release Roehampton University, its agents, or you from liability for negligence. 
 
e. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing 
to justify my decision and without prejudice. Furthermore, I am at liberty to 
withdraw my data at any time following participation in the study. 
 
f. My identity will not be passed on to anyone who is not involved in this study, and 
will be protected in the publication of any findings. Researchers involved in the 
study will be unaware of any links between my identity and the data collected and 
accordingly no individual feedback will be given. 
 
g. I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my 
participation and agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
 
I hereby give my consent to be the subject of your research. 
-------------------------------- -------------------------------- ------------------------------ 
signature Name date 
If you require advice, information or reassurance about a technical or health related 
matter, or have a concern about any other aspect of your participation, please raise this 
with the researcher: 
 
Researcher Contact Details: 
Email Sara Pretorius:   pretoris@roehampton.ac.uk 
Sara Pretorius 
PhD Research Student 
Psychology department 









  Supervisors: Director of Studies: 
Dr. Margot Crossman 
Psychology department 




020 8329 3757 
margot.crossman@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Jonathan Silas Dr. Amanda Holmes  
Psychology department Psychology department 
University of Roehampton University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College Whitelands College 
Holybourne Ave. Holybourne Ave. 
SW15 4JD SW15 4JD 
020 8329 3784 020 8392 3784 
j.silas@roehampton.ac.uk            a.holmes@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
  
However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of 
Department Dr. Diane Bray [email: d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk; 020-8392 3627; Room 

























Transcranial Electrical Current Stimulation (tES): Safety 
questionnaire 
 
1. Have you ever: 
 
a. Had an adverse reaction to tES e.g. transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS), transcranial random noise stimulation (TRNS), transcranial 
alternating current stimulation (TACS)?  Yes /No  
 
b. Had a seizure (generalised or partial/focal epileptic seizure)?  Yes /No 
 
 
c. Had an electroencephalogram (EEG) for clinical purposes?  Yes /No  
 
d. Had a stroke?  Yes /No 
 
 
e. Had a head injury (including neurosurgery)?  Yes /No  
 
2. Do you have any metal in your head (outside of the mouth,) such as 
shrapnel, surgical clips, or fragments from welding or metalwork?  
   Yes /No  
 
3. Do you have any implanted devices such as cardiac pacemakers, medical 
pumps, or intracardiac lines? Yes /No  
 
4. Do you suffer from frequent or severe headaches?  Yes /No  
 
5. Have you ever had any other brain-related condition?  Yes /No  
 
6. Have you ever had any illness that caused brain injury?  Yes /No  
 
7. Are you taking any medications?  Yes /No  
 
8. Is there any possibility that you might be pregnant? Yes /No 
 
 
9. Does anyone in your family have epilepsy?  Yes /No  
 
10.Do you have an existing skin condition on the scalp? Yes /No 
 










Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
 
Participant no._____________             
Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities 
by putting a check in the appropriate column. Where the preference is so strong 
that you would never try to use the other hand, unless absolutely forced to, put 
2 checks. If in any case you are really indifferent, put a check in both columns.  
Some of the activities listed below require the use of both hands. In these cases, 
the part of the task, or object, for which hand preference is wanted is indicated 
in parentheses. 
Please try and answer all of the questions, and only leave a blank if you have no 
experience at all with the object or task. 
 
 
 Left  Right  
1. Writing    
2. Drawing   
3. Throwing    
4. Scissors   
5. Toothbrush   
6. Knife (without fork)   
7. Spoon   
8. Broom (upper hand)   
9. Striking Match (match)   
10. Opening box (lid)   








State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults 
 
Trait Anxiety Scale 
The following questions are about how you feel. Please read each statement and then 
mark the appropriate number to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or 








I feel pleasant.  1 2 3 4 
I feel nervous and restless. 1 2 3 4 
I feel satisfied with myself. 1 2 3 4 
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. 1 2 3 4 
I feel like a failure.  1 2 3 4 
I feel rested.  1 2 3 4 
I feel ‘cool, calm and collected’.  1 2 3 4 
I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot 
overcome them. 
1 2 3 4 
I worry too much over something that really 
doesn’t matter.  
1 2 3 4 
I am happy.  1 2 3 4 
I have disturbing thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
I lack self-confidence. 1 2 3 4 
I feel secure.  1 2 3 4 
I make decisions easily.  1 2 3 4 
I feel inadequate.  1 2 3 4 
I am content.  1 2 3 4 
Some unimportant things run through my head 
and bothers me.  
1 2 3 4 
I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put 
them out of my mind.  
1 2 3 4 
I am a steady person. 1 2 3 4 
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think 
over my recent concerns and interests.  
1 2 3 4 
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State Anxiety Scale 
 
Now, please indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. 
 




I feel calm.  1 2 3 4 
I feel secure.  1 2 3 4 
I am tense. 1 2 3 4 
I feel strained. 1 2 3 4 
I feel at ease.  1 2 3 4 
I feel upset. 1 2 3 4 
I am presently worrying over possible 
misfortunes.  
1 2 3 4 
I feel satisfied.  1 2 3 4 
I feel frightened. 1 2 3 4 
I feel comfortable.  1 2 3 4 
I feel self-confident.  1 2 3 4 
I feel nervous.  1 2 3 4 
I am jittery.  1 2 3 4 
I feel indecisive. 1 2 3 4 
I am relaxed. 1 2 3 4 
I feel content.  1 2 3 4 
I am worried.  1 2 3 4 
I feel confused.  1 2 3 4 
I feel steady. 1 2 3 4 




Attentional Control Scale 
 
 
1=almost never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=always 
 
1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises  
around 1 2 3 4 
 
2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem I have trouble focusing my 
attention. 1 2 3 4 
 
3. When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events 
  around me.  1 2 3 4 
 
4. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me. 1 2 3 4 
 
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of  
What’s going on in the room around me. 1 2 3 4 
 
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people  
talking in the same room. 1 2 3 4 
 
7. When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty  
 blocking out distracting thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
 
8. I have a hard time concentrating when I am excited about something. 1 2 3 4 
 
9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst. 1 2 3 4 
 
10. I can quickly switch from one task to another. 1 2 3 4 
 
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task. 1 2 3 4 
 
12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between the listening and  
   writing required when taking notes during lectures. 1 2 3 4  
 
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly if I need to. 1 2 3 4 
 
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking on the phone. 1 2 3 4 
 
15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once. 1 2 3 4 
 
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly. 1 2 3 4 
 
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to 
   what I was doing before. 1 2 3 4 
 
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my  
   attention away from it. 1 2 3 4 
 
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks. 1 2 3 4 
 
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and  




Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
 
Please show your reactions to the following statements by circling either “T” (True) or “F” 
(False).  
Answer the questions quickly without thinking about them too much. 
1. I rarely worry about seeming foolish to others.    T F 
2. I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t T F 
make any difference. 
3. I become tense and jittery if I know someone is sizing me up.  T F 
4. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavourable  
impression of me.        T F 
5. I feel very upset when I commit some social error.    T F 
6. The opinions that important people have of me cause me little concern. T F 
7. I am often afraid that I may look ridiculous or make a fool of myself. T F 
8. I react very little when other people disapprove of me.   T F 
9. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings.  T F 
10. The disapproval of others would have little effect on me.   T F 
11. If someone is evaluating me I tend to expect the worst.   T F 
12. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone. T F 
13. I am afraid that others will not approve of me.    T F 
14. I am afraid that people will find fault with me.    T F 
15. Other people’s opinions of me do not bother me.    T F 
16. I am not necessarily upset if I do not please someone.   T F 
17. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they  
may be thinking of me.       T F 
18. I feel that you can’t help making social errors sometimes so  
why worry about it.        T F 
19. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.  T F 
20. I worry a lot about what my superiors think of me.    T F 
21. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me.   T F 
22. I worry that others will think I am not worthwhile.    T F 
23. I worry very little about others may think of me.    T F 
24. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me. T F 
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25. I often worry I will say or do the wrong things.    T F 
26. I am often indifferent to the opinions others have of me.   T F 
27. I am usually confident that others will have a favourable  
impression of me.        T F 
28. I often worry that people who are important to me won’t think 
 very much of me.        T F 
29. I brood about the opinions my friends have about me.   T F 








Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
 
Below is a list of some ways you may have felt or behaved. Please indicate 
how often you have felt this way during the last week by ticking the 
appropriate space. 
 
  Rarely or 
none of the 
time (less 
than 1 day) 
Some or a 
little of 
the time 
(1 -2  
days) 
Occasionally or a 
moderate amount 
of time (3 – 4 days) 
Most or 
all of the 
time (5 – 
7 days) 
1 Was bothered by 
things that usually 
don't bother me.  
    
2 Did not feel like 
eating; my appetite 
was poor. 
    
3 Felt that I could not 
shake off the blues 
even with help from 
my family and 
friends.  
    
4 Felt that I was just as 
good as other people.  
    
5 Had trouble keeping 
my mind on what I 
was doing.  
    
6 Felt depressed.      
7 Felt that everything I 
did was an effort.  
    
8 Felt hopeful about 
the future.  
    
9 Thought that my life 
has been a failure.  
    
10 Felt fearful.      
11 Had restless sleep.      
12 Felt happy.      
13 Talked less than 
usual.  
    
14 Felt lonely.      
15 Felt that people were 
unfriendly.  
    
16 Enjoyed life.      
17 Had crying spells.      
18 Felt sad.      
19 Felt that people 
dislike me.  
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20 Felt that I could not 
"get going."  






TES Intensity Scale 
 
Please rate the intensity with which you experienced the following whilst you had 
the brain stimulation equipment attached: 
 











































    
 










During the experiment each face pair presented consisted of a face with a neutral 
expression and a face with an angry expression.  One of the faces was replaced by 
a target letter which you were required to press.  In the training condition the 
letter replaced the neutral face 95% of the time.  In the control condition the 
letter replaced the neutral face 50% of the time and the angry face 50% of the 
time.   
Which condition do you think you were allocated to? 
  Training condition     
  Control condition  
 
Brain Stimulation 
During the experiment some participants received active stimulation (where 
stimulation was applied throughout the time that the equipment was attached to 
the head) or control stimulation (where the stimulation stopped after 20 seconds 
and remained switched off). 
Which stimulation group do you think you belong to? 
 
  Active stimulation    







Experimental Condition Questionnaire (Experiment 2) 
 
Training 
During the experiment each face pair presented consisted of a face with a neutral 
expression and a face with an angry expression.  One of the faces was replaced by 
a target letter which you were required to press.  In the training condition the 
letter replaced the neutral face 95% of the time.  In the control condition the 
letter replaced the neutral face 50% of the time and the angry face 50% of the 
time.  In the no-training condition a letter replaced either the angry face or the 
neutral face 80% of the time and no letter appeared 20% of the time.  The 
instruction was to press {Enter} if a letter appeared and not to press {Enter} if no 
letter appeared.  
Which condition do you think you were allocated to? 
  Training condition     
  Control condition 
  No-training condition  
 
Brain Stimulation 
During the experiment some participants received active stimulation (where 
stimulation was applied throughout the time that the equipment was attached to 
the head) or control stimulation (where the stimulation stopped after 20 seconds 
and remained switched off). 
Which stimulation group do you think you belong to? 
 
  Active stimulation    





Beck Depression Inventory ii 
 
Instructions:  This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements.  Please 
read each group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in 
each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past 
two weeks, including today.  Circle the number beside the statement you have 
picked.  If several statements in the group seems to apply equally well, circle 
the highest number for that group.  Be sure that you do not choose more than 
one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or 




0 I do not feel sad 
1 I feel sad much of the time 
2 I am sad all the time 
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it 
 
2. Pessimism 
0 I am not discouraged about my future 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse 
 
3. Past Failure 
0 I do not feel like a failure 
1 I have failed more than I should have 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person 
 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy 
1 I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy 







5. Guilty Feelings 
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time 
3 I feel guilty all of the time 
 
6. Punishment Feelings 
0 I don’t feel I am being punished 
1 I feel I may be punished 
2 I expect to be punished 
3 I feel I am being punished 
 
7. Self-Dislike 
0 I feel the same about myself as ever 
1 I have lost confidence in myself 
2 I am disappointed in myself 
3 I dislike myself 
 
8. Self-Criticalness 
0 I don’t criticise or blame myself more than usual 
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be 
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens 
 
9. Suicidal thoughts or wishes 
0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out 
2 I would like to kill myself 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance 
 
10. Crying 
0 I don’t cry any more than I used to 
1 I cry more than I used to 
2 I cry over every little thing 
3 I feel like crying, but I can’t 
 
11. Agitation 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual 
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still 
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3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing 
something 
 
12. Loss of Interest 
0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities 
1 I am less interested in other people or things than before 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things 
3 It’s hard to get interested in anything 
 
13. Indecisiveness 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual 
2 I have much great difficulty in making decisions than I used to 
3 I have trouble making any decisions 
 
14. Worthlessness 
0 I do not feel I am worthless 
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people 
3 I feel utterly worthless 
 
15. Loss of Energy 
0 I have as much energy as ever 
1 I have less energy than I used to have 
2 I don’t have enough energy to do very much 
3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything 
 
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
0 I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern 
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual 
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual 
2b I sleep a lot less than usual 
3a I sleep most of the day 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep 
 
17. Irritability 
0 I am no more irritable than usual 
1 I am more irritable than usual 
2 I am much more irritable than usual 





18. Change in Appetite 
0 I have not experienced any change in my appetite 
1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual 
1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual 
2a My appetite is much less than before 
2b My appetite is much greater than usual 
3a I have no appetite at all 
3b I crave food all the time 
 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
0 I can concentrate as well as ever 
1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual 
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long 
3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything 
 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual 
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do 
 
21. Loss of Interest in Sex 
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be 
2 I am much less interested in sex now 












Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
 
This measure assesses the way that social phobia plays a role in your life across a 
variety of situations. Read each situation carefully and answer two questions 
about that situation. The first question asks how anxious or fearful you feel in 
the situation. The second question asks how often you avoid the situation. If you 
come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, imagine “what if 
you were faced with that situation,” and then, rate the degree to which you 
would fear this hypothetical situation and how often you would tend to avoid it. 
Please base your ratings on the way that the situations have affected you in the 
last week. Fill out the following scale with the most suitable answer provided 
below. 
 
Fear or Anxiety:   Avoidance 
0 = None    0 = Never (0%) 
1 = Mild    1 = Occasionally (1-33%) 
2 = Moderate    2 = Often (33-67%) 
3 = Severe    3 = Usually (67 – 100%) 
 
  Fear or 
Anxiety 
Avoidance 
1 Telephoning in public   
2 Participating in small groups   
3 Eating in public places   
4 Drinking with others in public places   
5 Talking to people in authority   
6 Acting, performing or giving a talk in front of an 
audience 
  
7 Going to a party   
8 Working while being observed   
9 Writing while being observed   
10 Calling someone you don’t know very well   
11 Talking with people you don’t know very well   
12 Meeting strangers   
13 Urinating in a public bathroom   
14 Entering a room when others are already seated   
15 Being the center of attention   
16 Speaking up at a meeting   
17 Taking a test   
18 Expressing a disagreement or disapproval to 
people you don’t know very well 
  





20 Giving a report to a group   
21 Trying to pick up someone   
22 Returning goods to a store   
23 Giving a party   





Example Debrief Form 
 
 





Title of Research Project: Brain Stimulation and attention.  
 
Thank you very much for taking part in our study, we greatly appreciate your contribution.  
 
This study was interested in finding out how much your attention was automatically captured by 
threatening faces and whether you could be trained to attend less to threatening faces.  We tried 
to change brain activity in the front part of your brain and then measured whether this affected 
how much you could be trained to attend to neutral faces and away from threatening ones. 
You were in the real tDCS group. This means that electrical stimulation was applied during the 
twenty minutes when you had the tDCS machine attached to your scalp. 50% of our participants 
did not actually receive any stimulation. Your allocation to the ‘real’ group is complete chance. 
We would ask you not to discuss the details of the experiment with anyone else who might 
subsequently agree to participate. 
Your data are held securely and anonymously. If you wish to withdraw from the study, contact us 
with your participant number and your data will be removed from our files. 
Please note: if you have a concern or question about any aspect of your participation, please raise 








Researcher Contact Details: 
Email Sara Pretorius:   pretoris@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Sara Pretorius 
PhD Research Student 
Psychology department  






Supervisors:     
 Director of Studies: 
Dr. Margot Crossman 
Psychology department 




020 8329 3757 
margot.crossman@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Jonathan Silas Dr Amanda Holmes  
Psychology department  Psychology department 
University of Roehampton University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College Whitelands College 
Holybourne Ave.  Holybourne Ave. 
SW15 4JD  SW15 4JD 
020 8329 3784  020 8392 3784 
j.silas@roehampton.ac.uk            a.holmes@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
  
However, if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Head of 
Department Dr. Diane Bray [email: d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk; 020-8392 3627; Room 
2053, Whitelands College, Holybourne Avenue, Roehampton, London, SW15 4JD]. 
 
If you are a student at Roehampton University and are troubled or worried about any aspect 
of the study or issues it may have raised and you would prefer not to approach members of 
the Psychology department, you may find it helpful to contact one of the following who will 
be able to advise you on agencies that can deal with your particular concern: 
 
Student Welfare Officers:  
Business School; English & Creative Writing; Humanities; Social Sciences: Will Cooper (tel: 
020 8392 3204). Dance; Drama, Theatre & Performance; Education: Anne-Marie Joyes (tel: 
020 8392 3304). Life Sciences; Media, Culture & Language; Psychology: Hannah Desmond 
(tel: 020 8392 3502).  
If you feel your concerns are more serious or complex you may wish to contact the Student 
Medical Centre on Ext 3679. If you are a non-student your GP should be able to advise 









TES Electrode Placement 
 
 




TES electrode placement.  A. tRNS protocol – anode above right IFG and cathode above left 
IFG.  Right IFG identified as the intersection between the line joining T4 and Fz and the line 
joining F8 and Cz based on the 10-20 EEG system (e.g. Ditye et al., 2012).  B. tDCS protocol 





a)                                           b)                                         c) 
 
APPENDIX 19: Field Intensity Maps 
 
Cortical electric field induced by Montage A: Anode above right IFG (intersection between the line joining T4 and Fz and the line joining F8 
and Cz).  Cathode at left IFG (intersection between the line joining T3 and Fz and the line joining F7 and Cz).  Electrode size: 5cm x 7cm.  






Cortical electric field induced by Montage A: Anode above left DLPFC (F3).  Cathode at right contralateral supraorbital.  Electrode size: 5cm 
x 7cm.  TES amplitude: 1.5mA.   a) left hemisphere, b) right hemisphere, c) frontal cortex. 
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